Academic Paper

The Palestine Issue between Geopolitical Transformation and Geostrategic Transformation

Prof. Dr. Walid ʻAbd al-Hay

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Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

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Prof. Dr. Walid ʻAbd al-Hay[1]

Introduction

There is a degree of confusion in Arab political literature, particularly in media discourse, between three concepts whose dimensions overlap yet differ in their principal defining variable. These concepts are as follows:[2]

1. The concept of geopolitics views the state as an organic entity that expands, contracts and evolves geographically, shaping its interactions with other political units as its territory changes. This dynamic also affects the future of the political entity. For example, Tsarist Russia in 1547 encompassed approximately 3 million km²; by 1590, it had grown to 14.5 million km². With the rise of the Soviet Union, its territory reached 22.4 million km², but following the union's dissolution, it contracted to its current size of 17.1 million km² as the Russian Federation. Including the areas it controlled in Ukraine, the total reaches roughly 17.3 million km². Each expansion or contraction reflects the interaction between a state's domestic and foreign policies and its geographic conditions, illustrating the influence of politics on geography.

2. The concept of political geography is concerned with the reciprocal influence between the natural, demographic or economic characteristics of a geographical unit and its political behavior. For example, Afghanistan is a landlocked country, so it is natural that it would not consider building a fleet for either commercial or military purposes. Similarly, Nepal is also landlocked and is surrounded by two of the most populous countries in the world, which compels it to maintain a delicate balance between these giants or submit to necessity. In contrast, Egypt is a maritime country with a large population, yet most of its geography, approximately 96%, is desert, which shapes its political behavior. Would Turkey's approach toward Iraq and Syria be the same if the Tigris and Euphrates rivers did not exist? Would it remain unchanged if the region did not have a Kurdish population? These questions underscore the profound influence of geography on political behavior.

3. Geostrategy focuses on the importance of a location or region in determining the strategic value of a place within the framework of international or regional competition. From this perspective, can China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) be implemented without the Arab world? Can the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) be realized without the Arab region? Can the strategic value of the subregion in the Gulf be considered independently of oil as an energy source? In this way, geographical location emerges as a central determinant of a region's strategic value in its interaction with the international community.

In summary:

1. Political geography is an academic field that examines the role of place in shaping political behavior and structures, such as the influence of a river's course on the delineation of state boundaries with neighboring countries.

2. Geopolitics involves interpreting how political orientations, ideologies and the nature of political systems affect geography, for example, the pursuit of control over the Gulf region to dominate global oil trade.

3. Geostrategy considers geography as a strategic variable in formulating a state's overarching objectives, such as the decisions of major powers to establish military bases in specific regions rather than others.

In summary, geography shapes political behavior, as exemplified by landlocked countries, while politics can also reshape geography, as seen in imperial expansion. Together, these factors determine the strategic value of a region or state. These three dimensions will serve as the framework for examining the interactions surrounding the Palestine issue.

First: The Arab World and Transformations in the Three Dimensions


Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Arab geography constitutes the natural framework for the interactions surrounding the Palestine issue. The Balfour Declaration, for instance, was not issued without recognition of the strategic value of Palestine's geographical location within the context of British ambitions, as reflected in official British documents.[3] With the continuous changes in international, regional and state-level political structures, most of these levels have found it necessary to adapt their strategic orientations to such shifts. However, it is crucial to understand that this adaptation has increasingly relied on external variables at the expense of internal ones in analyzing policies of adjustment to all changes. This implies that while geography has in some respects been negatively affected by technological developments, it has gained importance in other aspects, particularly under the pressures of globalization. Since James Rosenau's study,[4] the literature has tended to regard "the identity of a political entity as determined more by its network of external relations than by its internal characteristics." This means that a state's adaptation policies reshape its strategic objectives, resulting in four forms of adaptation to geopolitical and geostrategic transformations, which define its interaction with the international environment:

1. **Acquiescent adaptation** occurs when external demands, whether regional or international, are prioritized over domestic ones. A clear example is the acceptance of Arab normalization with Israel, even though the vast majority of Arab populations opposed this policy.

2. **Intransigent adaptation** arises when domestic demands outweigh external pressures. This is evident in the growing influence of political Islam in the Arab region since 1979, which served as a mechanism to resist or mitigate foreign influence on internal affairs.

3. **Promotive adaptation** involves balancing pressures while retaining a degree of autonomy in choosing the mode of response. This can be seen in the participation of some Arab states in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) organization or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

4. **Preservative adaptation** refers to the use of both internal and external variables to maintain the status quo. An example is the acceptance of long-standing geographical boundaries in accordance with treaties among the concerned parties.

