

Palestinian Demographic Indicators

From

The Palestine Strategic Report

2024 – 2025



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We are pleased to provide readers, particularly those interested in the Palestinian population and demographic indicators, with this section drawn from Chapter Two of *The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025*, one of the most important and widely cited academic references on Palestinian affairs.

This section provides an updated statistical overview of the Palestinian people inside and outside Palestine, taking into account the exceptional circumstances resulting from the war and Israel’s policies. It examines Palestinian demographic characteristics and population growth trends during 2024–2025, while also addressing the right of return for Palestinians abroad. The second part of this chapter, which focuses on Palestinian economic indicators in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will be published separately at a later stage.

This chapter was prepared by Dr. Raed Hillis and academically edited by Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh. *The Palestine Strategic Report 2024–2025* is the fourteenth in a series issued by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. It is produced through the contribution, editing and review of a distinguished group of leading scholars and specialists in Palestinian affairs.

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Palestinian Demographic and Economic Indicators

Introduction

During 2024–2025, the Palestinian people witnessed an unprecedented escalation in both the scale and intensity of Israeli aggression, culminating in a genocidal war waged on GS since October 2023. This campaign was characterized by the widespread destruction of critical infrastructure, the large-scale killing of civilians, and the systematic targeting of essential means of survival, including housing, educational and healthcare institutions, and productive economic sectors. Furthermore, it was accompanied by a deliberate policy of starvation and a suffocating blockade, which collectively transformed GS into a catastrophic environment threatening human existence as a whole.

Concurrently, the WB was not insulated from these developments; rather, it experienced a parallel escalation in Israeli measures. This was reflected in the intensification of settlement expansion, land confiscation and restrictions on movement, alongside extensive arrest campaigns. In addition, the targeting of Islamic and Christian holy sites further compounded the crisis, thereby deepening Palestinian vulnerabilities and accelerating the deterioration of living conditions.

This chapter seeks to provide an updated statistical overview of the Palestinian people, both within their homeland and abroad, in light of the exceptional conditions imposed by the war and Israeli policies. In addition to pre-existing challenges, about half of the Palestinian people reside under occupation and blockade in their homeland, while the other half continues to experience conditions of refuge and displacement in the diaspora. Nevertheless, the analysis relies on available official data, particularly from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and PA institutions, supplemented by reports from international organizations, in order to produce an assessment that is as rigorous and objective as possible.

The second part of the chapter, in turn, examines economic conditions in the WB and GS during 2024–2025. It underscores the structural transformations induced by the war, assesses the scale of losses and damage across productive and service sectors, and considers their implications for future development prospects and the economic capacity of the Palestinian people.

First: Demographic Indicators

1. The Palestinian Population Worldwide

Available estimates, based on PCBS data, indicate that the global Palestinian population reached about 15.49 million by the end of 2025, up from 14.89 million at the end of 2024, an increase of 4.06% (see table 1/2).

According to 2025 estimates, Palestinians are distributed by place of residence into those living in historic Palestine, about 7.412 million, constituting 47.9% of the global Palestinian population. This group comprises about 5.557 million in the 1967 occupied territories, or about 35.9% of Palestinians worldwide, while Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories (Israel) are about 1.855 million, or about 12% of Palestinians worldwide (see table 1/2).

In the Diaspora, Palestinians are estimated at about 8.077 million by the end of 2025, accounting for about 52.1% of the global Palestinian population. According to data from researchers at al-Zaytouna Centre, Palestinians in Jordan (the vast majority of whom hold Jordanian citizenship) are about 4.878 million, or about 31.5% of Palestinians worldwide and about 60.4% of Palestinian Diaspora. In other Arab countries, the Palestinian population is about 1.941 million, representing about 12.5% of Palestinians worldwide, with most concentrated in neighbouring Arab states, particularly Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf countries, and Egypt (see table 1/2).

According to PCBS, Palestinians in foreign countries are approximated at 1.259 million, accounting for 8.1% of the global Palestinian population, with the majority residing in the US, Latin America, Canada, UK and other EU, countries.

It is important to note that these estimates may be outdated, and subject to inaccuracies. When considering the emigration of Palestinians from Arab countries over the past three decades (including countries surrounding Israel, the Gulf states and Libya), along with movements from Palestine to other regions, discrepancies in previous global Palestinian population estimates become apparent. For example, some estimates¹ suggest that there are over 600 thousand Palestinians in South America, with at least 300 thousand residing in Chile. Additionally, the Palestinian population in Europe is estimated to be not less than 350–400 thousand, while in North America there are approximately 300–350 thousand Palestinians, with at least 100 thousand in other countries. Based on these revised estimates, the global Palestinian population (excluding Palestine and the Arab world) is estimated to be between 1.35 million to 1.45 million, exceeding PCBS estimates by roughly

90–190 thousand. Accordingly, researchers and specialists face a demanding yet necessary task of producing more accurate and reliable estimates of the global Palestinian population, based on updated statistical methods and multiple data sources.

By the end of 2024, according to PCBS statistics, the global Palestinian population stood at 14.89 million, with 5.49 million residing in WB and GS, and around 1.793 million in the 1948 occupied territories (Israel), compared to 7.602 million living abroad; specifically 4.787 million in Jordan, 1.618 million in other Arab countries and 1.197 million in foreign countries (see table 1/2).


Table 1/2: Palestinian Population Worldwide Estimate by Place of Residence at the End of 2024 and 2025 (thousands)²

Place of residence		2024		2025	
		Population estimates	Percentage (%)	Population estimates	Percentage (%)
Palestinian territories occupied in 1967	WB	3,360.6	22.6	3,430.1	22.1
	GS	2,129.7	14.3	2,127	13.7
Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 (Israel) *		1,793.4	12	1,855.4	12
Palestinians in historic Palestine		7,283.7	48.9	7,412.4	47.9
Jordan **		4,786.7	32.2	4,877.6	31.5
Other Arab countries		1,617.9	10.9	1,940.8	12.5
Foreign countries		1,197.5	8	1,258.7	8.1
Palestinians abroad		7,602.1	51.1	8,077.1	52.1
Total		14,885.8	100	15,489.6	100

* For the Palestinian population in the 1948 occupied territories, the count excludes Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories, which includes the Jerusalem governorate, Arab Syrians, Lebanese, non-Arab Christians and individuals classified as “Others.” Israeli statistics present figures that deviate from those of the PCBS, indicating that the number of Arab Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories amounted to approximately 2.147 million in 2025. When subtracting the 405 thousand East Jerusalem residents and approximately 25 thousand individuals in the Golan Heights, the adjusted total stands at around 1.74 million.

