The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025





Edited By

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

Al-Zaytouna Centre For Studies & Consultations

The Palestine
Strategic Report
2024 – 2025

Al-Zaytouna Centre
For Studies & Consultations
Beirut - Lebanon

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025

التقرير الاستراتيجي الفلسطيني 2024–2025

Editor:

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

First Published in 2026 by:

Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

P.O. Box: 14-5034, Beirut, Lebanon

Tel: +961 21 803644

Tel-fax: +961 21 803643

E-mail: info@alzaytouna.net Website: www.alzaytouna.net

You can contact us and view the center's pages by clicking on the applications below:

ISBN 978-614-494-079-2

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publisher. For further information regarding permission(s), please write to: info@alzaytouna.net

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations.

Designed by:

Mr. Rabie Maarouf Murad

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025

Editor

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

Consultants

Dr. Adeeb Ziadeh
Mr. Mueen al-Taher
Mr. Munir Shafiq
Prof. Dr. Nizam Barakat
Prof. Dr. Sami al-Arian

Contributors

Mr. ‘Atef Ishaq al-Joulani
Dr. Basem Jalal Elkassem
Mr. Hani Mohammad ‘Adnan al-Masri
Ms. Iqbal Walid ‘Omeish
Dr. Mohannad Mustafa
Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh
Mr. Rabi‘ Mohammad al-Dannan
Dr. Raed Muhammad Hillis
Dr. Sa‘id Walid al-Haj
Mr. Sameh Muhammad Singer
Prof. Dr. Talal ‘Atrissi
Mr. Wael Ahmad Sa‘ad
Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay
Mr. Ziad Mohammad Bhies

Senior Language Editor

Ms. Rana Sa‘adah

Assistant Editors

Ms. Fatima ‘Itani
Ms. Iqbal ‘Omeish

Chapter Seven

The Palestine Issue and the Muslim World

The Palestine Issue and the Muslim World

Introduction

This chapter focuses on non-Arab Muslim countries. While these states hold varying positions on issues affecting the Muslim world, the Palestine issue remains the most widely consensual, despite differences in levels of sympathy, solidarity, support and relations with Israel. The chapter reviews the positions of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and presents two case studies; Türkiye and Iran. It also provides a brief overview of key stances in other countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan, in addition to examining popular engagement with the Palestine issue and the normalization process with Israel.

First: OIC

The strategic transformations experienced by the region during 2024–2025, together with the wide-ranging political, security, and economic challenges that accompanied them, did not result in any substantive change in the performance of the OIC. This was evident most notably in the organization's response to the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in the GS, which amounted to a war of extermination against its population and was accompanied by attempts at forced displacement. Nor did these developments prompt an elevation in the organization's engagement with strategic Islamic issues to a level commensurate with the aspirations of Muslim peoples. Consequently, throughout 2024–2025, the organization undertook no serious or effective measures to halt the genocide inflicted upon the Palestinian people. Its response remained largely confined to expressions of condemnation, denunciation, and censure concerning the killing of civilians and the extensive destruction that permeated all aspects of life in the GS.

In January 2024, the OIC welcomed the ICJ ruling endorsing the provisional measures sought by South Africa to avert further acts of genocide perpetrated by Israeli forces in the GS. Notably, these measures call for the immediate cessation of Israeli military operations in the GS. Moreover, the OIC urged all

States Parties to ensure Israel's full and prompt compliance with the Court's order, while emphasizing the obligation of the international community to assume its responsibilities in securing justice for the Palestinian people, affording them international protection, and bringing to an end the acts of genocide to which they continue to be subjected.[1]

While several States responded to Israeli demands by suspending funding for the UNRWA in an effort to curtail its operations and undermine its humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people amid Israel's genocidal war, the OIC expressed its regret over these States' decision to temporarily withhold the funds allocated to UNRWA. It further regarded this decision as constituting collective punishment, likely to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in the GS.[2]

In March 2024, the OIC held an extraordinary meeting at the level of foreign ministers of its member states to address Israel's aggression against GS. The final communiqué called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in response to the comprehensive assault on the Palestinian people in GS, the provision of humanitarian, medical and relief aid, the restoration of water and electricity services, and the opening of unobstructed humanitarian corridors to deliver urgent assistance in adequate quantities. It further underscored its "categorical rejection of, and opposition by all means to, any attempt to displace, expel, or forcibly transfer the Palestinian people from their land," and urged the Prosecutor of the ICC to expedite investigations into the war crimes committed by the Israeli officials against the defenseless Palestinian population.[3]

In this context, the OIC condemned the genocide in GS and, in its concluding statement at the summit held in Banjul, the capital of Gambia, in May 2024, called on its member states to exert "diplomatic, political and legal pressure" and to impose sanctions at all levels, economic, sporting, cultural and international, against Israel. The OIC further called for an "immediate, permanent and unconditional ceasefire" and urged a halt to the export of weapons and ammunition used by Israel's military to perpetrate the genocide in GS. The statement also emphasized, "We call on our Palestinian brothers and sisters to uphold unity in their struggle to achieve their goals under the banner of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."[4]

Strikingly, while the OIC was publicly condemning Israel's massacres in GS and urging the international community to fulfill its responsibility to halt the

extermination campaign, certain member states facilitated the establishment of a land corridor to supply Israel with goods after maritime transport via the Red Sea was disrupted, following Yemeni attacks on vessels bound for the Israeli port of Eilat. In December 2023, the UAE and Israel had signed a land bridge agreement, where "the new route will connect the UAE to Haifa through Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and will travel in both directions."[5]

In August 2024, the OIC held an extraordinary meeting at the level of foreign ministers to address Israeli crimes against the Palestinian people and Israel's violation of the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran through the assassination of Isma'il Haniyyah, head of Hamas's Political Bureau, in Tehran. During the opening session, OIC Secretary-General Hissein Brahim Taha strongly condemned the daily war crimes and acts of genocide committed by Israel against the Palestinian people in the GS and WB, including occupied Jerusalem. The final statement declared that "the assassination of Haniyyah constitutes an attack on Iran's sovereignty, territorial integrity and security… and represents an act of aggression and a blatant violation of international law."[6]

The OIC further urged all states to endorse the political initiative launched by Saudi Arabia through the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, emphasizing that it serves as a political safeguard for the realization of a two-state solution in accordance with international law, the UN Charter and its resolutions. The initiative reflects a firm commitment to supporting efforts to end Israel's occupation, establish the Palestinian state, and achieve a just, comprehensive and lasting "peace" in the region.[7]

At the outset of 2025, the OIC confronted a new challenge with the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House and the establishment of a right-wing administration fully aligned with Israel. In response, the OIC issued a strong condemnation of President Trump's call to forcibly displace the Palestinian population from GS. The OIC also reiterated its rejection of any schemes seeking to alter the geographic or legal status of the occupied Palestinian territories, underscoring that GS constitutes an inseparable part of the land of the occupied State of Palestine.[8]

Furthermore, to counter the threat of depopulating the GS, the OIC endorsed the Arab plan for the reconstruction of GS, explicitly ensuring that Palestinians would not be displaced. In its concluding statement, the ministerial meeting convened to

address Israel's aggression against the Palestinian people reaffirmed the "absolute rejection and resolute opposition to any plans aimed at displacing the Palestinian population, whether individually or collectively, within or beyond their land."

The statement also strongly condemned the policies of starvation and scorched-earth tactics designed to compel the Palestinian people to abandon their homeland. It welcomed efforts to establish a trust fund responsible for receiving financial pledges from all states and donor financing institutions, with the aim of implementing recovery and reconstruction projects. It also called for the establishment of an international fund, in cooperation with the UN, to support the orphans of GS, and emphasized strengthening the resilience and steadfastness of the Palestinian people on their land by providing enhanced humanitarian assistance and all possible facilitative measures.[9]

Amid Israel's continued failure to subdue the Palestinian resistance in the GS, and following its August 2025 declaration of intent to occupy the entire GS, the OIC, in coordination with the Arab Group at the UN, issued a press statement from UN headquarters condemning the Israeli decision. They expressed "their strong condemnation and categorical rejection of Israel's announcement of its intention to impose full military control over the Gaza Strip. We consider this announcement a dangerous and unacceptable escalation, a flagrant violation of international law, and an attempt to entrench the illegal occupation and impose a fait accompli/ facts on the ground by force, in contravention of international legitimacy."[10]

In response to Israel's continued escalation and its 9/9/2025 attempt to assassinate members of the Hamas negotiating delegation, the OIC convened the Joint Arab-Islamic Emergency Summit on 15/9/2025 in Doha, Qatar. At the summit, OIC Secretary-General Hissein Brahim Taha "expressed the Cooperation's full support for all measures taken by the State of Qatar to safeguard its sovereignty, security, and stability, and renewed his call on the international community, in particular the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), to shoulder its responsibilities to ensure that Israel is held accountable for all its crimes." He stressed that "the Israeli attack on the State of Qatar constitutes an extension of Israel's crimes against the Palestinian people, their land, and their holy sites. He called for strengthening the efforts of the international community to bring about a ceasefire, to ensure sufficient and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout the Gaza Strip, and for the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces."[11]

Following Trump's announcement, on 8/10/2025, that all parties had agreed to the arrangement, the OIC welcomed the announcement, viewing it as "a step towards achieving a permanent and comprehensive cessation of the Israeli aggression, enabling the return of the displaced to their homes, the withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces, the unhindered and adequate delivery of humanitarian assistance, and commencing the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip." The organization underscored the importance of sustaining "these efforts to eventually achieve justice and peace through ending the Israeli occupation, establishing an independent Palestinian state on the June 4, 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital."[12]

Second: Türkiye

Operation al-Aqsa Flood came at a delicate moment for Türkiye, especially amid its improving ties with Israel. In 2022, Türkiye had restored diplomatic relations and ambassadorial exchanges, with President Erdoğan advocating a separation between relations with Israel and its policies toward Palestinians. Just weeks before the operation, in September 2023, Erdoğan met Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at the "Turkish House"[13] in New York on the sidelines of the 78th session of the UNGA.[14]

Some analyses suggested that Ankara initially approached Operation al-Aqsa Flood cautiously, viewing its main aim as potentially linked to the evolving Türkiye-Israel relationship. Its official stance immediately after the operation differed from previous conflicts between Palestinian resistance and Israel. Türkiye condemned the "targeting of civilians," offered to assist in the "release of hostages," and called on "all parties" to exercise restraint, presenting a seemingly neutral position.

As the ground offensive in GS unfolded, marked by large-scale massacres, Türkiye returned to its prior stance, supporting the Palestinian narrative and condemning Israel's war crimes.

Türkiye's approach to the war in GS evolved through several stages, shaping both its relations and policy stance, and influencing the roles it has played or sought during and after the war.

This approach can be summarized in four key areas: relations with the Palestinian side, especially Hamas; the stance toward Israel; coordination with the US; and Türkiye's role in GS and the broader Palestine issue, alongside its specific role in the war.

Relations with Hamas

Türkiye's relations with Hamas were tested after Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which several international actors labeled a "terrorist act." Senior Hamas leaders had visited Türkiye frequently, with some present there on the day of the operation.

Nevertheless, Türkiye offered Hamas significant political cover, with Erdoğan denying its terrorist designation and recognizing it as a legitimate resistance movement against Israel,[15] likening it to Turkey's independence-era popular movement[16] and portraying it as a bulwark for Palestine, Anatolia,[17] and the wider Muslim world.[18]

Türkiye condemned the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau head Isma'il Haniyyah in Tehran, with officials, including Foreign Minister and Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, calling it a "despicable act" and an attempt by Netanyahu to escalate regional conflict.[19] At Haniyyah's funeral in Doha, Türkiye sent a large delegation led by Kurtulmuş and Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, including former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, major party leaders, and numerous civil society representatives, activists and journalists.[20]

Many Turkish officials condemned the attempted assassination of the Hamas negotiation delegation in Doha, calling it a "despicable" and "brutal terrorist" act that violated international law, Qatar's sovereignty and threatened mediation efforts to end the war in GS.[21]

During the war, meetings between Türkiye's leadership and Hamas were marked by two notable features. First, they moved beyond a purely security focus to the political level, involving not only Turkish intelligence but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and President Erdoğan himself, unlike most Arab and Muslim countries. Second, both the frequency and number of meetings increased significantly, with 15 official sessions held, unprecedented in the history of their relations.

Following a phone call in October 2023, Türkiye's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan met with Hamas Political Bureau Chief Isma'il Haniyyah in Türkiye in

January 2024 to discuss the "release of hostages," a ceasefire in GS, increased humanitarian aid and a two-state solution.[22] On 3/2/2024, a Hamas delegation met with Türkiye's National Intelligence Organization (*Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı*—MİT) director İbrahim Kalın in Doha on a similar agenda.[23]

In April 2024, President Erdoğan hosted a high-level Hamas delegation at Istanbul's Dolmabahçe Palace, led by Isma'il Haniyyah and accompanied by Fidan and Kalın. The meeting addressed efforts to achieve a ceasefire in GS and facilitate humanitarian aid, with Erdoğan stressing "the vital importance of unity among Palestinians" and asserting that "Israel will eventually and inevitably pay the price for its oppression of Palestinians."[24]

In September 2024, Ibrahim Kalın held talks in Ankara with members of Hamas's Political Bureau on ceasefire negotiations.[25]

Fidan also met a Hamas delegation in Ankara, led by Muhammad Darwish, Chairman of the movement's *Shurah* Council and leadership council, to discuss a similar agenda.[26] Another meeting took place in Doha in December 2024, where Fidan reaffirmed Türkiye's position on the Palestine issue, emphasizing that it was "using all its diplomatic capabilities to mobilize the international community towards pushing for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and ending the humanitarian catastrophe" in GS.[27]

In January 2025, President Erdoğan met in Ankara with a Hamas delegation led by Muhammad Darwish, alongside Turkish officials including Fidan and Kalın. During the meeting, Erdoğan stated that "Palestinian group's 471-day struggle in Gaza reaffirmed that the spirit of resistance will endure, praising the group's efforts."[28]

Contacts between the two sides continued. A Hamas delegation led by Darwish visited Türkiye and met Ibrahim Kalin. in April 2025,[29] followed by another meeting in late June 2025.[30] Foreign Minister Fidan also met a similar delegation in early July 2025 to discuss ceasefire efforts[31] and held a further meeting in early August 2025.[32]

Following the ceasefire's entry into force under the plan advanced by US President Donald Trump, Hakan Fidan and İbrahim Kalın jointly met a Hamas delegation in October 2025 to oversee its implementation.[33] Subsequently, on 1/11/2025, Fidan met in Istanbul with a Hamas delegation led by Khalil al-Hayya,

head of its negotiating team and its leader in GS, to address violations of the agreement and the mechanisms governing its implementation.[34] A few days later, Kalın held a separate meeting in Istanbul with the same delegation to explore ways of ensuring the durability of the ceasefire and advancing the implementation of the agreement's subsequent phases.[35] The delegation met once again in December 2025 with both Kalın[36] and Fidan.[37]

In parallel, and beyond its engagement with Hamas, Türkiye hosted 15 released Palestinian prisoners from Jerusalem under the exchange agreement,[38] followed by two additional prisoners, then 13 more,[39] and subsequently six others, bringing the total number who settled in Türkiye to 36.[40]

Furthermore, Ankara dispatched multiple humanitarian aid convoys, thereby positioning Türkiye as the leading contributor globally in this domain. Nevertheless, most of these consignments remained on the Egyptian side of the border as a result of Israel's closure of the Rafah crossing and its continued obstruction of humanitarian access.[41] Concurrently, Istanbul hosted a meeting of the "Group of Parliaments in Support of Palestine," convened under the patronage of the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (GNAT) Kurtulmuş, and attended by President Erdoğan, as part of broader and coordinated efforts to support the Palestinians.[42]

The war on GS emerged as the central theme of the Turkish president's addresses to the UNGA in both 2024 and 2025. In his 2024 address, he urged the General Assembly to issue a recommendation authorizing the use of force should it prove incapable of compelling Israel to bring the war to an end, invoking the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution.[43] In his 2025 address, he adopted an even more forceful tone, stating, "There can be no talk of two belligerent parties in Gaza, adding, "This is an occupation, deportation, exile, genocide; this is in fact a policy of collective extermination." He further maintained, "It must be ensured that the cadre of genocide is held accountable before international law."[44]

Position Toward Israel

As previously noted, the war in GS unfolded against the backdrop of expanding ties between Türkiye and Israel, driven by both sides' interest in cooperation across multiple sectors, most prominently energy. In this context, shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserted during his meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu on 20/9/2023, in New York that "Türkiye can

collaborate with Israel in the fields of energy, technology, innovation, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity."[45]

Nevertheless, bilateral relations rapidly deteriorated and became markedly strained with the onset of the war in GS. While Israel initially took the initiative to recall its ambassadors and close its embassies in several Arab and Muslim countries, anticipating popular backlash following the massacre at the Baptist hospital at the outset of the conflict,[46] Türkiye's official stance evolved progressively as the war in GS continued.

