

Summary
of
The Palestine Strategic Report
2024 – 2025



Editor

Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh



Al-Zaytouna Centre For Studies & Consultations

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**Al-Zaytouna Centre
For Studies & Consultations
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Introduction

Since 2005, the Palestine Strategic Report (PSR) has been published regularly by al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations in Beirut, an independent think tank specializing in strategic analysis and forecasting with a primary focus on the Palestine issue. The present volume is the fourteenth in the PSR series. It provides a comprehensive assessment of developments related to the Palestine issue during 2024–2025, while also outlining potential future trajectories.

Edited by Prof. Dr. Mohsen Mohammad Saleh, Professor of Palestine Studies and General Manager of al-Zaytouna Centre, the PSR examines and interprets the internal Palestinian landscape, demographic and economic indicators, and the status of the land and holy sites. It further analyzes Palestinian Arab, Islamic, and international relations, as well as the Israeli domestic context, resistance operations, and the peace process. The report is rigorously documented and supported by dozens of tables, statistical datasets, and charts. It was prepared by a team of 15 specialists and reviewed by a dedicated advisory body.

What follows is a summary of the report, whose full version exceeds 500 pages. Some statistical data remain provisional or pending release by relevant official and specialized authorities; these will be incorporated into the final edition once available.

While this summary provides substantial and densely presented material, the full PSR remains essential. Widely regarded as one of the most authoritative Palestinian references, PSR offers a comprehensive, rigorously documented study grounded in a forward-looking strategic framework, rendering it indispensable for researchers, analysts and specialists alike.

The Editor

First: The Palestinian Internal Situation

The Palestinian Authority’s Performance and Its Domestic Impact

The Palestinian Authority (PA) came under sustained criticism for its inadequate response to Israeli aggression and acts of genocide in Gaza Strip (GS), as well as to the continuing violations in the West Bank (WB). Furthermore, it was criticized for yielding to Israeli and international pressure, particularly following the decision issued by its president, Mahmud ‘Abbas, on 10/2/2025 to suspend financial allocations to prisoners and the families of martyrs. ‘Abbas also issued a constitutional declaration on 27/11/2024 stipulating that the Speaker of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) would temporarily assume the presidency in the event of a vacancy. Earlier, on 14/3/2024, he had appointed Muhammad Mustafa to form a new government. Furthermore, on 26/4/2025, ‘Abbas nominated Hussein al-Sheikh, Secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, as his deputy in both the presidency of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the presidency of the State of Palestine; the appointment was subsequently endorsed by the Executive Committee.

It is therefore probable that the PA leadership will persist in seeking to convince Israel and Western actors of its commitment to what are described as “reform measures,” thereby aligning with their conditions in order to preserve its political role and position itself to reassume governance in GS at a later stage. Concurrently, such pressures are likely to continue, serving as a mechanism to extract further concessions from the PA.

The Day After in GS

The positions of key actors regarding the post-war situation in GS were markedly divergent. As early as February 2024, PA President Mahmud ‘Abbas declared his readiness to assume governance of GS, maintaining this stance throughout the two years of confrontation. He held Hamas responsible for the deterioration of conditions in GS, demanded that it relinquish authority, and rejected any role for it in his post-war administration.

In contrast, Hamas and other Palestinian resistance factions demonstrated flexibility toward proposed post-war arrangements, expressing willingness

to step aside from governance. On 5/12/2024, they endorsed an Egyptian proposal to establish a “Community Support Committee” to administer GS, a plan ultimately rejected by the Fatah leadership and the PA despite their participation in the dialogues that produced it. Hamas and the resistance factions also welcomed President Trump’s October 2025 plan for halting hostilities, alleviating humanitarian suffering, facilitating aid and reconstruction, and arranging prisoner exchanges. Nevertheless, they rejected external oversight of the Palestinian people, insisted on their right to sovereignty, and referred other matters to national consensus, emphasizing their fundamentally internal Palestinian character.

The committee established to administer GS under the ceasefire agreement, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), is expected to commence its work despite Israeli obstacles. Nonetheless, prospects for consensus on the future of the resistance’s weapons remain weak due to divergent positions, while indicators suggest that Israel will continue its attacks, maintain the blockade, and delay any withdrawal from the Strip.

1. Opinion Polls

Throughout 2024–2025, Hamas and the Palestinian resistance consistently led public opinion polls, with findings indicating that they would obtain a clear majority in any elections held in WB and GS. For instance, a public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in March 2024 showed continued strong support for armed resistance in the WB, with 71% of respondents endorsing the October 7 attack, while satisfaction with Hamas’s performance rose to 75%, in stark contrast to the sharp decline in confidence in the PA and its leadership. Subsequent surveys reinforced these trends, revealing that nearly 80% of Palestinians called for the resignation of the PA president and that the majority viewed the PA as a “burden” on the Palestinian people.

Putting the Palestinian Political House in Order and Reconciliation

The year 2024 witnessed an intensive international diplomatic push to revive the Palestinian reconciliation process, aiming to establish a unified leadership capable of addressing the post-war challenges. The “Moscow

Dialogues” in February 2024 marked the initial phase of this effort, yet their outcomes remained largely limited to “verbal agreements,” without tangible implementation on the ground.

The key development was the “Beijing Declaration” in July 2024, in which China facilitated a comprehensive agreement signed by 14 Palestinian factions. The accord called for an “interim national unity government” to administer the WB and GS and to unify institutions in preparation for elections. This represented a significant political breakthrough, as it was the first agreement to set a clear timeline and mechanisms under the sponsorship of an emerging international power. Nevertheless, “entrenched structural divisions” persisted, the declaration faced outright Israeli rejection and US reservations, while disagreements over the PLO’s political program and conditions for international recognition continued to hinder efforts to put the Palestinian political house in order. Given prevailing internal dynamics and sustained external pressures, the most plausible scenario in the near term is the continuation of political fragmentation and rivalry, with little indication of a convergence of Palestinian positions or an end to the political schism.

PLO

In 2024, the institutions of the PLO, particularly the Executive Committee and the Palestinian Central Council (PCC), faced widespread criticism centered on the gap between formal institutional action and the rapid developments on the ground in GS and WB. While the Executive Committee continued to hold its regular meetings and issue statements condemning the aggression, large segments of the Palestinian population perceived these measures as confined to “traditional diplomacy,” which failed to effect tangible change on the ground or to galvanize an international response commensurate with the scale of the tragedy.

The effectiveness crisis deepened due to the persistent concentration of decision-making authority within the PLO, leaving its institutions hampered by weak comprehensive factional representation amid the absence of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ). Despite the leadership of the PLO and the PA striving to expand international recognition of the State of

Palestine, which reached 159 countries, part of this effort focused on securing resolutions (as evidenced by the UN conference of 28–30/7/2025 and the New York Declaration of 12/9/2025) aimed at disarming Hamas, and imposing conditions that prevent resistance factions from participating in elections and putting the Palestinian political house in order.

Palestinians of the 1948 Occupied Territories

The Palestinian community in the 1948 occupied territories has faced escalating crime and worsening security conditions, in what appeared to be a pattern enabled, whether through active patronage, tacit approval or indifference, by Israeli authorities. Voter turnout in local elections, announced on 27/2/2024, declined to 49% from 56% in the previous cycle, reflecting the ongoing impact of Israeli war on GS. At the same time, Israeli authorities implemented unprecedented repressive measures aimed at curbing engagement by Palestinians of 1948 with Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Nevertheless, various forms of solidarity with GS continued to emerge.

Palestinians Abroad

With regard to the Palestinians abroad, political mobilization became more structured. On 29/6/2024, the Second Palestinian National Dialogue Forum, organized by the Popular Conference of Palestinians Abroad (PCPA), announced the launch of the Global Alliance for Palestine (GAFP) to oppose Israeli occupation and called for the formation of a national coalition to support the resistance and safeguard national fundamentals. Moreover, in February 2025, the National Conference for Palestine convened in Qatar with around 400 participants from Palestine and diaspora communities, identifying as its central objective exerting pressure to rebuild and revitalize the PLO and restore its representative and institutional role.

In a significant step toward coordinating and consolidating the efforts of popular action institutions, the Third Palestinian National Dialogue Forum announced in November 2025 the establishment of the National Commission for Palestinian Popular Action (NCPPA), bringing together four Palestinian national conferences and a broad group of independent Palestinian figures.

While Israeli repression and surveillance are likely to continue in an attempt to marginalize the role of Palestinians of the 1948 occupied territories in responding to developments in GS and WB, emerging indicators suggest that Palestinian communities within the occupied interior are gradually overcoming the barrier of fear. Beyond Palestine, the launch of NCPPA is expected to enhance coordination mechanisms among national conferences and independent figures. In turn, this initiative may reinforce the role of the Palestinian diaspora within the broader trajectory of the national struggle.

The Internal Conditions of the Factions and Their Relations with One Another and with the PA

Hamas was subjected during Operation al-Aqsa Flood to a broad campaign targeting its political and military leadership. The head of its Political Bureau, Isma‘il Haniyyah, and his deputy, Saleh al-‘Aruri, were assassinated; subsequently, the newly appointed Political Bureau head, Yahya al-Sinwar, as well as the Chief of General Staff of Al-Qassam Brigades, Muhammad al-Daif, and several senior brigade commanders, were also killed. Hamas swiftly appointed al-Sinwar as Haniyyah’s successor following the latter’s assassination on 31/7/2024. However, after al-Sinwar’s killing on 16/10/2024, the movement took a different approach, establishing a temporary leadership committee to manage the movement’s affairs.

Amid mounting internal pressures on Fatah, its Central Committee resolved to review applications from individuals seeking readmission to the movement. On 5/10/2025, it approved the return of Nasser al-Qudwa. In addition, a Fatah delegation held an unprecedented meeting in Cairo with Samir Mashharawi, deputy head of the Democratic Reform Bloc, led by Muhammed Dahlan.

At the inter-factional level, disagreement over the position toward Operation al-Aqsa Flood evolved into a further source of escalating tensions and reciprocal accusations, particularly between Fatah and the PA, on the one hand, and Hamas and the resistance factions, on the other. These tensions spilled over into Lebanon, where divergent views emerged regarding the handover of weapons in the refugee camp (RCs). This followed an agreement signed on 21/5/2025 between the PA president and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun to restrict arms exclusively to the Lebanese state and to dismantle weapons

within the RCs. Meanwhile, in Syria, several leaders of Palestinian factions aligned with the Bashar al-Assad regime were compelled to leave the country, and the properties and training facilities of a number of these factions were subsequently confiscated.

