

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025



Edited By

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh



Al-Zaytouna Centre For Studies & Consultations

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025



**Al-Zaytouna Centre
For Studies & Consultations
Beirut - Lebanon**

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025

التقرير الاستراتيجي الفلسطيني 2024–2025

Editor:

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

First Published in 2026 by:

Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

P.O. Box: 14-5034, Beirut, Lebanon

Tel: +961 21 803644

Tel-fax: +961 21 803643

E-mail: info@alzaytouna.net

Website: www.alzaytouna.net

You can contact us and view the center's pages by clicking on the applications below:



ISBN 978-614-494-079-2

© All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the publisher. For further information regarding permission(s), please write to: info@alzaytouna.net

The views expressed in this book are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations.

Designed by:

Mr. Rabie Maarouf Murad

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025

Editor

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

Consultants

Dr. Adeeb Ziadeh

Mr. Mueen al-Taher

Mr. Munir Shafiq

Prof. Dr. Nizam Barakat

Prof. Dr. Sami al-Arian

Contributors

Mr. ‘Atef Ishaq al-Joulani

Dr. Basem Jalal Elkassem

Mr. Hani Mohammad ‘Adnan al-Masri

Ms. Iqbal Walid ‘Omeish

Dr. Mohammad Mustafa

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

Mr. Rabi‘ Mohammad al-Dannan

Dr. Raed Muhammad Hillis

Dr. Sa‘id Walid al-Haj

Mr. Sameh Muhammad Singer

Prof. Dr. Talal ‘Atrissi

Mr. Wael Ahmad Sa‘ad

Prof. Dr. Walid ‘Abd al-Hay

Mr. Ziad Mohammad Bhies

Senior Language Editor

Ms. Rana Sa‘adah

Assistant Editors

Ms. Fatima ‘Itani

Ms. Iqbal ‘Omeish



The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025

Chapter Four

*Trajectories of Aggression, Resistance
and the Peace Process*

Trajectories of Aggression, Resistance and the Peace Process

Introduction

This chapter examines the trajectories of Israeli aggression and Palestinian resistance, highlighting the ferocity and inherently aggressive character of Israel under one of its most extreme governments in the history of Israel. It evaluates the resistance in GS and WB during 2024–2025, reviewing key operations and battles, most notably Operation al-Aqsa Flood, as well as the conditions of prisoners in Israeli prisons. This chapter also examines the expansion of the war to other fronts, as it is no longer confined to GS but has spread to Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, Syria and Iraq. The final section addresses developments in the peace process over the period covered by the report. This process has remained clearly stalled, with no tangible progress achieved; Palestinian–Israeli negotiations were not resumed, nor were any serious new international initiatives introduced to advance it.

The events of 7/10/2023 constituted a decisive turning point in the trajectory of the Arab–Israeli conflict, amounting to a historic breach of the prevailing rules of engagement and restoring the Palestine issue to the center of international attention. On that date, Hamas (Ezzedein al-Qassam Brigades) launched Operation al-Aqsa Flood, precipitating an open, multi-front war that generated a new regional reality, while Israel faced unprecedented strategic challenges at both the domestic and external levels. Accordingly, the conflict could no longer be framed as a limited military escalation; rather, it became a contest over the reconfiguration of regional power balances and the future of the region as a whole. Subsequently, the “Middle East” entered a phase of sustained confrontation, defined primarily by Israel’s aggression against the GS, alongside a parallel escalation in the WB and a widening of hostilities to Lebanon, Yemen, Iran, Iraq and Syria, within an increasingly intricate regional environment. Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its aftermath thus highlighted the strategic weight of regional resistance actors in the struggle with Israel, while also exposing the profound risks associated with weakening the broader strategic environment or isolating the resistance within the Palestinian arena.

To underscore the intensity of Israel's response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its supporting fronts, the Israeli army reported in its 2025 annual report that it carried out approximately 20,900 airstrikes, alongside 430 military operations, across the GS and the WB, as well as in Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Yemen. Within the GS alone, it targeted 19,530 sites and destroyed roughly 13,910 infrastructure elements.¹ According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Israel conducted at least 10,631 attacks between 1/1 and 5/12/2025, constituting one of the most geographically extensive military campaigns in a single year. ACLED further details that Israel targeted:²

- The GS and WB 8,332 times, averaging 25 attacks per day (7,024 in GS and 1,308 in WB).
- Lebanon 1,653 times, despite a ceasefire in effect since 27/11/2024, averaging 5 attacks per day.
- Iran was targeted 379 times, affecting 28 of its 31 provinces.
- Syria 207 times.
- Yemen 48 times.
- Qatar once.
- Tunisian waters twice.
- The waters of Malta and Greece once each.

First: Israeli Aggression and the Resistance in GS

Since 7/10/2023, the GS has endured one of the most intense Israeli military campaigns in its history, featuring comprehensive air, land and naval assaults with highly destructive weaponry, alongside repeated ground incursions and attempts to assert control, yet without achieving a decisive strategic outcome. The operation profoundly shook Israel, prompting serious questions regarding its very “existence and survival.” In response, Israeli officials framed the conflict as either a “second war of independence”³ or an “existential war.”⁴ Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant further emphasized that “If the fate of Hamas is not complete dismantlement, we will not be able to live in the State of Israel.”⁵

Operation al-Aqsa Flood inflicted an unprecedented strategic shock on Israel, which responded by launching a comprehensive campaign against GS that assumed the character of a genocidal war. The operation deliberately targeted both civilians and infrastructure, pursuing major political and military objectives: the elimination of the resistance, particularly Hamas, the restoration of deterrence, the recovery of prisoners, the protection of settlements surrounding GS (Gaza Envelope), and the restructuring of the Strip's political and security landscape, alongside efforts to displace as many residents as possible. The scale of Israel's brutality was unparalleled. The GS endured a complete siege, with electricity, fuel, food, water, and medical supplies entirely cut off. Tens of thousands of Palestinians were killed, hundreds of thousands were wounded, and extensive, systematic destruction was inflicted on infrastructure, residential neighborhoods, hospitals, displacement camps and food storage facilities.

Operation al-Aqsa Flood was launched with the stated objectives of halting Israel's ongoing crimes against the Palestinian people, including its repeated incursions into the *al-Aqsa* Mosque, and securing the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli detention. This was emphasized by Muhammad Daif, known as "Abu Khalid," the commander of Al-Qassam Brigades, at the launch of the operation.⁶ In turn, Israel declared war on the GS and initiated Operation Swords of Iron.⁷ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated, "This war will take time. It will be difficult. Challenging days are ahead of us."⁸ Hundreds of elite fighters from the al-Qassam Brigades infiltrated through 110 breaches in the perimeter fence surrounding GS, advancing up to 22 km into Israeli-occupied territory. In what was widely regarded as an unprecedented operation, they stormed 12 military bases and 22 settlements. According to The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), 1,179 Israelis were killed and 251 others taken captive that day. Israeli media consequently characterized it as one of the darkest days in Israel's history.⁹

The Israeli assault on GS was accompanied by an extensive campaign of disinformation regarding the operation carried out by Hamas, including allegations of child killings and sexual violence, many of which were subsequently discredited. Concurrently, the Palestinian resistance factions displayed notable resilience and tactical flexibility. They sustained a protracted confrontation by maintaining rocket fire, executing ambushes and conducting complex operations behind the lines of Israeli incursions, thereby imposing gradual attrition on Israeli forces despite the

stark asymmetry in capabilities. Within this broader context, Operation al-Aqsa Flood constituted the most consequential act of resistance directed at Israel since its establishment in 1948. It has challenged Israel's security doctrine, struck at the very notion of its existence and functional role, eroded its sense of a secure haven, disrupted normalization efforts, strengthened the case for armed resistance, and coincided with the collapse of the peace process.

Despite the unprecedented number of people killed, injured, and missing, and the extensive destruction across the GS, Israel failed to dismantle Hamas or its military infrastructure. Instead, Israel's retaliation overwhelmingly targeted unarmed civilians, public infrastructure, and government facilities. This approach reflects a Zionist logic grounded in the use of violence, premised on the belief that what cannot be achieved by force can be secured through even greater force.

Over the two years of conflict, the Palestinian resistance demonstrated that, despite its heavy sacrifices and Israel's attempts to dismantle its capabilities and leadership, it could establish a new strategic balance rooted in resilience. It prevented Israel from achieving a decisive victory and turned the confrontation into a war of attrition, without fully dismantling the resistance's military infrastructure, while Israel's security, military, political, and economic costs continued to escalate. The issue of Israeli captives in GS became a central focus of the aggression. Israel failed to secure the release of a single captive by force and could not achieve its stated objectives without negotiating with the resistance, which leveraged the issue to impose a ceasefire, push for lifting the blockade, and advance an Israeli withdrawal from GS, alongside efforts toward a broader prisoner exchange leading to the release of all Palestinian detainees held in Israeli prisons.

1. Developments in the Battle and War on GS

Over two years of Israel's genocidal campaign in GS, its operations have been diverse, combining airstrikes, artillery shelling, and ground incursions, supported by tanks, armored vehicles, bulldozers, and other tools of systematic destruction.

The first ground invasion, launched on 27/10/2023 and continuing until March 2024, focused on the northern sector and Gaza City, with the stated aim of dismantling Hamas and recovering hostages. This offensive deployed tanks and infantry around the Jabalia and Beit Hanoun RCs and culminated in the Battle of Shuja'iyyah, considered the fiercest since the 2014 war.¹⁰

Following a 7-day humanitarian truce (23–30/11/2023), 240 Palestinian prisoners were released (75 women and 165 minors), while Palestinian resistance secured the release of 80 Israeli prisoners (44 women, 36 minors), including several dual nationals and 27 foreigners. On 3/12/2023, Israel announced an expansion of its ground operation in GS. Israeli Army Radio reported that the military had launched a ground operation north of Khan Yunis in the southern part of GS, while an Israeli government spokesperson stated that the operation was concentrated on Khan Yunis itself. A senior Al-Qassam Brigades commander told Al Jazeera that the operation concentrated on southern GS, with limited northern maneuvers, and noted that 70% of Israeli forces had withdrawn from the north of GS due to operational failures and resistance strikes.¹¹

By late December 2023, the Israeli military had expanded its ground offensive to the al-Bureij, al-Nuseirat, and al-Maghazi RCs in central GS, urging civilians to evacuate toward Deir al-Balah. Although Israel claimed control over 65% of the Strip, resistance forces responded with ambushes, including the Shuja'iyyah ambush, which killed 24 Israeli soldiers in a single day.¹² Key battles in Khan Yunis occurred in December 2023, May 2024, and July 2024. In this period, Israel destroyed 68% of GS's agricultural land, disabled half of the southern hospitals, and sustained dozens of troop fatalities.

The Rafah offensive marked a further phase of Israel's military operations in GS, spanning May to August 2024, with the primary aim of securing the borders, particularly the Rafah Crossing with Egypt. Israeli forces gained control of the Muraj axis, effectively incorporating the area between it and Salah al-Din into the "Israeli security zone." The campaign included the destruction of tunnels and roads and the issuance of evacuation orders affecting some 1.5 million residents.

Between 19/1/2025 and 18/3/2025, a fragile ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreement was reached, but it quickly unraveled due to repeated Israeli violations. On 15/1/2025, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin 'Abdulrahman Al Thani announced that a ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreement had been reached between the Palestinian resistance and Israel in GS, with implementation set to begin on 19/1/2025. Under its first phase, lasting 42 days, Hamas was to release 33 prisoners in exchange for 1,737 Palestinians, including 296 serving life sentences.¹³ Before the second and third phases could

proceed, Israel resumed its assault on GS with intense airstrikes involving 100 aircraft, declaring that the operations would continue as long as deemed necessary and could extend beyond aerial attacks.¹⁴

In early May 2025, the Israeli government approved a plan to expand ground operations to seize three-quarters of GS under the name Operation Gideon's Chariots, which began on 16/5/2025. The operation involved ground incursions into central and southern GS, accompanied by intensive bombardment of high-rise buildings in Gaza City. Although the operation concluded in August 2025 without fully achieving its objectives, it enabled Israeli forces to establish control over approximately 75% of GS.¹⁵ Subsequently, on 20/8/2025, Defense Minister Israel Katz approved Operation Gideon's Chariots II aimed at capturing Gaza City.¹⁶ On 3/9/2025, Israeli forces launched ground operations in several neighborhoods, including al-Zaytoun and al-Sheikh Radwan, destroying around 30 residential towers and striking more than 500 targets. The Israeli army later announced that it had gained control of roughly 40% of the city. The operation involved tens of thousands of reserve soldiers, some of whom were killed in resistance ambushes.¹⁷ Thereafter, on 16/9/2025, the Israeli army launched the main phase of its ground assault on Gaza City. Israeli military officials estimated that the operation would target up to three thousand Hamas combatants believed to remain inside the city.¹⁸

On 9/10/2025, US President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had signed the first phase of his Peace Plan for GS. He stated, "This means that ALL of the Hostages will be released very soon, and Israel will withdraw their Troops to an agreed upon line as the first steps toward a Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace." He further indicated that "that the disarmament of Hamas would be part of the second phase of the deal."¹⁹ All living Israeli captives in GS were released, and Israel also received all remaining bodies. Subsequently, on 14/1/2026, the US Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, announced the launch of the second phase of Trump's plan to end the war in GS, which provides about the establishment of a Palestinian technocratic committee, the NCAG, in the Strip.

On 15/1/2026, the Government Media Office in GS announced that, 95 days after the ceasefire took effect on 10/10/2025 and with the second phase of the agreement underway, Israel had committed 1,244 violations of the ceasefire. These violations resulted in 449 fatalities, 1,246 injuries and 50 cases of unlawful

detention. Furthermore, during this 95-day period only 24,611 aid trucks entered GS out of the 57 thousand stipulated under the agreement, an average of 259 trucks per day instead of the agreed 600, reflecting a compliance rate of no more than 43%. Fuel deliveries were even more limited: only 601 fuel trucks entered GS out of the expected 4,750, averaging 6 trucks per day rather than the designated 50, corresponding to a compliance rate of approximately 12%.

At the same time, Israel's continued closure of crossings and its prevention of the entry of tents, mobile homes, caravans, and other shelter materials further aggravated the humanitarian crisis. Combined with winter storms affecting GS at the start of the winter season, these restrictions led to the collapse of more than 50 previously damaged or bombed homes and buildings, resulting in dozens of casualties and injuries. Deaths from extreme cold were also recorded among displaced persons in tents, particularly as more than 127 thousand tents had become unusable, leaving over 1.5 million displaced people without even minimal shelter.²⁰

2. Fatalities, Injuries and Destruction

The Government Media Office in GS reported on 5/10/2025 and 10/10/2025 that roughly 90% of the Strip had been destroyed two years after the Israeli war. According to these statistics, 38 hospitals were destroyed or rendered inoperative, and Israel had gained control over approximately 80% of GS through invasion, displacement and sustained bombardment. Since the onset of the war, over 200 thousand tons of explosives were dropped on the territory. The office added that the total fatalities and missing persons reached 77 thousand, including 9,500 still unaccounted for. More than 67 thousand of the deceased were admitted to hospitals, with over 55% being children, women and the elderly.²¹ PCBS reported that the number of killed and missing persons reached 81,942.²² Meanwhile, UN Women stated that more than 38 thousand women and girls were killed (over 22 thousand women and 16 thousand girls) in GS during the period from October 2023 to December 2025, as a result of the Israeli assault.²³ In addition, the Government Media Office in GS reported that among the dead were over 20 thousand children, more than 12,500 women (including 9 thousand mothers), over 22,400 fathers, 1,670 medical personnel, 140 civil defense members, 257 journalists, 176 municipal staff, including four mayors, over 787 police and aid security personnel, and 894 members of the athletic community. The report

further noted that more than 39,022 families were subjected to massacres, with 2,700 entirely wiped from civil records. Over 12 thousand miscarriages occurred due to food and healthcare shortages, while 460 deaths resulted from hunger and malnutrition, including 154 children. The number of injured reached approximately 170 thousand, including 4,800 amputations and 1,200 cases of paralysis.