Ankara swiftly shifted from personally criticizing Netanyahu, comparing him to Hitler[47] and even predicting a similar fate,[48] to condemning Israel as a state, labeling it a "terrorist state."[49] In this context, Turkish authorities repeatedly announced the dismantling of espionage networks operating on behalf of Mossad[50] and imposed sentences on some of these networks.[51] Concurrently, Türkiye imposed restrictions on the export of numerous goods to Israel, ultimately announcing a complete suspension of trade,[52] although some reports suggested that limited commerce persisted through circumvention of these measures.

As part of its broader sanctions strategy, Ankara also barred Israeli President Isaac Herzog from using Turkish airspace to travel to Azerbaijan, because he was traveling on a military aircraft rather than a commercial one.[53] Furthermore, Türkiye formally called on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to suspend its partnership with Israel, arguing "It is not possible for the Israeli administration, which has trampled on the fundamental values of our alliance, to continue its partnership relationship with NATO."[54] It subsequently emerged that Ankara had effectively blocked all NATO engagements with Israel since October (the onset of the war in GS) including meetings and joint exercises.[55]

Türkiye spearheaded a diplomatic initiative in collaboration with several key states under the framework of the "Joint Letter," presenting a document signed by 52 Member States and two international organizations to the UN that called for "immediate steps to be taken to halt the provision or transfer of arms, munitions and related equipment to Israel" and emphasized that "Decisive actions are urgently needed to stop this dangerous trajectory, to end impunity and to ensure accountability for all violations, in line with obligations under international law."[56]

In terms of legal accountability for Israel and its leadership, particularly regarding the genocide case brought by South Africa before the ICJ, Türkiye

submitted evidence to the Court demonstrating Israel's culpability[57] and subsequently announced its intention to participate in the proceedings,[58] formally joining in August 2024.[59]

President Erdoğan asserted that Türkiye "must be very powerful so that Israel cannot do what it is doing now in Palestine," invoking Ankara's prior interventions in Libya and the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.[60] In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz stated, "Erdogan is going down the path of Saddam Hussein and threatens to attack Israel. He should just remember what happened there and how that ended," which was widely understood as both a personal threat to Erdoğan and a caution regarding potential destabilization and weakening of Türkiye.[61]

As Israeli aggression extended toward both Lebanon and Syria, Ankara began to perceive the threat not merely as a regional destabilization but as a direct security concern. Erdoğan cautioned that Israeli forces were "only two and a half hours from our borders,"[62] and the Turkish Parliament convened a closed session to deliberate on strategies for "countering the Israeli threat."[63] In addition, Ankara drew lessons from the Israeli-Iranian conflict through the prism of self-preservation, implementing practical measures to address the vulnerabilities that Israel had exploited in Iran, thereby acknowledging the real possibility of Israeli aggression against Türkiye itself.[64]

Ankara has cautioned that Israel may seek to occupy the Syrian capital, Damascus, following the collapse of the Assad regime, an outcome that, as the Turkish president cautioned, would lead to "the complete disintegration of Syria's geography" and severely undermine regional stability. He further stressed that Türkiye "will advocate immediate and lasting peace in Syria."[65] Nonetheless, despite sustained Israeli incitement against Türkiye's role in Syria and the direct targeting of Turkish interests on Syrian territory, Ankara has remained committed to avoiding direct confrontation with Israel. Accordingly, it announced the initiation of preliminary contacts,[66] followed by the convening of initial meetings,[67] and subsequently declared that a preliminary understanding had been reached to prevent any military confrontation between the two sides in Syria.[68]

Moreover, following the ceasefire in GS under the Trump plan, Ankara has repeatedly held Israel accountable for continued violations of the agreement,[69] warning that Israeli conduct could precipitate its collapse, while simultaneously commending Hamas and the Palestinian side for their adherence to its terms.[70]

Beyond its stance on the genocidal war in GS, Ankara consistently opposed Israeli policies concerning the WB and Jerusalem. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally rejected the Knesset's vote to annex the WB, describing it as "null and void" under international law and "has no legal validity." It underscored that "any attempt by Israel to annex it constitutes an illegitimate and provocative effort aimed at undermining peace efforts."[71]

Similarly, Türkiye has consistently opposed Israel's policies in Jerusalem. President Erdoğan has repeatedly underscored the city's significance in the consciousness of Muslims and Christians, as well as its historical status under the Ottomans, thereby invoking Türkiye's moral responsibility toward it.[72] Netanyahu's comments regarding the "Silwan Epigraph" offered Erdoğan an additional opportunity to reaffirm his country's position, stating, "He (Netanyahu) is spewing hatred at us because we didn't give him the Silvan Epigraph, which is a legacy of the ancestors," emphasizing "They pursue the Silvan Epigraph. We will not give you even a single pebble belonging to Jerusalem." He added, "Türkiye's struggle will continue until an independent Palestinian state with East Quds as its capital is established within the 1967 borders."[73]

Since the onset of the war in GS, Ankara has consistently reiterated its support for a two-state solution, presenting it as the essential framework for achieving peace in the Middle East and describing it as an "urgent necessity."[74] This stance was further reinforced by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who underscored Türkiye's rejection of any plan to forcibly displace Palestinians from GS, while stressing that the failure to resolve the Palestine issue through a two-state solution would inevitably prolong conflicts and confrontations, thereby undermining regional stability.[75]

After his meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House, prior to the announcement of the "Trump Peace Plan," Erdoğan emphasized that a two-state solution remains "the formula for lasting peace" in the Middle East, warning that the current situation is unsustainable. "Mr. Trump is also aware that things cannot continue this way," he said.[76] Moreover, Erdoğan welcomed the decisions of Western countries that had formally recognized the State of Palestine, characterizing these recognitions as "building blocks for a two-state solution."[77] He reiterated this official stance in a speech on the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, stating, "We will resolutely uphold our two-state solution

policy until a free, sovereign, and independent Palestinian state is established based on the 1967 borders, with East al-Quds serving as its capital."[78]

Cooperation with the US

Türkiye's approach diverged sharply from that of the US administration regarding the war in GS and its subsequent regional escalation. Ankara viewed itself as a potential target of US military posturing, notably the deployment of aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean at the onset of the war.

While Türkiye avoided direct confrontation with Washington, it consistently adopted positions that fundamentally contradicted US policy and, at times, openly criticized it. Erdoğan, for example, condemned the US Congress's hosting of Netanyahu and the excessive accolades during his speech, observing that "those who teach the entire world about democracy and human rights have no qualms about holding the Hitler of our time in high esteem."[79] Moreover, Türkiye formally and publicly opposed plans for the forced displacement of GS's population.[80] Erdoğan further denounced his US counterpart's plan to seize control of GS in coordination with Netanyahu, characterizing it as "a dire threat to world peace," adding, "The US… has unfortunately been siding with terrorist Israel with this attitude. With their assistance, Israel continues to threaten the oppressed and aggrieved Palestine."[81]

In the closing months of the war, Ankara and Washington drew increasingly closer, as the US sought Türkiye's mediation in achieving a ceasefire agreement. Erdoğan subsequently announced that an understanding had been reached with Trump,[82] emphasizing that the latter had requested his intervention "to convince Hamas" to accept the proposed terms, and confirmed that he had engaged directly with its leadership in this regard.[83] Moreover, the US President[84] commended his Turkish counterpart for his role in both GS and Syria during the Sharm El-Sheikh summit, where the ceasefire was formally announced.[85]

The Evolution of Türkiye's Role

For an extended period, Türkiye's involvement in the war in GS was primarily confined to humanitarian assistance and political engagement, functioning as a key component of joint Arab–Islamic initiatives and as a member of the committee established by the Joint Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit with the OIC and Arab League to support efforts toward a ceasefire in GS.[86]

In the later stages of the war, Türkiye assumed a more proactive role in the negotiation process, particularly concerning Hamas and other Palestinian factions. During this period, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and MİT Chief İbrahim Kalın held multiple meetings with senior Hamas leaders. In the final phase of negotiations, Kalın participated directly in the Qatari-Egyptian mediation, closely monitoring the concluding discussions that culminated in the agreement.

Prior to this, Türkiye was among the eight Arab and Muslim states that met with President Trump in New York shortly before he unveiled his plan, alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, Indonesia and Pakistan,[87] subsequently issuing a joint statement expressing their support once the plan was announced.[88]

Following the declaration of a ceasefire, Ankara assumed a role among the guarantor states responsible for its implementation, together with the US, Qatar and Egypt. President Erdoğan was present on the principal platform for the announcement of Trump's plan at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit. Ankara has consistently reiterated its readiness to play any role that would contribute to consolidating the ceasefire and alleviating the humanitarian situation in GS.[89] Furthermore, it declared its preparedness to deploy technical teams to assist in efforts to recover the bodies of missing Israeli soldiers in the territory.[90]

Nevertheless, Türkiye has consistently issued statements holding Israel accountable for the continued stalling of the agreement's implementation, as it had done previously, while simultaneously emphasizing the imperative of prosecuting those responsible for the atrocities and urging the international community to support a two-state solution.[91]

Moreover, Ankara signaled a clear willingness to participate in the ISF explicitly referenced in the Trump plan. This initiative, however, encountered strong opposition from the Israeli government, with Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar attributing Israel's stance to the fact that "Turkey, led by Erdogan, led a hostile approach against Israel."[92]

The US administration has expressed support for Türkiye's participation, relying on its potential role in "convincing Hamas" during the later stages of the plan, while also anticipating that this involvement could encourage other hesitant Arab and Muslim countries to engage. Nevertheless, US Vice President J.D. Vance stressed, "We're not going to force anything on our Israeli friends when it comes to foreign troops on their soil, but we do think that there's a constructive role

for the Turks to play."[93] Moreover, US Ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, revealed efforts to strengthen Türkiye-Israel relations, beginning with economic agreements; however, as of this writing, there is no concrete indication of progress along this trajectory. As a result, Türkiye was, for instance, excluded from the US-led conference in Doha convened to discuss the formation of the ISF.[94]

Türkiye took part in the Miami summit, which convened the four guarantor states to deliberate on modalities for advancing to the second phase of the agreement. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized, "As Türkiye, we stated that three parameters are important for us in any work to be carried out regarding Gaza. First, Gaza must be governed by Gazans; second, Gaza must not be divided territorially in any way; and third, everything done in Gaza must be done for Gazans." He added, "The ongoing violations by Israel, in particular, are making the process incredibly more difficult. What we see is that all parties are in agreement on this issue," however, "I think it was the most important meeting at the highest level since Sharm el-Sheikh."[95]

Future Outlook

In recent years, Türkiye has markedly enhanced its capabilities and overall power, enabling it to assume more advanced regional roles. This trajectory has been evident in the expansion of its defense industries, the improvement of its relations with several Arab countries, the easing of tensions with the EU, and relatively less strained relations with the US under President Trump. During the period covered by this report, two developments in particular have further strengthened Türkiye's regional standing, and that of President Erdoğan specifically: first, the political track aimed at resolving the domestic Kurdish issue, which culminated in the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*—PKK); and second, the collapse of the Syrian regime, followed by the emergence of a leadership inclined toward establishing strategic relations with Ankara.

In contrast, Israel achieved decisive strikes against several of its regional adversaries, including Iran, yet it has been unable to weaken or neutralize them entirely. Its emerging security strategy following the October 7, 2023 operation emphasizes preemptively confronting and neutralizing potential threats before they materialize, often through cross-border strikes. Furthermore, developments in Syria, specifically the expansion of Turkish influence and the strengthening of

Ankara's ties with the new Syrian leadership, alongside the intensification and deepening of Israeli attacks on the latter, have positioned Türkiye and Israel on opposite ends of a strategic equation in which their core interests conflict. This dynamic exacerbates their disputes and heightens the likelihood of confrontation.

Israel first designated Türkiye as a potential threat in 2020, though this classification did not immediately translate into operational consequences on the ground.[96] Nevertheless, the "Nagel" committee, commissioned by the Netanyahu government, recently recommended in its study that preparations be undertaken for a possible direct military confrontation with Ankara.[97] From Ankara's perspective, Israel is increasingly viewed as a direct threat, particularly in light of ongoing regional developments, most notably in Syria. This perception has been articulated in the above mentioned sessions of the Turkish Parliament and in statements by President Erdoğan, and has been accompanied by practical measures designed to close vulnerabilities that could be exploited in the event of a direct Israeli strike on Turkish territory.

Perceived as a growing threat to Israel, Türkiye's expanding influence in Syria, including the potential establishment of Turkish military bases on Syrian territory, prompted Israel to target Turkish interests within the country directly. This reportedly involved strikes on military bases visited by Turkish delegations evaluating the feasibility of force deployments,[98] as well as on Turkish surveillance installations, according to Israeli claims.[99] In turn, reports suggested that Türkiye was taking measures to deploy radar systems on Syrian soil, which could significantly constrain the operational freedom of the Israeli Air Force.[100]

Israel is determined to prevent Turkish forces from "encircling" it, from the north in Syria and the south in GS, and, as a result, has imposed a firm and unequivocal veto on Türkiye's participation in the ISF. Moreover, Israel seeks to contain and directly challenge Türkiye by mobilizing, supporting and inciting its adversaries. A striking example of this strategy is the 10th Trilateral Summit convened with Greece and Cyprus in Jerusalem, which discussed the formation of a Joint Rapid Response Force tasked with protecting infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean, clearly directed against Türkiye. At the summit, "Netanyahu said in a thinly veiled reference to Turkey that 'those who fantasize they can reestablish their empires and their dominion over our lands' should 'forget it.'"[101] Similarly, Israeli statements have indicated support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in opposition to Türkiye,[102] which has consistently advocated integrating the SDF

into a restructured Syrian army and has signaled the potential for an imminent military operation in coordination with Damascus.[103]

Accordingly, while the prospect of direct confrontation between Türkiye and Israel in the near term remains limited, the likelihood of indirect clashes is considerable, with initial signs already beginning to emerge. In this regard, the situation surrounding SDF or Israel's repeated strikes on Syria could act as a catalyst, potentially escalating tensions into a more complex confrontation.