2. Palestinian–Israeli Security Coordination

Security coordination between the PA and Israel, together with the issue of “political detention” increasingly undermined national unity, as arrests escalated in 2024 and 2025, targeting activists, released prisoners and university students for their political affiliations or support for the resistance. Traditional security coordination is likely to face growing challenges amid the rise of Israel’s far-right, which seeks not merely to coordinate but to weaken the PA and confine its Security Forces to limited “Village League” roles. This dynamic places the PA leadership before a stark choice: functional collapse or alignment with popular sentiment.

Second: Palestinian Demographic Indicators

Since 7/10/2023, the Palestinian people in GS have been subjected to a campaign of genocidal violence by Israel that has persisted for over two years, resulting in the deaths of about 77 thousand Palestinians and injuries to some 170 thousand others. The vast majority of Gazans have experienced forced internal displacement, while roughly 150 thousand were compelled to leave temporarily due to medical needs or the severity of their living conditions. Overall, GS has lost nearly 10.6% of its population, although a portion of this loss has been partially offset by natural population growth.

The Strip has endured a brutal and indiscriminate Israeli aggression targeting people, homes and infrastructure, intended to produce conditions conducive to the displacement of Palestinians. Yet, the steadfast attachment of the Palestinian people to their land and holy sites has thwarted these efforts. Concurrently, Israel has continued its aggression in Jerusalem and across the WB, pursuing similar demographic objectives, but it has been met with the same resilience and steadfastness from the inhabitants of Jerusalem and the WB.

Available estimates from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in Ramallah indicate that the number of Palestinians worldwide at the end of 2025 (early 2026) was about 15.5 million. More than half, or 8.1 million (52.1%), live in the diaspora, while the remainder, 7.4 million (47.9%), reside in historic Palestine. Within historic Palestine, about 1.85 million live in the territories occupied in 1948, and about 5.56 million in the 1967 Palestinian territories, of whom 3.43 million (61.7%) live in the WB and 2.13 million (38.3%) in GS.

According to data available to Al-Zaytouna Centre researchers, Palestinians in Jordan, most of whom hold Jordanian nationality, number at the end of 2025 roughly 4.88 million, representing about 31.5% of all Palestinians worldwide (about 60.4% of the Palestinian diaspora). Palestinians in the remainder of the Arab world are estimated at 1.9 million, accounting for 12.5% of the global Palestinian population, mostly concentrated in neighboring Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and the Arab Gulf states.

According to PCBS, about 1.3 million Palestinians live outside the Arab world (8.1% of Palestinians worldwide), with most residing in the US,


Latin America, Canada, Britain and other EU countries. It should be noted that these figures remain estimates, particularly outside Palestine, where accurate data are difficult to obtain. Some estimates, for example, indicate that the number of Palestinians in Latin America exceeds 600 thousand, with at least 300 thousand residing in Chile alone. In Europe, the Palestinian population is estimated to range between 350 and 400 thousand, while in North America it is between 300 and 350 thousand. In the rest of the world, their number is estimated at no fewer than 100 thousand.

Palestinian Population Worldwide Estimate According to Place of Residence at the End of 2024 and 2025 (thousands)

Place of residence		2024		2025	
		Population estimates	Percentage (%)	Population estimates	Percentage (%)
Palestinian territories occupied in 1967	WB	3,360.6	22.6	3,430.1	22.2
	GS	2,129.7	14.3	2,127	13.7
Palestinian territories occupied in 1948 (Israel)		1,793.4	12	1,855.4	12
Palestinians in historic Palestine		7,283.7	48.9	7,412.5	47.9
Jordan*		4,786.7	32.2	4,877.6	31.5
Other Arab Countries		1,617.9	10.9	1,940.8	12.5
Foreign Countries		1,197.5	8	1,258.7	8.1
Palestinians Abroad		7,602.1	51.1	8,077.1	52.1
Total		14,885.8	100	15,489.6	100

* The number of Palestinians in Jordan is based on the PCBS statistics in 2009, when their number was 3,240,473, and on the annual growth rates ranging between 3.1% and 1.9% during the period 2009–2024, issued by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS).

Palestinian Population Worldwide Estimate According to Place of Residence at the End of 2025 (%)



More than two-thirds of the world’s Palestinians are refugees. Beyond about 8.1 million Palestinians living abroad, there are roughly 2.3 million refugees from Palestine occupied in 1948 residing in the WB and GS, in addition to about 150 thousand who were displaced from their land but remain in the territories occupied in 1948. Consequently, the total number of Palestinian refugees is about 10.5 million, representing about 68% of the overall Palestinian population at the end of 2025. While this figure may include some duplication, as certain Palestinians abroad retain identity documents from interior Palestine, the margin of error is limited. By the end of 2024, the number of refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reached about 5.9 million. It should be noted, however, that a significant number of refugees remain unregistered, either because they do not require UNRWA’s services or because they reside outside its operational mandate, including in the Gulf countries, Europe and the US.


Palestinian Refugees Worldwide; Population Estimates at the end 2025 (thousands)

Region	WB	GS	Israel*	Arab countries	Foreign countries	Total
Estimates	902	1,406	150	6,818	1,259	10,535

Note: The estimates of WB and GS are based on the percentages published by PCBS (26.3% of the WB population and 66.1% of the GS population are refugees).

*Approximate numbers.

**Palestinian Refugees Worldwide; Population Estimates
at the end 2025 (thousands)**




According to PCBS statistics, the Palestinian population surpassed the Jewish population in historic Palestine by the end of 2023, with estimates indicating that the Palestinian population in historic Palestine reached about 7.3 million, while the Jewish population reached about 7.2 million according to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimates. The demographic trajectory shifted markedly in 2024–2025 due to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, which caused significant Palestinian casualties, and a reverse Israeli migration. Some Israeli sources suggest that this reverse migration involved no fewer than 500 thousand Israelis within the first six months of the war, while CBS reported a much lower figure (around 150 thousand over two years) reflecting a longstanding policy to maintain societal cohesion. Accordingly, Israeli demographic data should be approached with caution.

The table below presents estimated population count of Palestinian and Jews in historic Palestine up to 2030:

**Estimated Population Count of Palestinians and Jews in Historic Palestine
2022–2030 (thousands)**

Year	Palestinians in historic Palestine	Jews
2022	7,100	7,100
2023	7,300	7,200
2024	7,300	7,400
2025	7,400	7,400
2026	7,600	7,500
2027	7,800	7,600
2028	7,900	7,700
2029	8,100	7,800
2030	8,300	7,900

**Estimated Population Count of Palestinians and Jews in Historic Palestine
2022–2030 (thousands)**



It is important to highlight Israel’s escalating efforts to displace Palestinians and cultivate unwelcoming conditions for those in its territory, as part of a broader strategy to manage the growing Palestinian population, advance the annexation of WB, and secure a Jewish majority.

Third: The Land, Jerusalem and the Holy Sites

The process of Judaizing *al-Aqsa* Mosque and Jerusalem has reached an advanced stage, coinciding with the rise of religious Zionism within Israeli society and the concurrent growth of Christian Zionism in the US.

Al-Aqsa Mosque is no longer merely on the threshold of Judaization; it has progressed from one phase to another, with a parallel Jewish identity effectively imposed through daily incursions from Sunday to Thursday, averaging six hours per day. Beginning in 2024, these incursions have been accompanied by the enforcement of Torah rituals under official sanction, and from 2025, the mosque has been increasingly repurposed as a venue for celebrations, dancing and social events by governmental decree. Moreover, unprecedented attempts were made to perform animal sacrifices within the mosque three times during 2025, a practice without precedent since its occupation. By the same year, the number of Jewish intruders had surpassed 73 thousand, reflecting an average annual increase of 18% over 2024–2025.

During 2024 and 2025, developments at the Ibrahimi Mosque highlighted its role as a concrete expression of Israel’s settler-colonial vision toward *al-Aqsa*. The Judaization process, beginning with the “Great Hall” in the mosque’s northwestern section, ultimately appropriated 37% of its area for Jewish settlers and designated it for multiple Jewish religious and Zionist nationalist occasions. This strategy reflects a broader objective: shifting the Ibrahimi Mosque from a temporary regime of shared access toward the systematic erasure of its Islamic identity, thereby paving the way for full Judaization.

With respect to Christians and Christian holy sites, Israeli restrictions on religious celebrations have continued, particularly at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In addition, settler attacks targeting clergy, worshippers, and places of worship have persisted. More fundamentally, however, the most consequential and enduring trend remains the steady decline of Arab Palestinian Christianity as a result of sustained emigration. By 2025, Palestinian Christians accounted for only 3% of Palestinians in historic Palestine, and merely 1.5% of the total population of Palestine, including Jewish settlers. This represents the lowest proportion of Christians in Palestine in centuries, underscoring the profound demographic transformation underway.

Despite Israel’s demographic campaign against the Jerusalemites, their population continued to grow, reaching roughly 405 thousand, about 40% of the city’s total population across its eastern and western sectors, and about 64% of the population in the eastern sector.

The dynamics of this demographic war have crystallized into three principal trajectories within Israeli strategic planning:

First Trajectory: It centers on efforts to displace residents from strategically significant neighborhoods in central Jerusalem in order to penetrate and reconfigure the city’s urban core through processes of Judaization. In 2024–2025, this trajectory regained prominence with the reactivation of legal proceedings in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, alongside the intensification of judicial measures, demolition orders and displacement policies targeting the six Silwan neighborhoods threatened with collective eviction: Al-Bustan, Wadi al-Rababa, Batn al-Hawa, ‘Ein al-Louzeh, Wadi Qaddum, and Wadi Hilweh. A trajectory that is likely to escalate further in 2026.

Second Trajectory: This approach seeks to alter the boundaries of Jerusalem by excluding certain Palestinian population clusters, such as the Shu‘afat RC and Kafr ‘Aqab, while incorporating three major settlement blocs, Giv‘on, Adumim and Gush Etzion, thereby establishing what is referred to as “Greater Jerusalem,” expanding the area to 289 km² compared with the current municipal boundaries of 126 km². This expansion would simultaneously accelerate the displacement of Palestinian communities in the Jerusalem periphery, including Khan al-Ahmar, Jabal al-Baba and other communities.

Third Trajectory: This strategy entails the expansion of settlement construction in the eastern part of the city. The Israeli government has approved the establishment of a new settlement for the first time in a decade and a half, Atarot, on the site of the former Qalandiya Airport.