** The Palestinian population in Jordan is based on 2009 PCBS statistics, which reported a figure of 3,240,473. Subsequent calculations take into account the annual growth rates spanning from 2009 to 2024, as provided by the Jordanian Department of Statistics, Population and Housing, Demographic Statistics, ranging between 3.1% and 1.9%. For more information, refer to <https://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/>

Palestinian Population Worldwide Estimate by Place of Residence at the End of 2025 (%)



2. The Demographic Characteristics of the Palestinians

a. The WB and GS

By the conclusion of 2025, the Palestinian population in WB and GS was estimated at 5.557 million, with approximately 3.43 million residing in WB (61.7%) and 2.127 million (38.3%) in GS. This reflects an annual growth rate of 1.2%, considering that the combined Palestinian population in WB and GS stood at 5.49 million at the end of 2024.

Population growth in the WB and GS is driven mainly by demographic expansion in the WB, where the population rose from about 3.36 million at the end of 2024 to about 3.43 million by the end of 2025. By contrast, the population of GS slightly declined from approximately 2.129 million to 2.127 million over the same period. This decrease is attributed to the genocidal war on the Strip and its severe demographic impact, with a net population loss estimated at about 254 thousand Palestinians, or 10.6% in 2025 compared to pre-war estimates.³

The sharp demographic contraction in GS is further explained by large-scale human losses and forced displacement resulting from the genocidal war. According to figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, 70,942 Palestinians were killed in GS, including 18,592 children and 12,400 women, in addition to about 11 thousand missing persons, while around 171,195 people were injured by the end of December 2025. Moreover, more than 100 thousand Palestinians left GS since

the start of the Israeli assault on 7/10/2023, further deepening the demographic shift observed in GS by the end of 2025.⁴

As for the distribution of the population across the governorates of the WB and GS in 2025, the figures for GS presented below are hypothetical. Israel has created a new reality through systematic internal displacement during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, resulting in the concentration of large numbers of residents in specific areas, particularly the central region. Based on the above, Hebron Governorate has the largest population in the WB and GS (874.3 thousand, 15.7% of the WB and GS population), followed by Gaza Governorate (718.1 thousand, 12.9% of the WB and GS population), and Jerusalem Governorate (518.1 thousand, about 9.3% of the WB and GS population). By contrast, Jericho and Jordan Rift Valley Governorate records the lowest share, with about 57.8 thousand residents (1% of the WB and GS population). Table 2/2 presents the distribution of the population across the governorates of the WB and GS, based on PCBS estimates.

The Palestinian community in WB and GS is young with over a third of its individuals (36.3%) aged under 15, exhibiting a notable contrast between WB and GS, standing at 34.6% and 39.1%, respectively, by the end of 2025. Statistics indicate that the median age (the age dividing the population into two numerically equal groups, i.e., half of the population is below that age and half is older) in the WB and GS has increased throughout 2010–2025 from 18.5 years to 21.6 years. A separate analysis for the WB and GS during the same period indicates an increase in median age from 19.4 years in 2010 to 22.9 years in 2025 for the WB, and from 17.2 years in 2010 to 19.8 years in 2025 for the GS. This underscores demographic differences between the two areas and gradual shifts in their age structures.⁵

As for the elderly population (60 years and above), they represent a relatively small share of the Palestinian population, accounting for 6.1% of the total population in WB and GS at the end of 2025. This underscores the continued youthful structure of society and the relatively high dependency ratio. The total number of individuals aged 60 and above in WB and GS is about 340.5 thousand. The majority reside in WB, where they number about 232.9 thousand (6.7% of WB population), compared to about 107.6 thousand in GS (5% of GS population).⁶

**Table 2/2: Estimated Population Count in WB and GS by Governorate
2024–2025 (thousands)⁷**

Governorate	2024		2025	
	Estimates	Percentage (%)	Estimates	Percentage (%)
WB	3,360.6	61.2	3,430.1	61.7
Jenin	363.5	6.6	370.5	6.7
Tubas and Northern Rift Valleys	70.9	1.3	72.4	1.3
Tulkarm	211.3	3.8	214.8	3.9
Nablus	443.7	8.1	451.7	8.1
Qalqilya	131.1	2.4	133.9	2.4
Salfit	88.8	1.6	90.8	1.6
Ramallah and al-Birch	381.2	6.9	388.6	7.1
Jericho and Rift Valley	56.7	1.1	57.8	1
Jerusalem	507.8	9.2	518.1	9.3
Bethlehem	252.2	4.7	257.1	4.6
Hebron	853.4	15.5	874.3	15.7
GS	2,129.7	38.8	2,127	38.3
North Gaza*	422.7	7.7	422.1	7.6
Gaza*	719.2	13.1	718.1	12.9
Dayr al-Balah*	301.9	5.5	301.5	5.4
Khan Yunis*	422.7	7.7	422.1	7.6
Rafah*	263.5	4.8	263.1	4.7
Total (WB & GS)	5,490.3	100	5,557.1	100

Note: Minor differences may occur due to rounding.

* Hypothetical distribution.