The US administration seeks to engage Ankara in international stabilization efforts and broader arrangements in GS, owing to its strong ties with Hamas, which position it to "persuade" the movement to undertake certain measures and decisions. Moreover, Türkiye's involvement serves as an incentive for a number of Arab and Muslim countries to participate. Despite Ankara's status as one of the guarantors of the ceasefire, Israel's veto over its involvement remains both real and firm, and is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, thereby framing and significantly constraining Türkiye's role in GS.

Accordingly, Türkiye is set to remain within the framework of the guarantor quartet, while simultaneously seeking closer ties with Washington to help temper Israel's position regarding its participation in the ISF. In this context, together with Qatar and Egypt, Türkiye is likely to advocate for more flexible interpretations of the Trump plan's provisions, particularly those concerning the Palestinian Technocratic Committee and the BoP, while carefully avoiding direct confrontation or tensions with Trump. The approach adopted by Türkiye, in concert with Qatar and Egypt, appears to combine initial endorsement of the US president's declarations and proposed measures with subsequent efforts to recalibrate them through direct dialogue and by highlighting practical, on-the-ground constraints. Nonetheless, the precise limits of Türkiye's engagement remain unclear, particularly regarding the "disarmament" component envisioned under the plan through the ISF, on which the Turkish Foreign Minister has recently expressed reservations concerning its timing and sequencing, though not its underlying principle.[104]

In conclusion, Türkiye's relations with the Palestinian side, particularly Hamas, are likely to continue along the current trajectory over the coming year, with Ankara seeking a more prominent role in Gaza's internal arrangements. Conversely, improvement in relations with Israel appears unlikely in the near term, at least while Netanyahu remains in power, suggesting that the Knesset elections

scheduled for 2026 may prove decisive in shaping the future of Türkiye-Israel relations.

In this context, Israeli behavior constitutes a central factor influencing Türkiye's broader approach to the Palestine issue, as well as its stance toward the Trump plan regarding Gaza. By "Israeli behavior," we refer to a range of actions, including the continued veto on Türkiye's participation in the ISF, ongoing violations of the ceasefire in GS, the risk of renewed regional war, particularly against Lebanon and Iran, and scenarios of direct or indirect confrontation in Syria, including through the "SDF" or other instruments.

Accordingly, Türkiye's posture toward the war on GS has evolved since the outset of hostilities: from an initial expression of solidarity with the Palestinian side to a stance increasingly informed by self-perceived threats and the anticipation of potential confrontations with Israel. This trajectory may even extend toward a more explicit consideration of indirect confrontation, particularly in the Syrian context.

Third: Iran

Iran faced an unprecedented strategic challenge following Operation al-Aqsa Flood by Hamas on 7/10/2023, which elevated the Palestine issue to a regional and international priority while exposing Iran to Israeli and US threats that escalated into direct war in June 2025, marking its first direct confrontation with Israel since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Iran expressed its support for Operation al-Aqsa Flood from the outset, while denying any direct involvement. Concurrently, it condemned in international forums the massacres committed by Israel against the Palestinian people in GS. Iranian officials also held several meetings with Hamas leaders, reaffirming their political and military support for the movement and other Palestinian factions, at both the military and political levels. President Masoud Pezeshkian declared that "the Palestinian nation would not be left alone in this difficult situation," stressing that his "government will prioritize the issue of Palestine as the central issue of the Islamic world; We will try to achieve a ceasefire and stop killing in the Gaza Strip," asserting that Iran "will seriously pursue the end of the long-term occupation of the

Palestinian lands" and that "the future of Gaza and Palestine should be determined by the people of this land."[105]

Furthermore, in his address before the UNGA, the Iranian president sharply criticized Israel, stating that it had committed genocide in the GS and that "It is imperative that the international community should immediately stop the violence and bring about a permanent cease-fire in Gaza." He further asserted that "Israel has been defeated in Gaza and no amount of barbaric violence can restore its myth of invincibility," adding, "blind Israeli state terrorism over the past few days in Lebanon followed by a massive aggression with thousands of victims cannot go unanswered."[106]

Similarly, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, asserted that Israel "has gradually come to the conclusion that they will never triumph over Hamas and Hizbullah." He further maintained that "governments of the region are capable of establishing peace and security," arguing that "the main problem facing the region is foreign interference." Khamenei also affirmed that "the Palestinian people have the right to stand against an enemy that … ruined their lives," and contended that "no one has the right to criticize them [Lebanese] for helping" the Palestinians defend their land. In addition, he stated that "the resistance in Gaza had captured the world's attention," and that "the struggles of the fighters of Palestine and Lebanon have been able to push back the Zionist regime to the position it was in 70 years ago."[107]

In the same vein of endorsing Hamas's actions, Iran's permanent mission to the UN stated that the "spirit of resistance will be strengthened" following the killing of Yahya Sinwar. In a post on X platform, the mission asserted that Sinwar. "will become a model for the youth and children who will carry forward his path toward the liberation of Palestine. As long as occupation and aggression exist, resistance will endure."[108]

Iran's stance represented a clear challenge to Western policies, which centered on condemning Hamas while simultaneously extending strong support to Tel Aviv. Operation al-Aqsa Flood, however, underscored Israel's need for external protection by exposing significant vulnerabilities within its security and intelligence apparatus. Accordingly, the G7 Defense Ministers urged "Iran to refrain from providing support to Hamas, Hizbullah, Houthis and other non-state

actors, and taking further actions that could destabilize the region and trigger an uncontrolled process of escalation."[109]

The Western contradiction is evident: supporting the legitimate right to resistance is deemed "destabilizing," while backing Israel politically, militarily, economically, through media and security channels, and endorsing its aggressions and massacres is framed as "stabilizing"!! This perspective closely mirrors Israel's view of Iran, which Benjamin Netanyahu describes as the "head of the octopus" that must be eliminated in confronting resistance movements.

Iran was fully aware of the threats arising from its stance on the resistance and the Palestine issue. Under the pretext of its nuclear program, which it remained eager to negotiate with the US and European states, Iran sought to avoid a military confrontation it believed Israel sought. This approach, often termed "strategic patience," was sustained despite repeated Israeli assassinations of IRGC leaders, particularly in Syria. Iran's restraint was guided by the principle of denying the enemy opportunities to expand regional conflict. Following the assassination of Sheikh Saleh al-'Aruri, the IRGC affirmed that the operation would not provoke the resistance into a "strategic mistakes," and that the "strategic patience" of both the resistance and Hizbullah "will not deviate from the orbit of rationality and logic."[110]

However, Iran will, for the first time, abandon its strategy of "strategic patience" following its threats of a decisive response to the assassination of Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi on 1/4/2024, one of the IRGC's senior commanders in Syria. The Iranian ambassador in Damascus, Hossein Akbari, had stated that this action "will be met with Iran's decisive response."[111] Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian condemned the targeting of the consulate building as "a violation of all international obligations and conventions."[112]

Operation True Promise 1

In retaliation for the assassination of IRGC Brigadier General Zahedi in Damascus, Iran, for the first time in its history, launched on 13/4/2024 hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles directed at targets in Israel.

Israeli media acknowledged the involvement of other states in countering the Iranian strikes. Channel 12 reported that, according to the Israeli army, US and British fighter jets intercepted some of the drones over the Iraqi-Syrian border,

while French military assets also contributed to defending Israel against the Iranian attack.[113]

Emphasizing that Iran does not seek to expand the war or engage in the open confrontation it believes Israel aims for, IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami stated that the Iranian strike has concluded and there is no intention to continue it; however, the country will respond decisively if Israel targets its interests. He further warned that if Washington participates in any attack against Iran, its bases in the region will be targeted and will not be safe.[114]

In his first public statement on the strikes targeting Israel, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei asserted that "the number of missiles launched or hitting their targets, which has been a focus of the enemy, is secondary." He pointed out that "the primary issue was demonstrating the emergence of the willpower of the Iranian people and the Armed Forces on the global stage and this is what has upset the other side."[115]

Iran's mission to the UN rejected US accusations that it had attacked a US military site on the Jordan-Syria border, which resulted in three US soldiers killed and 34 wounded. In a statement to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), the mission affirmed that "Iran had no connection and had nothing to do with the attack on the US base," stressing that the "conflict between US forces and resistance groups in the region, which reciprocate retaliatory attacks."[116]

Nevertheless, Iran's efforts to avoid a broader war conflicted with Israel's long-standing strategy, which had been preparing for years to target the Iranian regime, referred to by Netanyahu as the "head of the octopus," with the aim of dismantling regional resistance movements.[117]

As part of its provocations, either to draw Iran into a broader conflict or to expose its perceived weakness, Israel carried out a targeted assassination on Iranian soil, killing Hamas Political Bureau Chief Isma'il Haniyyah in central Tehran on 31/7/2024 during his visit to attend the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian. The operation also struck at a leading Palestinian figure central to negotiations and relations with Arab and Muslim countries.

The assassination presented a significant challenge for Iran, sparking internal debate between the imperative to respond and caution against entanglement in the war Israel seeks. Following the attack, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declared,

"we believe it is our duty to take revenge," asserting that Israel has "prepared the ground for a severe punishment."[118] The IRGC similarly stated that Israel's crime would be met with a forceful response from the resistance front, particularly from Iran.[119]

Thousands of Iranians attended Haniyyah's funeral in Tehran amid calls for retaliation. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, led the prayers, while mourners carried images of Haniyyah and Palestinian flags at the University of Tehran. Official Iranian television broadcast scenes of the coffins of Haniyyah and his bodyguard, killed in the same strike, draped in Palestinian flags, with senior officials present, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.

The assassination placed Iran in a delicate position, balancing a direct response against the risk of falling into an "Israeli trap." Israel seeks to escalate the conflict from the GS and its support fronts in Lebanon and Yemen into a direct confrontation with Iran, potentially involving the US, an engagement Iran deems untimely. President Pezeshkian made this stance clear during his meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, stating that Israel's "criminal acts" in Gaza coupled with its assassination of Haniyyah "are a clear example of violating international law." He added, "Iran never seeks to escalate tensions and spread war in the region, but the Israeli regime will definitely receive a response to its crimes."[120]

In this context, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized that Iran remains fully "vigilant" and "will not fall into Israel's trap," describing the assassination of Isma'il Haniyyah in Tehran as "an attempt to provoke and enrage us, aiming to draw us into a broader conflict."[121]

Simultaneously, Iran expressed concern that war with Israel could jeopardize the ceasefire in the GS, which it regarded as a priority. Its permanent mission to the UN responded to the media's question about whether Iran will postpone the response to Israel until the talks regarding the ceasefire in Gaza. It stated, "Establishing a lasting ceasefire in Gaza is our priority; Any agreement that Hamas accepts will be accepted by us."[122]

In the same vein, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirmed that Tehran would not deploy forces to support Lebanon or Palestine, maintaining that the resistance movements in both arenas possess sufficient capacity to confront

Israel. During his weekly press conference, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani stated that Lebanon and Palestine possess the requisite capability to confront Israeli aggression, and that there is no need to deploy auxiliary or volunteer Iranian forces. He further added that Iran has received no requests for assistance and is aware that such support is not required.[123]

The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah ʻAli Khamenei, received a Hamas delegation that included the head of the movement's *Shura* (consultative) Council, Muhammad Darwish, along with senior officials Khalil al-Hayya and Nizar ʻAwadallah. Khamenei said during the meeting, "You prevailed over the Zionist regime and, of course, over the United States, and by God's grace, you did not allow them to achieve any of their goals." He pointed out that the issue of defending Palestine and supporting the Palestinian people is not a matter of debate in the minds of the Iranian people but a "settled issue." "For us, Palestine is a central issue, and the victory of Palestine is also a definite matter" the Leader said.[124]

Israel effectively foreclosed Iran's strategic options by launching a direct assault on Lebanon, beginning with the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah on 27/9/2024, one of Tehran's most consequential allies within the Axis of Resistance. In response, Iran carried out a direct retaliatory strike against Israel on 1/10/2024 (Operation True Promise 2). In a statement, the IRGC described the operation as retaliation for the assassinations of Isma'il Haniyyah, Hasan Nasrallah, and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan, who had been present alongside Nasrallah at the time of the attack.

The IRGC announced that it had targeted deep inside the occupied territories. In its official statement, it maintained that the "operation was carried out with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council and notification of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Ministry of Defense." It further warned that "if the Zionist regime reacts militarily to this operation, which is in accordance with the legal rights of the country and international laws, it will face further crushing and destructive attacks."[125] The IRGC added that "although the area was protected by the most advanced and large-scale defense systems, 90% of the missiles hit the targets successfully."[126] In parallel, *The Jerusalem Post* reported, on 14/10/2024, that the Iranian missile attack on Israel caused an estimated 200 million shekels (approximately $53 million) in damage to private property. Israel subsequently

"vowed to retaliate against Iran for the missile barrage and has been discussing its options with the U.S. in recent weeks."[127]

Although Iran regarded this response as harsher than the first, it warned against any repeat of Israeli aggression, emphasizing the need for US "restraint." Accordingly, "in indirect message to the US via Qatar, Iran says it doesn't want a regional war, but that Israel must be 'deterred.'"[128] Nonetheless, the scenario Iran sought to avoid appears to have materialized. Operations True Promise 1 and 2, designed to prevent a full-scale conflict, failed to dissuade Israel from engaging directly with what Benjamin Netanyahu has called the "head of the octopus," aiming for a decisive victory over the Axis of Resistance. As a result, the confrontation has escalated from a war against the Axis alone to one directly targeting its perceived "head."

This doctrine, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has articulated over several years, frames Iran not merely as a regionally influential state but as an "octopus," with its head in Tehran and limbs extending across Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the GS. From the Israeli perspective, these limbs constitute a direct, multi-front threat that requires a comprehensive strategy rather than isolated responses.[129]

In the early hours of Friday, 13/6/2025, Israel launched a surprise attack on multiple sites in Iran, codenamed Operation Rising Lion, employing over 200 fighter jets. The strikes targeted senior commanders in the Iranian army and IRGC, as well as military and nuclear facilities and high-ranking officials across Iran's security, military, and research institutions. The operation's name was inspired by a passage in the Old Testament, Book of Numbers, Chapter 23, Verse 24: "Behold, the people shall rise up as a great lion, and lift up himself as a young lion; he shall not lie down until he eat of the prey and drink the blood of the slain." [130]

The Israeli army stated that it had targeted dozens of Iranian sites, including military headquarters and nuclear facilities. In an official statement, it declared that, "following the directive of the political echelon, the IDF launched a preemptive, precise, combined offensive based on high-quality intelligence to strike Iran's nuclear program, and in response to the Iranian regime's ongoing aggression against Israel."[131] Iranian media reported the assassination of IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami, along with the nuclear scientists

Fereydoon Abbasi and Mohammad-Mehdi Tehranchi. It also announced the killing of Gholam Ali Rashid, commander of the IRGC's Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters, as well as Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri.[132]

This attack represented the gravest challenge Iran has confronted, not only in comparison with the pressures it faced between 2024 and 2025 following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the assassination of Isma'il Haniyyah, the war on Lebanon, and the killing of Hasan Nasrallah, but arguably since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Significantly, the apparent objective extended beyond the destruction of nuclear facilities to the regime itself.