Furthermore, the targeting of Islamic and Christian holy sites in GS has constituted a central element of the genocidal campaign throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood over the past two years. Israel has destroyed 93% of GS’s mosques, totaling 1,156 out of 1,244, including historically significant sites such as the Great ‘Umari Mosque, dating to the Rashidun period, and the Sayyid Hashim Mosque, originating from the Mamluk era. In addition, 66% of the GS’s cemeteries were obliterated, amounting to 40 out of 60. Furthermore,

over the course of two years of genocidal war in GS, Israel destroyed three churches, one of them was the Greek Orthodox Church of Saint Porphyrius. These actions highlight that the deliberate erasure of religious identity and historical heritage of the Palestinian people.

Settlement Expansion and Judaization in WB

In WB, although the US currently opposes the formal legal annexation of the territory, de facto annexation continues to advance at a steady pace, rendering its formalization increasingly a matter of timing rather than principle. Estimates by the Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem (ARIJ) indicate that the number of Jewish settlers in WB, including East Jerusalem, has reached about 870 thousand. Furthermore, the number of checkpoints and closure points throughout WB has surpassed 849. Meanwhile, the Separation Wall has remained relatively unchanged in recent years; about 64% of the planned 710 kilometers have been completed.

Concurrently, Israeli military operations in Jenin, Tulkarm and Nur Shams RCs throughout 2025 led to the displacement of more than 63 thousand Palestinians, effectively constituting a trial by fire for a broader strategy of mass displacement in the WB. Furthermore, settler violence against Palestinians in WB reached its highest level in 2025 since the UN began systematically documenting such incidents in 2006. A total of 1,800 attacks were recorded, affecting 280 cities, towns and villages. These assaults resulted in the killing of 15 Palestinians and the injury of 838 others, amounting to an average of 5 attacks and 2 injuries per day. Notably, 60% of these incidents were concentrated in the Ramallah and Hebron governorates.

Fourth: Economic Indicators in WB and GS

The Palestinian economy has experienced catastrophic deterioration, particularly in GS, as a direct consequence of the devastating genocidal war waged by Israel over a two-year period. Meanwhile, WB has likewise faced acute economic strain, largely as a result of annexation and Judaization policies, in addition to sustained assaults by the Israeli army and settlers. These pressures have been especially pronounced in the context of recurrent military campaigns, accompanied by widespread destruction and forced displacement in areas such as Jenin and Tulkarm, among others.

The Israeli aggression has inflicted catastrophic destruction across GS, devastating over 80% of homes and infrastructure and resulting in losses estimated at \$70 billion. Some 300 thousand housing units were completely destroyed, while an additional 200 thousand units suffered severe or partial damage. Nearly two million Gazans were displaced, most of whom lost their livelihoods, leaving more than 288 thousand families homeless. Furthermore, Israel closed GS crossings for about 600 days in a deliberate campaign of starvation. The human toll, with around 250 thousand casualties including both the dead and injured, compounded the suffering, depriving tens of thousands of families of their primary sources of income and care. The destruction, whether total or partial, extended to 38 hospitals, over 1,200 schools and educational institutions, 90% of agricultural land, 247 government offices, 725 central water wells, and 2,285 electricity transformers, in addition to extensive damage to roads and water and sanitation networks, among other essential infrastructure.

Moreover, the healthcare and education systems have experienced an almost complete collapse, while the Palestinian economy suffered an unprecedented downturn: GS's GDP contracted by 84% in 2025 compared to 2023, and the unemployment rate reached catastrophic levels of 78%. This economic downturn has also impacted WB, where GDP declined by 13% and the unemployment rate rose to 28%.


It is important to stress that caution is needed when discussing statistics in isolation, as the blood of martyrs, the suffering of the wounded, and the plight of the displaced, who have lost homes, property and livelihoods, cannot be reduced to numbers. Each case reflects indescribable horrors and countless acts of steadfastness, meaning the figures cannot fully convey the

scale of catastrophic suffering, particularly in the GS. The statistical indicators presented here are intended solely to illustrate one dimension of the hardships endured by the Palestinian people under Israel, which continues to suffocate the Palestinian economy by land, sea and air, to appropriate and deplete Palestinian resources, to exert control over the PA’s imports and exports, and to impede any meaningful development on the ground.

Trade

The volume of trade in 2024 between the PA in Ramallah and Israel amounted to \$5,112 million, or about 62% of the PA’s total foreign trade volume of \$8,262 million. Imports from Israel reached \$3,646 million, representing about 56% of the PA’s total imports of \$6,548 million, while exports to Israel amounted to \$1,466 million, representing about 86% of the PA’s total exports of \$1,714 million. This severely harms the Palestinian economy and leaves the trade balance severely and continuously skewed in favor of Israel.

Palestinian Trade with Israel in 2024 in Comparison with the Rest of the World (%)



GDP


In the WB and GS, GDP at current prices declined to about \$16,017 million in 2024, down from \$17,848 million in 2023, representing a decrease of 10.3%. Based on available data for the first three quarters of 2025, GDP is projected to recover slightly to about \$16,736 million in 2025, an increase of 4.5%. Nevertheless, Palestinian GDP remains exceedingly low relative to Israeli GDP, which in 2024 exceeded it by more than 33-fold (3,386%), highlighting the severe and sustained economic impact of the occupation on the Palestinian economy.

GDP in PA Territories and Israel 2020–2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)

Year	PA	Israel
2020	15,531.7	411,592
2021	18,109	489,872
2022	19,165.5	525,458
2023	17,847.9	510,288
2024	16,016.9	542,391
2025*	16,736.3	597,080

*Preliminary figures based on Q1, Q2 and Q3 2025 estimates.

GDP in PA Territories and Israel 2024–2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)



GDP per Capita

GDP per capita in 2023 and 2024 stood at about \$3,459 and \$3,050, respectively, at current prices, reflecting declines of 9% in 2023 and 11.8% in 2024. Based on figures available for the first three quarters of 2025, GDP per capita in the WB and GS is projected to increase modestly to \$3,131, representing a growth of 2.7%. PCBS anticipates that, under the baseline scenario, GDP per capita will rise by 1.8% in 2026. However, should the political and economic situation deteriorate, due, for instance, to a breach of the ceasefire by Israel in GS and the continued tightening of restrictions in the WB, GDP per capita is expected to decline by 6.3% in 2026.


The decline and volatility of GDP per capita between 2020 and 2025 have exerted a negative effect on consumption, reflecting the erosion of income levels influenced by developments in global prices. Furthermore, the disparity in GDP per capita between the WB and GS has grown markedly. In 2024, GDP per capita in WB was about \$4,744, six times higher than in GS, where it stood at about \$787. Based on estimates for the first three quarters of 2025, GDP per capita is projected to reach about \$4,654 in WB, compared with only about \$1,093 in GS. This pronounced divergence underscores the impact of the prolonged siege on GS, as well as the consequences of Israeli aggression and widespread destruction.

GDP per Capita in PA Territories and Israel 2020–2025 at Current Prices (\$)

Year	PA	Israel
2020	3,233.6	44,138
2021	3,678.6	51,681
2022	3,800	54,425
2023	3,458.5	51,831
2024	3,050	54,393
2025*	3,131	59,129

*Preliminary figures based on Q1, Q2 and Q3 2025 estimates.


GDP per Capita in PA Territories and Israel 2024–2025 at Current Prices (\$)



Revenues and Expenditures


Preliminary indicators show that the PA’s total net revenues in 2025, increased by about 2.6% compared with 2024, following a sharp decline of about 27.6% relative to 2023, a contraction attributable to the ongoing Israeli aggression and the genocidal war in GS. Total net revenues reached about \$3,236 million in 2025, compared with about \$3,155 million in 2024 and about \$4,359 million in 2023. Meanwhile, total general expenditures of the PA, including development spending, amounted to about \$3,750.6 million in 2025, down from about \$3,893.2 million in 2024, representing a decrease of 3.7%.

PA Revenues 2025 (%)



The PA’s revenues remain heavily dependent on sources beyond its control, with about 84% of 2025 revenues derived from clearance taxes collected by Israel and from international grants. These resources constitute significant instruments of leverage in the hands of Israel and various international actors, who provide them under political and security conditions that constrain the independence of Palestinian decision-making. Total revenues in 2025 amounted to about \$3,236 million, including \$1,755 million from clearance revenues (54.2%) and roughly \$962 million from external financing (grants and external aid) (29.7%). While international support had generally declined between 2009 and 2023, it increased in 2024 in response to international sympathy generated by the war in GS and the continued restrictions imposed in the WB.

PA External Budgetary Support (Including Development Financing) 2005–2025



Fifth: Trajectories of Israeli Aggression, Palestinian Resistance and the Peace Process

Israeli Aggression and Palestinian Resistance

Between 2024 and 2025, the Palestinian resistance, supported by its popular base, sustained a heroic struggle against the most intense and violent Israeli aggression against GS since its occupation in 1967. The scope of these confrontations extended beyond GS to WB, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Israel deployed extensive means of mass destruction throughout the confrontation. The campaign resulted in tens of thousands of fatalities, the destruction or severe damage of about 80% of homes, infrastructure, hospitals, schools and places of worship, and the forced internal displacement of more than 90% of GS's population. It also entailed siege conditions marked by starvation and the cutting of water, food, medicine, electricity and fuel, in addition to the dropping of about 200 thousand tons of explosives, equivalent to the force of 15 nuclear bombs such as those dropped on Hiroshima. Despite this unprecedented level of destruction, Israel failed to crush the resistance. The latter remained operationally effective until the final stages of the confrontation and ensured that none of the Israeli captives were released except on terms set by the resistance.

According to the Israeli army's 2025 annual report, it conducted about 20,900 airstrikes, in addition to 430 military operations, across GS and WB, as well as in Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Yemen during the course of 2025. Of these, 19,530 targets were struck in GS alone.

During 2024 and 2025, the WB experienced an unprecedented Israeli escalation, the most intense since Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This escalation manifested in military incursions, targeted field assassinations, mass arrests and the systematic destruction of infrastructure in RCs. Moreover, settler violence increased markedly, particularly in Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. At the same time, notwithstanding the continued security coordination between the PA Security Forces and the Israeli army, and despite the severe and deteriorating conditions on the ground, Palestinian resistance persisted in both individual and organized forms. Daily confrontations and various expressions of popular resistance likewise continued, even as the number of killed and detainees rose,

movement restrictions intensified, and recurrent closures were imposed on neighborhoods and cities.

The years 2024 and 2025 saw unprecedented Israeli violations against Palestinians in WB, including East Jerusalem, surpassing previous years. The Palestine Information Center—Mo3ta documented about 53,052 violations in 2024 and about 81,887 in 2025, while the total number of fixed and mobile Israeli checkpoints reached about 909.