The Government Media Office in GS reported that Israel struck 96 healthcare centers, rendering them non-operational, and targeted 197 ambulances and 61 civil defense vehicles for rescue and firefighting, while healthcare services endured over 788 attacks. More than 95% of schools were damaged: 670 school buildings and 165 universities and educational institutions were completely destroyed, with 392 partially damaged. The attacks claimed over 13,500 student lives, more than 830 teachers and educational staff, and over 193 scholars and researchers. Israel also destroyed over 835 mosques entirely and damaged more than 180 partially, repeatedly targeted three churches, demolished 40 of 60 cemeteries, exhumed over 2,450 bodies, and established seven mass graves in hospitals. Approximately 300 thousand housing units were completely destroyed, with another 200 thousand heavily or partially damaged rendering them uninhabitable, displacing nearly two million people. Over 288 thousand families were left homeless, forced to live in worn-out tents unfit for habitation, enduring extreme hardship; notably, more than 125 thousand of the 135 thousand tents had deteriorated.

Regarding deliberate starvation, Israel has kept Gaza's crossings closed for over 600 days, blocked the entry of hundreds of thousands of trucks, and targeted numerous food kitchens and distribution centers. This has led to the deaths of more than 460 civilians from hunger and malnutrition, over 2,605 people caught in "death traps" at so-called "US/ Israeli aid" centers and among aid seekers, in addition to 19,124 injuries and more than 200 missing persons. The report also indicates that Israel struck 293 shelters and forced-displacement centers, 47 food kitchens, 61 aid distribution points, and 128 aid convoys, resulting in 540 deaths among aid workers. Furthermore, 650 thousand children face life-threatening malnutrition, while over 22 thousand patients, including more than 5,200 children, require treatment abroad but are barred from traveling by Israel.

Israel destroyed 725 central water wells, rendering them inoperative, and targeted 134 freshwater projects. It also demolished 5,080 kilometers of electricity

networks, 2,285 distribution transformers, over 700 thousand meters of water pipelines, more than 700 thousand meters of sewage networks, and over 3 million meters of roads and streets. Furthermore, 247 government offices, 292 facilities including sports fields and gyms, and 208 of 325 archaeological and heritage sites were destroyed. The occupation devastated more than 94% of agricultural land, out of 178 thousand dunams (178 km²), along with 1,223 agricultural wells and 665 livestock and poultry farms, while the fishing sector was effectively destroyed due to attacks on fishing areas. According to the Government Media Office, preliminary direct losses across 15 vital sectors totaled \$70 billion.²⁴

Since the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Hamas has lost thousands of its members, including numerous senior political and military leaders. Among the top-tier leadership killed were the head of the political bureau, Isma'il Haniyyah, followed by Yahya Sinwar; the deputy head, Saleh al-'Aruri; and bureau member Rawhi Mushtaha, along with a large number of other senior political figures. On the military side, the commander of Al-Qassam Brigades Muhammad Daif, succeeded by Muhammad Sinwar, the deputy commander Marwan 'Isa, the spokesperson Abu 'Ubaida (Huthaifah al-Kahlut), and multiple brigade commanders were also among those killed.

The scope of assassinations expanded beyond Palestine, beginning with attempts on Haniyyah in Tehran and al-'Aruri in Beirut, alongside al-Qassam Brigades leaders Samir Fendi and 'Azzam al-Aqra'. Lebanon witnessed numerous killings of movement members and its political and military leaders, notably the movement's commander in Lebanon and a member of Hamas leadership abroad, Fatah Sharif (aka Abu al-Amin). Israel also attempted a major assassination by striking a meeting of Hamas leaders in Doha on 9/9/2025, during discussions of a US proposal to end the war; the attempt, however, failed.

Significant numbers of cadres from the PIJ, PFLP, and other resistance factions were also killed. Among the most prominent were members of the military council of al-Quds Brigades, the PIJ military wing, including Muhammad Abu Sakhil, Hasan al-Na'im, Riad Hashish, Yusuf Nabhan, Marzuq al-Sha'ir, Mahmud Abu Shammala, and the military spokesperson Abu Hamza (Naji Abu Saif), along with several central council members and numerous other PIJ cadres, who fell in GS or Lebanon.

In the same context, the Palestinian Freedom (al-Ahrar) Movement announced the death of its Secretary-General, Khalid Abu Hilal, at the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Similarly, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the armed wing of the PFLP, reported the killing of Muhammad ‘Abdu ‘Al (Abu Ghazi), political bureau member and head of the military-security department; Imad Odeh (Abu Ziad), member of the PFLP General Central Committee, member of its military department and its military commander in Lebanon; and several other PFLP members and cadres killed in GS or Lebanon.

Furthermore, the Popular Resistance Committees in Palestine reported the death of Ahmad Kamel Sarhan, field commander and head of the Special Operations Unit of the al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades, during an armed clash with an Israeli special forces unit that raided his home in Khan Yunis.

3. Israeli Human and Material Losses

Official Israeli data and reports from research centers indicate a heavy toll in both human and economic losses, the largest in decades, resulting from military operations across multiple fronts. On 6/10/2025, the Israeli Ministry of Defense reported that 1,152 personnel had been killed since 7/10/2023, including 487 under the age of 21 and 141 over the age of 40. These figures include soldiers, police personnel, members of the Israel Security Agency—ISA (*Shabak*), special operations forces, and members of local emergency response teams who took part in fighting in GS, the south, the north, Lebanon and WB. According to military data, 6,313 military personnel have been wounded since the beginning of the war, including 2,952 during the ground battles that began in GS on 27/10/2023. Nevertheless, an INSS report suggested that the total number of wounded military personnel may reach as high as 20 thousand.²⁵

Data from the National Insurance Institute of Israel (NII) indicate that the war resulted in the deaths of 978 civilians, including 84 foreigners. Notably, 7/10/2023 alone accounted for 778 civilian deaths, among them 70 foreigners, while a further 200 civilians, including 14 foreigners, were killed during the subsequent war. Regarding the injured, NII reported that it has treated more than 80 thousand individuals since 7/10/2023, including 24 amputees. In addition, 36,315 civilians applied for disability recognition due to what were classified as “hostile acts.” Of these applications, 33,983 were approved, including 30,462 psychological cases,

1,592 physical cases, and 1,929 cases involving both psychological and physical injuries. According to INSS, fatalities were distributed as follows:²⁶

- 1,721 killed, including 870 soldiers, on the GS front.
- 78 killed, including 31 soldiers, in the WB.
- 33 killed during the war with Iran.
- 132 killed, including 86 soldiers, as a result of attacks from Lebanon.
- One killed and 100 injured due to attacks from Yemen.

Israel imposes strict military censorship on its media concerning human and material losses for several reasons, particularly following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, most notably to maintain Israeli public morale. Accordingly, Israel has sought to restrict the dissemination of sensitive information through intensified military oversight. Military censors have been stationed directly in news studios to monitor “media violations,” while also closely tracking social media platforms.²⁷

Reports indicate that the number of Israeli fatalities is considerably higher than what the Israeli leadership has officially disclosed. In this regard, *Haaretz* revealed a significant discrepancy between the number of wounded soldiers reported by the Israeli army and the figures recorded in hospital registers. Moreover, at the beginning of the war, military censorship compelled *Yedioth Ahronoth* to revise the reported number of wounded personnel in the Israeli occupation army from 5 thousand to only 2 thousand.²⁸ Further indications emerged from statements by Israeli Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir, who disclosed on 4/2/2025 that 5,942 new Israeli families had been added to the list of bereaved families during 2024, while more than 15 thousand injured individuals had entered the rehabilitation system. These figures stand in sharp contrast to earlier statistics suggesting that the total number of fatalities since Operation al-Aqsa Flood was only 1,800, including about 900 soldiers.²⁹

NII reported that the war displaced about 164,500 Israelis from their homes, approximately 85% of whom later returned. Of these, 74,600 were displaced from settlements surrounding GS, with about 90% eventually returning, while 68,500 were displaced from settlements near the Lebanese border. In addition, about 21 thousand left their homes across various parts of Israel following Iranian attacks.³⁰

Moreover, the Israeli economy incurred substantial losses, while reverse migration increased (see “Israeli Demographic and Economic Conditions,” Chapter Five: The Israeli Scene, in this report).

In addition, 119 thousand Israelis submitted compensation claims for property damage, including 44 thousand claims resulting from Iranian missiles and 27 thousand from rockets launched from Lebanon. According to INSS, since the beginning of the war Israel has been subjected to approximately 37,500 rockets fired from multiple fronts, distributed as follows:³¹

- 17,300 rockets and 593 drones from Lebanon.
- 10,200 rockets and 51 drones from GS.
- 950 missiles and about 1,380 drones from Iran.
- 500 missiles from Yemen.
- 45 missiles from Syria.

Second: Israeli Aggression and Palestinian Resistance in the WB

In 2024 and 2025, the WB experienced an unprecedented escalation following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by daily incursions, targeted assassinations, mass arrests, and the destruction of infrastructure in RCs, alongside intensifying settler attacks. The aggression manifested in repeated raids on cities and RCs, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. However, despite security coordination between the PA and the Israeli army, both individual and organized operations increased, while daily confrontations and popular resistance persisted. The WB saw a significant rise in these activities amid thousands of casualties and detainees, severe movement restrictions, and repeated lockdowns of neighborhoods and cities.

Following 7/10/2023, Israel swiftly imposed a comprehensive closure on the WB, isolating cities from one another through military checkpoints. Simultaneously, it allowed settler militias to operate freely, spreading fear in contact areas out of concern that an uprising might erupt.³² Meanwhile, the PA sought to suppress any signs of escalation or popular mobilization, closed universities, and continued its security coordination with Israel.

The years 2024 and 2025 recorded the highest rate of Israeli violations against Palestinians in WB, including East Jerusalem, compared with the preceding five years, reflecting a marked escalation in the brutality of the Israeli occupation and the persistence of its aggressive policies toward Palestinians. The Palestine Information Center—Mo3ta documented 53,052 violations in 2024 and 81,887 in 2025, encompassing a broad range of crimes committed by Israeli occupation forces and settlers. These included killings, expulsions, arrests, and home demolitions, in addition to land leveling, property confiscation, and attacks targeting the education and health sectors, in clear breach of international conventions and treaties.³³ Moreover, Israeli occupation forces continued installing iron gates across the WB, including East Jerusalem, as part of a policy aimed at tightening restrictions on Palestinians and effectively besieging their communities. By 18/9/2025, the total number of permanent and flying checkpoints, iron gates, earth mounds and concrete blocks had reached about 909 barriers. Of these, 82 checkpoints and gates were installed since the beginning of 2025, while about 247 had been established after 7/10/2023.³⁴

In recent years, particularly since 7/10/2023, there has been a sharp increase in both the frequency and severity of settler violence against Palestinians in the WB, including East Jerusalem. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Media Observatory for Israeli Crimes Against Palestinians documented 10,439 such attacks between 2020 and 2025, reflecting an average annual increase of 36%.³⁵

Furthermore, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 2024 and 2025 recorded the highest levels of Israeli settler violence in the WB, including East Jerusalem, since documentation began nearly two decades ago. According to OCHA, settlers were involved in 1,420 incidents in 2024 and 1,800 in 2025. These incidents included physical assaults, arson attacks, raids on Palestinian communities, as well as the destruction of property and vandalizing trees, etc. Reports also indicate that settlers killed five Palestinians in 2024 and nine in 2025, while injuring 360 Palestinians in 2024 and 838 in 2025.³⁶ Similarly, Mo3ta documented 2,477 settler attacks in 2024 and 4,441 in 2025.³⁷

1. Resistance Operations and Escalation in WB

The pace of resistance operations remained consistently high throughout 2024 compared to the period prior to Operation al-Aqsa Flood. However, they declined

in 2025, primarily due to the escalation of Israeli repression, intensified campaigns of destruction and arrests, the continued security coordination of the PA with Israel, and the sustained state of exhaustion across the WB. In 2024, the Shabak recorded about 5,766 attacks in WB, including East Jerusalem and the 1948 occupied territories, killing 45 and wounding 339, while in 2025, this figure declined slightly to 4,744, killing 23 and wounding 195, excluding Palestinian resistance activities in GS during Operation al-Aqsa Flood. It should be noted, however, that most of the attacks recorded in WB consisted of confrontations, stone-throwing, Molotov cocktail attacks, and similar acts. The Shabak reported 267 significant attacks (shootings, bombings, stabbings and vehicular attacks...) in 2024 and 69 significant attacks in 2025, further noting that it foiled 1,051 significant attacks in 2024 and 1,374 significant attacks in 2025.³⁸ This reflects an increase in resistance activity within a complex and challenging security environment, where such activities have been systematically monitored and countered over many years, with coordination between the PA and Israel.

Table 1/4: Distribution of Resistance Operations in WB and the 1948 Occupied Territories 2024–2025, per Shabak³⁹

Year	Resistance Operations	Significant attacks	Popular Operations	Foiled Significant Attacks
2024	5,766	267	5,499	1,051
2025	4,744	69	4,675	1,374
Total	10,510	336	10,174	2,425

Table 2/4: Distribution of Significant Attacks of Resistance Operations in WB and the 1948 Occupied Territories 2024–2025, per Shabak⁴⁰

Year	WB (excl. Jerusalem)	East Jerusalem	1948 Occupied Territories	Total
2024	218	8	41	267
2025	54	2	13	69
Total	272	10	54	336

The annual reports of the Palestine Information Center—Mo3ta have noted that the popular and armed Palestinian resistance in WB, including East Jerusalem, has significantly increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 2024, Palestinians carried out 5,893 resistance operations in WB, including East Jerusalem, among which 2,071 were significant attacks. The report indicates that the governorates of Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm experienced the highest concentration of significant resistance operations, particularly shootings, with 760, 435, and 289 incidents, respectively. In 2024, resistance activities were documented across the WB and East Jerusalem, with the largest numbers recorded in Nablus 1,402, Jenin 1,094, Ramallah 618, Hebron 543, and Tulkarm 524. These operations reportedly resulted in 48 Israeli fatalities and 386 injuries.⁴¹

During 2025, Palestinians carried out 4,081 acts of resistance across the WB, including East Jerusalem, of which 695 were classified as significant (armed) attacks. According to the report, the governorates of Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm recorded the highest number of significant resistance activities, particularly shooting attacks, at 291, 134 and 57 respectively. More broadly, resistance activities were distributed across the WB and East Jerusalem throughout 2025, with the highest numbers recorded in Nablus 1,049, followed by Ramallah 686, Jenin 565, Hebron 456, and Jerusalem 322. As a result of these operations, 26 Israelis were killed and 226 others injured.⁴²

Table 3/4: Development of Resistance Action in WB and the 1948 Occupied Territories 2022–2025⁴³

Year	2022	2023	2024	2025
Popular Resistance Actions*	10,808	10,925	3,822	3,386
Significant Attacks**	1,380	3,258	2,071	695
Total	12,188	14,183	5,893	4,081

* Includes clashes, stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, strikes, protests, etc.

