

**The Palestine Issue
and the International Situation
From
The Palestine Strategic Report
2024 – 2025**



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The Palestine Strategic Report

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Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations is pleased to present a comprehensive reference study on the Palestine issue and the International situation during 2024 and 2025. The study constitutes Chapter Eight of *The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025*, one of the most important and widely cited academic references on Palestinian affairs.

The study examines developments in the Palestine issue within the international environment during 2024 and 2025, focusing on the positions of the US, Russia, China, and the European Union; the performance of the UN, UN Security Council and UN General Assembly; and the roles of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC). It also assesses international humanitarian and human rights efforts, the constraints on humanitarian organizations, and shifts in global public opinion toward Israel. Overall, the study argues that Operation al-Aqsa Flood profoundly reshaped the international landscape, weakening Israel's international standing and contributing to significant shifts in global public opinion, with its repercussions likely to persist over the short, medium and long term.

This study was prepared by Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, and academically edited by Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh. *The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025* is the fourteenth in a series issued by al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. It is produced through the contributions, editing and review of a distinguished group of leading scholars and specialists in Palestinian affairs.

For scholarly citation purposes, please use the following format:

Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, “The Palestine Issue and the International Situation,” in Mohsen Mohammad Saleh (ed.), *The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025* (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 2026), pp. 511–563.

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The Palestine Issue and the International Situation

Introduction

Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023 emerged as a pivotal moment shaping regional and international dynamics throughout 2024 and 2025. The ramifications of this strategic event reverberated across the international system, engaging the major global powers, most notably the US, Russia, China, and the EU, alongside intergovernmental international organizations, particularly the UN and its affiliated legal bodies, such as the ICJ, humanitarian institutions including the Human Rights Council (HRC), WHO and FAO, and political organs, notably UNSC and UNGA. These processes were further influenced by the recommendations of the ICC, as well as by the positions adopted by regional organizations across diverse geopolitical arenas and by international non-governmental organizations active in humanitarian work, such as Amnesty International, in addition to media and professional organizations, particularly those concerned with journalists. Beyond institutional and diplomatic arenas, Operation al-Aqsa Flood also left a profound imprint on global public opinion. It not only visibly undermined Israel's international standing but also laid bare the constructed nature of its self-image. Collectively, these developments have catalyzed significant shifts in international public attitudes toward what is increasingly perceived as the final manifestation of settler colonialism in the contemporary world.

This suggests that the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood will remain prominent across the short, medium and long term. However, while certain repercussions are likely to exert more profound and lasting effects than others, their form and intensity will evolve in response to the changing conditions of the international system. Accordingly, sustained attention to international interactions, both within and beyond the Middle East, cannot be disregarded, as these dynamics reinforce the Cobweb network model that currently prevails in contemporary theories of international relations.



First: UN

The UN's engagement with Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its repercussions commenced only days after the outbreak of the confrontation between the Palestinian resistance and the Israeli army. The organization's first formal decision was adopted by the UNGA on 27/10/2023, approximately three weeks after the operation began, calling for a humanitarian truce as a step toward halting the fighting. The resolution was supported by 120 states, opposed by 14, while 45 states abstained.¹

Subsequently, the UN maintained sustained engagement with developments in the war on GS throughout 2024 and 2025. These UN-level activities may be outlined as follows:

1. UNGA

In December 2024, the UNGA adopted a resolution affirming several strategic priorities, foremost among them support for the two-state solution, the designation of Israeli settlements in both the WB and the Golan as illegal, and the urgent need for a ceasefire in GS, alongside the facilitation of humanitarian assistance into the Strip. The resolution was supported by 157 states, opposed by 8, including the US and Israel.²

Subsequently, on 12/6/2025, the UNGA adopted another resolution calling on Israel to “immediately end the blockade, open all border crossings and ensure that aid reaches the Palestinian civilian population throughout the Gaza Strip immediately and at scale.” The resolution passed with a majority of 149 votes in favor, 12 against, and 19 abstentions.³

The UNGA had adopted a series of resolutions and statements during special sessions dedicated to discussing the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, namely:⁴

- a. On 10/5/2024, it overwhelmingly endorsed Palestine's membership in the UN, and urged the UNSC to support its efforts.
- b. On 18/9/2024, the UNGA overwhelmingly adopted historic text demanding Israel end its unlawful presence and its policies in GS and WB within one year.
- c. On 4/12/2024, the UNGA resumed its tenth emergency special session on illegal Israeli actions in Occupied Jerusalem and the rest of the GS and WB, where

the delegates underscored the urgent need to put an end to the conflict and for measures to contain the civilian population's suffering.

- d. On 11/12/2024, the UNGA demanded an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in GS, reiterated its demand for the immediate release of all hostages and demanded that Israel allow UNRWA to proceed with its aid operations without restriction in GS and WB.

The New York Declaration issued by the UNGA on 12/9/2025, following a joint French-Saudi initiative, endorsing the two-state solution, represented a further indication of Israel's growing isolation. The resolution was supported by 142 states, opposed by 10, including the US, Israel, Argentina, Hungary, Paraguay, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, while 12 states abstained from voting.⁵

2. UNSC

Between March and June 2024, the UNSC adopted two resolutions. The first, on 25/3/2024, "demanded an immediate ceasefire for the month of Ramadan leading to a lasting sustainable ceasefire. It also demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages." The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favor and one abstention (US). The second resolution, on 10/6/2024, welcomed the ceasefire proposal announced by US President Joe Biden on 31/5/2024 and was adopted with 14 votes in favor and one abstention (Russia).⁶

Earlier, on 22/12/2023, the UNSC had adopted a resolution the Secretary-General to appoint a Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator tasked with establishing a UN mechanism for accelerating humanitarian consignments to Gaza. It was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (Russia and the US).⁷

On 4/6/2025, the representative of Slovenia, on behalf of the ten non-permanent members of the Council, submitted a proposal calling for a ceasefire, the release of all hostages and the lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza. However, it was defeated by a vote of 14 in favor to 1 against (US), with no abstentions. The US delegation justified its position stating, "Any product that undermines our close ally Israel's security is a non-starter."⁸

On 18/9/2025, 14 members of the UNSC voted in favor of a draft resolution calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in GS, "the release of



all hostages held by Hamas and for Israel to lift all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid and ensure that it is safely distributed to the population – in particular by UN agencies and partners.” Nevertheless, the US exercised its veto to block the resolution, despite the unanimous support of the other members.⁹

What further underscores the US determination to defy the international consensus in the UNSC are its objections to proposals regarding the humanitarian aid mechanism for GS. Israel and the US advanced a plan coordinated by a new private entity called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) that would bypass the existing delivery architecture run by the UN and its humanitarian partners. The GHF began delivering aid at designated distribution sites secured by US contractors and the Israeli army. The UN and its partners refused to participate in the mechanism, because it “does not adhere to humanitarian principles and does not replicate the scale or accessibility of existing aid delivery channels.” The situation on the ground validated the UN’s concerns, once the (US-Israeli) mechanism began operating on 27/5/2025, several security incidents near GHF sites led to significant civilian casualties. Dozens of Palestinians were reportedly killed or injured while seeking aid from a distribution site, consequently, the Secretary-General condemned the incidents and called for “an immediate and independent investigation into these events and for perpetrators to be held accountable.”

This was followed by separate initiatives from three UNSC member states, Algeria, France and Slovenia. After informal consultations, they agreed that Algeria and Slovenia, along with Guyana, would introduce a single draft resolution calling for “an immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire in Gaza; the immediate, dignified, and unconditional release of all hostages held by Hamas and other groups; and the immediate and unconditional lifting of all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza and its safe and unhindered distribution at scale.” However, “the US expressed reservations about the draft and made several proposals that it considered prerequisites for further engagement, including a condemnation of Hamas,” which was supported by France and the UK. The US ultimately exercised its veto against the draft, marking its fifth veto during Operation al-Aqsa Flood.¹⁰

On 17/11/2025, relying on Trump’s plan to halt the fighting in GS (discussed further below), the UNSC approved the proposal with 13 members voting in favor, while Russia and China abstained. The plan stipulated:¹¹

The UNSC, “Welcoming the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict of 29 September 2025,”

- a. “calls on all parties to implement it in its entirety, including maintenance of the ceasefire.”
- b. “Welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework, and coordinate funding for, the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, and in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles, until such time as the Palestinian Authority (PA) has satisfactorily completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French Proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. After the PA reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza redevelopment has advanced, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”
- c. “Underscores the importance of the full resumption of humanitarian aid in cooperation with the BoP into the Gaza Strip in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles and through cooperating organizations, including the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Red Crescent, and ensuring such aid is used solely for peaceful uses and not diverted by armed groups.”
- d. Authorizes Member States participating in the BoP to establish operational entities for the performance of its functions, including: (1) “the implementation of a transitional governance administration, including the supervising and supporting of a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Strip, as championed by the Arab League, which shall be responsible for day-to-day operations of Gaza’s civil service and administration; (2) the reconstruction of Gaza and of economic recovery programs; (3) the coordination and supporting of and delivery of public services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza; (4) any measures to facilitate the movement of persons in and out of Gaza, in a manner consistent with the Comprehensive Plan.”
- e. “Calls upon the World Bank and other financial institutions to facilitate and provide financial resources to support the reconstruction and development of

Gaza, including through the establishment of a dedicated trust fund for this purpose and governed by donors.”