In 2023, data prior to the Israeli aggression on GS (with no available data for 2024 and 2025) showed that about 76% of the elderly (60 years and above) in Palestine suffer from chronic diseases, with around 75% in WB and 78% in GS. The percentage of those suffering from chronic diseases reached about 70% among males and 82% among females. These indicators underscore the healthcare and social care challenges facing older persons in WB and GS, particularly given the population's predominantly youthful structure. The elderly with chronic diseases and the injured in GS are among the most affected groups due to the Israeli aggression. They face significant challenges that could lead to a deterioration in their health because of the cut off medications and healthcare services, as well as the difficulty in accessing hospitals and care centers, especially with many facilities destroyed or out of service. According to data from the Emergency Medical Teams Coordination Cell (EMTCC) and the World Health Organization (WHO), around 58,915 patients with chronic diseases are at risk of their conditions worsening. The total number of required medical evacuations reached 14,469 cases, including 2,497 elderly (aged 60 and above), which includes 1,380 cancer patients and 126 kidney patients, as of 8/9/2024.⁸

In 2023, about 29% of the elderly (60 years and above) did not complete any educational stage; 18% among males and 39% among females, whereas the percentage of the elderly who completed intermediate diploma degree and higher did not exceed 18%. As for the labor force participation rate among older persons, it reached 18% in WB in 2024, compared to 5% in GS in the first three quarters of 2023, underscoring the limited integration of this group into economic activity and its impact on their economic and social independence.⁹

In terms of gender distribution, the male population in WB and GS reached 2.81 million at the end of 2025, compared to 2.74 million females, resulting in a sex ratio of 102.6 males per 100 females. In GS, the male population reached 1.07 million males compared to 1.06 million females, with a sex ratio of 101.1, while in WB, the male population reached 1.74 million compared to 1.69 million females, with a sex ratio of 103.5. Overall, these figures indicate only limited variation in the gender structure between the two areas.¹⁰

Data illustrated a decline in the dependency rate (the number of dependents per 100 individuals of working age, 15–64 years) in WB and GS from 78.7 in 2010 to 66.7 in 2025. Notably, there was a significant difference in the dependency rate

between the two regions, with rates dropping from 73.7 to 63.1 in WB and from 87.4 to 72.8 in GS between 2010 and 2025. Despite this downward trend, the dependency burden in GS remains significantly higher than in WB.¹¹

With regard to life expectancy, available data indicate a continued, albeit modest, improvement in survival levels among Palestinians, with only limited disparities between WB and GS. In 2023, life expectancy at birth reached about 73.6 years for males and 75.8 years for females in WB, compared to 72.9 and 75.1 years, respectively, in GS, reflecting a slight advantage for WB. This improvement is linked to relative progress in healthcare services and declining mortality rates, particularly the infant mortality rate (deaths per thousand live births), which stood at about 11.7 in WB and 12.7 in GS during 2015–2019. It also reflects a decline in the Crude Death Rate (CDR), reaching 3.9 per thousand population in WB in 2025, while available data for 2023 place it at 3.7 per thousand in GS. Together, these trends have contributed to higher life expectancy and improved survival outcomes (see table 3/2).

The natural population growth rate in the WB and GS declined from 3.6% in 2000 to 1.2% in 2025. In 2025, the natural population growth rate decreased to -0.13% in GS and 2.1% in WB (see table 3/2).

In 2023, there was a decrease in the average household size in WB and GS, with the average number of persons per household declining from 5.8 in 2007 to 4.9 in 2023. At the regional level, average household size in WB declined from 5.5 persons in 2007 to 4.7 in 2023, while in GS it dropped from 6.5 persons to 5.3 over the same period.¹² This reflects profound demographic, social and economic shifts, shaped in particular by sustained living pressures and broader structural changes in Palestinian society in recent years.

As for housing density (persons per room), the figure for 2022 was higher in GS compared to WB, with 1.7 persons/ room in GS compared to 1.4 in WB, resulting in a total average housing density of 1.5 persons/ room in both regions, reflecting greater housing pressure in GS. In parallel, about 81% of Palestinian households live in dwellings owned by a family member, with notable variation between the two areas. Homeownership reaches 87.3% in WB compared to 69.8% in GS,¹³ highlighting structural differences in housing patterns and ownership capacity between the two contexts.

Marriage registration data show a continued decline in WB in 2023, with 21,420 marriage contracts recorded, compared to 24,263 in 2022, a decrease of 2,843 contracts. These figures are limited to WB, as updated data for GS are unavailable due to the ongoing war and the suspension of Sharia Court operations during the conflict. This precludes updated estimates for the Palestinian territories as a whole and reflects the broader social, demographic and economic disruptions caused by the war and prevailing living conditions. Accordingly, 2022 remains the latest comprehensive reference year, with a total of 43,430 marriage contracts in WB and GS recorded in Sharia Courts and churches, 24,263 in WB and 19,167 in GS, highlighting the geographical disparity in marriage patterns between the two areas.¹⁴

With regard to education indicators, data from 2023 show that the illiteracy rate in WB and GS stood at 2.1% among individuals aged 15 years and above. This rate has declined for both sexes over recent decades, although a gender gap persists: illiteracy reached 3.2% among females compared to 1.1% among males in 2023, down from 20.3% and 7.8% respectively in 1997. This reflects an overall decline of about 85% over more than two decades, indicating significant improvement in basic education and literacy. Geographically, the illiteracy rate (aged 15 years and above) was 2.1% in WB in 2024 and 1.9% in GS based on 2023 data. These levels are among the lowest globally, especially when compared with West Asia and North Africa, where it reached 19% in 2022, according to UNESCO Institute for Statistics, including 24.6% among females and 13.7% among males. Globally, the rate stood at 13%, with 16.2% among females and 9.7% among males.¹⁵ Overall, this underscores the relative progress achieved in Palestine in education and literacy compared to regional and global benchmarks.

It is important to note that the education sector in WB and GS experienced unprecedented destruction between 2024 and early December 2025, with the impact far more severe in GS due to the widespread and systematic targeting of educational institutions. More than 179 government schools were completely destroyed, while 218 schools were bombed or damaged, including 118 government schools and 100 UNRWA schools. In WB, schools have faced repeated raids and demolition orders, and executed demolition orders, reflecting a systematic tightening of restrictions on the educational environment.¹⁶


At the higher education level, 63 university buildings in GS were completely destroyed, while 8 universities in WB were subjected to repeated raids and vandalism, disrupting academic processes and undermining institutional infrastructure. The human toll on education is staggering, where 18,979 school students were killed, including 18,863 in GS in addition to 1,399 university students, 797 school teachers and administrative staff, and 241 higher education personnel.¹⁷ This underscores a systematic assault on the education sector at all levels, with far-reaching implications for human capital and the future of national development in WB and GS.