Although Israel and the US did not explicitly declare regime change as their aim, the contours of the attack indicated one of two strategic objectives: either to impose a coercive settlement terminating Iran's nuclear program while allowing the regime to weaken from within, or to precipitate a decisive confrontation intended, by Israel, and backed by the US, to culminate in its collapse.[133] This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the sudden outbreak of hostilities occurred amid ongoing negotiations with the US over Iran's nuclear program, a sequence widely regarded in Tehran as an act of strategic deception. Moreover, the escalation was accompanied by a coordinated media and strategic "deception campaign" involving Israel and the US, designed to convince Iran that Israeli military movements were merely "pressure tactics" preceding a return to nuclear negotiations.[134]

The Iranian Response

Iran delayed only a few hours before retaliating against the Israeli attack. The very war it had sought to avoid, believing it could prevent Israel from drawing it into direct confrontation, had effectively commenced. On 14/6/2025, Iran launched missile strikes against Israeli targets under the designation Operation True Promise 3, where official sources announced that ballistic missiles were fired from bases in Tehran and Kermanshah.[135]

Israeli Channel 13 reported "unprecedented destruction" in the greater Tel Aviv area, noting that dozens of buildings and vehicles sustained direct damage from Iranian missiles or from debris generated by interception attempts.[136]

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, declared in a series of posts on X the launch of what he termed a "battle" against Israel, stressing that Tehran would not enter into any negotiations with the Israeli state. He posted, "We must act

forcefully against the terrorist Zionist entity. We will show no leniency toward the Zionists."[137]

Iranian Chief of Staff Abdolrahim Mousavi stated that his country's "existence and territorial integrity" faced an unprecedented threat during the 12-day war, with Israel.[138]

Direct US Intervention in the War

Amid the Israeli-Iranian confrontation, the US conducted airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities on 22/6/2025. President Trump confirmed the operation's success, targeting the Fordow, Natanz and Esfahan sites, following the deployment of B2 bombers from a US base across the Pacific. He stated that "Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated" and warned of "far greater" attacks if Iran does not "make peace."[139]

Israeli media reported that about 30 tons of explosives were dropped on Fordow, while ABC News cited an Israeli source noting that "The U.S. and Israel had practiced this attack in a military exercise about a year ago."[140]

In the aftermath of the US strikes on its nuclear facilities, Iranian media cited Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as declaring that the door to diplomacy had been "permanently closed." He added that, under such circumstances, calls for Iran to return to diplomatic engagement were devoid of meaning.[141]

A joint statement was subsequently issued by a number of Arab and Muslim countries rejecting the Israeli attacks against Iran. It stated:

> In light of the rapidly evolving regional developments and the unprecedented escalation of tensions in the Middle East, particularly owing to the ongoing military aggression of Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Foreign Ministers of the State of Qatar, People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Chad, the Union of the Comoros, the Republic of Djibouti, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Republic of Iraq, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the State of Kuwait, the State of Libya, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Republic of the Sudan, the Republic of Türkiye, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates hereby affirm… The categorical rejection and condemnation of Israel's recent attacks on the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 13th of June 2025, and any actions that contravene international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.[142]

The Iranian Response

In retaliation for the attack on its nuclear facilities, Iran launched a strike on the US Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, in an operation it designated Herald of Victory. Doha announced that its air defenses had successfully intercepted the Iranian missiles. In an official statement, the IRGC declared that following the US aggression against our nuclear facilities, Iran delivered a devastating blow to the US Al-Udeid base in Qatar.[143] According to Axios, citing an Israeli official, Iran launched six missiles towards US bases in Qatar. Meanwhile, Iran's Supreme National Security Council stated that "the targeting of Al-Udeid was carried out in a way that kept a safe distance from residential areas in Qatar, posing no threat to the Qatari people." For his part, a US official told Al Jazeera that no US personnel in Qatar were injured as a result of the Iranian missile attack.[144]

Immediately following the announcement of a ceasefire, the US president asserted that Iran's nuclear facilities had been destroyed and that Iran had been defeated. By contrast, Iran's Supreme National Security Council declared that it had compelled the enemy to "regret its actions, acknowledge defeat, and unilaterally cease its aggression."[145] For his part, President Masoud Pezeshkian proclaimed the end of the war with Israel as a "historic victory" for the Iranian nation. He also stated, "We are ready to resolve issues between ourselves and the US based on international frameworks."[146] In a similar vein, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated in a public address that Israel "was practically knocked out and crushed" and that the US wasn't "able to achieve anything significant." He congratulated Iranians "on the victory over the fallacious Zionist regime. With all that commotion and all those claims, the Zionist regime was practically knocked out and crushed under the blows of the Islamic Republic."[147]

Ynet Global cited a senior Israeli official who cautioned, "We must not be deceived; Iran remains a formidable power," adding that "Iran retains a substantial missile arsenal and its nuclear program has not been fully destroyed."[148] In the same vein, Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir declared in August 2025, "We are not finished with Iran yet," describing the 12-day conflict in June as merely the first phase of the operation.[149]

Ultimately, the US president opted to halt the war in the GS, after Israel's evident failure to achieve its goals of dismantling Hamas and securing the release of prisoners. He "felt like the Israelis were getting a little bit out of control in what

they were doing, and that it was time to be very strong and stop them from doing things that he felt were not in their long-term interests."[150]

Iran endorsed the ceasefire announcement and supported Hamas and other Palestinian factions in accepting the first phase of Trump's plan, which entailed ending the war, preventing displacement, facilitating humanitarian aid, and conducting a prisoner exchange. Nevertheless, Tehran declined to participate in the Sharm el-Sheikh summit held on 13/10/2025 at the invitation of the Egyptian president. In its official statement, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that Iran "has consistently supported every measure and initiative aimed at halting the genocidal war, ensuring the withdrawal of occupying forces, enabling the entry of humanitarian assistance, securing the release of Palestinian prisoners, and realizing the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people." It further affirmed its support for "the legitimate resistance of the Palestinian nation in its pursuit of the right to self-determination," while underscoring the "legal, humanitarian, and moral duty" of States and competent international institutions "to pursue justice through the identification and prosecution of" Israel war criminals."[151]

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs further expressed its readiness to contribute to humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in the GS, in line with its stated objective of breaking the siege. Concurrently, it warned of the "dangerous dimensions and aspects" of Trump's plan and reiterated "its warning about the repeated breaches and obstructionism by the Zionist regime in fulfilling its promises."[152]

Despite Israel's lack of formal adherence to the agreement, Iran's support for a ceasefire remained steadfast, consistent with its advocacy since the onset of the aggression. President Masoud Pezeshkian had stated that he would support any ceasefire in the GS. Speaking to journalists on the sidelines of the UNGA meeting, he affirmed his support for any agreement that would end the Palestinians' tragedy, save lives and alleviate the suffering of women and children from hunger.[153] In the same vein, the Iranian Foreign Ministry considered any decision regarding the future of the GS "to be within the authority of the Palestinian people and resistance," adding that it supports "any initiative that entails the cessation of ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Gaza."[154]

Analysts noted that while the agreement revealed Israel's failure to achieve its objectives and affirmed the resilience of the resistance, Iran remains concerned

that post-GS arrangements could advance normalization through the Abraham Accords and marginalize its role in the regional balance.[155]

Future Outlook

Despite the cessation of hostilities with Israel and the US, Iran remains wary, as unresolved domestic and regional issues continue to present multiple potential scenarios.

- The ceasefire with Israel does not signal an end to enmity or to the underlying causes of the war. Accordingly, Iran is racing to strengthen its missile arsenal and defense systems, repair war-related damage, and prepare for a potential future war, at a time when Israeli statements assert that the war with Iran is far from over.
- Although Iran had previously expressed willingness to negotiate with the US and the European Troika over its nuclear program, the war launched against it has undermined its trust in any renewed talks, especially since the war erupted just two days before a scheduled negotiation in Muscat, Oman, which Iran perceived as a betrayal. As a result, Iran now confronts reinstated sanctions while simultaneously needing to negotiate to secure recognition of its peaceful nuclear program, lift these sanctions, and address its economic challenges.
- Iran is expected, together with other resistance forces, to focus on rebuilding and strengthening its capabilities, drawing on the lessons acquired during the war and on the relative strengths, weaknesses, and operational capacities of each force. This will require a shared assessment of the war's outcomes and coordinated planning among resistance forces in the coming stages, whether in the context of a formal ceasefire or as preparation for potential future hostilities in the GS or Lebanon.
- The region remains highly unstable amid efforts to establish a regional order in which Iran and its allies within the resistance movements occupy marginal, if any, roles. This dynamic is evident in calls for "disarmament" in the GS and Lebanon, as well as in US and European demands to halt uranium enrichment and curb Iran's missile capabilities. Iran is likely to invest significant effort in countering such a system, particularly by strengthening trust-based ties with key regional states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye. Following the Israeli attack on Qatar, the Iranian president emphasized this approach, noting: "No

country in the region will be immune unless they unite to confront the occupying regime..”[156]

- Iran aims to enhance its defensive capabilities to deter any potential aggression, while offering support, as feasible, to parties within the Axis of Resistance and remaining ready to negotiate its nuclear program without preconditions.
- The Israeli-US campaign against Iran has highlighted Tehran’s pivotal role in supporting resistance movements. Despite sustained threats and pressures, Iran has consistently reaffirmed its commitment to the Palestine issue and to backing resistance against Israel, a stance echoed by resistance leaders in the GS and Lebanon.
- Iran, together with other parties of the Axis of Resistance, is expected to coordinate efforts to counter the promotion of normalization and the Abraham Accords, which the US is likely to seek to expand. This is especially important as the post-war phase may involve reconstruction in the GS and Lebanon, potentially extending over several years.

Overall, the US-Israeli war on Iran, launched in late February 2026, further reinforces these trends.

Fourth: Other Muslim Countries

Malaysia

During 2024–2025, Malaysia maintained its firm support for the Palestine issue and the defense of Palestinian legitimate rights. It supported South Africa’s case before the ICJ against Israel over its actions in the GS, including allegations of genocide. In a January 2024 statement, Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “The legal action against Israel before ICJ is a timely and tangible step towards legal accountability for Israel’s atrocities in Gaza and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) at large,” adding, “Malaysia calls on Israel to fulfil its obligations under international law and to immediately end its atrocities against Palestinians.”[157]

In this context, Malaysia announced a $2.1 million contribution to UNRWA, following Israel’s attack on the UN agency and the subsequent suspension of aid

through it by several Western states. Earlier, a Malaysian parliamentary delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mohamad Alamin, visited Cairo to facilitate the delivery of Malaysian emergency and humanitarian relief supplies to the Palestinian people in the GS.[158]

In a notably forthright stance, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim "slammed the West for its inconsistent application of international law in the Israel-Gaza war and called out its hypocrisy in condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine but not supporting a ceasefire in Gaza." Speaking at Canberra's Australian National University, he argued that "the gut-wrenching tragedy that continues to unfold in the Gaza Strip has laid bare the self-serving nature of much valued, the much vaunted rules-based order." He questioned the West's "so vociferous, vehement and unequivocal" condemnation of Russian invasion of Ukraine, "while remaining utterly silent on the relentless bloodletting inflicted on the innocent men, women and children of Gaza," stressing that international law must not be applied selectively.[159]

Later, Anwar Ibrahim announced his country's readiness to deploy peacekeeping forces to secure a ceasefire in the GS. In a social media statement, he noted that he had spoken by phone with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, during which they discussed the attacks on Palestine and confirmed both countries' willingness to send peacekeeping forces to the GS in coordination with Indonesia, should the UN mandate it.[160]

In a televised interview, Ibrahim reaffirmed that Malaysia would not recognize Israel under any circumstances, despite significant pressure over his publicly declared stance, stressing that this policy would remain unchanged and that Malaysia's support for the Palestine issue would continue.[161]

Malaysia has also sustained its support in international forums. While chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the bloc issued a statement welcoming the ceasefire in GS and calling for the entry of humanitarian aid.[162]

In February 2025, Malaysia took part in a humanitarian airdrop to the GS conducted by the Jordanian Air Force, following a $5 million contribution made in December 2024 by the Malaysian public through the Malaysian Humanitarian Trust Fund for the People of Palestine (AAKRP) to support the humanitarian air bridge.[163]

Amid Israel's ongoing attacks on civilians and siege of the GS, Malaysia called for an investigation into the deaths of 1,300 Palestinians killed by Israeli forces while awaiting humanitarian aid, often described as "death traps."[164]

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim described the US "peace" plan as "far from perfect" but stressed that the immediate priority "must be to halt the bloodshed and deliver aid to the Palestinian people." On X, he highlighted that the real responsibility lies in "ending Zionist atrocities, ensuring food and water reach the people, and keeping hope alive for those who still endure."[165]

Pakistan

Pakistan maintained its consistent support for the Palestine issue, while allowing broad space for public expressions of solidarity. President Arif Alvi welcomed the ICJ's preliminary ruling in the case brought by South Africa against Israel for committing genocide in the GS, calling it "an outstanding judgment" and urging Israel to "immediately stop the genocide and bloodshed of the innocent civilians in Gaza." He emphasized that the ruling exposes "the inhuman acts and barbarism being committed by Israel, adding that Israel had transgressed all boundaries of humanity by targeting women, children, and hospitals and didn't even spare people who were standing in queue for food." He "urged the international community and other organs of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, to take steps for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and prevent Israel from committing further bloodshed in Palestine."[166]

On 26/1/2024, the ICJ ruled that "Israel must take all measures within its power to prevent and punish the direct and public incitement to commit genocide in relation to members of the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip," and that the Palestinians in Gaza have the right "to be protected from acts of genocide."[167]

In later court sessions, Pakistan's representative asserted that Israel had created irreversible facts on the ground, enforcing discrimination against Palestinians since 1967 and restricting Muslim and Christian worship in Jerusalem. He stressed that a two-state solution must underpin peace and called for the reversal of all changes resulting from the forcible annexation of land.[168]

Pakistan condemned the UNSC's failure to grant Palestine full UN membership due to the US veto.[169] Subsequently, Pakistan's Alternate Permanent Representative to the UN, Asim Iftikhar, called on the international community to unite in

resolving the Palestine issue, establish "safe and secure humanitarian corridors," and "prioritize rebuilding Gaza's shattered healthcare system." He also reaffirmed Pakistan's support for granting Palestine full UN membership, considering it "a moral imperative to secure irreversibility of the two-state solution."[170]

Regarding Israel's assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Isma'il Haniyyah in Tehran on 31/7/2024, Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif condemned the act as a violation of all norms, and the Pakistani parliament adopted a resolution denouncing it.[171]

In a notable move, Pakistan admitted more than 150 medical and dental students from the GS to continue their studies at Pakistani universities. Welcoming the students, the prime minister said, "Dear students, our brothers, sisters, Pakistan is your second home," adding, "Our hearts are there for you, our homes are there for you, our institutions are there for you, our teachers are there for you."[172]

Pakistan swiftly expressed solidarity with Iran following Israel's attacks in June 2025. The Pakistani prime minister conveyed to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian his country's "unwavering solidarity with the brotherly people of Iran in the face of Israel's unprovoked aggression." Meanwhile, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif stated that "after targeting Palestine and Yemen, Israel has now launched attacks on Iran," thus stressing that "The Muslim Ummah must stand united in today's difficult time."[173]

In a related development, Pakistan and the PA signed a memorandum of understanding on health and pharmaceuticals, with Pakistan's health minister reaffirming Islamabad's unwavering support for the State of Palestine.[174]

Pakistan's foreign minister also commented on US President Donald Trump's plan to halt the war on the GS, announced in October 2025, noting that its immediate aims were to secure a ceasefire, stop the bloodshed, enable the flow of humanitarian aid and end forced displacement.[175]

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned Israel's 1/10/2025 attack on the Global Sumud Flotilla to the GS, calling it a "dastardly act." He urged the immediate release of all those illegally apprehended, noting "their crime was to carry aid for the hapless Palestinian people," and emphasized that "This barbarity must end. Peace must be given a chance and humanitarian aid must reach those in need."[176]