- f. “Authorizes Member States working with the BoP and the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza to deploy under unified command acceptable to the BoP, with forces contributed by participating States, in close consultation and cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, and to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law. The ISF shall work with Israel and Egypt, without prejudice to their existing agreements, along with the newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas; stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding of the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure.”

3. UN Conference 28–30/7/2025

At the invitation of France and Saudi Arabia, an international conference was convened under the auspices of the UN, demanding:¹²

- a. From Israel: A full ceasefire in Gaza; the withdrawal of the Israeli army; lifting the GS blockade; releasing Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the hostages held by Hamas; “a commitment to establishing a sovereign, contiguous, independent, and viable Palestinian state; halting all illegal Israeli settlement activity and committing to stop future construction; refraining from unilateral actions (like annexation) that undermine the two-state solution; ensuring access to holy sites in Jerusalem and preserving the status quo; adhering to international law and the UN Security Council resolutions; fully cooperating with UN bodies and the international community, including support for inspection and enforcement mechanisms; and assisting in humanitarian efforts and economic reconstruction in Gaza and the West Bank.”
- b. From the Palestinians: The “recognition of Israel and a commitment to the two-state solution and peace; establishing full PA control over all Palestinian territories under a unified governance framework (as emphasized repeatedly by PA President Mahmoud Abbas: (one state, one government, one law, and one weapon)); ending all violence and incitement against Israel; preventing terrorism and extremism in all forms; implementing political and economic reforms to

build a stable and functional state; holding transparent and democratic elections; and upholding human rights, gender equality, and inclusion of all segments of Palestinian society in both political and economic processes.”

- c. Transitional measures prior to the implementation of the final solution, such as eliminating any scenario where Hamas remains in power in GS; deploying an Arab/ international force to stabilize the security situation in GS; conducting a systematic and monitored disarmament of militias, reintegrating their members into legitimate civilian and institutional frameworks, and rehabilitating and developing effective non-Hamas Palestinian security forces. Furthermore, leading a comprehensive reconstruction plan for GS with international support and providing immediate humanitarian aid to its population.

4. UN Agencies Operating in the WB and GS

According to a UN statement, 13 UN entities are present in GS. Between October 2023 and early May 2025, a total of 295 UN personnel were killed in GS. In December 2024, the UNGA voted, by a majority of 137 in favor and 12 against (including the US), to request that the ICJ assess the extent of Israel’s compliance with its obligations to ensure secure conditions for the operation of these UN agencies and bodies in areas under occupation and to protect civilians.¹³

Given the extreme severity of living conditions in GS, the UN specialized agencies issued a joint statement on 12/7/2025 detailing the various dimensions of the crisis, with particular emphasis on the acute fuel shortage and its cascading impact across all aspects of daily life. Issued by OCHA, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), UNRWA, the World Food Programme (WFP), and WHO, the statement warned that the fuel shortage has become a direct driver of the collapse of basic living conditions and poses a serious risk of forcing these agencies to suspend the humanitarian operations entrusted to them by the international community.¹⁴

These positions align with the appeal issued on 10/4/2024 by the UN Special Rapporteur on Palestine, Francesca Albanese, calling on the EU to “suspend its trade and institutional ties with Israel to deter war crimes that amount to genocide



in the Gaza Strip.” She likewise endorsed the initiative advanced by Ireland and Spain to review the EU-Israel Association Agreement, noting that, under the prevailing circumstances, Israel has “no incentive whatsoever to change conduct.”¹⁵ Furthermore, Albanese issued a series of communications urging other states to pressure Israel, including through sanctions, to end its deadly bombardment of GS. She has also been a strong supporter of the ICC’s arrest warrants against Israeli officials, including Netanyahu, for allegations of war crimes. She issued a report naming several large US companies as among those aiding what she described as Israel’s occupation and war on GS.¹⁶

A report by UNRWA highlights the significant challenges it faces in delivering services to the Palestinian community. Chief among these challenges, according to the report, are:¹⁷

- a. All UNRWA international staff are banned from entering GS. This follows the passage of two laws by Israel’s Knesset, on 28/10/2024, that prohibit UNRWA’s operations in WB and GS and bar any contact between Israeli officials with UNRWA.
- b. In January 2026, there were 117 UNRWA facilities located within the Israeli militarized zone behind the so-called “Yellow Line” and in areas where access is subject to Israeli approval/coordination.
- c. The Israeli Authorities, since March 2025 and until 7/1/2026, have been blocking UNRWA from directly bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, pre-positioned outside Gaza, UNRWA has enough food parcels, flour, and shelter supplies for hundreds of thousands of people. It is worth noting that before that Israel had been obstructing aid delivery operations. For instance, of the 84 planned aid movements coordinated with Israeli authorities across GS between 1–8/7/2025, 53 were obstructed, accounting for 63% of the agency’s total activities.
- d. As of 30/12/2025, 955 incidents impacting UNRWA premises and the people inside them have been reported since the beginning of the war.
- e. Since the war began on 7/10/2023 and until 5/1/2026, UNRWA has recorded 382 colleagues killed in Gaza since the war began (309 UNRWA personnel, in addition to 73 persons who were supporting UNRWA activities).

5. The ICJ

The ICJ serves as the judicial arm of the UN, a role that the government of South Africa (followed by other states) sought to leverage by filing a case against Israel for committing genocide in GS. The Court also considered complaints from UN agencies regarding the restrictions imposed by Israeli authorities on their operations in the WB and GS.

The ICJ has issued advisory opinions on each of these cases as follows:

a. On 29/12/2023, South Africa filed a case against Israel,¹⁸ accusing it of committing inhumane acts that could constitute “genocide.” The court accepted the case, noting that “at least some of the acts and omissions alleged by South Africa to have been committed by Israel in Gaza appear to be capable of falling within the provisions of the Convention.” This indicates that the allegations of genocidal acts had sufficient basis for consideration, though, from the court’s perspective, the matter remains connected to Israel. In the preamble to its ruling on 26/1/2024, the court concluded “that South Africa has standing to submit to it the dispute with Israel concerning alleged violations of obligations under the Genocide Convention.”

In the Court’s view, the facts and circumstances mentioned above are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa and for which it is seeking protection are plausible. This is the case with respect to the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts identified in Article III, and the right of South Africa to seek Israel’s compliance with the latter’s obligations under the Convention.

The court’s ruling demanded the following:

1. “Israel must, in accordance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention, in relation to Palestinians in Gaza, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of Article II of this Convention, in particular:
 - a. killing members of the group;
 - b. causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group;
 - c. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; and
 - d. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.”



2. “The Court is also of the view that Israel must take all measures within its power to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide in relation to members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip.”
3. “The Court further considers that Israel must take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”
4. “Israel must also take effective measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article II and Article III of the Genocide Convention against members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip.”
5. “The Court considers that Israel must submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this Order within one month, as from the date of this Order.”
6. The Court “is gravely concerned about the fate of the hostages abducted during the attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 and held since then by Hamas and other armed groups, and calls for their immediate and unconditional release.”

b. On 24/5/2024, the ICJ issued a series of provisional measures concerning GS, including an order requiring Israel to “immediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate,” characterizing the humanitarian situation in GS as “catastrophic.”¹⁹

c. On 19/7/2024, the ICJ gave “its Advisory Opinion in respect of the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” It concluded that:²⁰

1. “The State of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful; the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible.”
2. “The State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory;
3. “The State of Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”

4. “All States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”
5. “International organizations, including the United Nations, are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, which requested the opinion, and the Security Council, should consider the precise modalities and further action required to bring to an end as rapidly as possible the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”

d. Continuing its activities, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion on 22/10/2025, which, while non-binding, stated that “As an occupying Power, Israel is obliged to ensure the basic needs of the local population, including the supplies essential for their survival... These obligations... must be read in conjunction with Article 59 in considering Israel’s obligations in relation to the activities of the United Nations, other international organizations and third States.” It further noted in its opinion that “there is no evidence that UNRWA, as an entity, breached the principle of impartiality,” and that Israel must support the relief work carried out by the agency. The UNGA had requested this opinion in December 2024, following Israel’s enactment of laws prohibiting UNRWA’s operations in the country. In delivering the opinion, the court’s president, Japanese judge Yuji Iwasawa, stated: “the occupying Power may never invoke reasons of security to justify the general suspension of all humanitarian activities in an occupied territory,” and emphasized that Israel is obliged to ensure that the basic needs of civilians in GS are met. The court also noted that “Israel has not substantiated its allegations that a significant part of UNRWA employees ‘are members of Hamas . . . or other terrorist factions.’” Additionally, Judge Iwasawa criticized the US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which Israel had promoted as an alternative to certain UNRWA activities.²¹



6. HRC

The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, which was established on 27/5/2021 by the HRC, and as an independent investigative body of the UN with the mandate to investigate international crimes, considered it important that it make an assessment of Israel's responsibility under the Genocide Convention, and provide its recommendations in relation to Israel. On 16/9/2025, it concluded that "the State of Israel bears responsibility for the failure to prevent genocide, the commission of genocide and the failure to punish genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip." These findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by other genocide experts and international human rights organizations.²²

It is clear that UN actions have generally aligned with Palestinian demands, a pattern expected to persist in the foreseeable future.