** Includes shooting, stabbing and run-over...

Table 4/4: Development of Significant Attacks in WB and the 1948 Occupied Territories by Type 2022–2025⁴⁴

Year	2022	2023	2024	2025
Shooting	848	2,053	1,143	221
Stabbing or attempted stabbing	37	46	31	18
Vehicular assault or attempted vehicular assault	18	25	21	18
Improvised explosive device (IED) deployment or dropping	222	653	723	318
Arson targeting military facilities, vehicles and posts	65	109	20	4
Destruction of military vehicles and equipment	187	336	117	114
Drone Downing	2	26	12	1
Twin bombings	1	-	2	1
Rocket launches	-	10	-	-
Self-immolation/ Self-sacrificial attacks	-	-	2	-
Total	1,380	3,258	2,071	695

2. Operation Iron Wall

In response to the escalation of resistance operations, Israel launched a large-scale military campaign targeting RCs in the northern WB. The campaign began in Jenin RC on 21/1/2025, followed by Tulkarm RC on 27/1/2025 and Tubas on 2/2/2025. Israel designated it Operation Iron Wall, the largest and most violent military operation since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. The operation resulted in extensive destruction, dozens of casualties and injuries, and the displacement of more than 51 thousand Palestinians after their homes were demolished by dozens of military vehicles equipped with advanced weaponry and surveillance technologies.

Following the forced evacuation of residents, Israel converted many houses into military barracks and positioned snipers on the rooftops of surrounding buildings. At the same time, Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in the areas

they entered, cutting electricity and water supplies and carrying out extensive bulldozing of streets. Neighborhoods were further fragmented through checkpoints and earthen barriers, while Israeli forces breached through houses to facilitate safer movement for soldiers. In addition, Israel restricted medical and food supplies to residents, allowing ambulances to move only with prior coordination, obstructing and assaulting medical crews, and besieging hospitals. It also prevented funeral processions for the dead whose bodies continued to arrive at hospital morgues, disrupted civilian communications, and completely paralyzed economic life in the areas of incursion.⁴⁵

Jenin has remained a central flashpoint of confrontation with Israel. From the outset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood until 28/1/2025, the city and its RC constituted the primary front in WB, witnessing dozens of armed clashes and targeted resistance operations. According to Mo3ta Center, Jenin recorded 1,871 organized and popular resistance actions during this period, resulting in three Israeli deaths and 85 injuries. Within Jenin and its RC, 254 were killed out of 913 across WB, while the number of wounded in the governorate reached 683. Jenin and its RC also recorded the highest number of armed confrontations with Israel among WB cities, totaling 739 incidents, or 35% of all such operations across the WB. Resistance there involved specialized armed actions and a significant development in the use of high-explosive devices, with 490 explosives planted and detonated against Israeli forces. Concurrently, popular resistance persisted through demonstrations, marches and stone-throwing, totaling 594 incidents over the year. The Mo3ta Center documented 434 clashes and stone-throwing incidents targeting Israeli forces and settlers, alongside 155 demonstrations and marches.⁴⁶

3. Killed and Wounded in WB

According to Mo3ta Center, since Operation al-Aqsa Flood until the end of 2025, the total number of fatalities in the WB reached 1,136, with 8,861 injured. Between the onset of the operation and the end of 2023, 332 Palestinians were killed, 3,529 were injured, and 5,233 were arrested.⁴⁷ In 2024, 534 Palestinians were killed by Israel and settlers, including 80 children, 21 women and 23 elderly individuals, while 2,508 were injured. Jenin Governorate recorded the highest number of fatalities that year, with 151 killed, followed by Tulkarm and Nablus Governorates with 141 and 58, respectively.⁴⁸ In 2025, 270 Palestinians were

killed, including 56 children, 8 women, and 19 elderly, and 2,795 were injured. As in 2024, Jenin had the highest number of fatalities in 2025, with 87, followed by Nablus, Tubas and Hebron Governorates, with 45, 30, and 30, respectively.⁴⁹ PCBS reported that escalating Israeli military operations and settler violence in the WB resulted in the killing of 1,102 Palestinians and the injury of 9,034 others from the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood until the end of 2025. More specifically, 319 Palestinians were killed in the WB from the onset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood until the end of 2023;⁵⁰ this figure rose to 516 in 2024,⁵¹ before declining to 267 in 2025.⁵²

Table 5/4: Palestinians Killed and Missing Persons in WB and GS, Since 7/10/2023 Until the End of 2025⁵³

Year	Since 7/10/2023	2024	2025	Total
WB	332	534	270	1,136
GS	21,822	23,662	25,458	70,942
Missing Persons from GS				11,000
Total	22,154	24,196	25,728	83,078

As for the Shabak, it reported 45 Israeli fatalities in 2024 and 23 in 2025 from Palestinian operations in the WB, including East Jerusalem, and within the 1948 occupied territories. Injuries declined from 339 in 2024 to 195 in 2025.⁵⁴

Table 6/4: The Killed and Wounded Among Palestinians and Israelis in WB and GS 2024–2025

Year	Killed		Wounded	
	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis
2024	534	45	2,508	339
2025	270	23	2,795	195
Total	804	68	5,303	534

4. Prisoners and Detainees

In 2024 and 2025, Israel's patterns of arrest underwent notable developments, closely tied to the intensification of resistance against the occupation. Systematic detentions have long constituted a consistent policy through which Israel seeks to weaken resistance movements that might further the Palestinian pursuit of self-determination and freedom.

As of 14/12/2024, about 10,300 Palestinian prisoners are held in Israeli prisons, excluding those from GS detained following Operation al-Aqsa Flood and those in Israel's military camps. Among the prisoners are 89 women, 345 children and five PLC members. Of the total, 10,100 are from the WB, including 300 from East Jerusalem, while 200 are Palestinians from the 1948 occupied territories, alongside dozens of Arab detainees from other countries (see table 7/4). Notably, 3,428 are classified as administrative detainees (see table 8/4).

The number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons reached about 9,250 as of 5/11/2025. This figure excludes prisoners from GS after 7/10/2023, as well as those in Israel's military camps. Among them are 49 women, 350 children and six PLC members. Of the total, 9,050 are from the WB, including 400 from East Jerusalem; in addition, about 200 are Palestinians from the 1948 occupied territories, alongside dozens of Arab detainees from other countries (see table 7/4). Moreover, 3,368 are classified as administrative detainees (see table 8/4).

Table 7/4: Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons 2021–2025⁵⁵

Year	Total no. of detainees	WB	GS	Serving life sentences	Women	Children
2021	4,550	4,250	230	544	32	170
2022	4,700	4,400	200	551	34	150
2023	9,000*	8,520	280*	561	70	200
2024	10,300*	10,100	—	561	89	345
2025	9,250*	9,050	—	113	49	350

* Excluding GS detainees after 7/10/2023.

Table 8/4: Administrative Detainees 2021–2025⁵⁶

Year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Administrative detainees	500	835	2,070	3,428	3,368

The two years covered by the report witnessed the highest levels of targeting of Palestinians in GS and WB, including East Jerusalem. Palestinians in these areas are subjected to a discriminatory military judicial system that criminalizes aspects of daily life and imposes harsh penalties even for minor infractions. Furthermore, the ongoing arrest campaigns have been accompanied by escalating violations and abuses, including severe beatings, threats against detainees and their families, and widespread destruction of civilians’ homes. These measures have also involved the confiscation of vehicles, money, and gold jewelry, as well as large-scale damage to infrastructure. In addition, Israel has demolished homes belonging to detainees’ families, taken relatives as hostages, and used detainees as human shields.

Furthermore, 2024 and 2025 were among the deadliest years for Palestinian detainees. According to Palestinian prisoner institutions (Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs (CDA), the Palestinian Prisoner’s Society (PPS), and the Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association—Addameer), 86 detainees whose identities have been confirmed died in Israeli custody. This total includes 11 deaths from the beginning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood until the end of 2023, 43 in 2024, and 32 in 2025. Meanwhile, dozens of detainees from GS remain forcibly disappeared, while Israel continues to withhold the bodies of 94 detainees, including 83 since the genocide.

Arrest campaigns escalated to an unprecedented level with the onset of the genocide and the accompanying comprehensive war. Since 7/10/2023, specialized institutions have documented around 21 thousand arrests in the WB, including East Jerusalem, encompassing all segments of Palestinian society. These include 1,655 children and 650 women. Notably, this figure does not include arrests in GS, which have been estimated in the thousands since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, nor those carried out in the 1948 occupied territories, which are estimated in the hundreds. Particularly targeted groups include journalists, among whom 217 cases of arrest and detention have been recorded. Medical personnel have also been subjected to

unprecedented targeting, especially in GS, where more than 360 individuals have reportedly been detained.

During 2025, Palestinian prisoner institutions documented more than 7 thousand arrests, including 600 children and 200 women, in addition to field interrogations targeting thousands. By comparison, arrest campaigns in 2024 exceeded 8,800 cases, including 700 children and 266 women. These figures exclude arrests in GS, which are estimated to number in the thousands. Notably, arrest campaigns largely targeted previously released prisoners and individuals who had been previously detained and released without charge. Furthermore, since the start of the GS war, more than 20 thousand administrative detention orders, both new and renewed, have been issued, including orders against children and women.⁵⁷

In 2024 and 2025, Israel's legislative system experienced an unprecedented intensification, with the Knesset enacting a broad package of laws and amendments that systematically entrenched the apartheid framework and strengthened mechanisms of control over the Palestinian population, particularly prisoners and detainees. The Israeli war on GS was used as a political and legal pretext to expedite over thirty punitive laws, bringing the total number of discriminatory Israeli laws to nearly one hundred, demonstrating the structural and systematic character of this legislative agenda.

These measures undermined fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, association and protest, as well as citizenship, family life, equality and socio-economic rights. At the same time, the detention and "punishment" system was significantly tightened through amendments to prison regulations, allowing the declaration of a "detention emergency," or Prison Emergency Law, thereby legitimizing harsh and inhumane confinement while granting prison authorities exceptional powers that exceed international standards for prisoner treatment.⁵⁸

Similarly, new laws permit the revocation of citizenship or residency, the imposition of house arrest, and the suspension of social benefits, as well as the deportation or punishment of detainees' relatives. They further expand the detention of children, extend confinement periods, and restrict judicial oversight of administrative detention orders.⁵⁹

In 2024, the Knesset focused on approving or introducing a series of laws targeting the economic life of Palestinians in general, and prisoners and their

families in particular. Among the most notable initiatives was a bill allowing individuals harmed by acts of Palestinian “resistance,” defined under Israeli law as “terrorism,” to file compensation claims against entities alleged to support such actions, including the PA. Furthermore, the Knesset discussed a bill proposing sanctions against financial institutions operating in the WB and GS that maintain relations with financial institutions inside Israel, such as banks, if they are found to have transferred PA funds to individuals classified by Israel as “terrorists,” namely released prisoners and the families of those killed. In addition, two bills were introduced “enabling the Israeli government to withhold funds from Palestinian tax revenues to pay for the medical care of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli detention.” Moreover, on 11/10/2024, a law was finally approved “mandating that funds be deducted from the Palestinian tax revenues held by the Israeli government to finance Israeli defense attorneys appointed by the court...to represent Palestinian prisoners involved” in the 7/10/2023 attacks, despite the refusal of Palestinian lawyers and organizations “to defend these prisoners, citing the illegality of their detention.”⁶⁰

In this context, on 10/11/2025, the Knesset approved at first reading a bill stipulating the death penalty for Palestinians, which allows the execution of anyone who “intentionally or negligently causes the death of an ‘Israeli’ citizen for racial or hostile motives.” Additional legislation criminalizes denial or “glorification” of the events of 7/10/2023, significantly expands police powers in cases of “incitement” with “minimal oversight, and prolonged remote trial procedures.”⁶¹ On 30/3/2026, the Knesset adopted the law in its final reading, securing 62 votes in favor, 48 against, and one abstention.⁶²

Meanwhile, detainees from GS following the genocide “were subjected to exceptional laws classifying them as ‘illegal combatants,’ allowing prolonged detention, restricting lawyer access, and reducing judicial oversight.” Emergency regulations governing arrests and interrogations “were extended through early 2026, enabling prolonged detention without formal charges.”⁶³

In a related development, the US “has not only continued supporting the occupation’s genocide, but has also targeted Palestinian human rights institutions.” It has designated “Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association as a ‘terrorist organization’ and imposed sanctions on it and several other institutions, including Al-Haq, Al-Mezan, and the Palestinian Center for Human Rights.”⁶⁴

5. Prisoner Exchange Deals

Prisoner exchanges have been a pivotal aspect of the Palestinian detainee issue, not only regarding the numbers released but also the coercive conditions attached and their lasting effects on the freed individuals. These exchanges occurred within a complex political and security context, with releases serving as bargaining tools rather than legal or humanitarian obligations. Following a brief seven-day humanitarian ceasefire (23–30/11/2023), 240 Palestinian detainees (75 women and 165 minors) were released, while Palestinian resistance secured the release of 80 Israeli detainees (44 women and 36 minors) and 27 foreign nationals.⁶⁵

According to data compiled by prisoner organizations, a total of 3,745 Palestinian detainees were released in 2025 in two distinct phases. The first, between 20/1/2025 and 27/2/2025, involved 1,777 detainees, while the second, following the October 2025 ceasefire, included 1,968 detainees. These releases were carried out in exchange for all Israeli captives in GS, both living and deceased, through phased arrangements linked to political and security considerations rather than independent legal procedures or fair judicial review. Since the genocide began, the total number of detainees released under exchange agreements reached 3,985, including 383 who were forcibly expelled from Palestine.⁶⁶ These exchanges led to the release of 535 individuals sentenced to life imprisonment or long terms, 2,718 GS detainees arrested after the war, and 13 detainees who had been held since before the Oslo Accords.⁶⁷

These figures do not signify the resolution of the detention issue; rather, they reflect the growing reliance on prisoner exchanges as a mechanism for managing detention, particularly as large-scale arrest campaigns continue alongside releases. Prisoner rights organizations have documented the re-arrest of dozens of released detainees within weeks or months of their release; some were detained immediately or placed under administrative detention without charge or trial, constituting a recurring retaliatory practice that undermines the legal and humanitarian significance of release. Moreover, several exchange deals were accompanied by forced exile, either outside the country or to areas within the Palestinian territories other than the detainees' places of residence.⁶⁸

Third: Lebanese Resistance and Israeli War on Lebanon

From the outset of the Israeli war on GS, the Lebanese front acted as an effective support line, imposing significant strategic costs on Israel. The Lebanese resistance—primarily Hizbullah, alongside the Fajr Forces the military wing of al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyyah, and select Palestinian factions, including Hamas and PIJ—managed escalation carefully, gradually expanding its targets while maintaining a balance that avoided full-scale war and sustained pressure on Israel’s northern front. Until the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 27/11/2024, the Lebanese resistance executed precise operations against Israeli military sites, command centers and surveillance systems, causing widespread disruption in northern settlements. In turn, Israel responded with airstrikes, artillery bombardments, targeted assassinations and the destruction of border villages.