Regarding the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the GS, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar announced that "Pakistan was ready to commit its troops to the Gaza peace force," emphasizing that Hamas's disarmament is the responsibility of the "Palestinian law enforcement agencies," not the peacekeepers'.[177]

Indonesia

In 2024, Israeli media reported secret talks between Indonesia and Israel on normalization, but no progress occurred in 2024–2025. Indonesia maintained its support for the Palestine issue during Israel's war on GS, sending 242 tons of medical and relief aid via Egypt's Al-Arish port in February 2024.[178]

Meanwhile, representing Indonesia at the ICJ, Minister for Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi criticized Israel, stressing that "No State should be granted a free rein to do anything they want against a weaker State." She stated that "Israel has even been circumventing negotiations through numerous strategic pretexts," while continuing the expansion of settlements, and "consistently obstructing a negotiated two-State solution." She further noted that Israeli governments "have been openly ignoring the calls from the UNSC to settle this issue peacefully and abide by its international obligations."[179]

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that "when needed and when requested by the United Nations, we are prepared to contribute significant peacekeeping forces to maintain and monitor this prospective ceasefire" in GS.[180]

Amid Israeli and Western attempts to hinder UNRWA's support for Palestinian refugees in the GS, Indonesia boosted its contribution by $1.2 million and provided a $2 million grant in response to UNRWA's urgent appeal for April–September 2024.[181]

Furthermore, Indonesia condemned the Israeli Knesset's efforts to restrict the functions of the UNRWA by labeling it a "terrorist organization," stating in July 2024 that "Israel's systematic efforts to dismantle UNRWA are unacceptable and, subsequently, negate the rights of Palestinian refugees to return and to be repatriated to their homes."[182]

Notably, the Indonesian government, which took office in October 2024, immediately condemned "the total blockade and Israeli attacks that have caused

severe hunger and the deaths of countless Palestinian civilians in Northern Gaza." It added, "The attacks targeting healthcare facilities and workers in Northern Gaza, including the Indonesian Hospital, are clear violations of international law, international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights."[183]

At the start of 2025, the Indonesian government and local humanitarian organizations launched a campaign, "Solidarity, Concrete Actions, and New Hope," coordinating efforts across Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia to raise over $200 million during Ramadan for relief and reconstruction in Palestine, especially the GS.[184]

In a humanitarian gesture, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto offered to temporarily host and treat wounded, trauma-affected individuals, and orphans from the GS in Indonesia until their recovery and safe return, directing his Foreign Ministry to coordinate with Palestinian authorities.[185]

Diplomatically, the Indonesian president told the UNGA, "We must never be silent while Palestinians are denied that same justice and legitimacy in this very hall," stressing the need to "stand for all — the strong and the weak." He added that "Indonesia is prepared to deploy 20,000 or even more of our sons and daughters to help secure peace in Gaza or elsewhere, in Ukraine, in Sudan, in Libya, everywhere when the peace needs to be enforced, peace needs to be guarded, we are ready."[186]

Reflecting widespread Indonesian support for the Palestine issue, Indonesia refused to grant visas to Israeli gymnasts, thereby preventing their participation in the 2025 World Artistic Gymnastics Championship held in Jakarta on 19–25/10/2025. Youth and Sports Minister Erick Thohir added, "The government firmly states that it will refrain from any contact with Israel until Israel recognizes the existence of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state."[187]

Fifth: Popular Islamic Responses to the Palestine Issue

The years 2024–2025 marked a critical juncture in the Muslim world. Operation al-Aqsa Flood triggered a profound shock in the collective consciousness and served as a source of inspiration, embodying faith, resilience, sacrifice and steadfastness. Despite fragmentation, division, and the subordination of many societies to territorially bounded regimes, often marked by corruption and alignment with

Western dominance, public engagement with the Palestine issue remained strong. Throughout 2024–2025, thousands of demonstrations, sit-ins, and solidarity events were held in support of Palestine, its people, Jerusalem and the resistance, while calling for support to GS, lifting the blockade, preventing displacement and ending genocide. Selected examples are highlighted below.

In January 2024, demonstrators in Sarajevo called for an end to the genocide in the GS. Safija Tadifi, one of the organizers, stated, "We demand a cease-fire and the end of the genocide. This is the third march we have organized," adding, "We want to organize these marches and show that the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are on the side of the Palestinian people."[188]

During the same month, the Al-Quds International Institute (QII), together with the Global Forum for Moderation, the International Union of Muslim Scholars, the International Arab Centre for Communication and Solidarity, and the Kuala Lumpur Forum For Thought And Civilization, held a conference in Istanbul under the banner "Freedom for Palestine." It condemned Israel's attacks on civilians in the GS and WB and called for a "Freedom and Justice for Palestine" alliance to support Gaza's resilience.[189]

In Kuala Lumpur, where protests persisted throughout Israel's 2024–2025 war, tens of thousands marched in March 2024 in solidarity with the GS. The demonstration reflected Malaysia's ethnic, religious and political diversity, led by Chua Tian Chang, a Malaysian politician of Chinese descent supporting the Palestine issue, alongside Indian minority leaders and heads of various NGOs. Chua affirmed that all parties in Malaysia share four key demands: the immediate and unconditional halt of Israel's military actions to stop the mass killings of Palestinians by Israeli forces; the unrestricted delivery of humanitarian aid to the residents of the GS; accountability for Israel and its political and military leaders for their war crimes; and UN recognition of the State of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital.[190]

In Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami organized hundreds of events, including a major demonstration in March 2024 in Islamabad in solidarity with GS, which drew large crowds. The party's leader, Siraj-ul-Haq, took part in the protest. Furthermore, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders also sent messages to the new Pakistani government under Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif, urging a firmer Pakistani stance on developments in GS. Senator Mushtaq Ahmad Khan questioned why Muslim

countries had not acted as South Africa did at the ICJ, linking the Palestine issue to Kashmir: "How can we demand our rights in Kashmir while failing to support the people of Palestine?!."[191]

In the Maldives, a solidarity gesture with the GS featured a banner reading, "We don't want your money with blood on it," accompanied by a link showing footage of Israeli massacres in the GS and signaling a ban on Israeli passport holders. Earlier, demonstrations outside the Maldivian parliament expressed outrage at Israel's attacks, and MP Saud Hussain proposed amending the immigration law to bar Israeli passport holders due to Israel's ongoing inhumane actions.[192]

In Türkiye, hundreds of events were held, including demonstrations in which thousands of citizens gathered in Istanbul and Ankara on 28/4/2024 in solidarity with the Palestinian people and in protest against the Israeli war in the GS, calling for an end to the aggression. Meanwhile, a mass rally in Istanbul's Üsküdar district, on the Asian side of the city, was organized by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH) and the Freedom Flotilla Coalition.[193]

In response to the wave of student protests in the US, thousands of students from across Malaysia held a demonstration in May 2024 outside the US embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Protesters condemned US policy as supportive of Israel's war on the GS. The rally, attended by prominent political figures including former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, called for an immediate ceasefire and affirmed support for the Palestinian people's right to freedom and independence.[194]

In the same context, students at the International University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina staged a protest on 16/5/2024 condemning Israel's war on the GS. Demonstrators raised the Palestinian flag and carried placards reading "Ceasefire Now" and "I Stand with Palestine." University President Professor Ahmet Yildirim said the protest was organized "to challenge the silence of many states over what is happening in the GS."[195]

In Bangladesh, a significant wave of demonstrations took place in support of GS. For example, in June 2024, large-scale protests were held in solidarity with the Palestinians of GS, urging their government to recognize the Palestinian state and coordinate with the international community accordingly. They also called for a ban on arms sales to Israel and for the boycott of Israeli goods in local markets.[196] Similarly, on 12/4/2025, more than one million people gathered in Dhaka in one

of the largest pro-GS mobilizations in the country, publicly pledging to boycott products and entities associated with Israel.[197]

In protest against the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Isma'il Haniyyah, protests erupted in several Iranian cities. Large crowds gathered in Tehran's Palestine Square, chanting against Israel and calling for revenge, while burning Israeli and US flags and raising those of Palestine and Hamas.[198] These demonstrations were part of a wider wave of mobilizations across Iran.

The assassination of Haniyyah by Israel marked a turning point in popular Islamic solidarity across most Muslim countries, with prayers for the soul of the Hamas leader spreading through the cities and towns of the Muslim world, as well as among Muslim communities worldwide. In Indonesia, funeral prayers in absentia (*salat al-gha'ib*) were held for Haniyyah and the Palestinian martyrs in several cities, with official participation. Similarly, in Malaysia, the Prime Minister joined the people in praying for the souls of the martyrs. Funeral prayer in absentia was also held in Pakistan, where the Central Ameer of Jamaat-e-Islami, Hafiz Naeemur Rehman, addressed attendees, stating that Haniyyah's martyrdom has instilled in a renewed spirit, and if people around the world stand with Hamas today, it is a significant achievement for them."[199]

At the one-year mark of Israel's genocidal war on GS, demonstrations erupted across the Muslim world, from Türkiye to Indonesia and Pakistan. The Pakistan Ulema Council issued a statement, led by Tahir Mehmood Ashrafi and endorsed by some 65 scholars and religious leaders, condemning Israel's blatant human rights violations in the occupied Palestinian territories and emphasizing that humanity suffers in Palestine, with Israel, as the occupying power, having crossed all moral limits.[200]

In October 2024, cities across Indonesia held vigils and marches marking one year since Operation al-Aqsa Flood and Israel's war on GS. In Jakarta, thousands gathered at the US embassy, responding to a call by the Alliance of Indonesian Defenders of Palestine (ARI-BP), denouncing US financial and military support for Israel, and urging their government, along with Arab and Muslim countries, to strengthen support for the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples.[201]

At the start of 2025, the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI) launched an initiative to build 100 mosques in the GS to address urgent local needs. Former Vice President of Indonesia and the DMI General Chair Muhammad Jusuf Kalla,

highlighted that over a thousand mosques in the GS had been destroyed by Israel in the past year and a half. He noted that the DMI would begin with 10 semi-permanent mosques, eventually reaching 100, and called on Indonesian worshippers to support the effort through zakat and donations, adding that plans were coordinated with local authorities in the GS.[202]

In Senegal, the Senegal Alliance for the Palestinian Cause organized in April 2025 a solidarity march condemning Israel's genocidal war on GS. Hundreds of demonstrators in Dakar joined, demanding severed diplomatic ties and the expulsion of Israeli diplomats, including the ambassador. During the 2.5-kilometer march, Seydi Gassama, Executive Director of Amnesty International Senegal, urged a boycott of Israeli products, declaring, "What is happening in Gaza concerns us all; our shared humanity is under attack," and stressed that "silence is no longer an option," concluding that "Netanyahu must be held accountable before the International Criminal Court."[203]

Meanwhile, in Türkiye, popular mobilization in support of the Palestine issue continued, as 200 trade unionists from over 40 countries protested, in April 2025, outside the UN Türkiye office in Ankara during the "International Congress on Labor, Digitalization and Social Justice," condemning Israel's genocide in the GS with banners reading: "No to War," "Free Palestine," and "17,954 children and 12,365 women were killed."[204]

In May 2025, the Gaza Tribunal Public Assembly was convened in Sarajevo to examine alleged war crimes committed by Israel in the GS. The initiative was organized by the Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum (ICYF), which brings together 66 member bodies, including 50 national youth organizations and 16 minority Muslim youth organizations. Established for humanitarian and ethical purposes, the people's tribunal was led by Richard Falk, former UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories.[205]

In Iran, Sunni scholars in Kurdistan Province held a large public conference in July 2025 at Quba Mosque, the largest mosque in Sanandaj, the provincial capital. Participants declared that "defensive jihad against Israel…is a religious duty upon the entire Muslim *Ummah*," and described silence or failure to support the GS as "an unforgivable historical betrayal." They added that "the Palestinian resistance, foremost Hamas and the Palestinian mujahidin, will remain a symbol of the *Ummah*'s dignity and its first line of defense."[206]

In India, Muslim leaders held a press conference in New Delhi on 28/7/2025 in support of Palestine. Jamaat-e-Islami Hind President Syed Sadatullah Husaini urged the Indian government to uphold its humanitarian obligations, stand firmly with the oppressed Palestinian people, and raise its voice on their behalf, stressing that these demands extend to the government, companies, and all segments of Indian society.[207]

On 12/10/2025, thousands of Indonesians marched in Jakarta to protest Israel's genocidal war against the Palestinian people in the GS, waving Palestinian flags and chanting in support of Gaza's steadfastness and resistance.[208]

It should be noted that the scale of popular mobilization across the Muslim world during 2024–2025 far exceeded the scope of this report; it therefore highlights only the most significant moments reflecting Muslim peoples' mobilization and solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Sixth: Normalization and Israel's Relations with Muslim Countries

Observers recognize the serious risks that normalization poses to the Palestine issue, especially amid a genocidal war spanning over two years. While Israel was under pressure, especially after Ansar Allah in Yemen disrupted shipping through the Red Sea toward Israel, several Arab and Muslim countries extended notable support. Reports indicate that Azerbaijani oil exports rose by 55% in the first half of 2024, and despite Türkiye's trade ban with Israel, the oil continued to transit the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline to the port of Ceyhan, from where it was shipped to Haifa.[209] In 2025, Israel's imports of Azerbaijani oil via Turkey's Ceyhan port reached a three-year high at 94 thousand barrels per day, up 31% from 2024, making up 46.4% of Israeli oil imports. In this context, Turkey maintained that it does not control the final destination of Azerbaijani oil transported through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. It further stated in November 2024 that exporters using Ceyhan "respected its decision to end trade with Israel" and that oil was not being loaded with Israel as the destination. Moreover, Turkey's Energy Ministry, in response to queries, referred to a 2024 statement saying that state-run pipeline operator BOTAŞ was not involved in the sale of Azerbaijani oil.[210]

In contrast, Israel provides Azerbaijan with weapons and military technology. In 2024, for the first time since 2020, Azerbaijani aircraft conducted over twenty cargo flights from Israel's Ovda Airbase, the main hub for arms shipments.[211]

In Azerbaijani-Israeli energy cooperation, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) with Israel's NewMed Energy and British Petroleum (BP) signed an agreement allowing SOCAR to explore oil within Israel, covering roughly 1,700 km² off the northern coasts of the occupied Palestinian territories. In June 2025, SOCAR also expanded its Israeli investments by acquiring a 10% stake in the Tamar gas field.[212]

Later in 2025, Azerbaijan concluded an economic cooperation agreement to import fresh vegetables from Israel. Oren Lavi, Director General of Israel's Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, described the move as opening "a new door for Israeli agriculture on the Modern Silk Road. This is an unprecedented move that expands agricultural exports and constitutes an important growth engine for the Israeli economy." He further noted that the "move could pave the way for similar opportunities in other countries along the route."[213]

Highlighting the strength of Israel-Azerbaijan relations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in May 2025 a planned five-day visit to Azerbaijan, which he later cancelled for security reasons, according to Israeli media; the reports also noted that Türkiye had not granted overflight permission for his aircraft. Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesperson Oncu Keceli stated, "The claims that overflight permission was granted to the Israeli Prime Minister's plane are absolutely untrue. No such request has been conveyed to us either."[214]

In November 2024, Israeli President Isaac Herzog cancelled a planned visit to the Azerbaijani capital to attend the 29th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or COP29). Israel's Channel 12 website cited a statement noting that, "in light of the security assessment and for security reasons," the trip was cancelled. By contrast, the Turkish authorities announced that they had denied Herzog's aircraft permission to traverse Türkiye's airspace en route to Azerbaijan.[215]

On 19/5/2025, Israeli Minister of Defense Israel Katz met Azerbaijani Defense Minister General Zakir Hasanov. According to the "Israel in Arabic" page, the visit aimed to deepen strategic and security ties. Katz also thanked Azerbaijan for mediating between Israel and Türkiye, for its consistent support, and for awarding

Israel 12 points in the Eurovision Song Contest.[216] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar further noted in January 2026 that bilateral trade increased by about 50% in 2025, exceeding $360 million.[217]

In November 2025, Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Abraham Accords during a White House dinner held on the sidelines of the second Central Asia + U.S. (C5+1) summit, attended by regional leaders: Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev; Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov; Tajik President Emomali Rahmon; Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedow; and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. In an official statement, the Kazakh government described the anticipated step as "fully consistent with the nature of republic's balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy."[218]

It is worth noting that bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Israel are not new, as they have maintained multifaceted, interest-driven ties since the 1990s.