Second: Regional and International Intergovernmental Organizations

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play a significant role in the international arena, with their number now exceeding 300.²³ Among those most directly engaged with the Palestine issue, the following stand out:

1. ICC

The ICC was established as an IGO in July 2002 and operates independently of the UN. Its jurisdiction extends to the criminal responsibility of individuals rather than states. As of 2024, 125 countries have signed the Rome Statute, of which 114 have ratified it; neither the US nor Israel are members. The court's mandate encompasses war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, and related offenses.

On 17/11/2023, the ICC received a further referral of the Situation in the State of Palestine, from South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros and Djibouti. On 21/11/2024, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I also issued two decisions:²⁴

- a. While rejecting challenges by the State of Israel brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute, it issued warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu

and Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from at least 8/10/2023 until at least 20/5/2024. Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel at the time of the relevant conduct, and Gallant, Minister of Defense of Israel at the time of the alleged conduct, are suspected of the war crimes of starvation as a method of warfare and of intentionally directing an attack against the civilian population; and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts.

- b. It unanimously issued a warrant of arrest for Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, commonly known as “Daif,” “for alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on the territory of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine from at least 7 October 2023.” Furthermore, the Prosecution had initially filed applications for warrants of arrest for two other senior leaders of Hamas, namely Isma‘il Haniyyah and Yahya Sinwar. Following confirmation of their deaths, the Chamber granted the withdrawal of the three warrants in August and October 2024, and February 2025.

2. The EU

The mega-trend of the European stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be summarized as follows:²⁵

- a. On 15/10/2023, the EU condemned the “brutal and indiscriminate terrorist attacks” of the Palestinian resistance attack on 7 October. It emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself while reiterating “the importance to ensure the protection of all civilians at all times.” The statement also called on the Palestinian resistance to “immediately release all hostages without any precondition,” reiterated “the importance of the provision of urgent humanitarian aid” and stated that the EU countries “stand ready to continue supporting those civilians most in need in Gaza.”
- b. In the first month after the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, heads of state and government from most European countries traveled to Israel. Between 13/10/2023 and the end of that month, ten presidents or prime ministers paid solidarity visits, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. A further six presidents or prime ministers from EU member states visited Israel in November 2023, all to express support and sympathy for Israel.



- c. A reaffirmation of Europe's commitment to the the two-state solution, pursued through cooperation between the legitimate PA and the wider international community, in order to prevent further regional escalation.
- d. Some divergence emerged among EU officials, particularly those closely involved in foreign policy, with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, taking a clearer stance than the Commission President, especially in criticizing Israel's violations of international law and its policies toward civilians. This divergence was particularly evident regarding the EU free trade pact with Israel, where member states were split over calls to suspend the agreement at the meeting on 30/8/2025. "We are divided about this issue," Kaja Kallas, the EU's foreign policy chief said, highlighting disagreements over Israel's access to an EU research-funding program. Deliberations showed that "Ireland, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands have called for the suspension of an EU free trade pact with Israel. But traditional allies of Israel, such as Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic, have rejected such steps." German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul justified Germany's stance by noting that research funding issues are unrelated to the war in GS, especially since Germany "had suspended delivery of weapons that could be used in Gaza." The matter is further complicated by the EU's position as Israel's biggest trading partner, with trade in goods between the two amounting to \$49.9 billion by the end of 2024.

It is important to note that the EU Commission officials clarified that suspending EU research-funding does not require unanimity. Instead, support from 15 out of the 27 countries would be enough if they represent 65% of the EU population.

- e. In August 2025, the foreign ministers of France, Luxembourg and Belgium condemned the US decision to suspend UN entry visas for Palestinian officials, including the President of the PA and its representatives.
- f. Following Israel's allegations that some UNRWA staff were involved in "terrorist" activities, European responses diverged as follows:²⁶
 - Temporary suspension of UNRWA funding by Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. However, all of these countries subsequently reversed their decisions, with the exception of Sweden and Netherlands.

- Increased contributions to UNRWA's budget by EU member states including Spain, Portugal and Ireland.
- Continuation of contributions without suspension by France, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and Slovenia.

However, the EU resumed its contributions to UNRWA's budget in early March 2024 and even increased them, after some member states had temporarily suspended funding pending investigations into certain UNRWA staff. On 29/1/2024, Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, informed UN Secretary-General António Guterres that funding had not been suspended and that "EU will determine upcoming funding decisions in light of the outcome of the investigation." In late January, he reaffirmed, "we shouldn't let allegations cloud UNRWA's indispensable and great work."²⁷ Consequently, the EU chose not to wait for the investigation's results and approved €275 million (\$297 million) in aid to the Palestinian population in GS and across the region for 2024, of which €82 million (\$89 million) of aid will be delivered through UNRWA, €125 million (\$135 million) will support humanitarian aid to Palestinians, also implemented by UNRWA, and €68 million (\$74 million) will be allocated through international partners such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent.²⁸

At the same time, the EU reached an agreement with UNRWA to conduct an investigation led by external experts appointed by the EU. On 29/1/2024, Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares stated, "We will not modify our relationship with UNRWA, although we are closely following the internal investigation and the result it may yield for the acts of a dozen people" in an organization that has "30,000 workers." According to Albares, UNRWA is "an indispensable body in order to alleviate the tremendous humanitarian situation in Gaza." On the same day, Spanish Minister of Social Affairs Pablo Bustinduy described the suspension of UNRWA funding by other Western countries as "an unjustified operation of collective punishment against the Palestinian people."²⁹

g. European countries, both individually and collectively through the EU, condemned the "Operation True Promise 1" carried out by Iran against Israel in April 2024. The EU deemed the attack unacceptable and regarded it as an escalation that endangers regional security.

The mega-trend in Europe indicates a gradual shift toward a less pro-Israel stance, particularly among the major European powers, Germany, the UK, France,



Italy and Spain, as well as other European states. This trend was evident in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's call in September 2025 to "suspend trade-related provisions of the EU–Israel Association Agreement" and to impose sanctions on two far-right Israeli ministers (Ben-Gvir and Smotrich). She also highlighted "Europe's 'painful' inability to respond to the war on Gaza and the ensuing humanitarian disaster." Implementing these measures, however, would require the support of at least 15 member states, while sanctioning the two ministers demands unanimity, making the latter measure unlikely to succeed.³⁰

The increasing European support for the "two-state solution" has raised concerns in Israel. The European Commission President emphasized this in her condemnation of Israel, where she "criticized plans for illegal settlements that would split the occupied West Bank in half, as well as incitement of violence by extremist Israeli ministers, as a 'clear attempt to undermine the two-state solution.'" Furthermore, in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, four European states recognized the State of Palestine. However, this trajectory gained additional momentum following Israel's attack on Qatar on 10/9/2025, after which eight more European states extended recognition. Nonetheless, countries such as Hungary and Germany represent a less supportive stance toward efforts to curb Israeli policies.³¹

Israel sensed a shift in Europe's stance. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar voiced his dissatisfaction with the European Commission's position on free trade between Israel and Europe, accusing the EU Commission President of "echo[ing] the false propaganda of Hamas and its partners."³²

The most notable shifts in the European position, as represented by the EU, are as follows:³³

- A transition from mere verbal criticism to discussions of trade and arms sanctions.
- Increased support in the UN for draft resolutions opposed by Israel.
- Growing European consensus in favor of granting Palestine full UN membership.
- A reversal of the stance on UNRWA funding, moving from proposed cuts to increased support.
- Acceptance by some European states of the rulings of the ICC and ICJ.
- Criticism of Israel's attack on Qatar under the pretext of targeting Hamas leadership.