The pace of resistance operations remained consistently high throughout 2024 and 2025. In 2024, the Israeli Security Agency—ISA (*Shabak*) recorded about 5,766 attacks in WB, including East Jerusalem and the 1948 occupied territories, while in 2025, this figure declined slightly to 4,744, excluding Palestinian resistance activities in GS. Of these, the Shabak reported 267 significant attacks in 2024 and 69 significant attacks in 2025, further noting that it foiled 1,051 significant attacks in 2024 and 1,374 significant attacks in 2025. By significant attacks, the Shabak refers to those carried out in a “hard” manner, such as shootings, bombings, stabbings and vehicular attacks... Other operations, by contrast, encompass popular resistance activities, including throwing Molotov cocktails and improvised devices, setting fires, and stone-throwing. Mo3ta Center further expands the definition of popular resistance to include confrontations, strikes and protests.

Distribution of Resistance Operations in WB, 2024–2025, per Shabak

Year	Resistance Operations	Significant attacks	Popular Operations	Foiled Significant Attacks
2024	5,766	267	5,499	1,051
2025	4,744	69	4,675	1,374
Total	10,510	336	10,174	2,425

The annual reports of Mo3ta Center have noted that the popular and armed Palestinian resistance in WB, including East Jerusalem, has significantly increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 2024, Palestinians carried out 5,892 resistance operations in WB, including East Jerusalem, among which 2,070 were significant attacks. In 2025, Palestinians carried out 4,081 resistance operations across WB, including East Jerusalem, of which 695 were significant.

Development of Resistance in WB, 2022–2025, per Mo3ta

Year	2022	2023	2024	2025
Popular Resistance Acts	10,808	10,925	2,070	3,386
Significant Attacks	1,380	3,258	3,822	695
Total	12,188	14,183	5,892	4,081

It is evident that the number of significant attacks declined relatively in 2025, reflecting the escalation of Israeli repressive measures, as well as the destruction and displacement that affected the Jenin and Tulkarm RCs. This decline was further reinforced by the cooperation of the PA with Israel, alongside the cumulative exhaustion experienced throughout the WB.

Since Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, the number of killed and missing Palestinians in WB and GS has reached more than 78 thousand, 98% of whom were in GS (over 77 thousand), including about 9,500 who remain missing. Among those killed, more than 20 thousand children and over 12,500 women, while the number of injured reached about 179 thousand.

**Palestinians Killed and Missing Persons in WB and GS, 2023–2025
Since Operation al-Aqsa Flood**

Year	2023	2024	2025	Total
WB	319	516	267	1,102
GS	21,822	23,662	25,458	70,942
Missing Persons from GS				11,000
Total	22,141	24,178	25,725	83,044

According to the Shabak, Palestinian attacks resulted in the killing of 45 Israelis in 2024 and 23 in 2025, encompassing incidents in the WB, East Jerusalem and within the 1948 occupied territories. 339 Israeli were injured in 2024 and 195 in 2025. Data from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) further indicates that, since Operation al-Aqsa Flood on 7/10/2023, Israeli casualties have been distributed as follows:

- 1,721 killed, including 870 soldiers, on the Gaza front.
- 78 killed, including 31 soldiers, in WB.
- 33 killed during the war on Iran.
- 132 killed, including 86 soldiers, as a result of attacks from Lebanon.
- One killed with 100 injured due to attacks from Yemen.

Nevertheless, Israel has consistently sought to conceal the full extent of its losses, with the military censor exercising direct control over the dissemination of any information pertaining to casualties. Multiple leaks suggest that actual losses are considerably higher, particularly when compared with the number of wounded admitted to Israeli hospitals. Moreover, a statement by Eyal Zamir, who subsequently assumed the position of Chief of the General Staff, indicated that the total number of Israeli deaths had reached 5,942 by February 2025.

Support Fronts

In Lebanon, Hizbullah maintained strong support for the Palestinian resistance, with its operations displacing roughly 100 thousand Israeli settlers from areas near the Lebanese border and disrupting tourism and economic activity in northern Israel. In response, after mid-September 2024, Israel shifted its focus toward Lebanon, targeting Hizbullah, its infrastructure and popular support. This included detonating pagers and walkie-talkies held by party members, injuring around four thousand personnel. Israel then launched Operation Northern Arrows on 23/9/2024 and assassinated Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah on 27/9/2024, followed by a ground invasion of southern Lebanon on 1/10/2024. The incursion met strong resistance from Hizbullah and allied forces, until the conflict ceased on 27/11/2024. This war claimed about 4 thousand Lebanese lives, and left 17 thousand wounded, including many of Hizbullah's military and political leaders, and caused widespread destruction in over fifty villages and the southern suburb of Beirut. It displaced around one million people, with damages estimated at roughly \$14 billion. Despite the cessation of hostilities, Israel did not fully withdraw and retained control over five strategic sites, continuing to this day carrying out assassinations, shelling, and destruction to pressure for Hizbullah's disarmament.

The Fajr Forces affiliated with *al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah*, together with the Al-Qassam Brigades and the PIJ, carried out several military operations and rocket attacks. At the same time, a number of their senior leaders and members were killed in Israeli strikes.

In Syria, Israel has treated the territory as a permanent corridor for operations against the Axis of Resistance. In 2024 alone, it conducted 373 strikes, primarily targeting sites linked to Iran, Hizbullah and the Syrian army. After the fall of the Assad regime on 8/12/2024, the campaign intensified, with roughly 500 airstrikes in one month destroying over 720 targets, according to Israeli estimates, and reportedly disabling about 85% of the Syrian army's strategic capabilities. Escalation continued into 2025 with additional strikes and a ground incursion seizing some 500 km² of border areas, including Mount Hermon, Daraa and Quneitra. Israel also encouraged separatist tendencies among Druze and Kurdish groups, and sought to impose a form of oversight over the Druze, while the new Syrian leadership avoided direct confrontation, focusing on consolidating authority and employing political and “soft” measures to prompt Israeli withdrawal.

In Yemen, Ansar Allah (the Houthis) added a new strategic dimension to the conflict by turning the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait into leverage against Israel and its allies. Since declaring their intervention in support of Gaza in November 2023, they carried out over two thousand attacks on vessels linked to Israel or its partners, alongside 137 strikes on ports, airports and military targets using hypersonic ballistic missiles and drones, effectively imposing a de facto blockade on maritime traffic to Eilat. The US and UK responded with a naval coalition and air operations under Operation Prosperity Guardian, followed by a wider campaign of strikes in 2024–2025, causing hundreds of deaths and severe damage to Yemeni infrastructure. Despite this, Ansar Allah continued missile and drone attacks, reaffirming their support for Gaza, while US officials acknowledged the high military and financial costs of countering these operations. Simultaneously, Israel launched Operation Long Arm, targeting political and military leaders, including Prime Minister Ahmad Ghalib al-Rahawi and several ministers, to dismantle the administrative and military structures enabling Yemen's regional role. The conflict resulted in hundreds of Yemeni fatalities and extensive damage to Sanaa Airport, the ports

of Hudaydah and Ras Isa, and areas in al-Jawf, ‘Amran and others. Throughout, Ansar Allah remained resolute in supporting the resistance in GS and upholding the Palestine issue, demonstrating a persistent readiness to sustain this support regardless of the cost.

In Iraq, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq emerged as a remote support arm, initially targeting US bases and later extending toward Israeli depth. Between late 2023 and April 2024, it conducted over 200 drone and missile strikes against US bases in Iraq and Syria, inflicting casualties that prompted extensive US retaliatory attacks. Efforts later shifted to Israeli targets, including gas platforms in the Karish gas field and sites in Haifa, Tel Aviv and the Golan. Nonetheless, operational impact remained limited due to logistical constraints and US and domestic pressure, leading factions to cease announcing attacks by late 2024 amid international threats and the loss of Syrian depth after the regime’s fall.

Iran supported the Palestinian resistance during Operation al-Aqsa Flood, stressing that the operation was an independent Palestinian decision conducted without prior Iranian knowledge and deliberately avoiding direct confrontation with Israel. Nevertheless, Israel assassinated senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers in Syria during the strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1/4/2024, killing Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi and Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi. In retaliation, Iran launched Operation True Promise 1, firing roughly 300 rockets toward Israel on 13/4/2024, followed by Operation True Promise 2, in early October 2024, with over 200 rockets targeting Israel in response to the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau head Isma‘il Haniyyah in Tehran, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, and IRGC’s deputy commander for operations ‘Abbas Nilforoushan. Israel then conducted a series of airstrikes on Iran on 26/10/2024.

Amid US–Iran negotiations over the nuclear program, Israel launched, on 13/6/2025, a sudden, large-scale offensive against Iran, prompting a targeted Iranian response in Operation True Promise 3, which involved roughly 550 missiles and 1,000 drones. The war lasted 12 days. Israel eliminated more than twenty Iranian military commanders and several nuclear scientists, including IRGC commander Hossein Salami and Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri, while the US participated in strikes on

Iranian nuclear sites. As for the Iranian missiles, they reached key Israeli locations, inflicting substantial damage, though Israel sought to downplay its losses. In total, Israel conducted around 1,500 air raids, resulting in 1,604 Iranian deaths and over 5,800 injuries; Israeli sources reported 28 fatalities and 3,238 wounded, with the Israeli Finance Minister estimating the war's cost at roughly \$12 billion.

The Suffering of Prisoners

During 2024 and 2025, the landscape of Israeli arrest operations underwent notable transformations, closely linked to the intensification of resistance against the occupation. Systematic arrests have long represented a consistent component of Israeli policy, serving as a central instrument for undermining Palestinian resistance movements.

By 14/12/2024, Israeli prisons held about 10,300 prisoners. This figure excludes detainees from GS after 7/10/2023, as well as those held in military camps administered by Israel.

Subsequently, by 5/11/2025, the number of prisoners stood at about 9,250, following the release of 3,745 prisoners in two exchange operations conducted during 2025. This total likewise excludes detainees from GS after 7/10/2023 and those held in Israel's military camps. Of those incarcerated, 49 were women, 350 were children, and 6 were PLC members. In terms of geographic distribution, about 9,050 prisoners were from WB, including 400 from East Jerusalem. A further 200 were Palestinians from the 1948 occupied territories, in addition to dozens of Arab detainees of various nationalities. Moreover, 3,368 prisoners were classified as administrative detainees. Over the course of 2024–2025, there were about 21 thousand recorded arrests.