Table 3/2: Selected Demographic Indicators of Palestinians in WB and GS¹⁸

Indicator		WB	GS	WB & GS
Population density (persons/ km2) (2024)		5,836	594	911
Population growth (2025) (%)		2.1	-0.13	1.2
Average family size (2024)		4.7	5.3 (2023)	4.9 (2023)
Life expectancy at birth (males) (years) (2023)		73.6	72.9	73.3
Life expectancy at birth (females) (years) (2023)		75.8	75.1	75.5
CBR* (births per thousand population) (2025)		25.9	31.1	28
CDR (deaths per thousand population) (2025)		3.9	3.7 (2023)	3.7 (2023)
Infant mortality rate (deaths per thousand live births) (2015–2019)		11.7	12.7	12.1
Average number of rooms in the housing unit		3.6 (2024)	3.5 (2022)	3.5 (2022)
Age structure (%) (2025)	0–14 years	34.6	39.1	36.3
	15–29 years	27.5	27.9	27.6
	30–59 years	31.2	28	30
	60 years and over	6.7	5	6.1
Average housing density (persons/ room) (2024)		1.4	1.7 (2022)	1.5 (2022)

* CBR: Crude Birth Rate

Age Structure in WB and GS 2025 (%)



b. The 1948 Occupied Palestinian Territories (Israel)

PCBS has indicated that Palestinians living in Israel at the end of 2025 were estimated at 1.855 million compared to 1.793 million in 2024. Available data shows that they are a young community in 2023, with individuals aged under 15 representing 30.8% of males and 29.7% of females, while those aged 65 years and over amounted to 5.1% of males and 6.3% of females (see table 4/2).

Available estimates for 2023 indicate that the fertility rate for Palestinians residing in Israel was 2.75 births per woman. As for the average Palestinian household size, it was 4.17 persons. The CBR and CDR reached 21.6 births and 3.2 deaths per thousand respectively, while infant mortality rate was 5.1 deaths per thousand live births. Notably, these figures exclude Arab citizens in the Syrian Golan Heights, citizens in J1 of the Jerusalem governorate, as well as, Lebanese Arabs who have moved to live temporarily in Israel, as they are considered part of the Arab population as a whole (see table 4/2).

Notably, the Palestinian community in the 1948 occupied territories (Israel) has witnessed a sharp rise in homicides in 2024 and 2025. The number of killings reached about 230 cases in 2024, then increased further to between 241 and 252 cases in 2025, the highest level on record among Palestinians in Israel. This escalation is clear in comparison with earlier years: homicides stood at 120 cases

in 2022, then nearly doubled in 2023 to 244 cases, a record at the time.¹⁹ The upward trend is attributed to the spread of armed violence, the expansion of organized crime networks, weak judicial deterrence, and the proliferation of illegal weapons. These factors have fueled a growing sense of insecurity and a pronounced social and security crisis within the Palestinian community in Israel.

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data at the end of 2024, Muslims in the 1948 occupied territories counted for 1.82 million, comprising 86% of the population, while Druze counted for 153 thousand and Christians 143 thousand, comprising 7.2% and 6.8% respectively.²⁰

c. Jordan

Palestinians living in Jordan at the end of 2025 were estimated at 4.88 million up from 4.79 million at the end of 2024, most of whom hold Jordanian citizenship (Jordanian citizens of Palestinian descent) (see table 1/2).

According to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, annual population growth was 1.9% in 2024, with projections suggesting it will remain stable through the end of 2025. This rate applies to the entire population, including Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Statistics also point to continued demographic shifts over 2020–2025. Fertility among Jordanian women aged 15–49 declined to 2.3 children per woman in 2024, down from 3.03 in 2016. Infant mortality stood at about 14 deaths per thousand live births, and under-5 mortality at around 15 deaths per thousand, based on 2023 data.²¹ Jordanians of Palestinian origin are likely to exhibit similar fertility and mortality patterns to the population as a whole.

According to UNRWA, the number of registered Palestine refugees (PRs) at the end of 2024 stood at 5.914 million, of whom 2.371 million reside in Jordan across ten official RCs, accounting for about 40% of the total.²²

d. Syria

According to UNRWA figures, the total PRs in Syria was 582,746 at the end of 2024, down from 586,842 in 2023. They are distributed across nine official RCs and several informal gatherings across the country.²³ These figures are estimates and may not reflect the actual resident population, as many refugees who have left Syria remain on UNRWA's records.

Following political developments in Syria, most notably the transfer of power after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in late 2024, a climate of cautious relief emerged in the region. This coincided with a temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon after a period of escalation and large-scale displacement. These shifts fostered expectations among Palestinian refugees of modest improvements and limited prospects for return, despite persistent instability. Within this fragile context, Palestine refugee returns to and within Syria during the first half of 2025 exceeded 29 thousand, more than double the approximately 14 thousand recorded over the previous five years combined. Inability to pay rent in displacement and the desire for family reunification were key drivers of returns, even to areas where homes remained partially destroyed, some still lacking walls or electricity, and where public infrastructure remained heavily damaged. Despite this movement, returns have coincided with a sharp decline in living conditions. Food insecurity among Palestinian refugees in Syria increased from 56% in 2023 to 63% in 2024, reaching an unprecedented 92% in 2025, reflecting the continued fragility of the humanitarian and economic context in which these returns are occurring.²⁴

According to a report published by the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria (AGPS) in February 2026, about 40% of Palestinian refugees in Syria remained displaced during 2025. The report also indicates that Palestinian fatalities in Syria in 2025 resulted from Israeli airstrikes (38%), explosions (19%), and both clashes and assassinations (14% each). It further estimates that around 23 thousand Palestinian refugees from Syria are in Lebanon, with over 80% living below the extreme poverty line due to the ongoing economic crisis and reduced humanitarian assistance.²⁵

In the health sector, an AGPS report indicates that more than 779 thousand refugees are in need of medical assistance, amid a lack of ambulance services and essential medicines in several areas, including Yarmouk RC, which continues to suffer from the dissolution of its local committee since 2018.²⁶