- European discourse has increasingly criticized Israel for rejecting the two-state solution, continuing settlement construction, and disregarding international and humanitarian law. This stance was clearly reflected in September 2025, when nearly all European countries, particularly the central powers of Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain and Greece, endorsed the two-state solution at the UNGA, despite opposition from the US and Israel.³⁴

There is a noticeable shift in the European stance toward actions contrary to Israel's position. Yet, this shift remains limited in effect, largely symbolic, or expressed through diplomatic reproach, and it also undermines the "unity of the European position."

3. The African Union

African states appeared split regarding the war in GS specifically, and the Palestine issue more generally. They can be categorized into three groups:

a. The group most supportive of Palestine comprises South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Their stance is reflected in official statements and voting behavior at the UN and the African Union, and can be summarized as follows:³⁵

- Supporting the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.
- Condemning Israeli violence in the occupied territories, particularly in GS.
- Repeatedly calling on Israel to comply with international law.
- Stressing the need for a lasting ceasefire in GS.
- Backing international efforts to provide food and medical aid to Palestinians in GS and condemning Israeli killings of civilians seeking such assistance.
- Rejecting unilateral measures taken by Israel.
- Supporting international judicial bodies, particularly the ICC and ICJ, in their engagement with the Palestine issue, and emphasizing the obligation on Israel to respond to their rulings and requests.
- Calling for de-escalation in the Middle East following the US and Israeli attack on Iran, given the serious risks it poses to international peace and security.
- Calling for the preservation of UNRWA and for the facilitation of its work.
- Reaffirming the need for Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, the Golan Heights and the occupied areas of southern Lebanon.

- b. The second group** is the most supportive of Israel. It is led by Kenya, Ghana, Rwanda, Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The positions of this group largely diverge from those of the first group across most of the issues outlined above.
- c. The third group** consists of the “hesitant” states. These countries tend to avoid engagement in debates surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict or the adoption of clear positions. While they generally incline toward accepting the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, they are careful to develop relations with Israel in ways that do not provoke the Arab side. Key states in this group include Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia.

The importance of African states goes beyond economic and strategic dimensions. Collectively, they form a substantial voting bloc in the UN, representing around 28% of the total votes. A review of voting in the UNGA on resolutions related to the war in GS shows that, with the exception of Liberia, no African state voted against resolutions calling for a ceasefire, the declaration of a humanitarian truce, or the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Strip.³⁶

4. BRICS

Since the launch of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, BRICS, which initially comprised Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and later expanded to include 10 members alongside 9 partner countries, has issued two statements on the war in GS. The first was released in October 2024 and stated:³⁷

- a. “We reiterate our grave concern at the deterioration of the situation and humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular the unprecedented escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip and in West Bank as a result of the Israeli military offensive, which led to mass killing and injury of civilians, forced displacement and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure.”
- b. “We stress the urgent need for an immediate, comprehensive and permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and detainees from both sides who are being illegally held captive.”
- c. “The unhindered sustainable and at scale supply of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, and cessation of all aggressive actions.”

- d. “We denounce the Israeli attacks against humanitarian operations, facilities, personnel and distribution points.”
- e. “We acknowledge the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the legal proceedings instituted by South Africa against Israel.”
- f. “We reaffirm our support for the State of Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations in the context of the unwavering commitment to the vision of the two-state solution based on international law including relevant UNSC and UNGA resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative that includes the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine in line with internationally recognised borders of June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital living side by side in peace and security with Israel.”

The second statement, released in July 2025, reaffirmed that:³⁸

- a. It condemns Israel’s attacks on Iran.
- b. “The situation in the Gaza Strip also raised concern, especially regarding the occupation of Palestine. For the Global South countries, the solution lies in the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel, as outlined in the 1967 United Nations resolution.”

5. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO statements,³⁹ which primarily covers the Eurasian region, reflect a high level of generality and do not convey clearly defined positions on the conflict in Palestine. The organization includes 10 member states, namely China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Belarus, in addition to two observer states and fourteen dialogue partners. In its July 2024 statement, the SCO expressed, “deep concern about the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Member States strongly condemn the actions that have resulted in extensive loss of life among civilians and a humanitarian disaster in Gaza.” It added, “The Member States stress the importance of ensuring immediate, complete and stable ceasefire, as well as access to humanitarian aid, and intensifying efforts to restore peace, stability and security for all populations in the region,” and noted “that an overarching and fair settlement of the Palestinian issue is the only path to ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East.”

The SCO condemned Israel’s attack on Iran in June 2025, stating that it was an action against “civilian targets, including energy and transport,” and represented a clear violation of Iran’s sovereignty and of international law and norms.⁴⁰



On 1/9/2025, the leaders of SCO, in a joint statement following the 25th summit of heads of state and government in Tianjin, China, “expressed ‘deep concern’ over the continued escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza.” They “strongly condemned the actions that have led to numerous casualties among the civilian population.” The SCO member states “stressed the need to achieve a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire as soon as possible, ensure the entry of humanitarian aid to Gaza, and increase efforts to ensure peace, stability, and security for residents in the region.” The statement affirmed that the “only way to ensure peace and stability in the Middle East is a comprehensive and just solution to the Palestinian issue.”⁴¹

Despite increasing indications of a shift toward security and defense cooperation, the organization’s positions remain less clear than those of BRICS, even with the substantial overlap in membership between the two bodies.

6. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The ASEAN, founded in 1967, comprises 10 countries: Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, Brunei and Myanmar. Member states’ positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict vary, a divergence that became particularly evident after Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Early statements following the events of 7 October ranged from sharp criticism of Israel and open support for Palestinian resistance, to countries maintaining their traditional alignment with Israel.

As the conflict persisted, early signs of limited shifts appeared within some of these countries, particularly those traditionally regarded as neutral. Singapore stood out in this regard, as its foreign minister stated that the Israeli military response “went too far.” Nevertheless, based on state-level reactions, the orientations of ASEAN, countries can be categorized as follows:⁴²

- a. States supportive of Palestine, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.
- b. States supportive of Israel, most notably the Philippines, though with civil society dissent.
- c. Neutral states, including Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Vietnam shows a tendency toward further developing its relationship with Israel.
- d. Myanmar, which is facing a civil war, has played no meaningful role in the conflict, despite Israel’s provision of arms to its military council until 2022.

A review of ASEAN's statements during Operation al-Aqsa Flood points to a relative shift toward greater support for the Palestinian position. This trend was also reflected in voting at the UNGA in favor of a ceasefire, Israel's withdrawal from GS, the facilitation of humanitarian aid, and the release of hostages. Support for these resolutions grew more cohesive, with these states voting unanimously in favor of 3 of the five UNGA resolutions.⁴³

7. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

Established in 2011, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) comprises 33 states from Latin America and the Caribbean. The positions of its member states regarding the war in GS are divided into two groups. It should be noted that any decision expressing the stance of the bloc as a whole requires consensus. However, this does not preclude the issuance of statements by subsets of member states that converge around a shared position.⁴⁴

- a. The first group:** Comprising 26 countries and representing 85.5% of CELAC's population, this group is led by Brazil. On 1/3/2024, it issued a joint statement calling for an immediate ceasefire in GS. The statement said, "Aware of the intransigence reflected in the statements of the Israeli government and the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, we deplore the killing of Israeli and Palestinian civilians.... We also express deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip and the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population." It added, "The heads of state 'strongly' endorsed the United Nations General Assembly's demand for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza and for all parties to the conflict to comply with international law, especially regarding the protection of civilians. The UN resolution was adopted in December 2023." Furthermore, the declaration by the CELAC countries also cites ongoing cases before the ICJ to "determine whether Israel's continued occupation of the State of Palestine constitutes a violation of international law and whether Israel's attack on Gaza would constitute genocide. The countries also emphasize the demand for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and reiterate the two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side by side within secure and recognized borders."
- b. The second group:** Comprising seven countries and representing 14.5% of CELAC's population, this group is most closely aligned with Israeli positions.



It includes Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Paraguay and Mexico.

However, the positions of these groups were not always consistent across all countries.⁴⁵ For instance, both Mexico and Brazil initially criticized the Palestinian attacks on Israel at the outset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, while also condemning Israel's response. These two countries appear to have pursued a "role-distribution" approach to diplomacy. In practice, their presidencies took clearer and more decisive stances than their foreign ministries, where statements were dominated by careful diplomatic language. Although Mexico criticized Israeli policies, it stopped short of severing ties between the two sides.