Nevertheless, this support front underwent profound and dramatic transformations, progressing through several violent phases that fundamentally altered its character. Following the launch of Operation Northern Arrows on 23/9/2024⁶⁹ and the announcement of a “limited, targeted” ground operation against Hizbullah positions near the southern border on 1/10/2024,⁷⁰ the front shifted from a largely restrained engagement zone—operating under rules of engagement established since the 2006 July Lebanon War—into a theater of direct confrontation and open warfare with Israel. As a result, the Lebanese front became a principal theater for Israel. In his first address as Hizbullah’s Secretary-General on 30/10/2024, Sheikh Naim Qassem designated this war the Battle of Mighty Warriors against Israel.⁷¹

The support front was characterized by strikes on critical segments of the party’s communications network and command-and-control systems, targeting operational capacities and senior leadership, including Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, Executive Council head Hashim Safieddine, Chief of General Staff Fuad Shukr, among numerous other leaders and members.⁷²

Israel intensified its policy of targeted assassinations against Hizbullah’s political and military leadership, beginning with the killing of the party’s Central Training Unit head, Wisam al-Tawil, on 8/1/2024. This campaign culminated in the assassination of senior military official Fuad Shukr on 30/7/2024, following

Israel's accusation that Hizbullah was responsible for a rocket strike on 27/7/2024 at a football field in Majdal Shams in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, which killed 12 and wounded dozens, an accusation Hizbullah denied. In retaliation, Hizbullah launched 320 rockets and several drones on 25/8/2024. Nasrallah "specified that the main focus of Hezbollah's attack was the Glilot base north of Tel Aviv, which is home to the Mossad, an Israeli intelligence service, and the military intelligence group Unit 8200."⁷³

Tensions in Lebanon intensified as Israel renewed its targeted operations against Hizbullah personnel. On 17/9/2024, thousands of pagers in the possession of members across various Hizbullah units detonated, followed the next day by the explosion of walkie-talkies held by additional operatives, collectively resulting in 37 fatalities and over 3 thousand injuries.⁷⁴ Nasrallah characterized the attacks as "a major security and humanitarian blow, unprecedented in the history of our resistance, and perhaps in the broader conflict with the enemy." Subsequently, on 20/9/2024, Israeli aircraft struck the Jamous neighborhood in southern Beirut, assassinating Ibrahim Aqil, a principal architect of Hizbullah's Al-Radwan Force, along with 37 others, including Ahmad Mahmud Wehbe, who had assumed leadership of the Central Training Unit following the killing of Wisam al-Tawil.⁷⁵ Moreover, Israel assassinated Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah on 27/9/2024; it then initiated a ground incursion into southern Lebanon on 1/10/2024. However, the advance was met with strong resistance from Hizbullah and other resistance forces.

Operation Northern Arrows represented Israel's most intense assault on Lebanon since 2006, systematically targeting Hizbullah's political and military infrastructure. The offensive struck senior and mid-level leadership, weapons depots, and missile launch sites, and included a ground incursion into southern Lebanon. The campaign resulted in approximately 4 thousand Lebanese killed, 17 thousand wounded, and over 1.2 million displaced.⁷⁶ According to INSS, Hizbullah lost 2,450 personnel by the ceasefire on 27/11/2024.⁷⁷ During the two-month operation, the Israeli military reported over 12,500 targeted strikes, including 360 in Beirut, alongside more than 100 special operations.⁷⁸ Investigations by *The New York Times* revealed extensive Mossad infiltration of Hizbullah, with operatives planting listening devices in Hizbullah bunkers,

monitoring meetings, and maintaining near constant visibility over the movements of its leadership, including Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah.⁷⁹

The British newspaper *The Independent*, citing Israeli sources, reported that more than 12 thousand rockets were launched at Israel from Lebanon between 8/10/2023 and 27/11/2024.⁸⁰ Meanwhile, the Shabak recorded the launch of 20,103 rockets from the Lebanese and Syrian fronts during 2024–2025.⁸¹ In parallel, Hizbullah carried out more than 4,637 publicly announced military operations (an average of about 11 per day) between 8/10/2023 and 27/11/2024, of which 1,666 took place during the two months of the Israeli war on Lebanon.⁸²

It appears that Israel found it advantageous to reach a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon in order to ease the burden on the Israeli military and economy, facilitate the return of settlers to the north, and prevent Hizbullah from re-establishing its influence and military capabilities in southern Lebanon following Israel's withdrawal.⁸³ Accordingly, on 27/11/2024 a cessation of hostilities agreement between Hizbullah and Israel entered into force, which was reached through US and French mediation. US President Joe Biden announced the agreement, stating that it aimed to bring about a permanent cessation of military operations. It was subsequently approved by the Israeli security cabinet as well as by the leadership of Hizbullah. The agreement stipulates that "Israel will not carry out any offensive military operations against Lebanese targets, including civilian, military, or other state targets, in the territory of Lebanon by land, air, or sea." In parallel, "the Government of Lebanon will prevent Hezbollah and all other armed groups in the territory of Lebanon from carrying out any operations against Israel." Furthermore, the "Israel will withdraw its forces in a phased manner south of the Blue Line," completing its withdrawal within 60 days. Hizbullah, for its part, is to redeploy north of the Litani River, while the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) will deploy 10 thousand soldiers south of the river, including at 33 positions along the border with Palestine.⁸⁴

However, on 24/1/2025, Israel announced that its army would not withdraw from the five positions it controls in southern Lebanon.⁸⁵ In response, the Lebanese government approved a plan to restrict arms to the state's security forces. LAF subsequently implemented the first phase of the plan, deploying across most areas south of the Litani River. Israel, however, deemed these measures insufficient,

asserting that Hizbullah was rebuilding its capabilities. Amid mounting criticism regarding the army's seriousness in limiting Hizbullah's weapons south of the Litani, the army command organized a media tour of the south on 28/11/2025. During the visit, it reported that since the launch of the "Homeland Shield" plan, aimed at ensuring the state's monopoly over arms, the army had dealt with 177 tunnels, closed 11 crossings along the Litani River, and seized 566 rocket launchers. It further indicated that 10 thousand soldiers had been deployed south of the Litani despite existing obstacles, supported by 200 army positions and 20 checkpoints.⁸⁶

More than a year after the ceasefire, the war has effectively not ended, as Israel continues its daily attacks on Lebanon. At the same time, the prospect of renewed large-scale escalation remains significant, particularly as Israel has disregarded the ceasefire agreement, despite Hizbullah's adherence to it, while its violations have exceeded 10 thousand (This assessment was confirmed while the report was being finalized, as Israel launched a wide-scale offensive against Lebanon in March 2026). Furthermore, Israel's army has taken control of five locations inside Lebanese territory and has established two buffer zones, thereby preventing not only the full deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces but also the return of thousands of displaced residents to villages near the Blue Line (Moreover, Israel has expanded its control, effectively establishing a border strip during its March 2026 offensive).

On 9/12/2025, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported almost 7,800 air violations, more than one thousand trajectories crossing the Blue Line (with almost all of them originating from the Israeli side), over 100 air attacks, and over 2,500 Israeli ground violations north of the Blue Line inside Lebanese territory. UNIFIL also reported discovering more than 360 illegal weapons and ammunition caches, which were subsequently referred to LAF.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PHEOC) of Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health released casualty figures resulting from Israeli attacks following the cessation of hostilities agreement between 28/11/2024 and 27/11/2025. The report recorded 335 fatalities and 973 injuries, including members of Hizbullah and other Lebanese and Palestinian resistance factions.⁸⁸

There are no definitive figures yet on the full extent of damage in Lebanon caused by the Israeli war. The south, in particular, has never experienced destruction of



this magnitude, nor have towns ever been entirely destroyed as in this war. Border areas from Naqoura to Shebaa suffered systematic damage from Israeli airstrikes and explosions, continuing even after the ceasefire, with destruction in some towns reaching 70%. According to Hashim Haidar, head of the Council of the South, 55 thousand units in the South and Western Beqaa were completely destroyed, while 180 thousand additional residential and non-residential units were damaged, totaling 235 thousand units at an estimated cost of \$5 billion. The assault also burned over 6 thousand olive trees, including 4,700 ancient olive trees, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture.⁸⁹ Lebanese Environment Minister Nasser Yassin reported that Israel's deliberate use of white phosphorus destroyed more than 5,745 hectares of land and forest in southern Lebanon, leaving over 52 towns and villages uninhabitable.⁹⁰

A World Bank report estimates Lebanon's reconstruction and recovery needs at \$11 billion, based on an assessment of damages and sectoral requirements across ten sectors between 8/10/2023 and 20/12/2024. The report indicates that the public sector will need to provide \$3–5 billion, including \$1 billion for infrastructure, while private sector financing of \$6–8 billion will be largely directed to housing, commerce, industry and tourism. Overall, the economic cost of the aggression is estimated at \$14 billion, comprising \$6.8 billion in damages of physical assets and \$7.2 billion in losses from reduced productivity, lost income and increased operational costs. Housing is the most affected sector, with damages of \$4.6 billion, while commerce, industry and tourism account for \$3.4 billion in losses. The conflict is further estimated to have contracted Lebanon's real GDP by 7.1% in 2024.⁹¹

In turn, Israel sustained substantial military and economic losses. Israeli sources report 118 killed from Hizbullah strikes, including 45 civilians and 73 soldiers. Authorities estimate property damage at over one billion shekels (about \$273 million), with thousands of homes, farms and businesses damaged or destroyed. The heaviest impact occurred along the Lebanese border, subjected to intense rocket fire by Hizbullah, while about 55 thousand acres of forests, nature reserves, gardens, and open land in northern Israel and the occupied Syrian Golan Heights were destroyed. This damage severely disrupted tourism and industrial activity.⁹²

Fourth: Yemeni Resistance Operations

Yemen entered the GS war as a strategic, long-range support front for the Palestinian resistance, representing a qualitative shift by extending the confrontation into the heart of Israeli interests and those of its allies. Forces aligned with the Caretaker Government of the Ansar Allah (Houthi) Movement conducted missile and naval operations against Israel and disrupted maritime routes linked to Israel in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait, causing major disturbances to international shipping, raising maritime shipping costs, and forcing global companies to alter their routes. Despite Western and Israeli strikes, Yemen maintained its operational role, demonstrating resilience and the capacity to counterbalance the technological superiority of its adversaries. This development represented a qualitative evolution in the military geography of the conflict. The Yemeni factor redefined the concept of strategic support and showed that the theater of confrontation is no longer confined to Palestine's immediate geographic vicinity. Yemen's performance thus established its front as a regional actor in the deterrence calculus surrounding the Palestine issue.

Since 14/11/2023, when Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen decided to intervene in support of the Palestinian people in GS, the group has carried out 2,155 attacks using ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, as well as drones and unmanned boats. These strikes targeted Israeli vessels, as well as ships of states supporting Israel, across the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, in addition to ports, airports and military sites within Israeli territory. Over two years, 228 commercial ships were hit, effectively imposing a naval blockade on traffic bound for Israel.⁹³ Following the cessation of the hostilities on GS in October 2025, Yusuf al-Madani, chief of the Houthi General Staff, stated in a message to Al-Qassam Brigades that operations against Israel would resume should it recommence its genocide campaign in GS.⁹⁴

An analysis by Al Jazeera's fact-checking agency, Sanad, indicates that Ansar Allah conducted 137 attacks on Israeli cities using hypersonic ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones between 31/10/2023 and 5/10/2025, averaging roughly one attack every five days. The frequency of attacks escalated markedly in 2025, with 87 incidents compared to 41 in 2024 and nine in 2023. September 2025 was

particularly intense, with strikes occurring approximately every two days, totaling 15 attacks.⁹⁵ These operations prompted the closure of Eilat port to maritime traffic on 20/7/2025, following the municipality's seizure of its bank accounts following non-payment of municipal taxes exceeding 600 thousand shekels (about \$178,800) per month.⁹⁶

In response, the US and its allies deployed a naval force to strike targets in Yemen, citing the protection of maritime navigation. Although this expanded the conflict geographically, it did not fully halt Yemeni attacks, which continued intermittently. In December 2023, the US, UK and other states launched Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect vessels targeted by the Houthis in the Red Sea. On 12/1/2024, President Joe Biden announced that the US and the UK had “successfully conducted strikes against a number of targets in Yemen used by Houthi rebels to endanger freedom of navigation,” while eyewitnesses reported strikes on Yemeni cities. Targets were hit by fighter jets from the US navy, US air force and Royal Air Force, along with ship-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak confirmed UK participation in the strikes, saying, “We have ... taken limited, necessary and proportionate action in self-defence, alongside the United States against targets tied to these attacks, to degrade Houthi military capabilities and protect global shipping.”⁹⁷

These attacks continued until the beginning of the second ceasefire in GS in January 2025. However, they resumed on 16/3/2025, when the US launched a large-scale campaign of air and naval strikes against Yemen. According to media outlets affiliated with Ansar Allah, around 40 US airstrikes targeted the capital Sanaa, as well as Saada and al-Bayda, killing 32 people and injuring more than 100 others, most of them women and children.⁹⁸ The operations continued until 6/5/2025, when US President Donald Trump announced that the US would “stop the bombings” against Ansar Allah in Yemen.⁹⁹ The group confirmed the announcement but emphasized that Yemen's continued support for GS would persist. Ansar Allah spokesperson Muhammad ‘Abdul Salam stated that the “preliminary understanding with the Americans has no relation to our position regarding support for Gaza.”¹⁰⁰

Meanwhile, US officials indicated that the campaign against Ansar Allah had cost the US more than \$1 billion since March 2025, involving the use of thousands

of bombs and missiles, the downing of seven drones, and the loss of two fighter jets. Washington further stated that it had carried out one thousand strikes in Yemen, killing of 650 Houthi fighters. According to US assessments, the Houthis' capacity to launch ballistic missiles declined by 87%, while one-way drone attacks fell by 65%.¹⁰¹

Ansar Allah reported that Yemen conducted more than 131 operations using 253 ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, in addition to drones, during that period. It also stated that the cost of the war exceeded \$3 billion, excluding direct losses estimated at more than \$1 billion. The group further noted that it carried out several notable operations, most prominently targeting Ben Gurion Airport and the Nevatim airbase. Meanwhile, it reported that the US and its allies conducted 1,712 airstrikes. These attacks resulted in the destruction of Sanaa International Airport, the temporary suspension of operations at Hudaydah Port, and the destruction of fuel storage and pumping facilities at the Ras Isa oil port in Hudaydah governorate. In addition, the Bajil Cement Factory in Hudaydah and the 'Amran Cement Factory in northern Yemen were destroyed. Approximately 280 civilians were reported killed across several Yemeni governorates, while hundreds more were injured.¹⁰²

For its part, Israel launched 17 waves of airstrikes on Yemen between 20/7/2024 and 25/9/2025, with a pause during the second ceasefire in GS at the beginning of 2025. Over time, these attacks on the Houthis assumed an increasingly escalatory character, moving beyond defensive deterrence toward a broader strategy of destruction. In this context, Israel initiated aerial strikes against the Ansar Allah movement in Yemen as part of Operation Long Arm. The operation targeted government assets of strategic value, as well as military and security sites and residential neighborhoods. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the attack on Yemen "makes it clear to our enemies that there is no place that the long arm of Israel will not reach," adding that the strikes were carried out in response to Houthis' aggression.¹⁰³ Notably, the targeted sites constitute key pillars of the Houthis' military, administrative and economic activity.¹⁰⁴

One of the most notable Israeli operations against the Houthis occurred on 28/8/2025, when Israel launched a large-scale strike on Sanaa and other locations in Yemen. The Israeli military stated that its air force had carried out what it described

as a “precise strike” targeting a Houthi military site in the capital. Subsequently, on 30/8/2025, Ansar Allah announced that the Israeli strike had killed the prime minister of the government appointed by the group, Ahmad Ghalib al-Rahawi, along with several ministers. Among those killed on 28/8/2025 were Minister of Information and government spokesperson Hashim Sharaf Addin; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs Jamal ‘Amer; Minister of Electricity, Energy, and Water ‘Ali Saif Muhammad; and Minister of Justice and Human Rights Ahmad ‘Abdullah ‘Ali.¹⁰⁵

On 10/9/2025, Israel carried out a large-scale attack on the Yemeni cities of Sanaa and al-Jawf, causing extensive damage to infrastructure and key facilities. According to the Ministry of Health affiliated with the Ansar Allah group in Yemen, the attack resulted in 35 fatalities and 131 injuries. Meanwhile, the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation reported that ten warplanes conducted the strike, dropping 30 bombs on 15 targets.¹⁰⁶

Fifth: Israeli Aggression Against Iran

Since the onset of the Israeli war on GS, relations between Israel and Iran have undergone a measured escalation. Israel largely carried out limited strikes targeting Iranian interests and those of its allies, while Iran responded with calibrated actions aimed at maintaining deterrence without being drawn into a comprehensive war. This pattern reflected both sides’ awareness of the risks of direct confrontation, even as the conflict remained contained within carefully managed rules of engagement. Moreover, the escalation involved a series of Israeli security and military strikes, most notably targeting leaders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-aligned factions in Syria and other countries. Consequently, the confrontation between Israel and Iran largely remained a “shadow war” until it expanded in June 2025.