The years 2024 and 2025 were the deadliest for Palestinian prisoners, marked by a sharp escalation in systematic abuse. During this period, detainees were subjected to severe and institutionalized torture, deprived of their most basic rights, and exposed to deliberate starvation, environments conducive to the spread of infectious diseases, as well as extreme cold and intense heat. These violations have been documented by prisoners' advocacy institutions, including the Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, the Palestinian Prisoner's Society, and the Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association—Addameer. According to their records, 86 prisoners and detainees

whose identities have been confirmed died in custody. Of these, 11 died between the beginning of Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the end of 2023, 43 in 2024, and 32 in 2025. Moreover, dozens of detainees from GS remain subject to enforced disappearance. At the same time, Israel continues to withhold the bodies of 94 prisoners, including 83 whose deaths have occurred since the genocide.

During 2024 and 2025, Israel’s legislative system underwent an unprecedented escalation, as the Knesset approved a wide-ranging package of laws and amendments that systematically entrenched the apartheid regime and further institutionalized mechanisms of control and repression targeting the Palestinian people, particularly prisoners and detainees. In total, more than 30 new laws were enacted, bringing the cumulative number of discriminatory Israeli laws to nearly 100. Taken together, these measures provide clear evidence of the structural and methodical character of this discriminatory racial legislative trajectory.

Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons 2022–2025

Year	Total no. of detainees	WB	GS	Serving life sentences	Women	Children
2022	4,700	4,400	200	551	34	150
2023	9,000*	8,520	280*	561	70	200
2024	10,300*	10,100	–	561	89	345
2025	9,250*	9,050	–	113	49	350

*Excluding prisoners from GS after 7/10/2023.

The Peace Process

It has become increasingly evident that the peace process has reached an impasse, and that the longstanding wager on a political settlement culminating in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders now lacks credible foundations. This stems not only from the structural imbalance of power, but also from the nature of the Zionist project, historically rooted in the negation of the other and the rejection of meaningful compromise. Furthermore, sustained US support for Israel’s opposition to Palestinian statehood has deepened this deadlock.

Given current circumstances, it is unlikely that 2026–2027 will witness a serious political trajectory. Rather, the continuation of open conflict and attempts to impose a flawed settlement, producing, at best, a Palestinian entity devoid of sovereignty, seems more probable, unless there is a fundamental shift in the balance of power or in the political structures at the Palestinian, Arab, regional and international levels. The future of the Palestine issue therefore remains open to multiple possibilities, contingent upon the Palestinians' ability to rebuild their national project and leverage regional and international transformations in a world marked by the decline of unipolar dominance and the rise of a more multipolar order. While Israel currently holds a surplus of power, this advantage is far from guaranteed, given its internal and external crises, as well as ongoing regional and international developments that have continued to shape its position, role, sustainability, resilience, and capacity to assert its conditions amid a rapidly changing environment.

Sixth: The Israeli Scene

The Internal Situation

The year 2025 witnessed a renewed and intensified drive for constitutional reforms, exploiting both the ongoing war in GS and the absence of significant public opposition, in contrast to the protests observed in 2023. These developments have transformed Israel from a flawed democracy into a competitive authoritarian system, marked by the systematic undermining of the judiciary, the weakening of legislative authority, the growing assertiveness of the executive, and the complicity, or coerced acquiescence, of the bureaucratic apparatus. President Emeritus of the Supreme Court Aharon Barak said that the system of government is “no longer a liberal democracy,” warning that “Israel has a one-man regime,” namely Benjamin Netanyahu.

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s trial, together with his request for a presidential pardon, has become a central political and societal issue shaping the direction of Israel’s political system and the prospects for upcoming elections. The ruling right-wing coalition has sought to bring the proceedings to an end, whether by attempting to reshape key law enforcement and judicial positions, most notably the government’s legal adviser, or by pursuing a presidential pardon without requiring Netanyahu to admit guilt or withdraw from political life. This effort has been further reinforced by the intervention of US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly called for granting Netanyahu a pardon.

At the same time, the issue of Haredi conscription has resurfaced, deepening political divisions over legislation mandating their military service. The government can no longer postpone this matter without risking a no-confidence vote. Although the Haredi parties have withdrawn from the coalition, they have stopped short of toppling it, instead applying pressure to secure legislation consistent with their demands. Yet the government remains either unable or hesitant to pass legislation conscripting the Haredim, fearing the potential electoral repercussions.

The year 2025 marked the beginning of renewed electoral mobilization, particularly within opposition circles. Most opinion polls suggest that the opposition is poised to win more seats than the parties of the current ruling coalition. Nevertheless, it may lack the capacity to form a government without

the backing of Arab lists. Consequently, debate has emerged over the possible inclusion of an Arab list in the governing coalition, even as the majority of opposition factions remain committed to establishing a Zionist government.


Demographic Indicators

CBS estimated Israel’s population at the end of 2025 at about 10.177 million, including about 7.297 million Jews, or about 71.7% of the population. As for the Arab population, including residents of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, CBS estimated it at about 2.147 million, or about 21.1% of the population. If we exclude the population of East Jerusalem (about 405 thousand) and the Golan (about 25 thousand), the number of Palestinians in the 1948 occupied territories would be about 1.72 million in 2025, or about 16.9% of the population. According to CBS, in 2025 Israel’s population growth rate was about 0.9% among Jews, while it was about 2% among the Arab population.

Population of Israel 2022–2025

Year	Total population	Jews	Arabs (including the population of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights)	Others
2022	9,662,000	7,101,400	2,038,800	521,800
2023	9,914,700	7,153,000	2,067,300	694,400
2024	10,054,800	7,230,200	2,104,100	720,500
2025	10,176,900	7,297,300	2,146,500	733,100

Population of Israel 2022–2025



Israeli authorities maintain a high level of secrecy regarding Jewish emigration from Israel. Evidence suggests that about 550 thousand Jews left during the first six months of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, and many others would consider emigrating if given the opportunity. According to CBS data, which should be treated cautiously due to Israeli policies obscuring true figures of reverse migration, about 83 thousand people left Israel in 2024, and about 69 thousand in 2025.

CBS figures also indicate that about 20,734 immigrants arrived in Israel in 2025, compared with about 31,068 in 2024, reflecting a significant decline linked to Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the erosion of the Israeli Jewish community’s sense of security. This decrease followed a prior surge in Jewish immigration to Israel, with about 74,807 arriving in 2022 and about 46,069 in 2023, largely driven by the migration of Russian and Ukrainian Jews due to the ongoing war.


Number of Jewish Immigrants to Israel 1990–2025

Year	1990–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014
No. of immigrants	609,322	346,997	182,208	86,859	91,129

Year	2015–2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
No. of immigrants	142,640	19,676	25,497	74,807	46,069	31,068	20,734	1,677,006

The following chart shows the evolution of the number of Jewish immigrants to Israel for every five years in the period 1990–2024, except for 2025.

Number of Jewish Immigrants to Israel 1990–2025



On the other hand, the Jewish Agency published a problematic statistical estimate of the global Jewish population for 2024, as inconsistencies appeared in its tables concerning the number of Jews in Israel. Accordingly, the 2023 estimates will be retained, as they appear to be more reliable.

World Jewish Population by Country 2023

Country	US	Israel	France	Canada	UK	Argentina	Russia	Germany	Australia	Other countries	Total
Estimates (thousands)	7,500	7,208	440	398	312	171	132	125	117	380	16,783
Percentage (%)	44.7	42.9	2.6	2.4	1.9	1	0.8	0.7	0.7	2.3	100

Economic Indicators

Israel enjoys an advanced economic position compared with both European standards and those of other Middle Eastern countries. This prosperity, however, is achieved at the expense of the Palestinian population, their land and natural resources. It is further reinforced by US support and influence in the Western world, the absence of formal Arab challenges, and normalization agreements with several Arab states.

In contrast, the escalation of Palestinian resistance has imposed substantial economic costs by destabilizing security, undermining investment opportunities, and increasing expenditures on military operations and reserve mobilization. The effects of Operation al-Aqsa Flood were particularly evident on Israel’s economy during the conflict, resulting in widespread business closures, capital flight, and disruption of key sectors, notably tourism and maritime transport. According to the Israeli website Wasla for Economy and Business, based on government data, about 60 thousand small and medium-sized enterprises were closed in 2024, representing a 50% increase compared to previous years. Moreover, Calcalist reported in September 2024 that institutional investors transferred roughly \$40 billion out of Israel following the outbreak of hostilities with Hamas on 7/10/2023. Among the major funds withdrawing investments were the Norway Wealth Fund, the Danish Teachers’ Pension Fund, and the Irish Strategic Investment Fund (ISIF), alongside divestments by several countries, including Türkiye, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland and others. Furthermore,

the boycott also affected global companies supporting Israel. Starbucks closed about 400 branches in the US, Carrefour exited the Jordanian market, and Coca-Cola reported a 10% decline in sales across the Middle East in Q4/2023. Many other companies also experienced significant losses.

Inbound tourism declined by more than 70% in 2024 compared to 2023, and by over 80–90% compared to 2019, which was considered a peak year for tourism in Israel. Official data from the Israel Hotel Association indicated a 58.8% drop in the number of visitors compared to 2023. In logistical terms, the port of Eilat was severely affected by the Red Sea blockade, with annual revenues falling from about 240 million shekels (about \$76 million) in 2023 to near zero in 2025, according to *Yedioth Ahronoth*.

In 2024, the GDP remained constrained by wartime conditions, rising by only 0.9%, while public debt rose to 68% of GDP compared to 62% at the end of 2023. According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance, the general budget deficit reached about 4.7% of GDP in 2025. According to the Israeli Ministry of Finance, total war expenditures on GS since 7/10/2023 amounted to about \$84.3 billion, while the Bank of Israel estimated the overall cost of the war at about \$100 billion.

The State budget for 2026 is expected to reach about 662 billion shekels (about \$206 billion), with a deficit ceiling of 3.9% of GDP, alongside a notable increase in the defense budget, which is projected at about 112 billion shekels (about \$35 billion), an increase of about 47 billion shekels (about \$15 billion) compared with the 2023 budget prior to the outbreak of the GS war.

According to CBS figures, Israel's GDP reached about 2,006 billion shekels (about \$542 billion) in 2024, and based on the first three quarters of 2025, it is estimated at about 2,061 billion shekels (about \$597 billion) for 2025. Israeli per capita income amounted to about 201,200 shekels (about \$54,400) in 2024, and is projected to reach about 204 thousand shekels (about \$59 thousand) in 2025, based on the first three quarters of 2025, noting the shekel's appreciation against the dollar.