The divergence in positions among these states is occasionally reflected in Ecuador's stance. In November 2023, Ecuadorian Vice President Veronica Abad sought a peaceful settlement between the Palestinian resistance and Israel. Ecuador supported Palestine's bid for full membership in both the UNSC and the UNGA, while simultaneously condemning the resistance's attack in October 2023.

Argentina's position appears to be the most openly aligned with Israel, reflecting both President Javier Milei's religious affinity for Judaism and the deepening trade relations between the two countries, as well as the growing influence of the Jewish lobby in Argentina.⁴⁶ By contrast, Bolivia's stance on the Palestine issue shifts with changes in government. Under the leftist presidency of Luis Arce, Bolivia severed diplomatic ties with Israel following 7 October; yet, after the right-wing government of President Rodrigo Paz assumed power in October 2025, relations with Israel were restored, a pattern that echoes similar developments in 2009 and 2019.⁴⁷

Third: International Non-Governmental Organizations

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are private, non-profit entities that operate independently of any government. They function across borders and engage in diverse fields, including legal, social, media, economic and medical activities, among others. Their total number is estimated to be at least 10 thousand.⁴⁸

The position of these INGOs on the Palestine issue, particularly in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, is evident in their public statements. In May 2025, 55 INGOs jointly condemned the measures announced by the Israeli government aimed at restricting their operations in the WB and GS. The statement noted, “Under the new provisions, INGOs already registered in Israel may face de-registration, while new applicants risk rejection based on arbitrary, politicised allegations, such as “delegitimising Israel” or expressing support for accountability for Israeli violations of international law. Other disqualifiers include public support for a boycott of Israel within the past seven years (by staff, a partner, board member or founder) or failure to meet exhaustive reporting requirements. By framing humanitarian and human rights advocacy as a threat to the state, Israeli authorities can shut out organisations merely for speaking out about conditions they witness on the ground, forcing INGOs to choose between delivering aid and promoting respect for the protections owed to affected people. INGOs are further required to submit complete staff lists and other sensitive information about staff and their families to Israel when applying for registration. In a context where humanitarian and healthcare workers are routinely subject to harassment, detention and direct attacks, this raises serious protection concerns. These new rules are part of a broader, long-term crackdown on humanitarian and civic space, marked by heightened surveillance and attacks, and a series of actions that restrict humanitarian access, compromise staff safety, and undermine core principles of humanitarian action. They are not isolated but part of a wider pattern that includes:⁴⁹

1. Blocking or delaying aid through arbitrary bureaucratic restrictions, logistical obstacles, and complete sieges, denying essential lifesaving supplies to Palestinians. (...)
2. Passing legislation aimed at curtailing the operations of UNRWA, the largest provider of essential services for Palestinians.
3. Advancing legislation to impose a tax of up to 80 per cent on foreign government funding to Israeli NGOs, while barring them from seeking recourse through the Israeli court system - including organisations that serve as partners for INGOs to deliver assistance and uphold protections in communities facing displacement, demolitions, or settler violence.



4. Suspending work visas for international staff and revoking permits for Palestinians residing in the West Bank to access Jerusalem, severely disrupting operations.
5. And now, making INGO registration conditional on political and ideological alignment, undermining the neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors.”

Furthermore, more than 100 humanitarian agencies have warned, “The Israeli government’s siege starves the people of Gaza.”⁵⁰

Fourth: Major International Powers

1. United States

US policy following Operation al-Aqsa Flood can be divided into two distinct phases. The first occurred under the Democratic presidency of Joe Biden, from October 2023 until the end of December 2024. The second began with the Republican presidency of Donald Trump in early 2025 and continues up to the time of writing.

The US administration’s policies in both phases exhibited several shared characteristics, the most significant of which are:⁵¹

- a. Condemning Operation al-Aqsa Flood as an unjustified act of “terrorism,” while disregarding the fact that it was a response to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, the sixteen-year land and naval blockade of GS prior to the operation, and the relentless series of Israeli attacks since 1948, which have included fifteen wars against GS. Notably, Israel has launched six major wars on GS since 2007, following Hamas’s takeover of the Strip, in 2007, 2008/2009, 2012, 2014, 2018/2019, and 2021.
- b. Blocking UNSC resolutions calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian access through the use of the veto on six occasions up to September 2025,⁵² while expressing reservations about the rulings of the ICJ and the ICC condemning Israel for genocide and calling for the referral of Israel’s prime minister and minister of defense. This position has been accompanied by the rejection of intergovernmental and non-governmental reports documenting Israel’s repeated

violations of international law, including genocide. Moreover, on 6/2/2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions on the ICC in response to the arrest warrants issued against Israeli leaders. In June 2025, the US further imposed financial sanctions on four ICC judges, including two who had been involved in investigating alleged crimes by Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. In parallel, the Trump administration imposed financial sanctions on Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, following her publication of a report documenting Israeli violations of international law during the war in GS. The US also sought to remove Albanese from her post, although this attempt ultimately failed.

- c. Providing financial, military and diplomatic support to Israel. During the two years of the war (October 2023 – September 2025), US military assistance to Israel totaled \$21.7 billion, according to Brown University. Moreover, the US incurred additional military expenditures, estimated at \$12.07 billion over the same period, to step-up its military operations in the region in support of Israel, bringing total US spending on the post-7 October wars to \$33.77 billion. Reports issued by UN bodies further indicate that “Israel benefits from the largest-ever defense procurement program – for the F-35 fighter jet, led by United States-based Lockheed Martin, alongside at least 1,650 other companies, including Italian manufacturer Leonardo S.p.A, and eight States.”⁵³
- d. The sustained effort to broaden the Arab-Israeli normalization framework, with a clear focus on integrating Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords of 2020, while US policy on a two-state solution remains ambiguous.
- e. A comparison of the US administration’s approach to GS under the Democratic administration in 2024 (the final year of Joe Biden) with that of the Republican administration in 2025 reveals significant divergences and inconsistencies in articulating the strategy the US adopts regarding GS. It also highlights the clear gap between US statements and actions. The following examples illustrate this point:⁵⁴
 - Then-US Secretary of State Antony Blinken laid out a series of principles for the “day after” the war in Gaza at a meeting of the G7, in Tokyo in November 2023, as follows: “No forcible displacement of Palestinians. No Israeli re-occupation of Gaza after the war ends. No attempt to blockade or



besiege Gaza. A future governance that must be Palestinian-led, involving the internationally backed Palestinian Authority. No role for Hamas.” By contrast, in February 2025, “Trump declared that the US would take over the Gaza Strip and build a ‘riviera of the Middle East’.” In practice, however, neither Blinken’s commitments nor Trump’s proposal were implemented.

- Under the Democratic administration, US statements consistently reaffirmed support for a two-state solution, yet these declarations were never translated into concrete measures. Under the Trump administration, this stance largely disappeared, giving way to conflicting policies: Israel was framed as a constrained state requiring additional territory, proposals were advanced to resettle Palestinians from the 1967 territories, and efforts to expand normalization with Israel intensified, entirely disregarding Palestinian interests. Notably, when France and Saudi Arabia convened a UN meeting to address the two-state solution, the US openly opposed it, despite widespread international support for the initiative.
 - Both the Democratic and Republican administrations have consistently maintained the flow of US financial and military aid, along with media and political support for Israel, particularly within the UNSC.
 - Between 2023 and 2025, the US devised plans to deliver aid to civilians in GS, first via a maritime port and later through airdrops. However, these initiatives were of questionable feasibility and offered only limited practical benefit.
- f. In the first week of August 2025, Netanyahu indicated that his plan to reassert control over GS, end Hamas’s rule, and disarm the movement, while transferring authority in the Strip to an Arab administration excluding the PA, had been agreed upon with the US only in its general outline, not in its details. This aligns with Trump’s remark that “I know Israel will do what it has to do.”
- g. The US imposed a suspension on entry visas for the PA president and Palestinian delegates to UN meetings. This measure, announced by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, was implemented shortly before the UNGA convened in September 2025 at the invitation of France and Saudi Arabia to discuss the two-state solution, notably at a time when support for the initiative was growing among a broad range of countries, including US allies.

Under the 1947 “Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations” with the US,⁵⁵ which guarantees delegates access to UN headquarters in

New York, US authorities may deny entry only on the basis of national security (Article 4, Section 11). Such measures must not impede the functioning of the UN, and the US is obliged to formally notify the UN and provide alternative arrangements to resolve the issue.