In northern Syria, AGPS documented 1,488 families in Idlib and northern rural Aleppo living under difficult conditions. In Deir Ballout and al-Muhammadiya RCs in the Afrin countryside, 80 Palestinian families displaced from southern Damascus are residing in temporary tents lacking adequate health services.²⁷

e. Lebanon

According to UNRWA figures, PRs residing in Lebanon at the end of 2024 constituted a total of 486,269, compared to 493,201 at the end of 2023.²⁸ However, the actual number residing in Lebanon stood at 231,515, of whom 12.1% hold Lebanese citizenship, according to a UNRWA digital identity verification process conducted from mid-2023 to mid-2025. A summary of the findings shows that 204,420 are registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, 23,451 reside in Lebanon but are registered in other UNRWA fields of operation, and 3,644 “do not fall under the Agency’s definition of Palestine Refugees but are recorded as other persons of concern.” The population displays balanced sex ratio. Children under 18 account for about 33%, while those aged 65 and above represent around 10%, reflecting a young demographic structure with strong dependence on social assistance and humanitarian services.²⁹

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are distributed between official RCs and Palestinian informal gatherings, particularly in the south. Many live in overcrowded conditions with weak infrastructure and high poverty levels. Estimates indicate that over 80% live below the poverty line amid severe economic deterioration, while 94% have benefited from one or more of the Agency’s services during the verification period. These demographic features, alongside a youthful age structure, small household sizes, and heavy reliance on humanitarian assistance, highlight the vulnerability of the Palestinian socio-economic and humanitarian situation in Lebanon. This is further exacerbated by legal restrictions on employment and property ownership, which continue to constrain long-term integration and stability.³⁰

According to the 2017 Population and Housing Census in the Palestine Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon (the latest official census available), individuals under 15 years constituted about 29% of the population, while those aged 65 and above accounted for around 6.4%, reflecting a predominantly youthful demographic structure. The average household size was about 4 persons, and female-headed households represented 17.5%, a notable indicator in a context of socio-economic vulnerability. The total fertility rate stood at approximately 2.7 births per woman, indicating continued natural population growth despite structural constraints on employment, income and access to basic services.³¹

f. General Comparisons Among Palestinians

Before comparing the major demographic indicators summarized in table 4/2, it's important to note that, some data may pertain to different years, potentially affecting the comparison process. Nevertheless, these data remain valuable as general indicators based on the latest available statistics. The following are the key observations:

- Regarding age structure, the share of young Palestinians (15 years and under) is highest in Jordan (39.9% in 2011), followed by GS (39.1% in 2025), and the combined WB and GS (36.3%). By contrast, the lowest proportions are recorded in Lebanon (29% in 2017) and in the 1948 occupied territories (30.8% for males and 29.7% for females in 2023), indicating clear disparities across Palestinian communities.
- The proportion of the elderly (65 years and above) is highest in Lebanon (6.4%), followed by the 1948 occupied territories (5.1% for males and 6.3% for females), then Syria (4.4%) and the WB (4.2%). In contrast, it remains lowest in GS (3%), underscoring its distinctly youthful demographic structure.
- The sex ratio (males per 100 females) reflects broad demographic balance across regions. It reached 103.5 in the WB, 101.1 in GS, and 102.6 for the WB and GS combined in 2025, compared with about 103.1 in the 1948 occupied territories; similarly, it stood at 100.4 in Syria and 102 in Lebanon. Overall, this indicates a largely balanced gender structure, with a slight male predominance in some areas.
- CBR is highest in GS at 31.1 births per thousand in 2025, followed by Jordan and Syria (29.2 in 2010), then the WB (25.9) and Lebanon (25.8), while the lowest rate was observed in the 1948 occupied territories (21.6). This pattern aligns with persistently higher fertility in GS, thereby intensifying demographic pressures amid limited resources and ongoing blockade.
- CDR remained high in WB and GS reaching 3.7 deaths per thousand, compared with 3.9 in the WB and 3.7 in GS, while it stood at about 3.2 in the 1948 occupied territories. This reflects the cumulative impact of adverse political, economic and health conditions, particularly in the WB and GS.
- The total fertility rate remains relatively high in the WB and GS, reaching 3.8 births per woman in the WB and 3.9 in GS during 2017–2019, compared with 2.75 in the 1948 occupied territories, 2.6 in Jordan, 2.5 in Syria, and 2.7 in

Lebanon. Thus, it highlights clear disparities in reproductive behaviour between Palestinians within historic Palestine and those abroad.

- Average household size was highest in GS at 5.3 persons per house in 2023, followed by Jordan (5.1), then the WB and GS combined (4.9), and the WB (4.7). By contrast, it declined to 4.17 in the 1948 occupied territories, 4.1 in Syria (2010), and 4 in Lebanon, thereby reflecting the effects of socio-economic change and urbanization on family patterns.

Table 4/2: Selected Demographic Indicators of Palestinians by Residence³²

Indicator	WB 2025	GS 2025	WB & GS 2025	Israel 2023	Jordan	Syria 2009–2010	Lebanon 2017
% of individuals under 15 years	34.6	39.1	36.3	30.8 males 29.7 females	39.9 (2011)	33.1	29
% of individuals 65 years and over	4.2	3	3.7	5.1 males 6.3 females	4.3 (2011)	4.4	6.4
Sex ratio (males per 100 females)	103.5	101.1	102.6	103.1	–	100.4	102
CBR (births per 1,000 population)	25.9	31.1	28	21.6	29.2 (2010)	29.2	25.8
CDR (deaths per 1,000 population)	3.9	3.7 (2023)	3.7 (2023)	3.2	–	2.8 (2006)	–
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	3.8 (2017–2019)	3.9 (2017–2019)	3.8 (2017–2019)	2.75	2.3 (2024)	2.5	2.7
Average household size (individuals per house)	4.7 (2024)	5.3 (2023)	4.9 (2023)	4.17	5.1 (2011)	4.1	4

(–): No value.

3. Palestinian Refugees

Despite the difficulty of determining the exact number of Palestinians worldwide, available official data allows for about reasonable estimates. Based on PCBS estimates up to the end of 2025, the total Palestinian population reached about 15.49 million by December 2025. Of these, about 5.56 million reside in the WB and GS, and about 1.86 million in the 1948 occupied territories, while the remainder are in the diaspora. Moreover, the diaspora totals about 8.08 million,

including about 6.82 million in Arab states, with the rest distributed across other countries.³³ Overall, this distribution underscores the scale of Palestinian dispersion as a result of prolonged historical and political coercive processes.

Based on population estimates derived from the refugee share in the WB and GS (42.2% according to the 2017 Population Census), the number of refugees in both areas is estimated at about 2.345 million by the end of 2025. This includes about 913 thousand in the WB, or 26.3% of the total population, and about 1.432 million in GS, or 66.1%.³⁴ While these figures remain indicative due to differences in sources and reference years, they nonetheless constitute the most reliable estimate based on available data.