Israeli Ministry of Finance figures show that cumulative expenditure reached about 650.5 billion shekels (\$202 billion) in 2025, compared with about 621.2 billion shekels (\$193 billion) in 2024, and about 516.1 billion shekels

(\$160.5 billion) in 2023. Total revenues, according to the ministry, amounted to about 551.9 billion shekels (\$171.7 billion) in 2025, and about 485 billion shekels (\$150.9 billion) in 2024.

Furthermore, data from the CBS indicate that total expenditures reached about 888.7 billion shekels (\$272.7 billion) in 2024, and about 757.5 billion shekels (\$232.4 billion) in 2023, while revenues amounted to about 726.8 billion shekels (\$223 billion) in 2024, and about 656.2 billion shekels (\$201.4 billion) in 2023.

Despite the agreement to halt the war, its repercussions continued to negatively affect exports and imports. Israeli exports in dollar terms declined by 2.8% in 2025, about 4.9% in 2024, and 12.7% in 2023. Meanwhile, Israeli imports fell by about 3.96% in 2025, about 0.03% in 2024, and 14.7% in 2023.

Total Israeli Exports and Imports 2021–2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)


Year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Exports	60,158.4	72,565.1	63,346.7	60,256.2	58,842
Imports	92,158.8	107,755.6	91,889.9	91,865.5	95,500.5

The US remained Israel’s primary trading partner in 2025, with Israeli exports to the US totaling about \$16.2 billion (27.4% of Israel’s total exports), while Israeli imports from the US amounted to about \$9.5 billion (10% of total Israeli imports). In the same year, China ranked as Israel’s second-largest trading partner, Germany third, and the Netherlands fourth. Switzerland rose from sixth place in 2023 to fifth in 2025, whereas Türkiye fell from fifth in 2023 to 23rd in 2025 due to measures it took to suspend trade relations with Israel in response to its war in GS.


**Israeli Exports and Imports With Selected Countries
2024–2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)**

	Countries	Trade volume		Israeli exports to:		Israeli imports from:	
		2025	2024	2025	2024	2025	2024
1	US	25,677.9	26,348.3	16,150.8	17,122.4	9,527.1	9,225.9
2	China	17,548.7	16,360.5	2,812.3	2,831.4	14,736.4	13,529.1
3	Germany	9,511.9	8,676.8	3,026.8	2,277.7	6,485.1	6,399.1
4	Netherland	6,824	6,486.8	2,663.9	2,702	4,160.1	3,784.8
5	Switzerland	5,855.2	5,185.5	575.8	612.5	5,279.4	4,573
6	Hong Kong	5,130.5	5,833.5	2,009.3	1,984.7	3,121.2	3,848.8
7	Italy	5,039.3	4,633.3	1,285.5	1,183.6	3,753.8	3,449.7
8	UK	4,366.7	4,126	1,499.6	1,527.9	2,867.1	2,598.1
9	Belgium	4,304	4,767.9	1,328.1	1,484.2	2,975.9	3,283.7
10	India	4,290.3	3,901.4	2,454.2	2,211.9	1,836.1	1,689.5
23	Türkiye	935	2,617.7	10.9	598.6	924.1	2,019.1
Other Countries		64,859	63,184	25,024.8	25,719.3	39,834.2	37,464.7
Total		154,342.5	152,121.7	58,842	60,256.2	95,500.5	91,865.5

Israeli Exports to Selected Countries 2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)



Israeli Imports from Selected Countries 2025 at Current Prices (\$ million)



Although Israel is a wealthy and advanced state, it has continued to receive substantial US support, averaging about \$3.1 billion annually from 1979 to 2017. Since 2018, this support has increased to about \$3.8 billion per year, including around \$3.3 billion in military aid. Altogether, Israel has received about \$170.79 billion in US assistance over the period 1949–2025.

However, during its war on GS (October 2023–September 2025), Israel received exceptional US support estimated at about \$21.7 billion by Brown University. In addition, the US provided roughly \$9.65–\$12.07 billion to assist Israel in countering its regional adversaries.

US Foreign Aid to Israel 1949–2025 (\$ million)

Period	1949–1958	1959–1968	1969–1978	1979–1988	1989–1998	1999–2008
Total	599.6	727.8	11,426.5	29,933.9	31,551.9	29,374.7

Period	2009–2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
Total	30,878.2	3,800	3,800	3,800	4,800	3,800	12,500	3,800	170,792.6

Military Indicators

Amid the attritional strain and exhaustion caused by the protracted war on GS and its extension to several additional fronts, the Israeli army faced two principal dilemmas during 2024–2025. The first was a severe manpower shortage of about 12 thousand soldiers, including 9 thousand combat troops and 3 thousand in support roles, compounded by a declining willingness among young Israelis to join combat units. Reports indicate that over 100 thousand reservists ceased their service.

The psychological impact of the war has been evident in the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among Israeli soldiers, where Israel’s Defence Ministry says it has recorded a nearly 40% increase in PTSD cases amongst its soldiers since September 2023, and predicts the figure will increase by 180% by 2028. According to the same ministry, roughly 60% of the 22,300 soldiers receiving treatment for war-related injuries suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. Military suicides have also increased, rising from 17 cases in 2023 to 21 in 2024 and 22 in 2025.

The second dilemma concerns the conscription of Haredi Jews, a central point of contention in Israeli society and was noted earlier.

Amid the failure to achieve several strategic objectives in the war on GS, deep divisions emerged between the military and political institutions regarding the conduct and continuation of the war. The military repeatedly

recommended ending the war and pursuing a prisoner exchange, warning that continuing without a clear timeline or political resolution would undermine the gains already achieved. This approach was supported by Defense Minister Yoav Galant, who also called for the establishment of an official inquiry into the failures during Operation al-Aqsa Flood and for advancing the recruitment of Haredi Jews. This stance ultimately led to his dismissal on 5/11/2024, with Yisrael Katz appointed as his successor.

As for Herzi Halevi, he stepped down as Chief of General Staff, succeeded by Eyal Zamir on 6/3/2025, reflecting the political leadership's efforts to consolidate control over the military.

Regarding Israel's military budget, it reached about \$48.93 billion in 2024 based on actual expenditures, with \$31.8 billion allocated to the Ministry of Defense in the 2025 general budget.

Despite the ongoing war on GS in 2024–2025, military supplies continued to flow into Israel. By 19/11/2025, the Ministry of Defense reported the receipt of 120 thousand tons of equipment and ammunition via 1,000 aircraft and roughly 250 ships.

Israeli military exports, according to the Israeli Ministry of Defense, reached about \$14.8 billion in 2024, up from \$13 billion in 2023.

Seventh: The Palestine Issue and the Arab World

Between 2024 and 2025, the Arab position on the Palestine issue was marked, as usual, by weakness and ineffectiveness. Yet, the genocidal war waged by Israel on GS during this period, met with strong resistance and remarkable popular steadfastness, exposed a critical dimension of this stance: an unprecedented official abandonment in the history of the struggle against the Zionist project. Some Arab regimes were complicit in besieging the resistance, attempting to distort its image, obstructing popular mobilization in support of Palestine, and even maintaining political and commercial ties that facilitated Israeli access to essential resources through their territories.

The Escalation of the Arab National Security Threat

Israeli programs of Judaization and annexation, coupled with displacement initiatives and the imposition of inhospitable living conditions in WB and GS, have posed strategic risks not only to Palestine but also to the surrounding environment, particularly Egypt and Jordan. These threats compelled these states, with Arab consensus, to adopt decisive measures against forced displacement. Furthermore, Israeli security doctrine has evolved significantly over time: from deterrence through threat to deterrence through destruction, then to precautionary destruction. Simultaneously, attempts to reshape the Arab and Islamic environment according to Israeli security criteria, rather than adapting Israel to the region's environment, have intensified threats to the national security of neighboring states. This strategy has increased the risk of direct Israeli intervention in their internal affairs and the lives of their populations, reflecting the concept of “securitizing people’s lives,” which seeks to regulate daily life according to Israeli standards. While Israel continued its sustained aggression against Lebanon and Syria, its operations extended to Yemen, Tunisia and Qatar. Simultaneously, it pressured Arab states, with US support, to suppress movements backing the resistance, curtail their political and media activity, and prevent fundraising for GS and Palestine, measures to which these states responded to varying degrees.

Arab Summits

The official Arab position maintained its traditional approach to the Palestine issue, emphasizing support for the peace process, the two-state solution, and the leadership of the PLO and the PA. The 33rd Arab Summit, held in Bahrain on 16/5/2024, reaffirmed these positions, calling for an end to the war in GS and the convening of an international “peace” conference in the Middle East. The Arab Extraordinary on Palestine, convened in Cairo on 4/3/2025 to address the Israeli-US displacement plans targeting the people of GS, presented a plan for the reconstruction of GS and measures to prevent forced displacement. The 34th Arab Summit, held in Baghdad on 17/5/2025, reaffirmed the centrality of the Palestine issue, condemned displacement, and emphasized the provision of aid and the opening of crossings. Furthermore, an Arab-Islamic Emergency Summit in Qatar on 15/9/2025 declared solidarity with Qatar, condemned Israeli aggression against it, and called for a unified stance against the genocidal campaign that Israel is conducting in GS.

Support for the Peace Process

The Arab states made considerable efforts at the international level to advance the peace process, with Saudi Arabia, in coordination with France, leading the organization of the High-Level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, in New York, on 28–30/7/2025. This initiative reinforced momentum, as a significant bloc of European countries and Israel’s traditional allies pledged, and later followed through, on recognizing the State of Palestine. Nonetheless, the New York Declaration, while including Arab participation, condemned Hamas and called for its disarmament. It further stipulated that Palestinian elections in WB and GS be restricted to those adhering to the Oslo Accords and the peace process, effectively excluding resistance factions, which consistently enjoy higher popular support according to public opinion polls. This framework thus intensified internal Palestinian tensions while simultaneously conceding to Israel’s conditions.

Mediation Efforts to Stop the War

Egypt and Qatar undertook significant mediation efforts to halt the war on GS, secure a prisoner exchange, facilitate Israeli withdrawal, allow humanitarian aid, and support reconstruction. These efforts, coordinated with the US, initially succeeded when the agreement came into effect on 19/1/2025. However, Israel refused to enter the second phase of the agreement and, after about two months, resumed its fierce aggression against GS. Despite Israel targeting Qatar, both Qatar and Egypt continued their mediation efforts, ultimately securing a new ceasefire on 9/10/2025 under US pressure and with Türkiye's support. The endorsement of Trump's plan for GS by eight Arab and Muslim countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the UAE, Türkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia) played a central role in constraining the resistance. While the plan's first component addressed ending the war, exchanging prisoners and facilitating aid, its essence has imposed US oversight over GS, undermined Palestinian sovereignty, and restricted their capacity to manage institutions and make independent decisions. It effectively conditioned Israeli withdrawal, cessation of attacks and the opening of crossings on Israeli-determined criteria. Several Arab states also participated in Trump's Board of Peace (BoP), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, Jordan and Bahrain, aiming to support de-escalation and guide the plan to minimize harm to GS residents. Nevertheless, the plan's provisions and the powers granted to Trump and Israel left limited room for maneuver.