- h. The overlap between the two-state solution and the question of annexing the WB, or parts of it, has produced a distinctly ambiguous US stance. This was a feature that has arguably come to define both the first (2017–2021) and second (2025 – present) Trump administrations, as reflected in the following indicators:⁵⁶
- In June 2019, during Trump’s first presidency, US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman declared “I think Israel has the right to retain some, but unlikely all, of the West Bank.”
 - In August 2025, during Trump’s second presidency, Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson expressed support for annexation, saying he believed that “Judea and Samaria” belong to the Jewish people and voiced his backing for the extension of Israeli sovereignty over WB.
 - During Trump’s second presidency, the new US Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, voiced support for the annexation of the WB and opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state, even going so far as saying, “There’s really no such thing as a Palestinian.”⁵⁷
 - Notably, President Trump largely avoided direct engagement on the issues of annexation and a Palestinian state, while simultaneously taking a leading role in declaring Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital, endorsing its annexation, and relocating the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Trump’s “Peace” Initiatives Regarding GS

President Trump consistently portrayed himself as a “peace advocate,” both globally and in the Middle East. He unveiled his plan for GS on 29/9/2025, which Israel immediately accepted, while the Palestinian resistance confirmed its approval on 3/10/2025 to implement the first phase, focusing on procedural measures. Issues of sovereignty and national significance were deferred to Palestinian national consensus. The plan, comprising 20 points, can be summarized as follows:⁵⁸

1. A reciprocal exchange involving the release of prisoners and the return of bodies by both sides.



2. The disarmament of the resistance and the dismantling of its military capabilities, including tunnels, coupled with guarantees that “New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.”
3. “No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return.”
4. “Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee,” with “oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body” to ensure stability in GS and neighboring states.
5. Rehabilitating infrastructure in GS and allowing the delivery of aid under the supervision of international organizations, in coordination with the transitional administration.
6. A gradual Israeli withdrawal from GS, coupled with the continued maintenance of a security presence in the areas surrounding the Strip.
7. These “conditions *may* finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination.” (However, the text neither articulates a US position on this prospective state nor frames its establishment as a binding commitment).

Approximately two weeks later, on 13/10/2025, the Sharm El-Sheikh Document was issued, which Trump termed the “The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.” The document was endorsed by Egypt, Türkiye and Qatar alongside Trump, and it emphasizes the following points:⁵⁹

1. Endorsement of Trump’s plan announced in September 2025 to halt the fighting in GS.
2. Commitment to peaceful coexistence and respect for the religious heritage of the region’s peoples.
3. “Determination to dismantle extremism and radicalization in all its forms.”
4. Commitment “to the resolution of future disputes through diplomatic engagement and negotiation rather than through force or protracted conflict.”
5. Emphasis on “the friendly and mutually beneficial relationship between Israel and its regional neighbors.”

It is clear that US policy on the Palestine issue has seen no fundamental change compared with previous administrations. However, Trump's political approach is marked by two key dimensions that are expected to persist throughout the remainder of his term, should he remain in office:

1. The continued lack of moral justification, whether in terms of democracy, human rights or similar principles, for US interventions in the region.
2. The ongoing pattern of unpredictable international actions, which further diverts attention from the Palestine issue.

2. Britain

Having reviewed the EU's positions in the UN, especially those of its institutions and the general stance of its member states, the focus now turns to the United Kingdom as a key European power, even though it is no longer an EU member.⁶⁰

The UK Government backed the truce agreement in January 2025 and said the agreement should be implemented in full. During the aid pause of March to May 2025, the government expressed concern that Israel was "at risk" of breaching international law in its blocking of aid. The government has reiterated that it is opposed to any forced displacement of Palestinians, loss of territory within GS, or annexation by Israel. The UK Government did not back the resumption of Israeli military action in March or its expansion in May 2025. On 20/5/2025, the government announced it would pause talks on a free trade agreement with Israel and review the 2023 road map on UK-Israel relations, which encompasses objectives for economic, social and defense cooperation. In June 2025, the government declared its readiness to take further measures, including targeted sanctions, should Israeli policies remain unchanged, and called on both Hamas and Israel to return to negotiations.

In May 2025, "the UK also announced a new round of sanctions against organisations and individuals involved in settler violence in the West Bank. This is the fourth series of sanctions announced since October 2023."

In June 2025, the UK, together with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway, announced an asset freeze and travel ban against Israeli ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. The UK said the two were "sanctioned for their repeated incitement of violence against Palestinian civilians". The Israeli Foreign Minister

Gideon Sa'ar said, “We will hold a special government meeting early next week to decide on our response to this unacceptable decision.”

These actions follow a joint statement issued by the governments of France, Canada and Britain on 19 May which said that they were prepared to take “further concrete action” in response to a “wholly disproportionate” Israeli military action and the lack of aid entering GS since March 2025.

The UK government stated that it would recognize a Palestinian state alongside “a secure and stable Israel” when it determines that such recognition would best support the peace process. It further emphasized that the June (French-Saudi) conference should be used to advance progress toward a two-state solution, including by increasing support for the PA, agreeing on security arrangements for GS after Hamas, and taking measures to address Israeli settlements in the occupied WB. Emily Thornberry, the chair of the foreign affairs select committee, said the time was coming for the UK to recognize Palestinian statehood, adding, “We need to do it with friends. We need to do it with the French.”⁶¹

It is evident that British decisions are largely symbolic and do not reflect a strategic shift, as seen in their positions within the UNSC. Nevertheless, growing concern over Israeli actions has increasingly shaped British policymaking, alongside the UK’s tendency to align with emerging trends in Europe in particular, and globally more broadly.

3. Russia

The framework shaping Russian policy on the Palestine issue during 2024–2025 can be understood through a set of interrelated factors:⁶²

- a. Russia does not classify Hamas as a “terrorist” organization, unlike most Western countries, a position explicitly affirmed by President Putin, particularly following Hamas’s electoral victory in 2006. This stance has facilitated Russia’s growing engagement with Palestinian resistance movements, notably Hamas and PIJ, including hosting delegations from these groups. At the same time, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov described the 7 October attack as an “act of terrorism,” while stressing that it does not justify Israel punishing the Palestinian people. President Putin endorsed Israel’s “right to self-defense,” yet the Russian government voted against Canadian amendments to a UNGA draft resolution calling for the “condemnation of Hamas.”

- b. Russia consistently upholds the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state through a two-state solution.
- c. Israel's continued attacks on Syria (prior to the fall of the Syrian regime in December 2024), despite Russian warnings against ongoing violations of Syrian territory, indicate that Russia's engagement with Hamas may have been partly intended as leverage to pressure Israel to limit its interventions in Syria.
- d. Operation al-Aqsa Flood has influenced Russia's war in Ukraine in several ways: by diverting Western attention and criticism from Russian policy in Ukraine; by compelling Russia to align with Iranian support for the Palestinian resistance, particularly following Iran's provision of drones for Russia's operations in Ukraine; by promoting economic cooperation between Russia and Iran to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on both countries; and by necessitating coordination between the two powers in supporting the Syrian regime (prior to its fall).
- e. Israel's unclear position on the Ukraine war prompted a cautious Russian response. President Putin delayed condolences to Israel for a week after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, linking Middle East developments to US failure in supporting "peace" efforts. Russia sought to curb the conflict in GS, halt the fighting, and allow humanitarian aid by submitting draft UNSC resolutions on 13 and 25/10/2023. These efforts failed due to US and UK opposition. Russia also opposed US amendments in December 2023 to a draft resolution submitted by the UAE.
- f. Russia's efforts, particularly with Gulf states, focused on coordinating oil policies and production levels in ways that safeguard Russian interests, especially regarding oil sales.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, ongoing since February 2022, has become central to Russia's strategic interests. Moscow seeks to leverage its international relationships to secure victory, making it essential to view its policy in the Arab world, and the Middle East more broadly, through the lens of advancing its Ukraine objectives amid rising Western political, economic and military pressure on Russia.

Several Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, the Gulf states, Iran and Türkiye, did not join Western sanctions on Russia. This prompted Moscow to deepen ties with these powers, extending its engagement to the Palestinian

resistance and other members of the Axis of Resistance, as shown by the following indicators:⁶³

- a. Russia condemned US-Israeli attacks on Iran and recognized Iran's April 2024 and June 2025 responses as self-defense, while continuing to pursue a mediating role.
- b. Media reports claimed that Russia sent security experts and satellite imagery to Ansar Allah in Yemen. Saudi Arabia expressed concern and objected to reports of Russian military supplies to the group.
- c. Hamas leaders visited Russia multiple times: October 2023; January, March, June and October 2024; and February 2025. Hamas also expedited the release of Israeli hostages of Russian origin captured during the 7/10/2023 attack.
- d. Russia sought to maintain relations with the new Syrian regime after the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's rule in December 2024, while ensuring the continued presence of some of its military bases. In late July 2025, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani visited Moscow, as Russia criticized Israeli interventions in Syria and reaffirmed its support for Syria's unity and sovereignty.