Between 2024 and 2025, Israel faced significant challenges, especially the need for a steady oil supply to maintain its military operations in the GS. To meet this, it boosted imports from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Nigeria. Data from the Washington-based Attaqa Research Unit show that Azerbaijan's average exports to Israel rose by over 17 thousand barrels per day in the first eight months of 2025, compared with 69 thousand barrels per day in the same period of 2024, reaching 86 thousand barrels per day. Over the same period, Kazakhstan's exports rose from 63 thousand to 66 thousand barrels per day, while Nigeria's increased from 13 thousand to 17 thousand barrels per day, placing it fourth after Gabon.[219]

It appears that Nigerian-Israeli cooperation has not been limited to the economic sphere. In a statement issued by Nigeria's Ministry of Defense, Permanent Secretary Gabriel Tanimu Aduda was reported to have received Israel's ambassador to Nigeria, Michael Freeman, at the Ministry's headquarters in Ship House in Abuja. Ambassador Aduda highlighted the critical need to deepen defense ties in the light of evolving global security challenges. He emphasized the importance of strategic areas such as joint operations, knowledge exchange, and the modernization of defense cooperation. The discussions also included plans to finalize a new bilateral defense agreement aimed at fostering technical collaboration in defense industry development. "The Ministry will engage in strategic initiatives to replicate successful Israeli military cooperation frameworks in Nigeria, thereby enhancing our national defence architecture," Aduda added.[220]

In April 2024, *Yedioth Ahronoth* reported that Indonesia and Israel had reached an understanding whereby Indonesia would normalize relations with Israel in exchange for Israel's approval of its request to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), following three months of discreet negotiations between the two countries and the organization. The report noted that OECD membership requires the unanimous approval of all 38 member states, including Israel.[221] Despite these leaks, no agreement was signed in 2024–2025 for Indonesia to join the normalization track. Later, President Joko Widodo emphasized that discussing normalization was inappropriate while Israel continued massacres and the killing of women and children, calling instead for peace, a ceasefire in the GS, and the implementation of a two-state solution.[222]

It is also worth noting that Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who assumed office in October 2024, stated during a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron that "Indonesia has conveyed that once Israel recognizes the State of Palestine, we are prepared to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic relations."[223]

As for Pakistan, at the official level it has maintained its rejection of normalizing relations with Israel. Nevertheless, Israel has continued its efforts to achieve a breakthrough, particularly as Israel's conduct has come under heightened scrutiny amid the mass killing of the Palestinians in GS. In this context, it sought to improve its image by organizing a familiarization trip for a group of Pakistani influencers, journalists and researchers, to Israel. The 10-member Pakistani delegation's visit was "organized by Sharaka, a nonprofit dedicated to promoting dialogue and coexistence in the Middle East, and was supported by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany," with the aim of introducing the delegation to "the history of Israel and the Jews."[224] The Pakistani Foreign Office reaffirmed that there was no change in the country's position that it did not recognize Israel, adding that officials were gathering information on an alleged visit to Israel by a local delegation of journalists and influencers.[225] Nonetheless, such isolated actions do not reflect the stance of the overwhelming majority of the Pakistani public, which remains supportive of the Palestine issue.

Israel appears keen, for several reasons, to deepen cooperation with Central Asian states as part of a broader strategy to move closer to Iran and surround it with countries cooperating with Israel across the security, military and intelligence

domains. A similar approach is evident in Africa, particularly in states influential in maritime navigation in the Horn of Africa, such as Somalia. In December 2025, Benjamin Netanyahu officially recognized "the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state."[226] This reflects Israel's continued strategy of encouraging fragmentation and division, its support for the partition of Somalia, and its efforts to secure a new foothold in the Horn of Africa.

***

The table below presents Israeli trade volumes with several non-Arab Islamic countries. Türkiye had previously led trade relations with Israel among Muslim countries, until measures taken resulted in the complete suspension of trade in May 2025. Azerbaijan remains among the most active partners, while ten other countries maintain comparatively limited and uneven levels of trade.

Table 1/7: Israeli Trade Volume with a Number of Non-Arab Muslim Countries 2023–2025 ($ million)[227]

Country	Israeli exports to:			Israeli imports from:		
	2025	2024	2023	2025	2024	2023
Türkiye	10.9	598.6	1,554.4	924.1	2,019.1	4,607.6
Azerbaijan	345.3	179	239.2	15.4	7.3	3.8
Kazakhstan	55.1	44.9	71.7	10.9	7.7	5.2
Uzbekistan	42.8	35.9	28.8	25.1	16.3	6
Indonesia	27.3	49.7	36.8	105.6	61.5	59.2
Turkmenistan	26	0.8	0.1	0	0.2	0
Nigeria	23	27.9	21.2	7.1	10.6	5.9
Malaysia	16.5	22.8	25.3	5.2	6	10.4
Senegal	6.5	19.6	21.5	3	4.2	5.9
Ivory Coast	4.1	3.9	33.4	1.2	0.2	0.1
Cameroon	3.7	2.7	5.1	0.2	0	0
Gabon	0.2	2	2.5	0.1	0.2	0.4

Israeli Exports to a Number of Non-Arab Muslim Countries 2024–2025 ($ million)



Israeli Imports From a Number of Non-Arab Muslim Countries 2024–2025 ($ million)



Conclusion

The OIC's performance has remained largely routine despite the Israeli war on GS, widespread destruction, and attempts at forced displacement. Its level of engagement has fallen short of the expectations of Muslim peoples, with no substantive measures taken regarding GS or ongoing repression and Judaization policies in Jerusalem and WB. Most of its activity has been limited to issuing statements of condemnation and denunciation of Israeli aggressions.

As for Türkiye, Operation al-Aqsa Flood came at a politically sensitive moment, particularly given its expanding relations with Israel. However, this initial unease soon shifted as the scale of the war and widespread massacres became clearer, alongside growing Turkish public sympathy. Ankara then reverted to its earlier stance, supporting the Palestinian narrative and condemning Israeli war crimes. In this context, Ankara provided Hamas with significant political cover, rejecting its designation as a "terrorist" organization and framing it as a legitimate resistance movement. This position was articulated by President Erdoğan himself, who drew parallels with the Turkish War of Independence. He further portrayed Hamas as a defensive front not only for Palestinian territories, but also, symbolically, for Anatolia (Turkish lands) and, more broadly, for the wider Muslim world.

The meetings between the Turkish leadership and Hamas during the war were marked by two main features. First, they went beyond the security dimension to the political level, involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as direct meetings with President Erdoğan. Second, their number and frequency increased markedly, reaching 15 officially announced meetings, an unprecedented level compared to any previous phase in bilateral relations. At the rhetorical level, the Turkish leadership adopted a strongly condemnatory stance toward the Israeli offensive. President Erdoğan called for issuing a recommendation to use force if diplomatic efforts failed to compel Israel to halt the war. Over time, Ankara's discourse shifted from criticizing Netanyahu and comparing him to Hitler, to condemning Israel as a "state," describing it as a "terrorist state." Türkiye also maintained its rejection of Israeli policies in Jerusalem and the rest of WB. In the final months of the war, Türkiye became more deeply involved in mediation and negotiation efforts, particularly regarding Hamas and other Palestinian factions.

In the near term, Türkiye is expected to remain part of the four-party guarantor framework of the ceasefire in GS (alongside Qatar, Egypt and the US). It will also pursue closer ties with Washington, which may help soften Israel's position regarding its participation in the ISF. Türkiye's relations with the Palestinian side, particularly Hamas, are likely to continue on a similar trajectory into 2026, alongside efforts to secure a greater role in arrangements related to GS. By contrast, relations with Israel are not expected to improve in the foreseeable future, especially as long as Netanyahu remains in power.

As for Iran, it has maintained its principled position in support of the Palestinian people and their armed resistance, while continuing to reject recognition of Israel.

In the context of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Iran was aware of the risks associated with its stance; nonetheless, it sought to avoid escalation into a direct military confrontation that Israel was attempting to provoke, in line with what has been described as "strategic patience." However, Iran ultimately responded to Israeli attacks on its territory and allies. It carried out strikes on targets in Israel on 13/4/2024 and 1/10/2024, in retaliation for the assassinations of Isma'il Haniyyah, Hasan Nasrallah, and Abbas Nilforoushan. It later fought a 12-day war following Israel's surprise attack on 13/6/2025, and subsequently became involved in a broader confrontation amid the Israeli-US escalation that began in late February 2026 and continued at the time of writing. Looking ahead, Iran is expected to maintain its commitment to Palestine while focusing, together with other resistance actors, on rebuilding its capabilities and drawing on the lessons of the war.

On the other hand, several major Muslim countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan, have maintained their established policies on the Palestine issue.

At the level of public opinion, Muslim peoples have shown sustained engagement with the Palestine issue, which remains a central point of consensus. Operation al-Aqsa Flood constituted a major emotional and symbolic shock in the Muslim world conscience, while also serving as a source of inspiration through its associations with faith, resilience, sacrifice and steadfastness. Despite fragmentation and internal divisions of these Muslim countries, many of which are marked by corruption and subordination to Western hegemony, thousands of demonstrations, sit-ins, and public events were organized in support of Palestine and its people, as well as Jerusalem and the resistance. These mobilizations called for support for GS, lifting the blockade, preventing displacement, and ending the genocide during 2024–2025, with several reaching very large scales, including "million-person" rallies.

As for normalization with Israel, it has faced significant setbacks following Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the offensive on GS. Türkiye, once the leading Islamic trade partner with Israel, saw bilateral trade come to a complete halt in May 2025. In contrast, economic ties between Israel and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have strengthened, while Kazakhstan announced in November 2025 its intention to join the Abraham Accords. However, the extensive devastation resulting from Israel's offensives in GS, Lebanon and Iran, alongside its assertive regional posture and continued actions in Jerusalem and against holy sites, remain key obstacles to any meaningful normalization process.

Endnotes

[1] WAFA, 26/1/2024. (in Arabic)

[2] WAFA, 28/1/2024. (in Arabic)

[3] Arabi21, 6/3/2024.

[4] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 5/5/2024. (in Arabic)

[5] Ariel Grossman, Israel And UAE Ink New Deal To Connect Ports Via Land Bridge, site of NoCamels, 7/12/2023, https://nocamels.com/2023/12/israel-and-uae-ink-new-deal-to-connectports-via-land-bridge/

[6] OIC, 7/8/2024.

[7] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 29/9/2024. (in Arabic)

[8] OIC, 5/2/2025.

[9] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 7/3/2025. See also OIC, 8/3/2025.

[10] Joint Statement on Developments in the Gaza Strip, OIC, 9/8/2025, https://new.oic-oci.org/SitePages/NewsDetail.aspx?Item=2937

[11] OIC, 15/9/2025, https://new.oic-oci.org/SitePages/NewsDetail.aspx?Item=3015

[12] OIC, 9/10/2025, https://new.oic-oci.org/SitePages/NewsDetail.aspx?Item=3066

[13] Turkish House or *Türkevi* Center is an official Turkish headquarters in New York where the president and senior officials hold diplomatic meetings and host formal events.

[14] Aljazeera.net, 20/9/2023. (in Arabic)

[15] Anadolu Agency, 9/3/2024. (in Arabic)

[16] Anadolu Agency, 17/4/2024. (in Arabic)

[17] Anadolu Agency, 15/5/2024. (in Arabic)

[18] Anadolu Agency, 7/9/2024. (in Arabic)

[19] Anadolu Agency, 31/7/2024. (in Arabic)

[20] Anadolu Agency, 5/8/2024. (in Arabic)

[21] Anadolu Agency, 9/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[22] Turkish top diplomat meets Hamas leader Haniyeh to discuss Gaza ceasefire, site of TRT World, 20/1/2024, https://www.trtworld.com/article/16723711

[23] Turkish intel chief, Hamas' Ismail Haniyeh meet in Qatar, *Daily Sabah* newspaper, 4/2/2024, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkish-intel-chief-hamas-ismail-haniyeh-meet-in-qatar

[24] Esra Tekin, Turkish President Erdogan stresses need to prevent recent Iran-Israel tension from benefiting Tel Aviv, Anadolu Agency, 20/4/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-president-erdogan-stresses-need-to-prevent-recent-iran-israel-tension-from-benefiting-tel-aviv/3197682

[25] Gökhan Çeliker, Türkiye's intelligence chief, Hamas political bureau leaders discuss Gaza cease-fire in Ankara, Anadolu Agency, 13/9/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiyes-intelligence-chief-hamas-political-bureau-leaders-discuss-gaza-cease-fire-in-ankara/3329776

[26] No: 217, 18 October 2024, Regarding the Meeting of H.E. Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, with the Chairman of the Hamas Shura Council and Members of the Political Bureau, site of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18/10/2024, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-217_-sayin-bakanimizin-hamas-sura-meclisi-baskani-ve-siyasi-buro-uyeleri-ile-gorusmesi-hk.en.mfa

[27] Hamas officials meet Turkish FM Fidan in Doha, discuss ways to stop Israeli aggression on Gaza, PIC, 7/12/2024, https://english.palinfo.com/news/2024/12/07/330077/

[28] Esra Tekin, Türkiye will continue to expose realities in Gaza: President, Anadolu Agency, 29/1/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-will-continue-to-expose-realities-in-gaza-president/3465984

[29] Aljazeera.net, 19/4/2025. (in Arabic)

[30] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 29/6/2025. (in Arabic)

[31] Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2/7/2025.

[32] Quds Press, 1/8/2025.

[33] Anadolu Agency, 21/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[34] RT, 1/11/2025. (in Arabic)

[35] Aljazeera.net, 5/11/2025. (in Arabic)

[36] Orhan Onur Gemic and Seda Sevencan, Türkiye's intelligence chief meets with Hamas delegation over Gaza ceasefire, Anadolu Agency, 20/12/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-s-intelligence-chief-meets-with-hamas-delegation-over-gaza-ceasefire/3776631

[37] RT, 24/12/2025. (in Arabic)

[38] Aljazeera.net, 4/2/2025. (in Arabic)

[39] Felesteen Online, 14/3/2025.

[40] Quds Press, 29/4/2025.