The normalization states maintained their political relations with Israel, despite some recalling their ambassadors, and continued to pursue commercial ties, with notable engagement from the UAE, Egypt and Jordan. By contrast, the normalization process with Saudi Arabia stalled, as Riyadh conditioned progress on Israel's acceptance of a two-state solution.

At the same time, the preoccupation of several Arab states with domestic crises, such as in Sudan, Libya, Syria and Somalia, diminished their capacity to support the Palestine issue effectively.

Selected Positions of Arab States

Egypt maintained its commitment to the peace process and its relations with Israel. While political ties remained limited, commercial relations, particularly gas agreements, expanded notably. Egypt played a central role in efforts to halt Israel's war on GS, hosting key mediators' meetings and negotiations, and took a firm stance against proposals to forcibly displace Palestinians from GS, deeming them a threat to its national security. Moreover, Egypt supported the two-state solution and the leadership of the PLO and the PA in Ramallah, facilitating reconciliation among Palestinian factions, sponsoring inter-factional dialogue, and assisting in the training of thousands of Palestinian police to assume future security responsibilities in GS. At the same time, the Egyptian government faced criticism for closing the Rafah crossing, failing to exert pressure to lift the blockade, complicating aid delivery and the evacuation of patients and the wounded, and for restricting popular public engagement in response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood.

Jordan experienced significant public mobilization in response to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, with thousands of demonstrations over the year and a half following the operation, accompanied by donation campaigns, gatherings, sit-ins and boycotts of Israeli and US products. These actions represented some of the most prominent expressions of popular Arab engagement. Nevertheless, the authorities curtailed this activism by banning the Muslim Brothers (MB) Movement in Jordan in April 2025 and arresting several individuals on charges related to weapons possession, attempts to carry out operations against Israel, and illicit fundraising... Furthermore, relations between the Jordanian state and Hamas remained strained throughout this period. Jordan acted decisively against any initiatives to forcibly displace Palestinians, regarding them as a threat to its national security. Concurrently, reports indicated that commercial ties with Israel persisted and that Jordan continued to serve as a transit route for Israeli-bound food and essential supplies transported overland from the UAE.

Hizbullah's active role in Operation al-Aqsa Flood (see Section Five: Aggression and Resistance) reverberated across Lebanon's internal politics. The party focused on reorganizing its leadership, military structure and popular base while maintaining its arsenal and commitment to the resistance line, avoiding open conflict with Israel and prioritizing reconstruction. At the same

time, the Lebanese state recalibrated its political landscape with the election of former army commander Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of a government led by Nawaf Salam. Despite intense external pressure to compel the government to disarm the resistance, and with certain internal Lebanese actors advocating the same, the government sought to avoid internal confrontation, focusing instead on Israel's withdrawal, reconstruction and national consensus. Coordinated steps with Hizbullah enabled partial disarmament, particularly south of the Litani River, alongside measures to disarm Palestinian factions outside the RCs.

The Syrian revolution, which culminated in the overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024, generated significant Israeli and Western concern owing to its Islamic orientation. In response, Israeli forces rapidly destroyed most of the Syrian army's weapons and military equipment before the new authorities were able to secure them. Concurrently, the Israeli army occupied about 500 km² in the border areas, capitalizing on the fragile and transitional state of the new regime, which faces substantial challenges in consolidating control over Syrian territory, addressing separatist trends and armed insurgency, stabilizing the economy, and achieving the lifting of Western sanctions.

The new Syrian regime deliberately avoided direct confrontation with Israel, notwithstanding Israel's efforts to provoke it, support Druze and Kurdish separatist initiatives, and impose its own security conditions. Concurrently, the regime adopted a notably flexible political posture that aligned with the broader Arab consensus. Although both direct and indirect contacts took place with the Israeli side, the regime consistently affirmed Syria's territorial unity, while expressing no principled objection to mutually agreed security arrangements. Moreover, it moved against Palestinian factions previously aligned with the former Syrian regime and refrained from establishing direct relations with Hamas. At the same time, Palestinian refugees retained their legal rights and were able to return freely to the areas and RCs from which they had been displaced or had departed during the war.

Yemen has offered a notable model of support for Palestine, including direct involvement in military actions against Israeli aggression (see Section Five: Israeli Aggression and Palestinian Resistance). This reflected a strong alignment between political leadership and widespread popular backing for Palestine and its resistance. Despite enduring over 2,800 Israeli, US and British airstrikes,

hundreds of killed, and extensive infrastructural damage, Yemen sustained its support for the resistance until the ceasefire. Even amid severe domestic challenges and deep internal divisions, Palestine remained the unifying cause for the Yemeni people.

Popular Response

Arab publics mobilized extensively around the Palestine issue, particularly in the context of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. This mobilization was most evident where political space allowed for public expression. Thousands of demonstrations were held across Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Kuwait and Syria, with especially large, indeed, million-strong, rallies in Yemen. In parallel, wide-ranging grassroots initiatives emerged to collect donations and to boycott Israeli and US goods in these countries, as well as in Oman and Algeria. Nevertheless, several governments in 2025 tightened restrictions on charitable work and fundraising, notably in Kuwait and Jordan.

Future Prospects

Arab efforts are likely to concentrate on rehabilitating the PA to restore its governance over GS, primarily through political backing and financial support from Gulf states.

Arab countries, led by Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan, are expected to advocate for implementing the Trump plan to end hostilities in GS and to expedite the second phase, which encompasses reconstruction and the reorganization of the Strip's political and security structures, without conditioning progress on Hamas' disarmament. While Arab states do not oppose disarming Hamas and other resistance factions in principle, they will seek a mechanism acceptable to Hamas, simultaneously redefining the mandate of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) to focus exclusively on "peacekeeping" and monitoring the ceasefire.

Pressures are likely to mount for Hizbullah's disarmament in Lebanon, linked to Israel's withdrawal; however, Hizbullah is expected to resist. Efforts will instead aim to secure an arrangement that maintains calm, preserves Lebanese state sovereignty, and avoids internal conflict. Concurrently, Israel and the US will seek to weaken the Houthi movement and may attempt targeted

assassinations of its leadership, yet the Houthis have shown resilience and a continued capacity to support Palestine and resistance even under extreme conditions.


The normalization process may face setbacks due to Israel’s growing drive for regional dominance, the enforcement of its security priorities, and its reluctance to make concessions on a two-state solution, alongside policies displacing Palestinians within Israel. These developments are likely to heighten Arab states’ awareness of threats to their national security, making them more cautious and measured in advancing the peace process.

According to CBS data, trade relations between Israel and the Arab states that have normalized relations with it remained largely unaffected by Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Notably, these states did not impose any meaningful measures or sanctions against Israel in response to its war on GS. In 2025, the UAE accounted for about 70.4% of total Arab trade with Israel, a share it had largely maintained throughout 2023–2024. Furthermore, Israel’s trade with Egypt, Jordan and Morocco recorded overall growth during the 2023–2025 period, except for Bahrain, whose exports to Israel surged in 2024 before returning to their previous levels. The following table illustrates Israel’s trade relations with normalized Arab states.


**Israeli Exports and Imports with Normalized Arab Countries
2023–2025 (\$ million)**

Country	Israeli exports to:			Israeli imports from:		
	2025	2024	2023	2025	2024	2023
Egypt	202.6	304.5	258.5	357.9	274.4	182.7
Jordan	96.6	108.3	76	541	368.5	371.8
Morocco	115.7	95	62.5	12.5	14.4	16.2
UAE	634.1	500.8	626.6	2,574.9	2,753.3	2,316.3
Bahrain	7.5	6.3	3.4	13.7	102.2	8.1

Israeli Exports to Normalized Arab Countries 2024–2025 (\$ million)



Israeli Imports from Normalized Arab Countries 2024–2025 (\$ million)



Eighth: The Palestine Issue and the Muslim World

The PSR examines the conditions of the Palestine issue and the broader Muslim world, with a particular focus on the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), while analyzing the roles of the two regional actors, Türkiye and Iran. It also investigates the dynamics of popular engagement with the Palestine issue and the processes of normalization.

Türkiye

During 2024–2025, Türkiye’s official stance on the war in GS gradually evolved, reflecting support for Palestinian rights and condemnation of Israeli crimes through economic, security, diplomatic and legal measures. Relations with Israel shifted from criticism to perceived threat, eventually leading to indirect confrontations, particularly in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, where Israel targeted bases that Ankara had considered for troop deployment. Furthermore, Türkiye progressively curtailed its trade relations with Israel, ultimately bringing them to a complete halt in May 2025. Concurrently, it allowed public mobilization, including demonstrations and fundraising campaigns in support of the Palestine issue. Furthermore, it hosted several Hamas leaders.

As Türkiye became more engaged in the negotiation process and joined the guarantors of the ceasefire, it signaled willingness to contribute to the ISF, a position blocked by an Israeli veto and understood by the US.

Looking ahead to 2026, Türkiye’s relations with Hamas and the Palestinian side are unlikely to change significantly, as Ankara will likely continue its efforts to “persuade” Hamas to adopt a more flexible stance on the next stages of the Trump plan. At the same time, a resolution of the crisis between Türkiye and Israel remains unlikely, despite US attempts to mediate. Nonetheless, the Knesset elections could create a window for a relative easing of tensions if they result in Netanyahu’s defeat.

Iran

Operation al-Aqsa Flood brought the Palestine issue to the forefront of regional and international attention while simultaneously making Iran a target

of US–Israeli pressures and threats. These pressures risked escalating into the first direct confrontation between Iran and Israel since the 1979 revolution.

Iran’s objectives have been to support Operation al-Aqsa Flood, affirm the Palestinian people’s right to resist, and simultaneously work toward a ceasefire and an end to the massacres in GS.

Iranian positions directly challenged Western policies, which had intensified sanctions and pressure over its nuclear program. Nevertheless, Iran continued negotiating with the US and European states while seeking to avoid military confrontation it believed Israel sought to provoke, a strategy known as “strategic patience,” maintained for several years. However, for the first time, Iran departed from this approach, launching Operations True Promise 1 and 2, marking the start of an unprecedented phase of direct confrontation with Israel. Despite this, Iran sought to prevent escalation into a full-scale war. In June 2025, Israel launched a sudden offensive, for which it had apparently been preparing for years, prompting Iran’s response in what became known as the 12-Day War, while the US simultaneously struck three Iranian nuclear facilities in support of Israel.