In this context, the estimates are broadly consistent with UNRWA data, which indicate about 918 thousand PRs in the WB and about 1.556 million in GS by the end of 2024 (see table 5/2). The discrepancies are mainly attributable to the emigration of some refugees from the WB and GS, alongside the presence of Palestinians abroad originating from these areas who hold “citizenship” status and retain the right of return and residence.

Furthermore, an estimated 150 thousand Palestinians from the 1948 occupied territories, who were displaced from their historical cities and villages, yet remained within the geographical borders of occupied Palestine in 1948. Thus, the total tally of Palestinian refugees by the end of 2025, is projected at 10.572 million, constituting 68% of the global Palestinians population.

It’s worth noting that UNRWA’s data is limited to the PRs within its five areas of operation: WB, GS, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, these statistics do not comprehensively capture the global refugee population, as they exclude many refugees residing outside UNRWA’s operation areas, and even those within its operational areas who have not enlisted with the agency to benefit from its services. Furthermore, UNRWA’s figures exclude the Palestinian refugees who took refuge post the 1967 war. Besides, there are refugees who had to flee Palestine under different circumstances (other than war) and were prevented from returning.

Therefore, UNRWA statistics of PRs, except to a limited extent in Syria and Lebanon, are incomplete and should not be considered definitive figures reflecting the reality of the 1948 refugee population. These figures only represent registrants with UNRWA eligible for its assistance and services, rather than all Palestinian refugees.

The total number of Registered Persons (RPs), including Other RPs, in the five UNRWA fields of operation was about 6.729 million by the end of 2024. This population is distributed as follows: 2.574 million in Jordan (38.2%), 2.913 million in the WB and GS (43.3%), including about 1.764 million in GS (26.2%) and 1.149 million in the WB (17.1%). The remaining about 1.242 million (18.5%) reside in Syria and Lebanon. Moreover, registered families across the five fields of operation numbered about 1.3 million, with an average household size of 5.3 persons, reflecting the overall demographic structure of PRs under UNRWA, as well as its capacity to plan educational, health and social services on the basis of these data.³⁵


Palestinian refugee figures remain largely approximate, particularly for those residing outside UNRWA fields of operation. In these areas, official statistics are lacking, as are reliable data on population growth rates, which complicates the issue of double counting. This is further compounded by the fact that refugees may relocate for work or residence while remaining registered in their place of origin. This applies especially to Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, as well as Palestinians in historic Palestine residing abroad.

**Table 5/2: UNRWA-RPs According to Their Area of Operation
By the End of 2024³⁶**

Indicator	WB	GS	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon	Total
PRs	917,942	1,556,061	2,371,389	582,746	486,269	5,914,407
Other RPs*	231,313	208,161	202,278	97,157	76,250	815,159
Total RPs	1,149,255	1,764,222	2,573,667	679,903	562,519	6,729,566
Official RCs	19	8	10	9	12	58
Schools	96	–	161	104	61	422
Pupil enrolment	47,157	–	104,336	50,541	37,972	240,006
Primary health-care facilities	43	7	25	24	27	126

* Other RPs: include non-refugee wives, non-refugee husbands, non-refugee children, Jerusalem poor, Gaza poor, etc.

UNRWA-RPs by the End of 2024



UNRWA-RPs by Area by the End of 2024




Table 6/2 indicates that UNRWA refugee communities, much like the general Palestinian population, are young, with 28% of Agency-PRs are children under the age of 18, with highest proportion in the GS (38.6%) and lowest in Lebanon (21.4%).

The data reveals that fertility rates among refugees in the WB and GS are the highest across UNRWA’s five operation areas (3.6 births per woman), as reflected in the average family size in these areas (5.6 individuals per household).

The dependency ratio (the number of dependents per 100 individuals of working age, 15–64 years) among registered refugees is notably high in the GS primarily attributable to the significant percentage of individuals under 15 years old. This

situation could pose challenges given the high levels of unemployment and worsening economic conditions.

Table 6/2: Selected Demographic Indicators of UNRWA-PRs According to Their Area of Operation 2024³⁷

Indicator	GS	WB	Jordan	Syria	Lebanon
Children below 18 years (%)	38.6	26	23.1	24.9	21.4
Average household size (individual per house)	5.6	5.6	5.2	4.8	4.7
Fertility rate (births per woman)	3.6	3.6	3.2	2.7	2.7
Dependency ratio	62.7	45.9	38.5	41.9	45.6

Regarding education, the 2022 figures indicate that refugees generally surpass non-refugees across education levels in both the WB and GS. Specifically, the illiteracy rate among refugees (15 years and above) stands at about 1.9%, compared with 2.3% among non-refugees. At the regional level, in the WB, the illiteracy rate among refugees (15 years and above) is about 2.1%, compared with 2.4% among non-refugees; similarly, in GS, it is about 1.7%, compared with 2% among non-refugees. Moreover, the proportion of individuals holding a bachelor's degree (aged 18 and above) is higher among refugees overall, reaching about 21%, compared with 19.1% among non-refugees. In the WB, the rate stands at about 19.2% among refugees, compared with 19.5% among non-refugees; by contrast, in GS, it rises to about 22%, compared with 17.7% among non-refugees.³⁸

4. Demographic Growth Trends

Despite a relative decline in the rate of natural population growth among Palestinians, it remains comparatively high relative to other populations, including Israelis. However, in the wake of Operation al-Aqsa Flood and its repercussions, particularly Palestinian fatalities and reverse Israeli migration, the trajectory of demographic change diverged during 2024–2025. Notably, a significant wave of Jewish out-migration was reported, with some Israeli indicators suggesting figures of no less than about 500 thousand during the first six months of the war; by contrast, the Israeli CBS reported markedly lower estimates (about 150 thousand over two years). This disparity reflects a recurring Israeli tendency to present conservative

figures in an effort to preserve social cohesion and continuity; accordingly, Israeli demographic data should be approached with caution.