At the outset of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Tehran stressed that the attack was entirely Palestinian, executed solely by Palestinians without external assistance, while reaffirming its support for Palestinian resistance. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated Iran’s backing for Palestine and its resistance, adding, “those who say that non-Palestinians are behind what the Palestinians have done do not

know the Palestinian nation. They underestimate the Palestinian nation.”¹⁰⁷ Major General Hossein Salami, Commander of the IRGC, described the operation as a response to 75 years of injustice.¹⁰⁸ Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian dismissed allegations of Tehran’s direct involvement as “baseless claim,” noting that Iran does not “want this war to spread out,”¹⁰⁹ though he cautioned that escalation could follow continued US support for Israel, emphasizing that such backing has intensified the war.¹¹⁰

In 2024, two major aerial confrontations took place between Israel and Iran. The first occurred in April after Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024, killing several IRGC commanders in Syria and Lebanon, most notably Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Brigadier General Mohammad Hadi Haji Rahimi, along with five accompanying officers.¹¹¹ In response, Iran launched Operation True Promise 1 on 13/4/2024, firing approximately 300 missiles and drones toward Israel. According to the IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, the attack destroyed two key Israeli military sites. He further stated that the Iranian strike has concluded and there is no intention to continue it; however, the country will respond decisively if Israel targets its interests.¹¹²

The Israeli military reported having “thwarted” the Iranian attack, intercepting 99% of the drones and missiles and describing the outcome as a “major strategic achievement.” According to its statement, Iran launched over 300 threats of various types, including more than 120 ballistic missiles, of which only 7 crossed the border, striking Nevatim airbase and causing minor damage. *The New York Times* cited Israeli officials stating that Iran had deployed 185 drones, 110 surface-to-surface missiles, and 36 cruise missiles. Channel 12 further noted that US and British fighter jets, together with French military assets, contributed to repelling the assault.¹¹³

The second confrontation occurred in October 2024, following Israel’s assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Isma’il Haniyyah in Tehran on 31/7/2024, after his participation in the Iranian presidential inauguration, as well as the assassinations of Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah and IRGC commander Abbas Nilforoushan on 27/9/2024 in Beirut’s southern suburbs. In response, the IRGC launched Operation True Promise 2, firing over 200 rockets against Israeli military and security targets, reportedly achieving a 90% success

rate. Official Iranian television further reported that the operation marked the first use of the hypersonic Fattah-1 missile, aimed specifically at Israel's Arrow 2 and 3 missile defense systems.¹¹⁴

In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the strike on Israel "failed," and thanked the US for its support of Israel's defensive measures, stressing that Iran made a "big mistake tonight" and "it will pay for it."¹¹⁵ The Israeli military acknowledged that the Iranian missile strike caused damage to its air bases but minimized its significance and withheld specific locations. The Cable News Network (CNN) reported that video analysis showed an Iranian missile detonating less than one kilometer from Mossad headquarters.¹¹⁶ As in the initial wave, US and British fighter jets, alongside French military assets, contributed to repelling the Iranian assault,¹¹⁷ while Jordanian authorities intercepted multiple missiles and drones that entered their airspace.¹¹⁸

Israel attempted to leverage Iran's response in the second confrontation to strike its nuclear program; however, US pressure, aimed at preventing a broader war, led Israel to limit the operation. On 4/10/2024, the Israeli Security cabinet authorized a retaliatory response,¹¹⁹ which culminated on 26/10/2024 in a series of airstrikes. Within four hours of launching Operation Days of Repentance, which involved three waves of strikes targeting 20 locations, the Israeli military announced the operation had achieved all its objectives. Israeli media reported that approximately one hundred fighter jets participated, including F-35, F-16, and F-15 aircraft. NBC and ABC cited an Israeli official confirming that the targets excluded energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities. Iran, for its part, claimed its air defenses successfully repelled the attacks, though "limited damage" occurred at certain sites in Tehran, Khuzestan and Ilam. Axios reported that Israel, through a third party, sent Tehran a warning not to retaliate, seeking to curb further exchanges and prevent broader escalation.¹²⁰

With the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency at the beginning of 2025, and Israel's success in weakening Iran's regional allies, an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear program increasingly appeared to be only a matter of time, effectively opening the path for an Israeli attack on Iran. According to Benjamin Netanyahu, such a strike had initially been planned before April 2025. However, Trump's insistence on allowing a negotiation window, during which the US

sought to compel Iran to halt uranium enrichment, delayed the operation by sixty days.¹²¹ On 13/6/2025, on the eve of the deadline set by Trump for reaching an agreement on Iran's nuclear program, and despite the announcement of a new round of negotiations, Israel launched a large-scale, coordinated military operation against Iran dubbed Operation Rising Lion. The operation involved more than 200 fighter jets and targeted around one hundred sites across Iran, including the IRGC headquarters, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters of the armed forces, and several nuclear facilities, most notably the Natanz Nuclear Facility. Israeli military spokesperson Effie Defrin stated that Israeli warplanes had attacked and damaged Iranian air defense systems.

The attack resulted in the killing of at least twenty senior Iranian military commanders and six Iranian nuclear scientists. Iranian media reported the killing of the IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami; the commander of the IRGC's Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters, Gholam Ali Rashid, along with his deputy Mehdi Rabbani; as well as the Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces, Mohammad Bagheri, and IRGC Air Force head Amir Ali Hajizadeh.¹²² Moreover, an Israeli security source indicated that the Mossad had maintained a significant presence within Iran for several years, particularly in Tehran, where it had established an operational branch. According to the source, Mossad special forces carried out a series of covert operations deep inside Iran in the period preceding the attack.¹²³

In response, the IRGC announced the launch of Operation True Promise 3 and carried out a missile strike against Israel, targeting dozens of Israeli objectives, military centers, and air bases. Meanwhile, Israeli media reported estimates indicating that more than 100 missiles and around 100 drones had been launched from Iran.¹²⁴ Several reportedly penetrated Israel's air defense systems and struck multiple locations across Israel, including Haifa and Tel Aviv. In turn, Ali Khamenei warned Israel of severe punishment, stating, "With this crime, the Zionist regime has prepared for itself a bitter, painful fate, which it will definitely see."¹²⁵

Benjamin Netanyahu stressed that the operation "will continue for as many days as it takes to remove the threat," with attacks primarily targeting Iran's missile production capabilities.¹²⁶ Tzachi Hanegbi specified that the goals of the operation, as approved by the cabinet, against Iran are four-fold: "striking Iran's

nuclear program, striking its ballistic missile capabilities; attacking its capacity to destroy Israel via a ground attack; and creating the conditions for the long-term thwarting of Iran's nuclear program via diplomatic means."¹²⁷

On 22/6/2025, the US joined the attack on three Iranian nuclear facilities—Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. In response, Iran launched six missiles at the US Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar in an operation it termed “Bashayer al-Fath.” Doha, however, announced that its air defense systems had successfully intercepted the missiles.¹²⁸ Meanwhile, Donald Trump said “Iran gave the United States notice prior to shooting missiles at its military base in Qatar.”¹²⁹

A ceasefire between the parties was announced on 24/6/2025, with both sides claiming victory. Trump asserted that Iran's nuclear program had been “obliterated.”¹³⁰ Israel likewise maintained that Iran had sustained significant losses affecting its nuclear program, missile production factories, missile stockpiles, launchers and Iran's leading nuclear scientists, while reiterating that “Iran will not have nuclear weapons.”¹³¹ Conversely, Iran claimed it had prevailed over its adversaries and that Israeli losses were greater than officially acknowledged. In particular, it pointed to strikes on areas in Tel Aviv, several security institutions, and scientific facilities such as the Weizmann Institute of Science and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, as well as the Haifa oil refineries and the headquarters of certain Israeli security agencies, incidents that Israel acknowledged only days after the confrontation.¹³²

Estimates indicate that the war against Iran, which lasted 12 days, cost Israel's treasury about 22 billion shekels (about \$6.44 billion), including around 10 billion shekels (about \$2.92 billion) allocated to financing the expenditures of the Israeli military.¹³³ Nevertheless, Bezalel Smotrich stated that the total cost of the war could reach \$12 billion.¹³⁴ Israeli medical officials also reported that 28 people were killed and 3,238 others injured as a result of Iran launching roughly 550 ballistic missiles and about one thousand drones at Israel during the war, most of which were intercepted, according to the Israeli military.¹³⁵ Estimates further indicate that throughout the conflict Israel and the US jointly launched about 195 interceptor missiles: 80 of the Arrow-3 type, 22 Arrow-2 missiles, and 93 THAAD interceptors.¹³⁶

Moreover, Israeli authorities reported that more than 9 thousand people had been displaced from their homes. According to Channel 12, approximately 31 thousand buildings were damaged (out of 39 thousand reported damage claims), while 25 homes were deemed at risk of collapse and around 4 thousand vehicles were destroyed. The channel further reported that Iran launched 591 ballistic missiles, 67 of which penetrated air defenses and struck inside Israel. In addition, 1,050 drones were launched, with the channel claiming that 99% were intercepted. It also recorded 17,825 missile alerts over a 12-day period. The most extensive damage was reported in central Israel and the Tel Aviv metropolitan area (25 thousand damage reports), followed by Ashkelon (11 thousand reports).¹³⁷ Meanwhile, the Israeli Bazan Group reported that the damage caused by an Iranian missile attack on its Haifa Bay refinery and subsidiaries is estimated between \$150 million and \$200 million.¹³⁸

According to Channel 12, Israel conducted approximately 1,500 airstrikes on Iranian territory, targeting 1,480 military sites. The channel further reported that Israel struck eight nuclear facilities in Iran, causing significant damage to two major installations. It also claimed that most of Iran's senior security leadership had been eliminated and that 260 missile launch platforms had been destroyed.¹³⁹ Similarly, the Israeli military stated that it had killed more than 30 Iranian security officials and 11 nuclear experts associated with Tehran's nuclear program. It further asserted that roughly 50% of Iran's missile launch platforms had been destroyed, in addition to 15 aircraft, while six airports were targeted.¹⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Saeed Ohadi, assistant to the president and head of Iran's Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation, reported that 1,604 Iranians were killed during the Israeli assault and more than 5,800 were injured.¹⁴¹

Regarding Iran's nuclear program, most available reports, including those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), suggest that the damage inflicted was greater than Iran acknowledges but significantly less than the claims advanced by the US and Israel.¹⁴²



Sixth: Israeli Aggression Against Syria

Since 7/10/2023, Israel has repeatedly struck Syrian territory, targeting military sites and logistical infrastructure to prevent the establishment of new deterrence balances. Although Syria's direct responses have been limited, these attacks have fallen short of achieving their full strategic aims. The Syrian arena has therefore remained part of a broader cycle of reciprocal pressure, without escalating into an open front, while indirect responses have been pursued through other theaters, notably Lebanon and Iraq. As a result, Syria has become a continuous corridor of targeting within a wider confrontation between Israel and an integrated axis of resistance-supporting forces.

Since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, Syria has emerged as a direct target of Israeli attacks, which have intensified both in frequency and scale. Before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, these strikes were limited and primarily focused on Iranian positions, select Palestinian factions operating in Syria, and Hizbullah leaders and sites. Following the escalation of Israeli aggression in Lebanon in September 2024, attacks on Syria intensified markedly, targeting strategic Iranian and Hizbullah positions as well as various Syrian regime sites.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Israel carried out 373 strikes on Syrian territory in 2024, of which 347 were airstrikes and 26 were rocket attacks, marking the highest annual total of Israeli attacks on Syria. These operations damaged or destroyed 1,032 targets, including weapons depots, military installations, vehicles, and border crossings, with particular focus on positions used by Hizbullah and Iran-aligned militias. In the eight months preceding Israel's large-scale offensive on Lebanon, 61 strikes were recorded by SOHR, rising to 98 during the three months of the campaign, resulting in 226 military fatalities.¹⁴³

Amid a series of international, regional and domestic developments, most notably Donald Trump's election as US president and the implementation of the Lebanon ceasefire between Hizbullah and Israel, Syria experienced a dramatic shift on 27/11/2024, when opposition factions launched Operation Deterrence of Aggression. The offensive quickly escalated, culminating on 8/12/2024 in the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime and his departure from the country.¹⁴⁴ In the aftermath, Israel intensified its military operations, carrying out widespread

airstrikes across Syrian territory that targeted multiple sites within a compressed timeframe, alongside limited ground incursions in southern regions, including Quneitra and Mount Hermon.

By December 2024, Israeli strikes had escalated from selective targeting to broad-scale destruction. That month, the Israeli army carried out 214 airstrikes on Syrian territory, 210 of which followed the fall of the Assad regime. These operations, totaling approximately 500 sorties against Syrian air, land and naval forces, destroyed over 720 military targets¹⁴⁵ and effectively crippled Syria's conventional military capabilities. On 10/12/2024, the Israeli army announced that it has struck 320 "strategic targets" in Syria, from Damascus to Tartus, with over 350 fighter jets participating in the operation, dubbed Operation Bashan Arrow. The strikes reportedly destroyed aircraft, missile ships and strategic installations to prevent their capture by opposition forces. Israel claimed to have eliminated nearly 85% of Syria's strategic military assets within 48 hours, including "Scud missiles, cruise missiles, surface-to-sea, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, UAVs, fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, tanks, hangars, and more." It further stated that "Israeli Navy missile ships struck two Syrian Navy facilities simultaneously: the Al-Bayda port and the Latakia port, where 15 Syrian naval vessels were docked."¹⁴⁶

The 2024 strikes resulted in the deaths of 414 combatants and injuries to 277 others, predominantly from the IRGC, Hizbullah and other Iran-backed forces.¹⁴⁷

Since early 2025, Israel has intensified its military operations in Syria, conducting 105 strikes, 89 aerial and 16 ground, which damaged or destroyed some 142 targets across multiple governorates. This pattern reflects a consistent model of cross-border operations, targeting not only weapons and ammunition depots but also military headquarters, centers and vehicles, across the south, central regions, the coast, and Damascus and its surroundings. These strikes resulted in 76 deaths, half of whom were personnel from Syria's Military Operations Administration (MOA) and the Ministry of Defense.¹⁴⁸

Israel also exploited the security vacuum in southern Syria to expand its control, particularly within the buffer zone established under the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. Following the withdrawal of the Syrian army, Israel declared the agreement effectively collapsed and launched a

military campaign through which it seized about 440 km² (other estimates put the figure at 600 km²). The areas captured included several strategic locations, most notably the summit of Mount Hermon, as well as Tulul al-Humur, Jubata al-Khashab, and al-Hamidiyah. Israeli forces subsequently established military bases and observation posts there, benefiting from the withdrawal of Russian forces from southern Syria and the near-total absence of the Syrian army.¹⁴⁹ However security sources indicated that Israel's military incursion reached roughly 20 km southwest of Damascus.¹⁵⁰

This Israeli escalation in Syria can be understood as part of efforts to establish new facts on the ground along the Syrian border, including the installation of military positions inside Syrian territory that did not exist during the Assad regime. At the same time, Israel seeks to consolidate its security red lines without bearing the costs of a long-term occupation. Furthermore, Israel appears to be attempting to influence Syria's internal balances and reshape its political landscape in ways that serve its security and strategic interests, including through selective support for minorities, particularly the Druze. In this context, Israel has repeatedly stated that its strikes in Syria aim to protect the Druze from threats posed by the Syrian government and armed factions, especially following the clashes in Suwayda in July 2025.¹⁵¹

Seventh: Iraqi Resistance Operations

Iraq has functioned as a site of indirect support for the Palestinian resistance in GS. Since the outset of the war in GS, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia' al-Sudani sought to respond in a conventional manner, expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people while refraining from military involvement. Al- Sudani, like other Arab leaders, balanced Iraq's ties with the US and its substantial security and economic influence, while avoiding confrontation with Iran, whose political and security sway in Iraq remains considerable. He also sought to exert control over Iran-aligned armed factions, which largely ignored his political calculations in deciding whether to engage in the conflict within the resistance axis and "unity of arenas."¹⁵²

Following the onset of the war, Iraq contributed to broadening the conflict. Factions operating under the banner of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” launched drone and missile attacks on US and Israeli bases in the region, framing their actions as retaliation for the assault on GS and in support of the Palestinian resistance. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq encompasses several armed groups, including the Kata’ib Hizbullah, Harakat Hizbullah al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (HAAA), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Tashkil Al-Warithin.