[41] Anadolu Agency, 8/4/2025. (in Arabic)

[42] Esra Tekin, Meeting of parliament speakers in support of Palestine kicks off in Istanbul, Anadolu Agency, 18/4/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/meeting-of-parliament-speakers-in-support-of-palestine-kicks-off-in-istanbul/3542285

[43] Muhammed Enes Calli, Türkiye urges UN to recommend use of force for Gaza, similar to 1950 General Assembly resolution, Anadolu Agency, 30/9/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkiye-urges-un-to-recommend-use-of-force-for-gaza-similar-to-1950-general-assembly-resolution/3346692

[44] "Today is the day to stand upright by the oppressed Palestinians in the name of humanity," site of Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 23/9/2025, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/today-is-the-day-to-stand-upright-by-the-oppressed-palestinians-in-the-name-of-humanity

[45] Servet Gunerigok, President Erdogan, Netanyahu discuss ties, cooperation and Israeli-Palestinian conflict in New York, Anadolu Agency, 20/9/2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/president-erdogan-netanyahu-discuss-ties-cooperation-and-israeli-palestinian-conflict-in-new-york/2996374# (in Arabic)

[46] Israel evacuating embassy staff throughout Middle East, site of Jewish News Syndicate (JNS), 19/10/2023, https://www.jns.org/israel-reportedly-evacuating-embassy-staff-from-egypt-morocco/

[47] Anadolu Agency, 9/3/2024. (in Arabic)

[48] Anadolu Agency, 16/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[49] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 11/4/2025.

[50] Aljazeera.net, 1/2/2024 and 5/4/2024. (in Arabic)

[51] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 18/9/2024.

[52] Aljazeera.net, 2/5/2024. (in Arabic)

[53] Erdogan admits to barring Herzog's flight to COP29 from using Turkish airspace, The Times of Israel, 20/11/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-admits-to-blocking-herzogs-flight-to-cop29-from-using-turkish-airspace/

[54] Diyar Guldogan, Türkiye will not approve attempts to cooperate with Israel within NATO: President Erdogan, Anadolu Agency, 12/7/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-will-not-approve-attempts-to-cooperate-with-israel-within-nato-president-erdogan/3273076

[55] Aljazeera.net, 1/8/2025. (in Arabic)

[56] UN, General Assembly, A/79/572-S/2024/802, 1/11/2024, https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/572

[57] Anadolu Agency, 12/1/2024. (in Arabic)

[58] Anadolu Agency, 1/5/2024. (in Arabic)

[59] Anadolu Agency, 7/8/2024. (in Arabic)

[60] Erdoğan: Türkiye can enter Israel and help Palestinians, Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 30/7/2024, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/dis_basinda_turkiye/detay/erdogan-turkiye-can-enter-israel-and-help-palestinians

[61] Lazar Berman, Israeli FM likens Erdogan's threat to Iraq's Saddam Hussein: "Remember how that ended," The Times of Israel, 28/7/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israeli-fm-likens-erdogans-threat-to-iraqs-saddam-hussein-remember-how-that-ended/; and Aljazeera.net, 28/7/2024. (in Arabic)

[62] RT, 1/10/2024. (in Arabic)

[63] Aljazeera.net, 9/10/2024. (in Arabic)

[64] Aljazeera.net, 1/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[65] President Erdoğan answers journalists' questions on his return from visits to Albania and Serbia, Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 12/10/2024, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-answers-journalists-questions-on-his-return-from-visits-to-albania-and-serbia

[66] Aljazeera.net, 9/4/2025. (in Arabic)

[67] Anadolu Agency, 10/4/2025. (in Arabic)

[68] Arabi21, 21/5/2025.

[69] Aljazeera.net, 24/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[70] RT, 3/11/2025. (in Arabic)

[71] Asiye Latife Yilmaz, Israeli Knesset's West Bank annexation vote 'null and void': Türkiye, Anadolu Agency, 23/7/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/israeli-knesset-s-west-bank-annexation-vote-null-and-void-turkiye/3640224

[72] Aljazeera.net, 8/10/2023. (in Arabic)

[73] Gökhan Ergöçün, Türkiye will not give even single pebble belonging to Jerusalem to Israel, President Erdogan says, Anadolu Agency, 19/9/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkiye-will-not-give-even-single-pebble-belonging-to-jerusalem-to-israel-president-erdogan-says/3692837

[74] Aljazeera.net, 8/10/2023. (in Arabic)

[75] Anadolu Agency, 2/2/2025. (in Arabic)

[76] Gizem Nisa Demir, Turkish President Erdogan says he and Trump reached 'shared understanding' on Gaza ceasefire, Anadolu Agency, 26/9/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkish-president-erdogan-says-he-and-trump-reached-shared-understanding-on-gaza-ceasefire/3699823

[77] Western recognition of Palestine should set the stage for two-state solution, says Erdogan, TRT World, 14/10/2025, https://www.trtworld.com/article/ff29fc0e6289

[78] President Erdoğan's message on "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People," Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 29/11/2025, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogans-message-on-international-day-of-solidarity-with-the-palestinian-people

[79] Karya Naz Balkiz, Erdogan condemns US Congress applause for "Hitler of our time," TRT World, 26/7/2024, https://www.trtworld.com/article/18188190

[80] Anadolu Agency, 2/2/2025. (in Arabic)

[81] President Erdoğan answers Narasi TV's questions in Indonesia, Directorate of Communications, Presidency of The Republic of Türkiye, 13/2/2025, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-answers-narasi-tvs-questions-in-indonesia

[82] Anadolu Agency, 26/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[83] Erdogan says Trump asked Turkey to convince Hamas to back Gaza plan, Reuters, 8/10/2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/erdogan-says-turkey-is-explaining-hamas-best-approach-palestinian-future-2025-10-08/

[84] Anadolu Agency, 26/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[85] Anadolu Agency, 13/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[86] Anadolu Agency, 21/5/2025. (in Arabic)

[87] Aljazeera.net, 24/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[88] Anadolu Agency, 14/11/2025. (in Arabic)

[89] Aljazeera.net, 9/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[90] Türkiye sends rescue experts to Gaza to find missing hostage bodies, *Daily Sabah*, 16/10/2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkiye-sends-rescue-experts-to-gaza-to-find-missing-hostage-bodies

[91] Aljazeera.net, 14/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[92] Reuters and Nava Freiberg, Sa'ar: Israel won't accept Turkish armed forces in Gaza, The Times of Israel, 27/10/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/saar-israel-wont-accept-turkish-armed-forces-in-gaza/

[93] Press Conference: JD Vance Speaks to Reporters in Kiryat Gat, Israel - October 21, 2025, site of Roll Call, 21/10/2025, https://rollcall.com/factbase/trump/transcript/donald-trump-press-conference-jd-vance-kiryat-gat-israel-october-21-2025/

[94] Anadolu Agency, 17/12/2025. (in Arabic)

[95] Seda Sevencan, Türkiye's foreign minister says Israeli violations complicate Gaza peace efforts, Anadolu Agency, 21/12/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-s-foreign-minister-says-israeli-violations-complicate-gaza-peace-efforts/3776777

[96] Anadolu Agency, 15/1/2020. (in Arabic)

[97] Shirit Avitan Cohen and Dudi Kogan, Israel concerned over Turkish moves in Syria, *Israel Hayom*, 8/1/2025, https://www.israelhayom.com/2024/12/23/will-turkey-go-after-israel/

[98] Al Arabiya News, 4/4/2025. (in Arabic)

[99] Al Arabiya News, 28/8/2025. (in Arabic)

[100] Arab 48, 25/12/2025.

[101] Lazar Berman and Nava Freiberg, Netanyahu uses summit of Israel, Greece, Cyprus leaders to send warning to Turkey, The Times of Israel, 23/12/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-uses-summit-of-israel-greece-cyprus-leaders-to-send-warning-to-turkey/

[102] Sirwan Kajjo, Israel urges action to protect Syria's Kurds, site of Voice of America (VOA), 11/12/2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/israel-urges-action-to-protect-syria-s-kurds-/7897681.html

[103] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 18/12/2025. (in Arabic)

[104] Samia Nakhoul, Turkey's Fidan: Gaza governance must precede Hamas disarmament in ceasefire deal, Reuters, 6/12/2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-says-gaza-administration-police-force-should-come-before-hamas-2025-12-06/

[105] Pezeshkian: Palestinian Nation Not to Be Left Alone in Difficult Situation, site of Iran Press, 15/7/2024, https://iranpress.com/content/284311/pezeshkian-palestinian-nation-not-left-alone-difficult-situation

[106] Iran wants global peace, end to Israeli crimes: Pezeshkian tells UNGA, site of Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 26/9/2024, https://irangov.ir/detail/451590

[107] Palestinian and Lebanese Resistance pushed back Zionist regime to 70 years ago, site of Khamenei.ir, 4/10/2024, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11146/Palestinian-and-Lebanese-Resistance-pushed-back-Zionist-regime

[108] I.R.IRAN Mission to UN, NY (@Iran_UN), X, 18/10/2024, 1:48 a.m., https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1847046967924281814?s=20

[109] Joint Declaration of the G7 Ministers of Defence, site of G7 Italia 2024, 19/10/2024, https://www.g7italy.it/en/joint-declaration-of-the-g7-ministers-of-defence/

[110] Zionist assassinations, a failed attempt to compensate February 7 defeat: IRGC, site of Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) 3/1/2024, https://en.irna.ir/news/85342825/

[111] Iran to give decisive response to Zionist regime: Envoy, IRNA, 1/4/2024, https://en.irna.ir/news/85432277/

[112] Israel seeks to provoke Iran into a big war, site of West Asia News Agency (WANA), 1/4/2024, https://wanaen.com/israel-seeks-to-provoke-iran-for-a-big-war/

[113] Aljazeera.net, 14/4/2024, https://aja.ws/cxxrxn (in Arabic)

[114] Ibid.

[115] Zionist regime upset about power of Iranians' determination, not number of missiles that struck them, Khamenei.ir, 21/4/2024, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/10714/Zionist-regime-upset-about-power-of-Iranians-determination

[116] Tehran has nothing to do with US base attack: Iran's UN mission, IRNA, 29/1/2024, https://en.irna.ir/news/85368668/

[117] *Al-Akhbar*, 14/6/2025, https://www.al-akhbar.com/world/845273

[118] Zionist regime has prepared the ground for its severe punishment by martyring our guest Haniyeh, Khamenei.ir, 31/7/2024, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/10996/Zionist-regime-has-prepared-the-ground-for-its-severe-punishment

[119] IRNA, 31/7/2024, https://ar.irna.ir/news/85554331 (in Arabic)

[120] President Pezeshkian: Promotion of Russia ties among Iran's foreign policy priorities, IRNA, 5/8/2024, https://en.irna.ir/news/85559623/

[121] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 24/9/2024. (in Arabic)

[122] Iran: Whatever agreement Hamas accepts, we accept it, site of Iranian Students' News Agency, 10/8/2024, https://en.isna.ir/news/1403052012944/Iran-Whatever-agreement-Hamas-accepts-we-accept-it

[123] Aljazeera.net, 30/9/2024, https://aja.ws/2ui4xy (in Arabic)

[124] The victory of the people of Gaza was a victory over the US, Khamenei.ir, 8/2/2025, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11462/The-victory-of-the-people-of-Gaza-was-a-victory-over-the-US

[125] Iran's IRGC fires dozens of missiles at Israeli regime, IRNA, 1/10/2024, https://en.irna.ir/news/85614632/

[126] IRGC says 90% of missiles successfully hit Israeli targets, site of Mehr News Agency, 1/10/2024, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/222277/

[127] Galit Altstein/BloombergNews/TNS, Israel data show hundreds of structures damaged in Iran's attack, *The Jerusalem Post*, 14/10/2024, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-824486

[128] Iran warns of 'unconventional response' in case of new Israeli attack, Al Jazeera, 3/10/2024, https://aje.io/z9lv53

[129] *Al-Akhbar*, 14/6/2025, https://www.al-akhbar.com/world/845273

[130] Aljazeera.net, 17/6/2025, https://aja.ws/pm7czc (in Arabic); and Shmuel Munitz, Operation Rising Lion: The biblical roots of Israel's Iran campaign, Ynet Global, 14/6/2025, https://www.ynetnews.com/jewish-world/article/skadfz9mee

[131] The IDF has Launched a Preemptive Strike Against Iran's Nuclear Program, site of Israel at War, 13/6/2025, https://www.idf.il/298474

[132] I.R.G.C.'s Chief Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami and others assassinated in Israeli strikes, IRNA, 13/6/2025, https://en.irna.ir/news/85860936/; and Iran's Armed Forces chief martyred in Israel attack, Mehr News Agency, 13/6/2025, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/233035/

[133] *Al-Akhbar*, 14/6/2025.

[134] Aljazeera.net, 17/6/2025. (in Arabic)

[135] New Wave of Iranian Missile Strikes on Israeli Regime Begins, 14/6/2025, WANA, https://wanaen.com/new-wave-of-iranian-missile-strikes-on-israeli-regime-begins/

[136] Aljazeera.net, 13/6/2025, https://aja.ws/911s77 (in Arabic)

[137] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 18/6/2025, https://aawsat.news/93fnx (in Arabic); and Khamenei.ir Hebrew (@Khamenei_Heb), X, 18/6/2025, 3:49 a.m., https://x.com/Khamenei_Heb/status/1935137873939796024?s=20 (in Hebrew)

[138] Major General Mousavi: The Aerospace Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Produces Dignity and Honor, IRNA, 14/7/2025, https://ar.irna.ir/news/85887959 (in Arabic)

[139] The White House (@WhiteHouse), X, 22/6/2025, 2:57 a.m., https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1936574129009803509?s=20; Faris Tanyos, U.S. launches strikes on 3 Iranian nuclear facilities, Trump says, site of CBS News, 22/6/2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-launches-strikes-iranian-nuclear-facilities-trump-says/; and Joe Walsh, Trump calls U.S. strikes on Iran a "spectacular military success," warns of more attacks if Iran doesn't "make peace," CBS News, 22/6/2025, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-address-nation-us-iran-strike/

[140] Aljazeera.net, 22/6/2025, https://aja.ws/niclwp (in Arabic); and US and Israel practiced during Biden administration: Source, site of ABC News, 22/6/2025, https://abcnews.com/International/live-updates/israel-iran-live-updates?id=122881565&entryId=123085942&utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=dhfacebook&utm_content=null&fbclid=IwY2xjawLAh-RleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETFHNVNHbVpvakZCOVdKbnRmAR5i_CnFr_je_BZvyNDW8DQwClbLDAIIJ_sLDubyNDhBMvULfMDK6P1Fq_cMJQ_aem_6hom7axOBTEFmx2R3edAuw

[141] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 22/6/2025, https://aawsat.news/m9cq5 (in Arabic)

[142] Joint statement by Arab and Islamic countries affirms the necessity of halting Israeli hostilities against Iran and returning to the path of negotiations, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-State of Qatar, 16/6/2025, https://mofa.gov.qa/en/latest-articles/statements/joint-statement-by-arab-and-islamic-countries-affirms-the-necessity-of-halting-israeli-hostilities-against-iran-and-returning-to-the-path-of-negotiations

[143] Aljazeera.net, 23/6/2025, https://aja.ws/z19l8a (in Arabic)

[144] Ibid.; Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid), X, 23/6/2025, 7:37 p.m., https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1937188213875180015?s=20; and Operation "Herald of Victory" Launched Against U.S. Bases in the Region, WANA, 23/6/2025, https://wanaen.com/operation-herald-of-victory-launched-against-u-s-bases-in-the-region/

[145] Aljazeera.net, 24/6/2025, https://aja.ws/faqs74 (in Arabic)

[146] All credit for historic victory belongs to great nation of Iran: President Pezeshkian, site of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 24/6/2025, https://president.ir/en/159927; and Iran ready to resolve issues with US based on international frameworks: Pezeshkian, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 24/6/2025, https://president.ir/en/159924

[147] Statement "Iran must surrender" is too big for the US president's mouth; Zionist regime crushed under Iran's blows, Khamenei.ir, 26/6/2025, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11751/Statement-Iran-must-surrender-is-too-big-for-the-US-president-s

[148] Aljazeera.net, 4/10/2025, https://aja.ws/gzf3vw (in Arabic)

[149] Aljazeera.net, 24/9/2025, https://aja.ws/khuxr9 (in Arabic)

[150] Kushner and Witkoff on 60 Minutes, site of Rev, 20/10/2025, https://www.rev.com/transcripts/kushner-and-witkoff-on-60-minutes

[151] Statement of Iranian Foreign Ministry on ceasefire proposal in Gaza, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Islamic Republic of Iran, 6/10/2025, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/776115; and Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Efforts to End the Genocide in Gaza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs- Islamic Republic of Iran, 9/10/2025, https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/newsview/776370

[152] Statement of Iranian Foreign Ministry on ceasefire proposal in Gaza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Islamic Republic of Iran, 6/10/2025.