It is evident that Russian policy toward the Palestine issue did not undergo a substantive change between the Biden administration and Trump's second presidency, as the Quartet in which Russia participates remained effectively paralyzed in both periods. However, concerns persist that Russia may offer concessions in the Middle East to secure gains in Ukraine, potentially limiting the depth of Iranian–Russian relations and those with other members of the Axis of Resistance, including Palestinian resistance movements.⁶⁴

It is also evident that the Russian position oscillates between two perspectives:⁶⁵

- a. One view holds that Russia benefited from Operation al-Aqsa Flood and may have had prior knowledge of the planning or contributed indirectly through intelligence coordination with the resistance via Iran, aiming to disrupt US policy in the region and divert attention from Ukraine. This perspective also suggests that Hamas may have obtained Russian weapons through third parties or relied on Russian banking services to manage some financial ties amid mounting restrictions.
- b. The second view sees Russia's stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood as gradually shifting. It began with strong criticism of Israel and the US, as reflected in

official media, but from 13/10/2023, Russia described the attacks as an “act of terrorism,” affirmed Israel’s right to self-defense, and offered condolences for Israeli casualties, while also condemning Israeli strikes on civilians in GS. This perspective argues that Russia benefited by diverting attention from the war in Ukraine and by leveraging Western protests in support of GS to fuel unrest in Western societies.

4. China

Since 1978, Chinese foreign policy has been marked by pragmatism over ideology, a focus on peaceful international engagement, and the promotion of respect for international law. This approach is reflected in key initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, 2013), the Global Development Initiative (GDI, 2021), the Global Security Initiative (GSI, 2022), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI, 2023). Alongside the concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind,” these initiatives form a broader strategy to reshape the international environment and advance China’s vision for the global order.⁶⁶

China’s GSI is considered a blueprint of China’s foreign policy and seeks to “eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international efforts to bring more stability and certainty to a volatile and changing era, and promote durable peace and development in the world.” The GSI further intends to expand China’s role in international politics and challenge the Western-led global governance system. The document also “advocates for a lasting peace and stability in the Middle East and seeks to strengthen relations with regional organizations.”⁶⁷

Building on these priorities, China submitted a proposal to the UNSC on 30/11/2023 for resolving the Middle East conflict, based on the following principles:⁶⁸

- a. Implementing a comprehensive ceasefire and ending the fighting. Parties to the conflict should truly implement the relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions and immediately realize a durable and sustained humanitarian truce. Building on UNSC Resolution 2712, the Security Council, in response to the calls of the international community, should explicitly demand a comprehensive ceasefire and end of the fighting, work for deescalation of the conflict, and cool down the situation as soon as possible.



- b. Protecting civilians effectively and demanding in explicit terms that all parties comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, notably with regard to the protection of civilians. It is imperative to stop any violent attacks against civilians and violations of international humanitarian law, and avoid attacks on civilian facilities. The Security Council should further send a clear message on opposing forced transfer of the Palestinian civilian population, preventing the displacement of Palestinian civilians, and calling for the release of all civilians and hostages held captive as soon as possible.
- c. Ensuring humanitarian assistance. All relevant parties must, as per requirements of the UNSC resolution, refrain from depriving the civilian population in Gaza of supplies and services indispensable to their survival, set up humanitarian corridors in Gaza to enable rapid, safe, unhindered and sustainable humanitarian access. The Security Council should encourage the international community to ramp up humanitarian assistance, improve the humanitarian situation on the ground, and support the coordinating role of the UN as well as the UNWRA in humanitarian assistance, and prepare the international community for supporting post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza.
- d. Demanding that parties to the conflict exercise restraint to prevent the conflict from widening and uphold “peace” and stability in the Middle East. The Security Council should value the role of regional countries and organizations, support the good offices of the UN Secretary General and the Secretariat, and encourage countries with influence on parties to the conflict to uphold an objective and just position so as to jointly play a constructive role in deescalating the crisis.
- e. Seeking political settlement. According to relevant UNSC resolutions and international consensus, the fundamental settlement of the question of Palestine lies in the implementation of the two-state solution, restoration of the legitimate national rights of Palestine, and the establishment of an independent State of Palestine that enjoys full sovereignty based on the 1967 border and with east Jerusalem as its capital. The Security Council should help restore the two-state solution. A more broad-based, authoritative and effective international peace conference led and organized by the UN should be held as soon as possible to formulate a concrete timetable and roadmap for the implementation of the two-state solution and facilitate a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine. Any arrangement on the future of Gaza must respect the

will and independent choice of the Palestinian people, and must not be imposed upon them.

China's foreign policy principles are reflected in its stance on Operation al-Aqsa Flood, as outlined by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 7/3/2025:⁶⁹

- a. Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people. It is an inseparable part of the Palestinian territory.
- b. Changing its status by forceful means will not bring about "peace," but only new chaos.
- c. China supports the plan for restoring "peace" in Gaza initiated by Egypt and other Arab countries. The will of the people must not be defied, and the principle of justice must not be abandoned.
- d. Major countries should promote comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, ramp up humanitarian assistance, observe the principle of Palestinians governing Palestine, and contribute to the reconstruction in Gaza. The international community need to build consensus and promote "peace" between Palestine and Israel.
- e. The Palestinian question has always been at the heart of the Middle East issue. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict takes place again and again simply because the two-state solution is only half achieved. The international community should focus more on the two-State solution and give more support to independent statehood for Palestine. All parties in the Middle East need to rise above differences to support Palestinian statehood.
- f. The State of Israel has long been a reality.
- g. All Palestinian factions need to deliver on the Beijing Declaration to achieve unity and self-strengthening.
- h. Concerning the military clashes since the start of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, China urged that "Neither the Israelis nor Palestinians should become targets of armed attacks or collective punishment."⁷⁰

Most Chinese statements condemned several Israeli actions,⁷¹ including the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April 2024 and the assassination of Hamas leader Isma'il Haniyyah in Tehran in July 2024, as well as the US-Israeli attack on Iran in June 2025.



5. India

Despite the rapid expansion of India-Israel relations since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in 2014, and India's frequent avoidance or abstention regarding the repercussions of Operation al-Aqsa Flood in UN votes, India nevertheless endorsed the UNGA New York Statement of 12/9/2025 supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of the two-state solution, despite strong opposition from the Israeli government.⁷²

6. Japan

Japan's position can be delineated along the following dimensions:⁷³

- a. Japan condemned the Palestinian resistance attack on 7/10/2023, expressed concern over the repercussions of the Israeli response, particularly its impact on civilians, and emphasized the necessity of negotiations between the two sides in order to achieve a comprehensive “peace.”
- b. Official statements from Japanese authorities, political parties and civil society organizations reflect increasing criticism of Israeli policies in the WB and GS.
- c. Japan affirms that a two-state solution represents the most appropriate path to resolving the Middle East conflict.
- d. Japan regards UNSC resolutions, the Madrid principles, the Roadmap, and the Arab Initiative as the accepted framework for negotiations between the parties, while emphasizing the need to avoid violence.
- e. Japan's engagement in resolving the conflict rests on three pillars: political dialogue with Middle Eastern parties, confidence-building between Palestinians and Israelis, and the provision of economic assistance to the Palestinians. Japan intends to continue these efforts through the Cooperation among East Asian countries for Palestinian Development (CEAPAD), and the “Corridor for Peace and Prosperity” initiative.
- f. Japan remains firmly committed to its position that all settlement activities in the 1967 occupied territories are illegal and must be halted.
- g. Japan supports the two-state solution as the most viable outcome in the Middle East and endorses Palestine's full UN membership, as reflected in Japan's 2024 UN vote.

- h. Providing support to the Palestinians, particularly in GS, with Japanese assistance totaling \$240 million from the outbreak of the war in October 2023 through October 2025.

Fifth: International Public Opinion

A study by Walid ‘Abd al-Hay, the expert in futures studies, highlighted a significant decline in Israel’s international standing,⁷⁴ a trend that appears to have persisted in 2025. This is reflected in public opinion on Israeli policies across Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas, as shown in the following table:

Table 1/8: International Views of Israel 2025 (%)⁷⁵

Countries	Unfavorable	Favorable	Confidence in Netanyahu	
			No confidence	Confidence
Canada	60	33	66	26
US	53	45	52	32
Netherlands	78	19	78	19
Spain	75	18	84	11
Sweden	25	20	78	18
Greece	72	23	74	21
Italy	66	29	80	14
Germany	64	31	76	21
France	63	28	77	17
Poland	62	16	70	11
UK	61	30	68	24
Hungary	53	36	57	31
Indonesia	80	17	76	19

Countries	Unfavorable	Favorable	Confidence in Netanyahu	
			No confidence	Confidence
Japan	79	13	78	10
Australia	74	25	72	20
South Korea	60	31	64	25
India	29	34	28	34
Türkiye	93	4	94	2
South Africa	52	34	54	28
Kenya	42	50	40	54
Nigeria	32	59	38	50
Mexico	61	24	65	19
Brazil	58	32	63	27
Argentina	40	26	55	17

The 24-country median for international views of Israel shows that negative perceptions prevail at 62%, compared with 29% holding positive views. In terms of international confidence in Netanyahu, 69% expressed a lack of confidence, while only 21% expressed confidence.