These operations prompted coordinated responses from both the US and Israel, which targeted the factions’ positions as the attacks increasingly pressured the US administration amid mounting American military casualties. The factions conducted strikes from Iraqi and Syrian territory against US bases in both countries in retaliation for US support of Israel’s campaign in GS. Key targets included Ain al-Asad air base, Kharab al-Jir base, al-Shaddadi base, al-Harir air base, al-Tanf base, Rmelan air base, al-Malikiyah base, and the vicinity of the Koniko (or Conoco) natural gas field and al-Omar oil field, as well as US forces near Erbil Airport and the Green Village. In their statements, the resistance underscored that these operations achieved direct hits on the intended targets.¹⁵³

According to statistics released by these factions on 26/4/2024, they conducted a total of 243 attacks since 17/10/2023, with 90 in Iraq, 88 within Israel, and 65 in Syria,¹⁵⁴ demonstrating that the majority of these actions were directed against US forces in Iraq and Syria. Among the most significant of these attacks was a drone strike on 28/1/2024, in which the US military reported three soldiers killed and 34 wounded at the Logistics Support Base at “Tower 22” in the Rukban area of Al-Ruwaished District, north-eastern Jordan, near the Syrian border. Executed by Kata’ib Hizbullah, the strike prompted retaliatory US airstrikes targeting dozens of armed faction sites across Iraq and Syria, accompanied by public warnings from senior US officials.¹⁵⁵

Since April 2024, Iraqi factions have shifted their focus toward targeting Israeli sites, having previously concentrated on US targets. At the same time, the frequency of their drone attacks has increased and their scope has expanded to include strategic facilities. These operations have targeted airports, ports, power

stations, chemical facilities and Israeli military bases. Furthermore, these factions have claimed responsibility for attacks on vital Israeli targets in the Jordan Valley, the occupied Golan Heights, Beersheba, Tiberias, Haifa, Tel Aviv and Eilat, in addition to the Israeli Karish gas field platform. They also reported striking a “vital target” in Haifa using the long-range cruise missile al-Arqaḥ (an upgraded cruise missile).¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, although these groups maintain that the strikes directly hit their intended targets, Israel, along with independent sources, has generally not confirmed these claims or reported specific casualties or losses.

In November 2024, US military officials reported that Israel was facing daily drone attacks launched from Iraq, which US forces and their partners were compelled to intercept. A US regional security officer further indicated that approximately five launches per day were carried out from Iraqi territory by these factions targeting Israel. According to the conflict-monitoring organization ACLED, and based on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) analysis of its data, attacks by Iraqi factions escalated to roughly 25 per week. The factions themselves claimed responsibility for 35 attacks against Israel in September 2024, 47 in October 2024, and 25 in November 2024. These figures refer to the number of attacks rather than the number of strikes within each attack, as a single attack may involve multiple strikes.¹⁵⁷

One of the most notable operations occurred on 2/10/2024, when a drone targeted an Israeli military base in the northern occupied Syrian Golan, killing two soldiers and injuring 25 others. Significantly, this was the first instance since the beginning of Israel’s military campaign in which Iraqi factions succeeded in causing Israeli fatalities and injuries.¹⁵⁸

Nevertheless, despite the large number of operations claimed by these factions and their escalatory rhetoric toward Israel, their actions remained the least impactful among the Axis actors,¹⁵⁹ likely due to their limited capabilities and geographical distance. By late November 2024, the factions had quietly stopped issuing statements announcing attacks against Israeli occupation, without any formal declaration. This development coincided with the ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon. According to Yasser Watout, a member of the Iraqi parliament’s Security and Defense Committee, the suspension of operations

resulted from “pressure on the factions from the Iraqi government and Shiite political actors within the Coordination Framework (CF) alliance, in addition to external threats directed at Iraq.” He further noted that Iraq had received “threats from Israel and even from the US,” adding that “the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria was a key factor in halting operations,” as the factions could no longer launch attacks from Syrian territory as they had previously done.¹⁶⁰

Eighth: The Peace Process

In 2024–2025, the Palestine issue entered one of its most critical phases since the *Nakbah* of 1948. The genocidal war on GS coincided with an unprecedented escalation of settlement and annexation in the WB and significant shifts in the international system, particularly in global public opinion. The false Zionist narrative faltered, giving way to a Palestinian framing of the issue as a struggle for national liberation, in contrast to attempts to reduce it to a humanitarian matter concerning a population rather than a people entitled to self-determination.

In this context, the “two-state solution” has resurfaced within international political discourse, notably promoted by the administration of President Joe Biden as well as by certain European and Arab powers. Although this initiative carries symbolic weight, particularly in light of the growing number of states recognizing the Palestinian state—including the UK, the author of the Balfour Declaration, and France—it has largely remained rhetorical. Such recognition has not been accompanied by sanctions against Israel or by substantive shifts in the policies of these states. Consequently, despite its diplomatic significance, this approach is fundamentally at odds with the realities on the ground, where Israel continues to impose facts through occupation and settlement expansion, making the prospect of a Palestinian state increasingly remote. Unless international recognition is translated into concrete policies, sanctions, or other mechanisms capable of enforcing a genuine political track, its practical effect will remain limited. Indeed, in the absence of a serious political process on the ground, this discourse has effectively provided political cover for Israeli policies that undermine any realistic possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state.

The following section seeks to examine the developments of 2024–2025, analyze the underlying causes of the peace process deadlock, and assess potential trajectories in the near term, taking into account ongoing regional and international transformations.

1. Lack of Progress in the Peace Process 2024–2025

During the period examined in this study, the peace process experienced no substantive advancement. Palestinian–Israeli negotiations were not resumed, nor were any new international initiatives introduced that transcended the conventional framework established since the Oslo Accords. Consequently, the “peace process” has effectively disappeared from the agenda, supplanted by a logic aimed at managing or containing the conflict, ultimately seeking to resolve it at the expense of Palestinian rights.

This is reflected in several developments:

- The complete absence of any formal political process or negotiation-oriented meetings since 2014.
- The persistent pursuit of unilateral Israeli policies.
- The international community’s emphasis on managing humanitarian crises, without addressing their underlying political causes.

2. The Nature of the Zionist Project, Its Rejection of Settlements, and the Limits of a Historical Settlement

The current impasse in the peace process cannot be understood without considering the nature of the Zionist project itself. From its inception, it developed as a settler-colonial project aimed at controlling the land while excluding and displacing its indigenous population. Accordingly, it has relied on force, aggression, killing, settlement expansion, occupation, ethnic cleansing, and displacement as principal instruments for achieving its objectives.

Historical experience further underscores this pattern. Beginning with the 1947 partition resolution, which envisaged the establishment of an Arab state (for Palestinian Arabs) on a territory roughly twice the size of WB and GS combined, and continuing through the Oslo Accords, Israel has not treated settlement as a framework for ending the conflict. Rather, it has used it as a mechanism for

managing the conflict while consolidating its control. In doing so, it has benefited from the imbalance of power, unconditional US and Western support, damaging Palestinian miscalculations, and the persistence and deepening of the Palestinian schism.

3. The Current Israeli Government and the Project for Final Resolution

The formation of Israel's current government, arguably the most extreme in its history, has reinforced this trajectory. Comprising religious and ultranationalist forces with openly racist and fascist agendas, it rejects Palestinian national rights and advocates annexation, territorial expansion and the displacement of Palestinians.

The government frames the present moment as a “historic opportunity” to resolve the conflict definitively, pursuing measures that include:

- Imposing Israeli sovereignty over the WB, as reflected in Knesset resolutions overwhelmingly rejecting a Palestinian state and endorsing annexation.
- Reducing the Palestinian presence to a minimal level.
- Preventing any sovereign Palestinian entity, while systematically undermining the PA in the WB and promoting alternative forms of representation in GS that bypass established Palestinian representative institutions.

4. The Structural Nature of US Bias

US policy constitutes a central factor in the stalemate of the peace process. Rather than serving as a neutral mediator, the US has become an organic strategic partner of Israel, evident in its unlimited military support, use of the UNSC veto, and obstruction of international efforts to hold Israel accountable. The Trump plan, for example, contained no commitment to a political track toward a Palestinian state, instead it imposed conditions on the PA's participation, contingent on reforms deemed “satisfactory” by Washington and Tel Aviv, and based on their decisions.

President Joe Biden has further demonstrated this bias, openly aligning ideologically with Zionism while showing little capacity or willingness to exert meaningful pressure on the Israeli government. Similarly, Trump underscored this partiality by asserting that Israel, as a small state, required territorial expansion at the expense of the Greater Middle East.

5. The Two-State Solution Discourse as a Conflict-Management Tool

Although frequently invoked, the discourse of the two-state solution has rarely translated into actionable policy. Instead, it has served to manage international pressure and deflect criticism, without challenging the core of Israeli policies.

In this context, the two-state solution has shifted from a substantive political project to a rhetorical instrument, used to justify postponing fundamental issues and conditioning any political progress on security and administrative requirements imposed by Israel. With Donald Trump's presidency, the two-state framework was effectively sidelined, granting the Israeli government renewed impetus to advance the conflict on its own terms and pursue the vision of "Greater Israel."

6. Transforming the Palestinian State into a Conditional Reward

A critical shift in the peace process has been the redefinition of the Palestinian state from an inherent, inalienable legal right into a conditional political reward. At times, this reward is contingent upon recognition of Israel and its right to exist; at others, it hinges on "reforming" the PA according to US–Israeli standards. In effect, this approach subjects the Palestinian right to self-determination to the logic of external hegemony rather than to international law.

This approach directly contradicts:

- UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions.
- The principle of peoples' right to self-determination.
- The international recognition of the State of Palestine in 2012, with 159 states having recognized it at the time of writing

7. Continuity of Trump-era Policies Under Biden

Despite the formal transition following the 2020 elections, the Biden administration has largely preserved the key policies of Trump's first term, including:

- Relocating the US embassy to Jerusalem.
- Reopening the consulate that had been closed in East Jerusalem.
- Closing the PLO office in Washington.
- Suspending support to the PA.
- Maintaining recognition of Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights.

These actions highlight the enduring structural bias of US policy.

8. The Genocidal War in GS as a Political Instrument

The genocidal war in GS marked the apex of this trajectory, employing unlimited military force to pursue political objectives, foremost among them the breaking of Palestinian resolve and the imposition of new facts on the ground.

While Israel did not achieve all its declared goals, it succeeded in inflicting widespread destruction and producing catastrophic humanitarian conditions, later leveraged to exert political pressure.

9. International Trusteeship and the Reframing of the Palestine Issue

The arrangements following the ceasefire effectively imposed a form of international, particularly US, trusteeship over GS, presented under the guise of international legitimacy. This framework shifted responsibility onto the victim while absolving the occupier of any accountability, without any clear commitment to ending the occupation.

This approach reflects a reframing of the Palestine issue as a matter of managing the occupation, planning for post-conflict scenarios, and addressing humanitarian and administrative concerns, rather than as a struggle for national liberation. Consequently, the population is treated as mere residents, and Palestine is conceptualized as fragmented territories, even between WB and GS, thereby entrenching division and territorial segmentation.

10. Targeting Palestinian Political Representation

This approach seeks to undermine Palestinian political representation by marginalizing the PLO and denying its role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, despite widespread international recognition. While Israeli–US conduct has been a primary driver of this trend, the unilateral approach of the PLO leadership has, in parallel, reinforced it, particularly through its failure to incorporate influential and effective Palestinian forces on the ground, its inactivation of PLO institutions, and its marginalization of Palestinians abroad.

This approach constitutes a strategic threat, as it facilitates the circumvention of Palestinian rights and the legitimate representative of the people. If left unchecked, it risks producing imposed solutions that lack national legitimacy.

11. The WB and the Creeping Annexation Plans

In WB, Israel continues to implement “creeping annexation” plans through settlement expansion, territorial fragmentation, the isolation of Jerusalem, and the displacement of Palestinian communities, as part of a broader project aimed at “annexing land while excluding its population.”

12. The Abraham Accords and Their Limits

The US has sought to expand Arab normalization with Israel; however, the outbreak of Operation al-Aqsa Flood has reshaped this agenda. Several Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, have made any future normalization conditional on the establishment of a Palestinian state or, at minimum, the initiation of a credible and serious process to achieve it.

13. The Saudi–French Initiative and International Recognition

The Saudi–French initiative helped revive the two-state solution on the international stage, generating both political and moral momentum, as evidenced by the growing number of states recognizing Palestine. Nevertheless, its impact remained limited in the absence of effective pressure mechanisms.

14. International Shifts and the Surge in Global Public Opinion

The genocidal campaign in GS sparked an unprecedented wave of international solidarity with the Palestinian people and exposed the Israeli narrative to wide segments of global public opinion, producing a long-lasting cultural and political shift.

Conclusion

During 2024–2025, the Palestinian resistance, supported by its popular base, continued a sustained and intense confrontation against the most severe Israeli campaign targeting GS since its occupation in 1967. Meanwhile, the scope of hostilities expanded to include the WB, as well as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Israel’s extensive use of destructive force resulted in tens of thousands of fatalities, as well as the destruction or damage of about 80% of homes, infrastructure, hospitals, schools and places of worship. It also led to the internal forced displacement of

more than 90% of GS's population. Moreover, siege conditions were imposed, marked by deprivation of water, food, medicine, electricity and fuel, in addition to the deployment of about 200 thousand tons of explosives (equivalent to 15 nuclear bombs similar to the one dropped on Hiroshima). Nevertheless, Israel failed to eliminate the resistance, which remained operational until the final stages of the war. Moreover, it did not secure the release of any of its captives except under the resistance's terms.

During 2024–2025, the WB witnessed an unprecedented Israeli escalation since Operation al-Aqsa Flood, marked by near-daily incursions, field assassinations, mass arrests, and systematic destruction of infrastructure in RCs, alongside a sharp increase in settler violence, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. In parallel, and despite security coordination between the PA security forces and the Israeli army, as well as highly adverse conditions, Palestinian resistance continued through both individual and organized operations. Moreover, daily confrontations and various forms of popular resistance persisted, amid rising fatalities and detainees, tightening restrictions on Palestinian movement, and recurrent closures of neighbourhoods and cities.

In Lebanon, Hizbullah continued its strong support for the Palestinian resistance. In response, the Israeli leadership shifted its focus after mid-September 2024 toward Lebanon, targeting Hizbullah, its infrastructure and its social base. However, it encountered sustained resistance from the party and other resistance forces until the war ceased on 27/11/2024. Nevertheless, as of this writing, Israel continues to violate Lebanese territory through assassinations, bombardment, and destruction, aiming to pressure the disarmament of Hizbullah.