Estimates by the PCBS indicate that the number of Palestinians in historic Palestine reached about 7.4 million by the end of 2025. This figure is broadly equivalent to about 7.4 million Jews, according to the Israeli CBS for the same year, thereby reflecting a relative demographic balance. Notably, Palestinians had already surpassed Jews for the first time in many years in 2023, by about 100 thousand; moreover, projections suggest that this gap may widen to about 400 thousand in favor of Palestinians by 2030.

Furthermore, sustained Israeli efforts to displace Palestinians and to foster coercive environments for Palestinians inside Israel should be underscored, as part of broader strategies aimed at countering Palestinian demographic growth, facilitating the annexation of the WB, and securing a Jewish majority.

Table 7/2: Estimated Population Count of Palestinians and Jews in Historic Palestine 2022–2030 (thousands)³⁹

Year	Palestinians in historic Palestine	Jews
2022	7,100	7,100
2023	7,300	7,200
2024	7,300	7,400
2025	7,400	7,400
2026	7,600	7,500
2027	7,800	7,600
2028	7,900	7,700
2029	8,100	7,800
2030	8,300	7,900

Estimated Population Count of Palestinians and Jews in Historic Palestine 2022–2030 (thousands)



Within a positive analytical framing, these projections underscore a structural reality: despite decades of oppression, displacement and Israeli occupation, the Palestinian people remain firmly rooted in their land and capable of reproducing their demographic and social presence. Consequently, this points to a strategic impasse confronting Israel. Indeed, about 125 years after the establishment of the World Zionist Organization and nearly 74 years after the founding of Israel, the Zionist project faces a demographic equation that contradicts its founding assumptions, namely, the numerical predominance of Palestinians in historic Palestine over Jewish settlers brought from more than one hundred countries across successive phases. This dynamic constitutes a significant source of structural concern for decision-makers in Israel, given its long-term political, security and strategic implications.

Nevertheless, characterizing this reality as a Palestinian “demographic time bomb” should not be construed as evidence of an imminent resolution of the conflict, nor should it invite overly optimistic conclusions that overlook the nature of settler colonialism as a project capable of reshaping realities through force. Rather, comparative colonial experiences suggest that, although demographically significant, the numerical superiority of an indigenous population does not, in itself, translate into political or emancipatory advantage unless coupled with

effective organization, power resources, and the capacity to impose deterrence or sustained costs on the colonial project.

In this context, Israel's cumulative policies over past decades may be understood as a systematic strategic response to this demographic challenge. In this regard, the 2005 withdrawal from GS served as a practical model aimed at offloading the Palestinian demographic burden while retaining effective control over the Strip's vital space. In the WB, by contrast, policy has increasingly centred on maximising land control with minimal Palestinian population presence. This has been pursued through settlement expansion, the fragmentation of Palestinian geography, and the imposition of an integrated framework of economic, security and legal restrictions designed to engineer a coercive living environment, thereby encouraging forced or quasi-voluntary migration.

The recent Israeli war on GS, particularly in the aftermath of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, unfolded within an escalatory context that extends beyond declared military objectives. More specifically, it has revealed an explicit attempt to reintroduce forced displacement as a possible response to the perceived demographic impasse. In this regard, the war has assumed an extensive destructive character targeting residential, economic and service infrastructure, thereby generating large-scale internal displacement and catastrophic humanitarian conditions, which may be read as a prelude to depopulation or outward migration pressures. Although this attempt has so far failed due to Palestinian resilience and the absence of explicit international political endorsement, the continued circulation of such an option underscores the depth of the structural crisis of the Zionist project.⁴⁰

Accordingly, while Palestinian demographic resilience remains central, it does not, in itself, constitute sufficient protection against the settler-colonial project unless embedded within a comprehensive national strategy. Such a strategy would need to translate demographic weight into a coherent political framework capable of confronting policies of slow extermination, forced displacement, and the reengineering of Palestinian geography and demography. In this context, the war on GS signals a shift toward a more dangerous phase, in which colonial practices move beyond control and toward attempts at physical and demographic erasure. Consequently, this reality necessitates a renewed Palestinian and international approach that treats the demographic dimension as a central arena of struggle, no less significant than the military and political domains.

5. Palestinians Abroad and the Right of Return

Palestinian refugees abroad play a central role in sustaining awareness of the Palestine issue and reinforcing national identity among younger generations, primarily through affirming the right of return and attachment to the land of Palestine. This role extends beyond symbolism to political and organisational action, as Palestinian communities, despite political constraints and limited institutional support, continue to launch educational and advocacy initiatives and expand international backing for the cause. Moreover, they operate through community networks to document violations, construct alternative narratives, and organise digital, cultural and legal campaigns that keep the right of return present in international discourse.

In this context, the PCPA, established in Istanbul on 25/2/2017, has continued to play a significant role in highlighting the Palestine issue, particularly the refugee question and the right of return, through its activities during 2024 and 2025, especially the second and third Palestinian National Dialogue Forums. Notably, the final statement of the second forum, held in Istanbul on 28–29/6/2024 with the participation of about 200 Palestinian figures from Palestine, Jordan, Türkiye, the Gulf states, Europe, the US and Latin America, reaffirmed support for resistance in the WB and GS. It further called for strengthening Palestinian steadfastness and coordinating national efforts, while advocating the establishment of a national alliance in support of resistance and a global coalition against Israeli occupation, with the aim of mobilising international solidarity and reinforcing national unity.⁴¹

PCPA launched an online campaign titled “Brotherhood Day” in March–April 2024, aimed at raising funds to support the population of GS.⁴² It also convened a major conference for Palestinians abroad in Istanbul on 11–12/4/2025 under the slogan “The Palestinian people reject displacement projects; there is no alternative to the right of return,” as part of efforts to unify Palestinian positions in confronting displacement schemes and to move beyond structural fragmentation in national action. The conference called for resisting forced displacement policies and urged Palestinians abroad either to exercise the right of return or to actively contribute to defending national identity.⁴³