[153] *Asharq al-Awsat*, 26/9/2025, https://aawsat.com/node/5190835 (in Arabic)

[154] Statement of Iranian Foreign Ministry on ceasefire proposal in Gaza, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Islamic Republic of Iran, 6/10/2025.

[155] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 11/10/2025, https://edgs.co/qsdpg

[156] No one is immune from Israeli attacks unless regional states unite: Pezeshkian, IRNA, 15/9/2025, https://en.irna.ir/news/85940038/

[157] Malaysia Welcomes the Application by South Africa Before the International Court of Justice Against Israel on Alleged Genocide Violations in the Gaza Strip, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2/1/2024, https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/malaysia-welcomes-the-application-by-south-africa-before-the-international-court-of-justice-against-israel-on-alleged-genocide-violations-in-the-gaza-

[158] Special Visit of Malaysian Members of Parliament to the Arab Republic of Egypt," site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 22/2/2024, https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/special-visit-of-malaysian-members-of-parliament-to-the-arab-republic-of-egypt; and Malaysia's Unwavering Commitment to UNRWA site of ReliefWeb, 22/3/2024, https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/malaysias-unwavering-commitment-unrwa-enms

[159] SuLin Tanin, Malaysia's PM Anwar slams the West's inconsistency with international laws in IsraelGaza war," *South China Morning Post* newspaper, 7/3/2024, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3254504/malaysias-pm-anwar-slams-wests-inconsistency-international-laws-israel-gaza-war

[160] Anwar Ibrahim (@anwaribrahim), X, 1/7/2024, 2:00 p.m., https://x.com/anwaribrahim/status/1807 731085532659759?s=20

[161] Aljazeera.net, 18/11/2024. (in Arabic)

[162] *Al-Quds al-'Arabi*, 22/1/2025.

[163] *Alghad*, 2/2/2025; and Malaysia Donates US$5 Million To The People Of Palestine, site of Bernama News Agency, 18/12/2024, https://bernama.com/en/news.php?id=2374861

[164] WAFA, 2/8/2025. (in Arabic)

[165] PM urges focus on saving lives amid imperfect US-led Gaza peace proposal, site of The Vibes, 4/10/2025, https://www.thevibes.com/articles/news/113593/pm-urges-focus-on-saving-lives-amid-imperfect-u.s-led-gaza-peace-proposal

[166] PR No. 162 President welcomes ICJ ruling on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in Gaza Islamabad: January 26, 2024, site of Press Information Department, 26/1/2024, https://pid.gov.pk/site/press_detail/24458

[167] International Court of Justice, Summary of the Order of 26 January 2024 in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), site of International Court of Justice (ICJ), 26/1/2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203454

[168] Aljazeera.net, 23/2/2024. (in Arabic)

[169] Pakistan "deeply disappointed" by UNSC dissensus on Palestine's full UN membership; regrets US veto: FO spox, site of Associated Press Of Pakistan, 19/4/2024, https://www.app.com.pk/national/pakistan-deeply-disappointed-by-unsc-dissensus-on-palestines-full-un-membership-regrets-us-veto-fo-spox/

[170] Statement by Ambassador Asim Iftikhar, Alternate Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN the Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question – Security Council Briefing (3rd January 2025), site of Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations, 3/1/2025, https://pakun.org/official-statements/01032025-01

[171] Aljazeera.net, 3/8/2024. (in Arabic)

[172] Kashaf Rehman, 'Pakistan is your second home,' says PM Sharif after welcoming Palestinian students, site of Arab News, 23/10/2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2576491/amp

[173] Pakistan urges Islamic countries to cut ties with Israel, site of Ary News, 14/6/2024, https://arynews.tv/pakistan-urges-islamic-countries-to-cut-ties-with-israel

[174] WAFA, 17/9/2025. (in Arabic)

[175] PIC, 1/10/2025. (in Arabic)

[176] Government of Pakistan (@GovtofPakistan), X, 2/10/2025, 1:20 p.m., https://x.com/GovtofPakistan/status/1973694533507396065?s=20

[177] FM Dar says Pakistan ready to join Gaza peace force, 'not ready' to disarm Palestinian resistance group Hamas, site of Dawn, 29/11/2025, https://www.dawn.com/news/1958159

[178] *Alghad*, 14/2/2024.

[179] ICJ, Public sitting held on Friday 23 February 2024, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Salam presiding, on the Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem (Request), ICJ, 23/2/2024, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/203740

[180] Special Address by General (Retd) Prabowo Subianto at the 21st Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, site of International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1/6/2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2024/transcripts/final/special-address/special-address---qa---as-delivered.pdf

[181] WAFA, 15/7/2024. (in Arabic)

[182] Indonesia strongly condemns Israel's move to restrict UNRWA operations, site of Antara News Agency, 24/7/2024, https://en.antaranews.com/news/319641/indonesia-strongly-condemns-israels-move-to-restrict-unrwa-operations

[183] MoFA Indonesia (@Kemlu_RI), X, 22/10/2024, 10:35 a.m., https://x.com/Kemlu_RI/status/1848629201773203829?s=20

[184] Savero Aristia Wienanto, Indonesia Humanitarian Campaign: Raising Aid of Rp3.2tn for Palestine, site of Temp English, 27/2/2025, https://en.tempo.co/read/1980440/indonesia-humanitarian-campaign-raising-aid-of-rp3-2tn-for-palestine

[185] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 9/4/2025.

[186] Speech by the President of the Republic of Indonesia Prabowo Subianto at the 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, site of UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 26/9/2025, https://www.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/en/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-prabowo-subianto-at-the-80th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly

[187] Minister supports ban of Israeli gymnasts competing in Indonesia, Antara, 10/10/2025, https://en.antaranews.com/news/385421/minister-supports-ban-of-israeli-gymnasts-competing-in-indonesia; and Niniek Karmini, Indonesia to block Israeli team from competing at gymnastics world championships in Jakarta, site of Associated Press (AP), 10/10/2025, https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-israel-world-gymnastics-championship-fb325108354ee4a1074a787f00b63e46

[188] Talha Ozturk, Hundreds of people gather in Bosnia's capital to show support for Palestine, Anadolu Agency, 7/1/2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/hundreds-of-people-gather-in-bosnias-capital-to-show-support-for-palestine/3102636

[189] Aljazeera.net, 15/1/2024. (in Arabic)

[190] Aljazeera.net, 3/3/2024. (in Arabic)

[191] Aljazeera.net, 11/3/2024. (in Arabic)

[192] Palestine Online (@OnlinePalEng), X, 18/4/2024, https://x.com/OnlinePalEng/status/1781031910967296132?s=20; and Aljazeera.net, 21/4/2024. (in Arabic)

[193] PIC, 29/4/2024. (in Arabic)

[194] *Alghad*, 5/5/2024.

[195] *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 16/5/2024; and "Stand up for Palestine": IUS Students and Staff Unite in Support of Palestine, site of International University of Sarajevo, 16/5/2024, https://news.ius.edu.ba/en/news/stand-palestine-ius-students-and-staff-unite-support-palestine

[196] Site of Iran Press, 1/6/2024.

[197] Shehab Sumon, One million Bangladeshis make public pledge to boycott Israel-linked products, Arab News, 12/4/2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2596778/world

[198] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 31/7/2024.

[199] Aljazeera.net, 2/8/2024. (in Arabic)

[200] WAFA, 8/10/2024. (in Arabic)

[201] Aljazeera.net, 6/10/2024 (in Arabic); and "Protesters march to US embassy in Jakarta to show support for Palestinians," AP Archive channel, site of YouTube, 11/10/2024, https://youtu.be/KJE6eGNqm88?si=xdWPzveTQd-afwYL

[202] PIC, 28/1/2025 (in Arabic); and About 10 Of The 100 Mosques In Gaza Will Be Completed By Ramadan, site of Voice of Indonesia (VOI), 27/1/2025, https://voi.id/en/news/455132

[203] *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 15/4/2025; and Hundreds rally for Gaza in Senegal in rare West Africa protest, The New Arab, 14/4/2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/hundreds-rally-gaza-senegal-rare-west-africa-protest

[204] Unionists gather in front of UN Türkiye for Palestine, *Daily Sabah*, 21/4/2025, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/unionists-gather-in-front-of-un-turkiye-for-palestine/news

[205] Ismail Ozdemir and Asiye Latife Yilmaz, Gaza Tribunal to hold 1st public session in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Anadolu Agency, 25/5/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/gaza-tribunal-to-hold-1st-public-session-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/3578957

[206] *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, 26/7/2025.

[207] Aljazeera.net, 28/7/2025. (in Arabic)

[208] Thousands Rally in Jakarta to Support Palestine, Demand End to Genocide, site of Indonesian National Police (INP), 12/10/2025, https://inp.polri.go.id/artikel/thousands-rally-in-jakarta-to-support-palestine-demand-end-to-genocide

[209] Israel imports Azerbaijani oil via Türkiye: $1 billion in six months, site of Attaqa, 19/7/2024, https://attaqa.net/2024/07/19/إسرائيل-تستورد-النفط-الأذربيجاني-عبر/

[210] Sudarshan Varadhan, Israel's imports of Azerbaijani oil via Turkey jump despite Ankara's trade ban, Reuters, 21/1/2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/israels-imports-azerbaijani-oil-via-turkey-jump-despite-ankaras-trade-ban-2026-01-21/

[211] Analysis: In 2024, the number of Azerbaijani cargo flights from Israel ranked second only to the figures recorded in 2020, site of Public Radio of Armenia, 17/1/2025, https://ar.armradio.am/2025/01/17/تحليل-في-عام2024-،-سيكون-عدد-رحلات-الشحن/ (in Arabic)

[212] Azerbaijan-Israel ink natural gas exploration deal, site of Türkiye Today, 17/3/2025, https://www.turkiyetoday.com/business/azerbaijan-israel-ink-natural-gas-exploration-deal-132365/; and Azerbaijan's SOCAR officially closed deal to buy 10% of Israel's Tamar gas project – media, site of Interfax, 27/6/2025, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/112324/

[213] Pesach Benson, Israel launches first agricultural shipments to Azerbaijan, site of World Israel News, 6/4/2025, https://worldisraelnews.com/israel-launches-first-agricultural-shipments-to-azerbaijan/

[214] Report: Netanyahu forced to cancel Azerbaijan visit because Turkey barred him from airspace, The Times of Israel, 4/5/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-netanyahu-forced-to-cancel-azerbaijan-visit-because-turkey-barred-him-from-airspace/; and Türkiye refutes reports of overflight clearance for Israeli premier, site of TRT World, 3/5/2025, https://www.trtworld.com/article/4d226a18d556

[215] Rania Abu Shamala, Israeli president cancels trip to Azerbaijan due to security concerns, Anadolu Agency, 16/11/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/israeli-president-cancels-trip-to-azerbaijan-due-to-security-concerns/3395711; and Sumeyye Dilara Dincer, Türkiye denies Israeli President Herzog's airspace request, Anadolu Agency, 17/11/2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkiye-denies-israeli-president-herzogs-airspace-request/3396272

[216] Israel in Arabic (@IsraelArabic), X, 19/5/2025, https://x.com/IsraelArabic/status/19244 54383565033826?s=20

[217] Israel plans to deepen strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, FM Gideon Sa'ar says, site of News.am, 26/1/2026, https://news.am/eng/news/927206.html

[218] Central Asian and U.S. Leaders Meet at the White House, site of Embassy of Turkmenistan, 7/11/2025, https://uk.tmembassy.gov.tm/en/news/154319; and Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Accession to the Abraham Accords, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 7/11/2025, https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/mfa/press/news/details/1101139

[219] List of countries exporting oil to Israel… Does it include any Arab states?, Attaqa, 10/9/2025, https://attaqa.net/2025/09/10/قائمة-الدول-المصدرة-للنفط-إلى-إسرائيل/

[220] Nigeria, Israel reaffirm commitment to military cooperation, site of The Authority, 25/4/2025, https://authorityngr.com/2025/04/25/nigeria-israel-reaffirm-commitment-to-military-cooperation/

[221] Itamar Eichner, Indonesia to normalize ties with Israel as part of bid to join OECD, Ynet Global, 11/4/2024, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/b1uxbxrxa

[222] Aljazeera.net, 18/10/2024, https://aja.ws/wk1rku (in Arabic)

[223] President Prabowo Calls on Israel to Recognize Palestinian Statehood, site of Cabinet Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 28/5/2025, https://setkab.go.id/en/president-prabowo-calls-on-israel-to-recognize-palestinian-statehood/

[224] Etgar Lefkovits, Rare Pakistani delegation visits Israel, site of Jewish News Syndicate (JNS), 19/3/2025, https://www.jns.org/rare-pakistani-delegation-visits-israel/; Felice Friedson, Pakistani Documentary Film Director Tells TML: 'I Wanted To Find Out What Israel Has Done to Pakistan,' site of The Media Line, 24/3/2025, https://themedialine.org/top-stories/pakistani-documentary-film-director-tells-tml-i-wanted-to-find-out-what-israel-has-done-to-pakistan/; and Aljazeera.net, 19/3/2025. (in Arabic)

[225] Saima Shabbir, Pakistan to investigate alleged visit of journalists to Israel, says 'no question' of recognizing Tel Aviv, Arab News, 20/3/2025, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2594231/amp

[226] Benjamin Netanyahu (@netanyahu), X, 26/12/2025, 4:06 p.m., https://x.com/netanyahu/status/2004554522283131310?s=20

[227] See CBS, https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2025/409/16_25_409t1.pdf

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025

This Report

Al-Zaytouna Centre is pleased to present The Palestine Strategic Report (PSR) 2024–2025, now in its 14th consecutive edition. This report provides an academic, objective and comprehensive analysis of developments related to the Palestine issue across various dimensions. It offers up-to-date and accurate information and statistics through the end of 2025, complemented by analytical insights and forecasts.

Prepared by 14 specialized professors and researchers, this PSR consists of eight chapters that explore various aspects of the Palestinian situation. It examines the internal Palestinian scene, demographic and economic indicators, and the status of Jerusalem and its holy sites. The report also analyzes the courses of aggression, resistance and the peace process, while providing insights into the Israeli political, demographic, economic and military landscape. Furthermore, it discusses Palestinian Arab, Islamic and international relations. Notably, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has significantly influenced the report's findings and perspectives.

The PSR has emerged as a key reference in Palestine studies, serving as an indispensable resource that provides invaluable insights for those interested in Palestinian affairs. Al-Zaytouna Centre aspires, through the PSR, to make a significant contribution to the field of Palestine studies.

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations
مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات
P.O. Box: 14-5034 Beirut - Lebanon
Tel: +961 21 803 644 | Tel-Fax: +961 21 803 643
info@alzaytouna.net | www.alzaytouna.net

ISBN 978-614-494-079-2