In Yemen, Ansar Allah (the Houthis) introduced a new dimension to the war by turning the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait into a strategic pressure front against Israel and its supporting states. Despite significant losses, including hundreds killed and extensive infrastructure damage, Ansar Allah has maintained its commitment to supporting the resistance in GS and backing Palestine until the end of the war, while consistently affirming its readiness to continue this support regardless of the cost.

In Iraq, the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” emerged as a distant support front, primarily targeting US bases, before subsequently extending its operations toward Israeli depth.

Iran, in turn, supported the Palestinian resistance and stood by it during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, while largely avoiding direct military confrontation with Israel. Nevertheless, it later became involved in more intense confrontations, most notably the 12-day war in June 2025.

By contrast, 2024 and 2025 marked the most lethal years for prisoners, who were subjected to systematic and severe torture, deprived of their basic rights, and exposed to starvation, the spread of infectious diseases, as well as extreme cold and heat.

On the other hand, it is evident that the peace process has reached an impasse, and that the prospect of a political settlement leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 borders has become increasingly detached from political reality. This is due not only to the imbalance of power, but also to the nature of the Zionist project itself, which is based on the negation of the other and the rejection of historic compromises, in addition to US support for the Israeli position opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Based on current developments, it is unlikely that 2026–2027 will witness a serious political process. Instead, open conflict is expected to continue, accompanied by attempts to impose a flawed settlement that, at best, would produce a Palestinian entity devoid of sovereignty, unless there is a fundamental shift in the balance of power or in the political structures at the Palestinian, Arab, regional and international levels. The future of the Palestine issue remains open to multiple possibilities, dependent on the Palestinians’ capacity to rebuild their national project and to capitalize on regional and international transformations in a world where unilateral dominance is waning and a more multipolar order is emerging.

Endnotes

- ¹ Aljazeera.net, 31/12/2025. (in Arabic); and Stav Levaton, In year-end summary, IDF says it struck some 20,900 targets across all fronts in 2025, *The Times of Israel*, 31/12/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/in-year-end-summary-idf-says-it-struck-some-20900-targets-across-all-fronts-in-2025/
- ² “How Many Countries Did Israel Attack in 2025?,” Aljazeera.net, 1/1/2026, <https://aja.ws/h38x9n> (in Arabic). The statistics cited in the report are based on confirmed reports and are likely lower than the actual number of attacks due to reporting gaps in areas of targeting and confrontation.
- ³ Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman, Netanyahu: Israel fighting second War of Independence, *The Jerusalem Post*, 27/10/2023, <https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-770514>
- ⁴ Netanyahu: ‘We are in an existential war, Israel has to win,’ *The Times of Israel*, 7/3/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-we-are-in-an-existential-war-israel-has-to-win/
- ⁵ Emanuel Fabian, Gallant: If Hamas isn’t totally dismantled, we won’t be able to live in Israel, *The Times of Israel*, 17/1/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/gallant-if-hamas-isnt-totally-dismantled-we-wont-be-able-to-live-in-israel/
- ⁶ PIC, 7/10/2023, <https://palinfo.com/?p=852723>; and Safa, 7/10/2023, <https://safa.ps/p/363487>
- ⁷ *The Times of Israel*, 7/10/2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-2200-rockets-fired-from-gaza-hamas-terrorists-infiltrated-from-land-sea-and-air
- ⁸ Statement by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, 7/10/2023, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-7-oct-2023>
- ⁹ Aljazeera.net, 7/10/2025, <https://aja.ws/uhwu1s> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁰ Two Years of War: Major Israeli Ground Operations in Gaza, site of Alaraby TV, 5/10/2025, <https://www.alaraby.com/news/غزة-الاحتلال-في-نقذها-البرية-التي-أبرزت-العمليات-البرية-التي-نقذها-الاحتلال-في-غزة>
- ¹¹ Aljazeera.net, 3/12/2023. (in Arabic)
- ¹² Aljazeera.net, 23 and 24/1/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹³ Site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs-State of Qatar, 15/1/2025; and Aljazeera.net, 15/1/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁴ Aljazeera.net, 18/3/2025. (in Arabic); PIC, 18/3/2025. (in Arabic); and Anadolu Agency, 18/3/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵ Two Years of War: Major Israeli Ground Operations in Gaza, Alaraby TV, 5/10/2025.
- ¹⁶ ‘Gideon’s Chariots II’: Katz approves Gaza City takeover plan, *The Jerusalem Post*, 20/8/2025, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-864732>
- ¹⁷ Two Years of War: Major Israeli Ground Operations in Gaza, Alaraby TV, 5/10/2025.
- ¹⁸ Steven Scheer and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Israel says ‘Gaza is burning’ as it launches ground assault, Reuters News Agency, 16/9/2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-says-gaza-is-burning-it-launches-ground-assault-2025-09-16/>
- ¹⁹ Matt Spetalnick, Nidal al-Mughrabi and Alexander Cornwell, Israel and Hamas agree to Gaza ceasefire and return of hostages, site of Al Monitor, 8/10/2025, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/10/israel-and-hamas-agree-gaza-ceasefire-and-return-hostages>; and site of Al Jazeera, 9/10/2025, <https://aje.io/25jxbo>
- ²⁰ Government Media Office in Gaza Strip channel, Telegram, 15/1/2026, <https://t.me/s/mediagovps>



- ²¹ Government Media Office in Gaza Strip channel, Telegram, 5 and 10/10/2025; and Aljazeera.net, 5 and 10/10/2025. (in Arabic)
- ²² A brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2025, PCBS, 31/12/2025, <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/en/post-details/?postId=23319>
- ²³ More than 38,000 women and girls were killed in Gaza between October 2023 and December 2025 – UN Women, site of UN Women, 17/4/2026, <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/press-release/2026/04/more-than-38000-women-and-girls-were-killed-in-gaza-between-october-2023-and-december-2025-un-women>
- ²⁴ Government Media Office in Gaza Strip channel, Telegram, 5 and 10/10/2025; and Aljazeera.net, 5 and 10/10/2025. (in Arabic)
- ²⁵ Anadolu Agency, 6/10/2025. (in Arabic); Aljazeera.net, 7/10/2025. (in Arabic); *The Jerusalem Post*, 6/10/2025; and The Times of Israel, 6/10/2025.
- ²⁶ For more, see Ibid.
- ²⁷ For more, see Do unofficial news channels in Israel bypass military censorship?, MADAR, 28/10/2024, <https://2h.ae/MVoyJ>; and Aljazeera.net, 4/5/2025, <https://aja.ws/e3n5vu> (in Arabic)
- ²⁸ Aljazeera.net, 11/12/2023.
- ²⁹ Aljazeera.net, 4/2/2025.
- ³⁰ Anadolu Agency, 6/10/2025. (in Arabic); Aljazeera.net, 7/10/2025. (in Arabic); *The Jerusalem Post*, 6/10/2025; and The Times of Israel, 6/10/2025, <https://aja.ws/jp4nkq> (in Arabic)
- ³¹ Anadolu Agency, 6/10/2025. (in Arabic); Aljazeera.net, 7/10/2025. (in Arabic); *The Jerusalem Post*, 6/10/2025; and The Times of Israel, 6/10/2025.
- ³² Aljazeera.net, 14/11/2023, <https://aja.ws/jp4nkq> (in Arabic)
- ³³ For further details, see Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2024, site of the Palestine Information Center—Mo3ta, 4/1/2025, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/40; and Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2025, Mo3ta, 5/1/2026, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/76
- ³⁴ Checkpoints and Iron Gates: Fragmenting the West Bank, Mo3ta, 18/9/2025, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/68
- ³⁵ Settler Attacks Have Been Increasing By 36% Annually in the West Bank Since 2020, site of The OIC Media Observatory for Israeli Crimes Against Palestinians, 16/12/2025, <https://palestine.oic-oci.org/2025/12/16/settler-attacks-have-been-increasing-by-36-annually-in-the-west-bank-since-2020/>
- ³⁶ Humanitarian Situation Update #252 | West Bank, site of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2/1/2025, <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-252-west-bank>; and Humanitarian Situation Update #352 | West Bank, OCHA-oPt, 7/1/2026, <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-352-west-bank>
- ³⁷ For further details, see Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2024, Mo3ta, 4/1/2025; and Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2025, Mo3ta, 5/1/2026.
- ³⁸ Monthly Reports of Israel Security Agency—ISA (*Shabak*), <https://www.shabak.gov.il/english/publications/Pages/monthlyreports.aspx>
- ³⁹ Ibid.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid.
- ⁴¹ Mo3ta Annual Report on Resistance in the WB and Jerusalem, 2024,” Mo3ta, 1/1/2025, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/39

- ⁴² Mo3ta Annual Report on Resistance in the WB and Jerusalem, 2025,” Mo3ta, 1/1/2026, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/75
- ⁴³ For more see Mo3ta Annual Report on Resistance in the WB and Jerusalem, 2024,” Mo3ta, 1/1/2025; Mo3ta Annual Report on Resistance in the WB and Jerusalem, 2025,” Mo3ta, 1/1/2026; and Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, *The Palestine Strategic Report 2022–2023*, p. 224.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ⁴⁵ Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2025, Mo3ta, 5/1/2026.
- ⁴⁶ “Resistance in Jenin and its refugee camp, from the beginning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7–10–2023 until 28–1–2025,” Mo3ta, 28/1/2025, https://mo3ta.ps/single_article/44
- ⁴⁷ For more, see Since October 7th, Mo3ta, https://mo3ta.ps/daily_mo3ta
- ⁴⁸ Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2024, Mo3ta, 4/1/2025.
- ⁴⁹ Mo3ta Annual Report on Violations in the West Bank and Jerusalem 2025, Mo3ta, 5/1/2026.
- ⁵⁰ H.E. Dr. Awad, presents a brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2023, PCBS, 31/12/2023, <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/en/post-details/?postId=20512>
- ⁵¹ Dr. Awad, presents a brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2024, PCBS, 31/12/2024, <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/en/post-details/?postId=22028>
- ⁵² A brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2025, PCBS, 31/12/2025.
- ⁵³ For WB figures, see “Since 7 October,” Mo3ta, https://mo3ta.ps/daily_mo3ta
For GS figures, see H.E. Dr. Awad, presents a brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2023, PCBS, 31/12/2023; Dr. Awad, presents a brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2024, PCBS, 31/12/2024; and A brief on the status of the Palestinian people at the end of 2025, PCBS, 31/12/2025.
- ⁵⁴ Monthly Reports of Shabak.
- ⁵⁵ For further details, see the reports of Addameer, <https://addameer.ps/ar/statistics>
- ⁵⁶ Ibid.
- ⁵⁷ For further information, see Prisoner Institutions Issue a Special Report on Key Issues and Data Concerning the Situation of Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons during 2024, site of Palestinian Prisoner’s Society (PPS), 31/12/2024, <https://www.ppsmo.ps/home/studies/16832?culture=ar-SA> (in Arabic); and The Genocide Inside the “Israeli” Occupation’s Prisons 32 Palestinians Killed Behind Bars in 2025, PPS, 30/12/2025, <https://www.ppsmo.ps/home/studies/18014?culture=ar-SA>
- ⁵⁸ The Genocide Inside the “Israeli” Occupation’s Prisons 32 Palestinians Killed Behind Bars in 2025, PPS, 30/12/2025.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Israeli Laws: An Instrument of Oppression and Persecution: New Laws and Legal Amendments in 2024, site of Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association—Addameer, 24/5/2025, <https://addameer.ps/media/5552>
- ⁶¹ The Genocide Inside the “Israeli” Occupation’s Prisons 32 Palestinians Killed Behind Bars in 2025, PPS, 30/12/2025.
- ⁶² Israeli Knesset passes death penalty for West Bank terrorists, site of i24NEWS, 30/3/2026, <https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/politics/artc-israeli-knesset-passes-the-death-penalty-for-west-bank-terrorists-bill-in-final-vote>
- ⁶³ The Genocide Inside the “Israeli” Occupation’s Prisons 32 Palestinians Killed Behind Bars in 2025, PPS, 30/12/2025.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.

- ⁶⁵ Aljazeera.net, 3/12/2023. (in Arabic)
- ⁶⁶ The Reality of Palestinian Detainees in Israeli Prisons in 2025: An Analytical Human Rights Report published by International Organization of Solidarity with Palestinian Detainees (Tadamon) 2025, site of International Organization of Solidarity with Palestinian Detainees (Tadamon), 7/4/2026, https://www.solidarity-ps.org/en/category_details/7344
- ⁶⁷ For more, see Statistics on the First Phase of the Prisoner Exchange Deal Carried Out in Seven Batches (20/1/2025 until 27/2/2025), site of Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs (CDA), 11/3/2025, <https://cda.gov.ps/images/2025/documents/1232025/file.pdf> (in Arabic); and Statistics on Prisoners Released in the Final Batch of the First Phase of the Third Prisoner Exchange Deal 13 October 2025, CDA, 21/10/2025, <https://cda.gov.ps/index.php/ar/ar-news-2/21286-13-2025> (in Arabic)
- ⁶⁸ The Reality of Palestinian Detainees in Israeli Prisons in 2025: An Analytical Human Rights Report published by International Organization of Solidarity with Palestinian Detainees (Tadamon) 2025, Tadamon, 7/4/2026.
- ⁶⁹ Jacob Magid, Sept. 23: IDF names military offensive against Hezbollah operation “Northern Arrows,” The Times of Israel, 23/9/2024, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-september-23-2024/>
- ⁷⁰ Yoav Zitun et al., IDF troops begin ground operation against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Ynet Global, 1/10/2024, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r1u3xkdra>
- ⁷¹ Jaber Suleiman, Israel’s Wars on Lebanon, 1978-2024: A Comparative Approach, Policy Paper 119, site of Institute for Palestine Studies, 6/11/2024, <https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1656406>
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ Ayham al-Sahli, “War Biography: Israeli Aggression Against Lebanon 2023–2024,” *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, Institute for Palestine Studies, issue 141, Winter 2025, pp. 208–227, <https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/mdf-articles/208-227.pdf> (in Arabic)
- ⁷⁴ Aljazeera.net, 17/9/2024. (in Arabic); Arabi21, 17/9/2024; *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 18/9/2024; *Al-Akhbar*, 19/9/2024; and Barak Ravid, Israel conducted Lebanon pager attack fearing Hezbollah was onto the operation, site of Axios, 18/9/2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/09/18/hezbollah-pager-explosions-israel-suspicions>
- ⁷⁵ Ayham al-Sahli, “War Biography: Israeli Aggression Against Lebanon 2023–2024,” pp. 208–227.
- ⁷⁶ For more see General Secretariat of the Supreme Defense Council and Lebanese Council of Ministers Presidency, Israeli Attacks on Lebanon, Weekly Report No. “50” on the Current Situation, Institute for Palestine Studies, 29/11/2024, <https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/u155/SITREP%20No%2050%20Nov%2029%20-%20AR.pdf>
- ⁷⁷ Costs of Israel-Hezbollah conflict on Lebanon, Israel, Reuters, 27/11/2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/costs-israel-hezbollah-conflict-lebanon-israel-2024-11-26/>
- ⁷⁸ Yoav Zitun, 12,500 targets, 100 special operations: IDF tallies Hezbollah conflict after cease-fire, Ynet Global, 29/11/2024, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hkamacuqkl>
- ⁷⁹ Mark Mazzetti, Sheera Frenkel and Ronen Bergman, Behind the Dismantling of Hezbollah: Decades of Israeli Intelligence, *The New York Times* newspaper, 29/12/2024, <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/world/middleeast/israel-hezbollah-nasrallah-assassination-intelligence.html>
- ⁸⁰ The terrible cost of peace between Israel and Hamas: In numbers, *The Independent* newspaper, 17/1/2025, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/gaza-palestine-war-death-toll-israel-hamas-hostages-b2681313.html>
- ⁸¹ Monthly Reports of Shabak.
- ⁸² Ayham al-Sahli, “War Biography: Israeli Aggression Against Lebanon 2023–2024,” pp. 208–227.