Among the key national initiatives reflecting the engagement of a broad and significant segment of Palestinians abroad in national work was the convening of

the National Conference for Palestine in Doha, Qatar, from 17–19/2/2025. The conference emphasized the necessity of forming a unified Palestinian national leadership, rebuilding the PLO and confronting genocide as well as annexation and settlement schemes, in addition to countering the Trump–Netanyahu project premised on displacement and ethnic cleansing.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the Third Palestinian National Dialogue Forum, held in Istanbul on 14–15/11/2025 under the slogan “Unity of the Palestinian Position in the Face of Genocide, Displacement and Annexation,” marked a further stage in national mobilization, reflecting the growing role of the PCPA. The forum endorsed the establishment of the National Authority for Palestinian Popular Action, as an umbrella coordinating framework for popular conferences, initiatives and independent national figures inside and outside Palestine, with the aim of organizing efforts and mobilizing resources in support of resistance and Palestinian steadfastness. According to its final statement, the body is mandated to support the Palestinian struggle in all its forms, confront annexation, settlement and displacement plans, and address the consequences of the aggression. Moreover, it seeks to develop a project for Palestinian representation, including the election of representatives in available arenas, in addition to building Arab and Islamic alliances, formulating a national vision for the next phase, and exploring the establishment of a “Palestinian virtual world” to produce a unified digital Palestinian identity.⁴⁵

Moreover, the Palestinian communities abroad played an important role in foregrounding the Palestine issue and in enhancing the engagement of local constituencies in supporting it, as well as in condemning the war on GS and Israeli occupation policies and practices. This was achieved through the organisation of thousands of demonstrations worldwide, particularly in Europe, North America and Australia, alongside fundraising and related initiatives. In addition, Palestinians abroad contributed to shaping global public opinion via social media by disseminating solidarity messages and awareness campaigns on violations during the war on GS. Consequently, this strengthened the visibility of the Palestine issue in international discourse and helped construct a collective narrative that has limited attempts to obscure the scale of destruction and genocide in GS.⁴⁶

The General Union of Palestinian Communities in Europe (GUPCE) called on EU member states and the international community to impose sanctions on Israel, following the precedents set by Canada, the UK, France and Belgium.⁴⁷

It also firmly rejected Trump’s plan to displace Palestinians from GS.⁴⁸ In the same vein, Palestinian communities in Italy reaffirmed the right of return for millions of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons.⁴⁹ In the UK, the Association of the Palestinian Community in the UK (APCUK) organized a parliamentary session at the UK House of Commons entitled “Amplifying the Voice of Palestinian Women Under Occupation,” aimed at highlighting the suffering of the Palestinian people, particularly women facing compounded vulnerabilities under occupation.⁵⁰

Moreover, in a significant step toward preserving Palestinian collective memory, the Qatar Press Center (QPC), in cooperation with the Encyclopedia of Palestinian Camps, launched on 18/2/2025 the project’s official website, a key digital platform for documenting the history of Palestinian camps and safeguarding the heritage of refugees.⁵¹

In March 2024, Palestinian figures, civil society organizations, and activists launched a popular campaign calling for the unification of Palestinian leadership, bringing together hundreds of participants from diverse political, professional, academic and union backgrounds.⁵²

In this context, the Palestinian Return Centre (PRC) convened a conference in London in February 2025 entitled “Naming Genocide: The Global Responsibility For Gaza,” calling for Israel to be held accountable for its actions in GS and emphasizing that “justice for Palestine is both a legal and moral imperative.”⁵³ Furthermore, Association 302 to Defend Refugees Rights highlighted the plight of Palestinian refugees by opposing UNRWA service reductions and administrative measures against its staff, while condemning Israel’s systematic destruction of the agency’s facilities and schools in GS, as well as its measures against UNRWA in occupied Jerusalem.⁵⁴

Accordingly, Palestinians abroad constitute a central pillar of the Palestinian national project, as custodians of collective memory and the right of return, and as influential actors. Notably, their mobilization during the genocide war on GS underscored the diaspora’s centrality as a sphere of narrative contestation and political pressure. Nevertheless, the consolidation of this role remains contingent upon their integration into national decision-making structures and the development of effective organizational frameworks that safeguard the right of return and counter displacement schemes.

Endnotes

- ¹ For further details on population estimates and demographic projections of Palestinians worldwide through 2050, see Youssef Courbage and Hala Naufal, *Al-Filastiniyyun fi Al-'Alam: Dirasah Dimoghrafiyyah (Palestinians Worldwide: A Demographic Study)* (Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2020).
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- ³ See PCBS, *Palestinians at the End of 2025*.
- ⁴ See Ibid.
- ⁵ See Ibid.
- ⁶ See Ibid.
- ⁷ See Ibid.; and PCBS, *Palestinians at the End of 2024*.
- ⁸ PCBS, On the Occasion of the International Day of Older Persons, 1/10/2024, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_IntDayOlderP2024E.pdf
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- ¹⁰ PCBS, *Palestinians at the End of 2025*.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² See Ibid.; and PCBS, *Statistical Yearbook of Palestine 2025* (Ramallah: PCBS, December 2025), <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/media/df3bkm2e/book2733.pdf>
- ¹³ PCBS, *Statistical Yearbook of Palestine 2023* (Ramallah: PCBS, December 2023), <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2688.pdf>
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- ¹⁹ Pesach Benson, Israeli Police Probe Fatal Shooting as ArabSector Murder Toll Climbs to 241, site of Israel.com, 10/12/2025, <https://israel.com/crime/israeli-police-probe-fatal-shooting-as-arab-sector-murder-toll-climbs-to-241/>
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- ³⁵ See PCBS, *Palestinians at the End of 2025*; and see Department of Health, Annual Report 2024, UNRWA, 2024, https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/content/resources/2024_annual_report_version_1_res.pdf
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- ⁵¹ Aljazeera.net, 19/2/2025, <https://aja.ws/49d4v2> (in Arabic)
- ⁵² A popular campaign calls for the unification of the Palestinian leadership, site of Palestinian Return Centre (PRC), 27/3/2024, <https://prc.org.uk/ar/news/6145> (in Arabic)
- ⁵³ PRC Kickstarts International Conference on Gaza: A Call to Name Genocide and Demand Accountability, PRC, 23/2/2025, <https://prc.org.uk/en/post/4879/prc-kickstarts-international-conference-on-gaza-a-call-to-name-genocide-and-demand-accountability>
- ⁵⁴ See Association 302 to Defend Refugees Rights page, site of Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/people/اللاجئين-لحقوق-الهيئة302للدفاع-عن-حقوق-اللاجئين-Association-302to-defend-refugees-rights/100067932875019/>