Iran endorsed the components of President Trump’s plan relating to a ceasefire in GS, the entry of humanitarian aid, the prevention of displacement and a prisoner exchange. Nevertheless, it has maintained its firm commitment to supporting the resistance and to upholding the Palestinian people’s right to liberate their land and exercise sovereignty over it. At the same time, it continues to reject recognition of Israel.

Iran is facing mounting pressure aimed at depriving it of its nuclear and missile capabilities and curbing its support for the resistance, amid growing speculation about the possibility of war and attempts to foment internal unrest. However, Tehran remains resolute in defending its sovereignty and its military and technological rights. It is therefore likely to seek to navigate these challenges by deepening trust-based relations with key states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye, enhancing its defensive capabilities to deter potential war and supporting parties within the Axis of Resistance. Simultaneously, it remains prepared to negotiate on its nuclear program without preconditions.

Popular Mobilization


Across the Muslim world, there was substantial popular engagement with the Palestine issue, particularly in reaction to the massacres committed by the Israeli occupation. This was accompanied by pronounced expressions of support for Hamas, the resistance forces, and the popular base, whose conduct was widely perceived as a source of inspiration for Muslims globally. Thousands of demonstrations were organized in most Muslim countries, at times reaching “million-strong” proportions, as seen in Türkiye, Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, etc. These protests were complemented by fundraising campaigns, boycotts of Israeli and US goods, participation in flotillas seeking to break the blockade, and a range of media, cultural and political initiatives. However, such mobilization remained below these societies’ potential capacities and was largely episodic; intensifying in response to major developments and gradually waning over time. In parallel, the official policies of many Muslim countries continued to align with those of Arab governments supportive of the peace process.

The following table presents Israel’s trade relations with a number of Muslim countries 2023–2025 (\$ millions):


**Israeli Trade Volume with a Number of Muslim Countries
2023–2025 (\$ millions)**

Country	Israeli exports to:			Israeli imports from:		
	2025	2024	2023	2025	2024	2023
Türkiye	10.9	598.6	1,554.4	924.1	2,019.1	4,607.6
Nigeria	23	27.9	21.2	7.1	10.6	5.9
Azerbaijan	345.3	239.2	179	15.4	7.3	3.8
Kazakhstan	55.1	44.9	71.7	10.9	7.7	5.2
Indonesia	27.3	49.7	36.8	105.6	61.5	59.2
Malaysia	16.5	22.8	25.3	5.2	6	10.4

Israeli Exports to Some Muslim Countries 2024–2025 (\$ million)



Israeli Imports from Some Muslim Countries 2024–2025 (\$ million)



Ninth: The Palestine Issue and the International Situation

The Palestine issue dominated the global agenda throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the Israeli aggression on GS (2023–2025), garnering unprecedented sympathy for Palestine and its people across states, societies, and international institutions. The Palestinian narrative resonated widely in circles that might not otherwise have engaged with it, driven by the visible Israeli brutality and the remarkable Palestinian resilience, including among youth, university students in the US and the West, artists, athletes and others. In contrast, the Israeli narrative, particularly regarding the legitimacy of its existence, its claimed right to self-defense, its image as a democratic haven, and its stance against anti-Semitism, largely lost credibility.

International Institutions

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) consistently voted overwhelmingly in favor of a two-state solution, rejecting Israeli settlement expansion in WB, GS and the Golan, and emphasizing the need to halt the war on GS and facilitate humanitarian assistance. This broad support for Palestine signaled Israel’s growing international isolation, rendering it increasingly a “pariah” state. At the UN Security Council (UNSC), there was near-universal support for Palestine; however, the repeated use of the US veto, employed six times, continued to obstruct the adoption of effective resolutions.

The UN conference held from 28–30/7/2025, convened by France and Saudi Arabia, provided a platform to advance the Palestinian state project and call for an end to the war on GS. This initiative was reinforced in the UNGA’s New York statement on 12/9/2025. The conference notably emphasized the disarmament of Hamas and other resistance forces, as well as compliance with the Oslo Accords and PLO commitments. Moreover, international momentum continued throughout Operation al-Aqsa Flood, reaching its peak in the summer of 2025, when several Western countries, either traditional allies of Israel or maintaining strong ties with it, recognized the State of Palestine, including the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Norway, Ireland and Luxembourg. This brought the total number of countries recognizing Palestine to 159.

Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) continued the case brought by South Africa against Israel for committing genocide in GS, joined by numerous other states. While a final judgment may take considerable time, the court has issued several rulings and recommendations, including a declaration that Israel's occupation of WB and GS is illegal and a call for cooperation with UN agencies to facilitate humanitarian access... At the same time, the International Criminal Court (ICC) pursued the case filed by five states against Israel for violations of Palestinian rights, issuing arrest warrants for Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gallant on charges of crimes against humanity.

The United States

The US consistently aligned with Israel during its war on GS, leveraging its global influence and international cover to prevent any measures that might compel Israel to halt the attacks, withdraw, or implement international resolutions. It supplied Israel with about 100 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition used in the campaign of widespread killing and destruction in GS, a pattern evident under both Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump. The US also supported Israel in its regional confrontations in Lebanon, Iran, Yemen and Syria. In addition to blocking UNSC resolutions, it withheld support from decisions of international legal bodies such as the ICJ and ICC and dismissed reports from both governmental and non-governmental organizations condemning Israel for violations of international law and human rights. The Trump administration further denied entry visas to the President of the PA, despite the PA's adherence to the peace process and close security cooperation with Israel in pursuing resistance members in WB.

In contrast, the US witnessed widespread popular mobilization in support of the Palestine issue, including thousands of demonstrations and significant activism by university students across more than one hundred campuses. This surge in grassroots advocacy prompted US authorities to adopt repressive measures against activists, even as public support for Israel reached historically low levels.

The Trump Plan

Although the Trump plan announced on 29/9/2025 addressed urgent humanitarian Palestinian needs, most notably halting Israel’s war on GS, facilitating humanitarian aid, and preventing the displacement of civilians, alongside vague promises of a timeline for Israeli withdrawal, it entirely disregarded the core issue of the conflict: the Palestinian people’s right to their land, sovereignty over it, and the election of their leadership through free will. The plan effectively maintained a disguised Israeli occupation, placed GS under US oversight, undermined Palestinian legitimacy, and sought to disarm the resistance. The plan further attempted to institutionalize this oversight through the BoP, chaired by Trump; the Executive Board, to be managed by former UN Middle East Envoy Nickolay Mladenov; and the so-called ISF, which the US aimed to use to disarm the resistance. The plan contained inherent risks of failure, whether due to Israel’s insistence on imposing its agenda without fulfilling commitments or the resistance’s and Palestinian people’s refusal to disarm... It also conflicted with efforts by Palestinians, together with Arab and Muslim countries and most other countries, to secure a meaningful and effective role for Palestinian leadership in administering GS as part of the PA’s territory. Furthermore, most major and influential states declined to participate in the BoP, which Trump sought to expand its authority beyond the UN and its institutions and extend its mandate to other global issues.

Europe

Meanwhile, European policy increasingly leaned toward endorsing the two-state solution, implementing certain trade sanctions and arms embargo, and expanding support for granting Palestine full UN membership. There was also a marked shift away from the prior stance of cutting aid to UNRWA, with some countries even increasing assistance. Several European states recognized decisions of the ICJ and ICC, while criticism intensified regarding settlement expansion in WB and the excessive use of force, destruction, starvation and displacement in GS. In addition, popular mobilizations, evidenced by more than 46 thousand pro-Palestine demonstrations in Europe during the GS war, and the widespread use of social media significantly boosted support for

the Palestine issue, increasing Israel’s international isolation and pressuring governments to take concrete action. Countries such as Spain, Ireland, Norway, Belgium and Italy assumed particularly clear positions in expressing solidarity with Palestine.

China and Russia

China maintained a consistent policy toward the Palestine issue, prioritizing a pragmatic, peace-oriented approach to international relations. It called for an end to the fighting in GS, the protection of civilians, opposition to the forced displacement and starvation of Palestinians, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and post-conflict reconstruction. China also endorsed a two-state solution and hosted a conference to support Palestinian reconciliation, as noted previously. At the same time, it remained Israel’s second-largest trading partner after the US. While China criticized US conduct on the Palestine issue, it did not challenge the BoP. As for Russia, its stance largely mirrored China’s, supporting a two-state solution, calling for a cessation of hostilities in GS, advocating civilian protection, hosting a reconciliation conference, and criticizing US policy. Both countries, however, were careful to avoid direct confrontation with the US.

Other Countries

South Africa and Brazil assumed prominent roles in supporting the Palestine issue. South Africa led efforts to criminalize Israeli aggression in GS and filed a case accusing Israel of committing genocide. Popular support for Palestine also grew in Japan, which remained committed to a two-state solution, while India voted in favor of the two-state solution in the New York Declaration on 12/9/2025, despite its close ties with Israel. Several South American countries adopted strong stances, most notably Colombia, severing diplomatic relations with Israel and preparing to deploy 20 thousand troops to confront the Israeli occupation.

Future Prospects

In the foreseeable future, the US, through the Trump plan and the BoP, is expected to increase pressure on the Palestinian side, particularly regarding the disarmament of resistance groups and the dismantling of their structures. It will also seek to marginalize the two-state solution, effectively emptying it of its substance, while expanding normalization efforts and advancing Abraham Accords–style agreements. In parallel, the US will exert significant efforts to obstruct the work of the ICJ and ICC and to prevent any practical measures against Israel.

Conversely, although international sympathy for the Palestine issue may wane, the effects of Operation al-Aqsa Flood will endure in the global arena. Israel will continue to face international isolation and diplomatic cooling, potentially requiring many years to restore its image. Furthermore, the declining international standing of the US, its domestic challenges, the rise of a multipolar world order, and growing European disapproval of Israeli actions will constrain Israel’s ability to impose its policies in the region, while simultaneously fostering Palestinian, regional and international conditions with reasonable prospects to challenge the Zionist project.

Summary
of
The Palestine Strategic Report
2024 - 2025



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations
مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات

P.O. Box: 14-5034 Beirut - Lebanon

Tel: +961 21 803 644 | Tel-Fax: +961 21 803 643

info@alzaytouna.net | www.alzaytouna.net