Additional surveys underscore this trend, particularly in Europe, which has historically been the region most aligned with Israeli policies.⁷⁶ These findings are further reinforced by polling on attitudes toward the Palestinians.⁷⁷

A review of US public opinion polls shows a gradual decline in Americans approval of Israel’s military action in GS, as illustrated in the following table:

Table 2/8: Americans’ Overall View of Israel’s Military Action in GS (%)⁷⁸

	Approve	Disapprove
November 2023	50	45
July 2025	32	60

When examined by partisan affiliation, the polls reveal a clear divide in US public opinion, as reflected in the following table:

**Table 3/8: Support for Israel’s Military Action in GS,
by US Party Affiliation (%)⁷⁹**

Party Affiliation	November 2023	July 2025
Republicans	71	71
Independents	47	25
Democrats	36	8

Surveys indicate a pronounced divide within American public opinion and an even sharper partisan split, with differences between Republicans and Democrats widening from roughly twofold in November 2023 to ninefold by July 2025.

Meanwhile, the Gaza blockade-breaking “Global Sumud Flotilla” highlighted growing international and popular sympathy for the humanitarian crisis in GS. Launched after mid-2025 by international civil society groups,⁸⁰ it included dozens of vessels from multiple countries and drew participation from political, parliamentary, human rights and cultural figures.⁸¹

Conclusion

The international dimension of 2026–2027, particularly concerning the strategic aspects of the Palestine issue, can be summarized as follows:

1. The urgent reconstruction of GS is likely to be a central point of contention over the next two years in international dealings on the Palestine issue. This process will likely be shaped by international and regional political pressures, placing Palestinian negotiators in highly complex conditions. Future Palestinian and international discussions are expected to focus on the following points:

- The scale, allocation, priorities and oversight of aid, particularly at crossings between GS and Israel and Egypt, as well as the prospects for operating the Gaza port and airport.

- Political conditions set by donor countries, including the structure of the political and administrative authority in GS, the disarmament of the resistance, recognition of Israel, and the promotion of Arab–Israeli normalization. These may also involve attempts to reinterpret, weaken or even overturn international judicial rulings against Israel, as was the case with the 1975 resolution labeling Zionism as racist, which was revoked in 1991.
- The designation of bodies responsible for implementing reconstruction plans, likely leading to extensive and intense negotiations among the companies involved in these projects.

This suggests that the reconstruction of GS will be extremely challenging. Countries traditionally supportive of the resistance, such as Iran, Russia, China, some Arab and Muslim countries, and certain less US-aligned countries in Europe and the developing world, have shown limited capacity or willingness to provide substantial material or financial aid, even if their assistance carries fewer political conditions. Conversely, the most capable donors, the US, Europe and most Gulf states, are likely to impose the strictest political and strategic conditions. Palestinians will thus face a stark choice: endure prolonged devastation, poverty and minimal reconstruction, or make political concessions as severe as the devastation itself.

2. International diplomatic engagement concerning the “Palestinian state or the two-state solution” is expected to continue, yet significant progress is unlikely over the next two years for multiple reasons. The ongoing trend of instability in the Middle East⁸² will inevitably shape the Palestine issue, producing both negative and positive consequences. Crucially, the outcomes of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the positions adopted by Arab and Muslim countries, and the broader challenges stemming from heightened political instability in the region collectively define the central contours of future developments. Furthermore, the probability of a Black Swan event in such a volatile region, which ranks highest globally in terms of instability, further increases the potential for unexpected and transformative shifts. The future recognition of a Palestinian state will also confront a distinctly Israeli policy in the coming years, aimed at altering the facts on the ground in the 1967 occupied territories to make the establishment of a Palestinian state increasingly difficult. This policy includes the continued expansion of settlements, the systematic dismantling of Palestinian political structures (whether the PA or

resistance factions) and the imposition of pressures that encourage both forced and “voluntary” displacement. While these measures may reduce international pressure, they could simultaneously generate tensions between Israel and certain international actors, reflecting Israeli apprehension regarding the implications of expanding international recognition of Palestine as a state. These dynamics are closely tied to the two-state solution, whose origins trace back to UN Resolution 181 of 29/11/1947 and extend to the UN conference convened by France and Saudi Arabia in July 2025, whose statement reaffirmed the necessity of a two-state resolution. It appears that Israel’s response may take the form of severe retaliatory measures aimed at preventing such developments. Impeding the reconstruction of GS is likely to serve as one of Israel’s primary instruments, linking any rebuilding efforts to conditions and procedures designed to curtail Palestinian gains of a strategic character. Moreover, given the prevailing instability in the Middle East, Israel remains in a constant state of concern, which in turn prompts measures such as reoccupying GS, maintaining or tightening the blockade, increasing various forms of pressure, promoting the notion of so-called “voluntary migration” of Gazans, or asserting Israeli sovereignty over areas in the WB and surrounding GS. Consequently, these actions could entail a range of repercussions for Israel, including international isolation, setbacks in Arab-Israeli normalization, increased responsibility for supporting the Palestinian population, the imposition of sanctions by international actors, and heightened security threats on multiple fronts.⁸³ Therefore, it appears that Israel faces only two narrow diplomatic pathways in its engagement with the international community, namely:

- The rejection of the two-state solution, with all its previously noted implications by the international community, particularly in the event of even relative US leniency on the issue.
- Acceptance of a two-state solution, accompanied by redefining the state as demilitarized and closer to autonomy, with Palestinian state borders drawn to provide Israel extensive security advantages, including the ability to veto certain policies of any governing authority in the proposed Palestinian state. Muslims would retain freedom of access to *al-Aqsa* Mosque under Israeli sovereignty, and Jerusalem would remain Israel’s eternal capital. Under this plan, the Palestinian state could include Areas A and part of B, while Area C would remain under Israeli control, as most settlements are located in Area C, which constitutes



approximately 61% of the WB. However, the establishment of a Palestinian state, even in a form acceptable to Israel, would require dismantling some or all of the WB 141 settlements and 335 outposts, in addition to the 15 Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, which house over a million Jews.⁸⁴ Such dismantling, particularly given the ICJ's ruling on their illegality, could trigger civil conflict between settlers in WB and right-wing supporters on one side and the Israeli government on the other, a risk further heightened by Israel's ethnic diversity and subcultural divisions.⁸⁵

Regarding displacement, large-scale forced displacement does not appear to be internationally acceptable; however, Israeli right-wing policies could drive developments in that direction if favorable international and regional conditions emerge. The situation in GS is more acute than in the WB due to the severe living conditions resulting from the war, though such a scenario is unlikely to materialize in the near term (2026–2027).

3. As for Israel's international relations, they cannot be understood without considering the relative shift in global public opinion and the positions of key regional blocs. In the EU, the African Union, CELAC and BRICS, stances have become noticeably less favorable toward Israel. In the US, the Democratic Party's policies may produce some divergence between US and Israeli approaches, given recent trends in American public opinion. A Democratic president or increased Democratic influence in Congress would likely unsettle the Israeli right more than a Republican consolidation in the midterm elections.

It appears that neither Russia nor China is likely to undergo a strategic shift in their positions regarding the Palestine issue. However, Russia may become somewhat freer from the burdens of the Ukrainian war, expected to subside during 2026–2027, potentially enabling it to play a more active role in the region, which could be relatively favorable for the Palestinian side. China, meanwhile, is likely to focus on the Taiwan issue during 2026–2027. Despite its increasingly pragmatic diplomacy, heightened tensions over Taiwan could place Israel in a delicate position, caught between US demands on one hand and Chinese expectations on the other.

Finally, tensions could emerge between Israel and countries insisting on enforcing the ICC ruling, particularly concerning the arrest of Israeli figures such as Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. Several European

countries, including Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania and Slovenia,⁸⁶ have signaled their readiness to implement the ruling, alongside dozens of other states across multiple continents.

Furthermore, Israel's ambitions to advance the "Greater Israel" project are likely to persist, whether through a security-oriented approach centered on expansion and buffer zones between Israel and neighboring Arab states, as promoted by Netanyahu and the religious Zionist right,⁸⁷ or through an economic vision advanced by former prime ministers such as Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin, which casts Israel as the Middle East's economic and technological hub along the lines of the Benelux model (The Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg Union).⁸⁸ Both approaches carry significant risks for regional stability and independence.



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