- ⁸³ Sameh Singer, Israel's Approval of a Ceasefire in Lebanon: Motivations and Domestic Criticism, Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 30/12/2024, <https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2024/12/30/academic-paper-israels-approval-of-a-ceasefire-in-lebanon-motivations-and-domestic-criticism-arabic/>
- ⁸⁴ UN Security Council (UNSC), Letter dated 29 November 2024 from the Permanent Representatives of France and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2024/870, UN, 2/12/2024, <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/870>; and Aljazeera.net, 28/11/2024. (in Arabic)
- ⁸⁵ Israeli forces to stay in south Lebanon beyond withdrawal deadline, Reuters, 25/1/2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-army-withdrawal-southern-lebanon-will-last-beyond-60-days-pm-netanyahu-2025-01-24/>
- ⁸⁶ *Annahar* newspaper, Beirut, 28/11/2025, <https://annah.ar/259170> (in Arabic)
- ⁸⁷ One-year since the Cessation of Hostilities agreement, site of United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), 9/12/2025, <https://unifil.unmissions.org/en/news/one-year-cessation-hostilities-agreement>
- ⁸⁸ Public Health Emergency: 335 Martyrs and 973 Wounded since the Signing of the Ceasefire Agreement, site of Ministry of Public Health, Lebanon, 28/11/2025, <https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/DynamicPages/index/127/81701/public-health-emergency-335-martyrs-and-973-wounded-since-the-signing-of-the-ceasefire-agreement>
- ⁸⁹ *Annahar*, 11/10/2025.
- ⁹⁰ Aljazeera.net, 11/12/2024. (in Arabic)
- ⁹¹ Lebanon Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), site of World Bank Group, 7/3/2025, <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099030125012526525/pdf/P506380-f58e9761-b29e-4d62-97c3-cbf5a511c4e1.pdf>
- ⁹² Aljazeera.net, 28/11/2024. (in Arabic)
- ⁹³ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 3/10/2025. (in Arabic); and *Al- 'Arabi al-Jadid*, 6/10/2025.
- ⁹⁴ *Al- 'Arabi al-Jadid*, 11/11/2025.
- ⁹⁵ Aljazeera.net, 9/10/2025. (in Arabic)
- ⁹⁶ Debt ridden Eilat Port to close Sunday, site of Globes, 16/7/2025, <https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-debt-ridden-eilat-port-to-close-sunday-1001516171>
- ⁹⁷ Statement from President Joe Biden on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas in Yemen, site of U.S. Embassy and Consulate in the United Arab Emirates, 12/1/2024, <https://ae.usembassy.gov/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-coalition-strikes-in-houthi-controlled-areas-in-yemen/>; and Dan Sabbagh and Julian Borger, US and UK strike Houthi sites in Yemen in response to 'unprecedented' attacks, *The Guardian*, 12/1/2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/12/us-uk-air-strikes-yemen-houthi-rebels-red-sea-crisis>
- ⁹⁸ Aljazeera.net, 16/3/2025. (in Arabic)
- ⁹⁹ Natasha Bertrand and Kylie Atwood, Trump says US to stop strikes on Houthis in Yemen, site of Cable News Network (CNN), 6/5/2025, <https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/06/politics/us-to-stop-strikes-on-houthis-in-yemen>
- ¹⁰⁰ For more, see *Al- 'Arabi al-Jadid*, 7/5/2025; *Asharq al-Awsat*, 7/5/2025. (in Arabic); and Aljazeera.net, 8/5/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁰¹ Aljazeera.net, 8/5/2025. (in Arabic); site of NBC News, 8/5/2025; and Natasha Bertrand, Haley Britzky and Zachary Cohen, Houthis' successful targeting of US drones is hampering Trump's mission to kill group's senior leadership, CNN, 25/4/2025, <https://www.cnn.com/2025/04/25/politics/houthis-target-drones-hampering-trump-mission>

- ¹⁰² For more, see *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 7/5/2025; *Asharq al-Awsat*, 7/5/2025. (in Arabic); and Aljazeera.net, 8/5/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁰³ Lazar Berman, Netanyahu: Strike on Houthi port shows Israel will reach its enemies, however far away, *The Times of Israel*, 20/7/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/pm-after-strike-on-houthi-controlled-port-israel-will-strike-its-enemies-however-far-they-are/
- ¹⁰⁴ Ali al-Dahab, The Military and Strategic Implications of Israeli Attacks on the Houthis, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 14/9/2025, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/article/6313>
- ¹⁰⁵ Aljazeera.net, 28 and 30/8 and 1/9/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁰⁶ Aljazeera.net, 10/9/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁰⁷ Islamic world must not remain silent in the face of Zionists’ crimes, site of Khamenei.ir, 10/10/2023, <https://english.khamenei.ir/news/10169/Islamic-world-must-not-remain-silent-in-the-face-of-Zionists>
- ¹⁰⁸ Aljazeera.net, 15/10/2023. (in Arabic); and Raialyoum electronic newspaper, London, 15/10/2023. See also Reuters, 15/10/2023.
- ¹⁰⁹ Fareed Zakaria GPS: Israeli Ground Forces Fighting Inside Gaza; Interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, site of Transcripts CNN, 29/10/2023, <https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-10-29/segment/01>
- ¹¹⁰ Aljazeera.net, 15/10/2023. (in Arabic); Raialyoum electronic newspaper, 15/10/2023; and site of Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 30/10/2023. See also Reuters, 15/10/2023.
- ¹¹¹ IRNA, 1/4/2024.
- ¹¹² IRNA, 14/4/2024.
- ¹¹³ Aljazeera.net, 14/4/2024. (in Arabic); *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 14/4/2024; site of The White House, 13/4/2024; and *The New York Times* newspaper, , 14/4/2024.
- ¹¹⁴ Site of Tasnim News Agency, 1/10/2024, <https://www.tasnimnews.ir/ar>; and *Asharq al-Awsat*, 1/10/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹¹⁵ Lazar Berman, Netanyahu says Iran made a “big mistake” with missile attack and “will pay for it”, *The Times of Israel*, 1/10/2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-says-iran-made-a-big-mistake-with-missile-attack-and-will-pay-for-it/
- ¹¹⁶ Anadolu Agency, 2/10/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹¹⁷ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 1 and 2/10/2024. (in Arabic); and Aljazeera.net, 2/10/2024. (in Arabic)
See also The White House, 1/10/2024.
- ¹¹⁸ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 1/10/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹¹⁹ Aljazeera.net, 4/10/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹²⁰ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 26/10/2024. (in Arabic); IRNA, 26/10/2024; *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 26/10/2024; Aljazeera.net, 26 and 28/10/2024. (in Arabic). See also *The Jerusalem Post*, 28/10/2024.
- ¹²¹ Israel’s War with Iran Moves out of the Shadows, Situation Assessment, site of Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), 17/6/2025, <https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/israel-campaign-on-iran-and-the-iranian-response.aspx#>
- ¹²² Arab 48, 13/6/2025; Tasnim, 13/6/2025; *Alghad*, 13/6/2025; Aljazeera.net, 13/6/2025. (in Arabic); *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 13/6/2025; and *Asharq al-Awsat*, 13/6/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹²³ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 13/6/2024. (in Arabic)
- ¹²⁴ *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 13/6/2025.
- ¹²⁵ Zionist regime will definitely receive a painful punishment, Khamenei.ir, 13/6/2025, <https://english.khamenei.ir/news/11729/Zionist-regime-will-definitely-receive-a-painful-punishment>

- ¹²⁶ Statement by PM Netanyahu, Prime Minister's Office, Israel, 13/6/2024, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement130625>
- ¹²⁷ Hanegbi: Military force alone can't destroy Iran's nuke program; only Trump can compel Iran to abandon it; Iran's political leaders won't be targeted, The Times of Israel, 13/6/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/hanegbi-military-force-alone-cant-destroy-irans-nuke-program-only-trump-can-compel-iran-to-abandon-it-irans-political-leaders-wont-be-targeted/
- ¹²⁸ Aljazeera.net, 23/6/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹²⁹ Trump says Iran gave US notice before attack on Qatar military base, Reuters, 23/6/2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-iran-gave-us-notice-before-attack-qatar-military-base-2025-06-23/>
- ¹³⁰ Gram Slattery, Alexander Cornwell and Parisa Hafezi, US strikes failed to destroy Iran's nuclear sites, intelligence report says, Reuters, 25/6/2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/trump-announces-israel-iran-ceasefire-2025-06-23/>
- ¹³¹ Statement by PM Netanyahu - 24 June 2025, Prime Minister's Office, Israel, 24/6/2024, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-24-jun-2025>
- ¹³² Walid 'Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Implications of the US-Israeli Offensive on Iran for the Future of Iran's Regional Standing, Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/8/2025, <https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2025/08/04/academic-paper-implications-of-the-us-israeli-offensive-on-iran-for-the-future-of-irans-regional-standing/>
- ¹³³ Israel faces \$12 billion in losses after 12-day war with Iran, The New Arab, 25/6/2025, <https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-faces-12-billion-losses-after-12-day-war-iran>
- ¹³⁴ Ibid.; and Aljazeera.net, 22/6/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹³⁵ Emanuel Fabian, The Israel-Iran war by the numbers, after 12 days of fighting, The Times of Israel, 24/6/2025, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-israel-iran-war-by-the-numbers-after-12-days-of-fighting/>
- ¹³⁶ Arab 48, 17/7/2025.
- ¹³⁷ Sue Surkes, Authorities say 9,000 Israelis displaced from their homes so far amid Iranian missile strikes, The Times of Israel, 25/6/2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/authorities-say-9000-israelis-evacuated-from-their-homes-so-far-amid-iranian-missile-strikes/; and Aljazeera.net, 25/6/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹³⁸ Damage from Iran missile attack on Haifa Bay refinery estimated at nearly \$200 million, company says, Ynet Global, 17/7/2025, <https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/hjn2hwr8gg>
- ¹³⁹ Aljazeera.net, 25/6/2025. (in Arabic)
- ¹⁴⁰ *Asharq al-Awsat*, 27/6/2025. (in Arabic). See also Reuters, 27/6/2025.
- ¹⁴¹ IRNA, 22/9/2025.
- ¹⁴² Walid 'Abd al-Hay, Academic Paper: Implications of the US-Israeli Offensive on Iran for the Future of Iran's Regional Standing, Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, 4/8/2025.
- ¹⁴³ Highest annual toll ever | Israel attacks Syria on 373 occasions in 2024, destroying over 1,000 targets and killing and injuring nearly 845 combatants and civilians, site of Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 2/1/2025, <https://www.syriaahr.com/en/352978/>
- ¹⁴⁴ Saba Abdul Latif, The Israeli Escalation in Syria (From Deterrence of Aggression to the Fall of Assad's Regime), site of Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 15/12/2024, <https://2h.ae/DdHYf> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁴⁵ Highest annual toll ever | Israel attacks Syria on 373 occasions in 2024, destroying over 1,000 targets and killing and injuring nearly 845 combatants and civilians, SOHR, 2/1/2025.

- ¹⁴⁶ Uzi Baruch, Operation Bashan Arrow: 320 targets struck, 80% of Syrian military capabilities destroyed, Arutz Sheva 7 (Israel National News), 10/12/2024, <https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/400537>
- ¹⁴⁷ Highest annual toll ever | Israel attacks Syria on 373 occasions in 2024, destroying over 1,000 targets and killing and injuring nearly 845 combatants and civilians, SOHR, 2/1/2025.
- ¹⁴⁸ 105 Israeli Strikes on Syria in 2025: Civilian and Military Casualties and Widespread Destruction Across Several Syrian Provinces, SOHR, 31/12/2025, <https://2h.ae/fpGrk> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁴⁹ For further details on Israeli statements regarding remaining in the buffer zone along the Syrian border, see *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 8/12/2024; Aljazeera.net, 9 & 15/12/2024. (in Arabic); and *Asharq al-Awsat*, 10, 12 & 17/12/2024. (in Arabic)
See also The Times of Israel, 8 & 10/12/2024; and *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 & 17/12/2024.
- ¹⁵⁰ Reuters, 10/12/2024, <https://www.reuters.com/ar/world/TCYK7YLQGNNERPPE545OUJLFBU-2024-12-10/> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵¹ For further information on Israeli statements regarding the protection of Syrian Druze, see Aljazeera.net, 14, 16 & 21/7/2025. (in Arabic); *Asharq al-Awsat*, 15 and 17/7/2025. (in Arabic); Arab 48, 16/7/2025; and *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 16/7/2025. See also Ynet Global, 15/7/2025.
- ¹⁵² Liqaa Makki, Iraq and the Regional Implications of the Conflict, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 3/9/2025, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/node/6305>
- ¹⁵³ Site of al-Mayadeen Channel, 3/1/2024, <https://www.almayadeen.net> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵⁴ 200 Days of War.. Statistics of the Operations of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq,” Al-Mayadeen Channel, 26/4/2024, <https://2h.ae/SdKay> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵⁵ US drone attack: Three US troops killed in drone strike on US base in Middle East, BBC, 29/1/2024, <https://bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68122706>
- ¹⁵⁶ For more see PIC, 3/11/2023, <https://palinfo.com/?p=859299> (in Arabic); PIC, 28/12/2023, <https://palinfo.com/?p=869485> (in Arabic); RT, 7/1/2024; and Aljazeera.net, 17/11/2024, <https://aja.ws/c123dv> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵⁷ BBC, 24/12/2024, <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c205dn1zg1yo>
- ¹⁵⁸ Aljazeera.net, 17/11/2024, <https://aja.ws/c123dv> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁵⁹ Akeel Abbas, The Iraqi Armed Factions and the Axis of Resistance: Their Role and Its Limits in the Context of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, ACRPS, 3/11/2024, <https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/PoliticalStudies/Pages/iraqi-armed-factions-and-the-axis-of-resistance-role-and-limitations-in-the-context-of-alaksa-flood.aspx#> (in Arabic)
- ¹⁶⁰ *Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid*, 30/12/2024.

This Report

Al-Zaytouna Centre is pleased to present The Palestine Strategic Report (PSR) 2024–2025, now in its 14th consecutive edition. This report provides an academic, objective and comprehensive analysis of developments related to the Palestine issue across various dimensions. It offers up-to-date and accurate information and statistics through the end of 2025, complemented by analytical insights and forecasts.

Prepared by 14 specialized professors and researchers, this PSR consists of eight chapters that explore various aspects of the Palestinian situation. It examines the internal Palestinian scene, demographic and economic indicators, and the status of Jerusalem and its holy sites. The report also analyzes the courses of aggression, resistance and the peace process, while providing insights into the Israeli political, demographic, economic and military landscape. Furthermore, it discusses Palestinian Arab, Islamic and international relations. Notably, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has significantly influenced the report's findings and perspectives.

The PSR has emerged as a key reference in Palestine studies, serving as an indispensable resource that provides invaluable insights for those interested in Palestinian affairs. Al-Zaytouna Centre aspires, through the PSR, to make a significant contribution to the field of Palestine studies.

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh

The Palestine Strategic Report 2024 – 2025



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات

P.O. Box: 14-5034 Beirut - Lebanon

Tel: +961 21 803 644 | Tel-Fax: +961 21 803 643

info@alzaytouna.net | www.alzaytouna.net



ISBN 978-614-494-079-2



9 786144 940792



Al-Zaytouna Centre For Studies & Consultations