Second: Studying Change and Adaptation in the Three Geographical Dimensions of Arab Political Behavior and Their Strategic Impact

Transformations in geographical features, together with their political and strategic dimensions, inevitably require corresponding patterns of adaptation, as outlined above. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for example, compels adaptive responses from both Egypt and Sudan. Similarly, the continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights necessitates strategic adjustment on the part of Syria. In the same vein, the presence of Kurdish minorities along the peripheral regions of the Syrian and Iraqi states requires a mode of adaptation appropriate to the nature of this interaction, etc. Collectively, these cases underscore the necessity of taking the following considerations into account:

1. Methodologically: It is crucial to distinguish analytically between an event, a sub-trend, a trend, and a mega-trend. This differentiation can be illustrated by the early clandestine bilateral meetings between Arab actors and Israeli figures before and after the establishment of Israel. As the number of Arab parties engaged in secret contacts gradually expanded, a sub-trend gradually emerged. Subsequently, the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty in 1979 led to a significant expansion of cooperative frameworks between Arab states and Israel across multiple sectors, thereby elevating the sub-trend into a broader and more consolidated trend. This evolution, in turn, laid the groundwork for the emergence of a mega-trend, characterized by a transition from zero-sum relations between Arabs and Israel to non-zero-sum relations.[5] As a result, a significant portion of Arab political orientation has shifted geographically from a focus on Palestine toward a focus on Iran, accompanied by a relative decline in Egypt's strategic standing. This development constituted a

serious geostrategic transformation that cast long shadows over the network of Arab and international interactions in the region, particularly with regard to the Palestine issue. Notably, this outcome has long represented a strategic objective that Israel has pursued with determination.

2. The forces of Arab mechanical cohesion, upon which the theories of Arab nationalism and Arab unity were originally constructed, have experienced a marked decline in favor of the growing prominence of organic forms of cohesion. This shift is reflected in the expanding political, economic and technological relations with Israel and with non-Arab states. Consequently, geographical proximity, which theories of international political integration identify as a central variable, has not played a decisive role in consolidating Arab economic integration policies.[6] For instance, the proportion of non-Arab labor in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states exceeds that of Arab labor.[7] Moreover, as trade, economic and technological ties expand and as institutional interdependence deepens among Arab, Israel and Western actors in the management of everyday affairs, the relative weight of traditional Arab mechanical bonds such as religion, nationalism, shared language and common history continues to erode. By comparison, intra-European Union trade accounted for approximately 61% of total EU trade in 2025, whereas intra-Arab trade remains limited to roughly 12–13%.[8]Taken together, these patterns suggest that the geoeconomic dimension has increasingly overshadowed the geopolitical variable. This, in turn, has produced a further geostrategic shift that contributes to the continued marginalization of the Palestinian dimension within Arab policy orientations.

3. The absence of a central regional power, the Arab regional state historically represented by Egypt, has coincided with the rise of three competing powers: Israel, Türkiye and Iran, diminishing Egypt's regional influence. Gamal Hamdan's theory of the [strategic] "Genius of Place"[9] sheds light on the link between geography and a state's international political standing. According to Hamdan, Egypt lost a quarter of its value with the establishment of Israel, half of its value after the 1967 defeat, and its full value following the Camp David Accords. Today, Egypt ranks 113th globally.[10] Considering that 52 UN member states have populations of no more than one million, effectively marginal states, it follows that Egypt occupies a relatively low position in international standing among the 141 non-marginal states. This reflects a diminished recognition of the strategic value of its geographical position, with negative repercussions for Arab strategy both regionally and globally, including in relation to the Palestine issue. Therefore, Egypt's current policies cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the country's loss of a strategy that effectively capitalizes on the strategic advantages of its geography.

4. International geostrategic shifts and their implications for Arab strategies: The year 1979 represents a critical turning point in the Middle East, marked by profound political transformations that reverberated across the Arab world at local, regional and international levels. These developments had a direct and significant impact on the Palestine issue, influencing it across the four dimensions previously outlined, as detailed below:

- a. The Iranian Revolution, which culminated in February 1979, generated a complex set of repercussions, both negative and positive. Negatively, it intensified sectarian

conflicts and reshaped regional perceptions of political Islam and its role. Positively, it precipitated shifts in regional and international alliance structures involving Middle Eastern states, accompanied by a heightened emphasis on the Palestine issue within Iranian political discourse. It is sufficient to note that the subsequent rise of jihadist political Islam was not disconnected from the broader repercussions of the Iranian Revolution. The year 1979 marked a critical juncture in the growing appeal of jihadist orientations in their diverse interpretations. This period saw the emergence of several organizations, including the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ) 1980, Hizbullah 1982 and Hamas 1987. With the rise of al-Qaeda in 1988, an Islamic movement began to take shape that sought to relocate the conflict to geographies beyond Palestine, in parallel with the environment generated by the Soviet–Afghan war. In this context, the Iran–Iraq War, together with the phenomenon of the "Arab Afghans," contributed, albeit in relative terms, to a geostrategic reorientation that shifted the epicenter of conflict away from Palestine.[11]

- b. Chadli Bendjedid assumed power in Algeria in 1979 and initiated a trajectory of domestic reforms. The most salient outcome of this process materialized a decade later, with the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the subsequent outbreak of the Algerian civil war. Although Algeria had long been among the most significant supporters of the Palestine issue, the confrontation with FIS generated some apprehensions toward Palestinian jihadist groups. This, in turn, elevated the geographical dimension as a constraining factor, "relatively" reducing Algeria's engagement in Palestinian affairs, especially when compared with the marginal role of geographical considerations during the presidency of Houari Boumediene.[12]

- c. The Egyptian–Israeli Treaty of March 1979: This treaty marked a profound transformation in official Arab confrontation strategies toward Israel, signaling the shift from a zero-sum framework to a non-zero-sum relationship between Israel and several Arab states. Geopolitics is particularly salient in this context: Morocco emerged as a central pillar of normalization within the Maghreb, while Egypt became the principal conduit linking the Maghrebi normalization track with the Gulf Abrahamic bloc, including Sudan. This realignment produced sustained and intensified pressure on the Axis of Resistance, pushing it toward strategic exhaustion and ultimately consolidating the geography of normalization at the expense of the geography of resistance.

- d. Saddam Hussein officially assumed the presidency of Iraq in July 1979, a political shift that precipitated the outbreak of the longest war the region experienced in the twentieth century. Research indicates that his predecessor, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, had favored avoiding confrontation with Iran, viewing the 1975 agreement as a foundation for a pragmatic policy toward Iran.[13] The ensuing war represented a profound reconfiguration of Arab geostrategy, rendering the Arab region the most unstable among the world's geographic zones.[14] Furthermore, it redirected Arab strategic focus from Western to Eastern Arab Asia, a detrimental shift that compounded the region's existing transformations.

e. The attack by Juhayman al-'Utaybi on The Sacred Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, which lasted approximately two weeks, left a deep and lasting imprint on the Arabian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. Combined with other contemporaneous developments, it heightened anxieties about political Islam, often blurring the distinction between genuine jihadist movements and politically engineered Islamic activism. The impact extended beyond the Middle Eastern region, diverting attention from the Palestine issue as Arab states retreated inward, focusing on curbing Islamic resistance to Western-backed projects within their own territories.[15]

f. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, December 1979: The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ignited a wave of jihadist mobilization against the Soviet Union, bolstered by US and Gulf support. This development redirected jihadist attention away from the Palestine issue, despite its central religious significance, and gradually shifted both material aid and the deployment of thousands of fighters away from Palestinian territories.[16]

Third: The Israeli Strategic Perspective on These Transformations

The profound shifts outlined above prompted Israel to adopt an adaptive approach, manifested in a strategy with multiple dimensions:

1. The Shift from the Zionization of Judaism to the Judaization of Zionism: In its first phase, the Mapai Party, later Labor or the (*Ma'arach*) Alignment, dominated the political arena, winning 46 seats in the inaugural Knesset now reduced to 4, and sought to adapt Jewish heritage to advance the nationalist Zionist agenda. In the second phase, Likud became the central political force, beginning with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic address to the Israeli Knesset in 1977 and continuing to the present. This transformation is closely linked to the broader global resurgence of religious movements, including the rise of right-wing politics in Europe, the ascent of India's Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) since 2014, the revival of Orthodox tendencies in Russia, the influence of neoconservatives in the US, the renewed emphasis on Confucian heritage in China, and the expansion of Pentecostalism in Latin America. These trends represent a counter-reaction to organic globalization, extending beyond regional dynamics to the global stage. As such, this shift constitutes a major driver of religious movements in the Arab world, with significant strategic implications and direct consequences for Israel.[17]

2. The rising influence of religious ideology has prompted the Zionist religious right to consolidate certain core principles. Foremost among these is the assertion that the land of Israel belongs exclusively to the people of Israel, coupled with the framing of the Palestinian presence as a strategic problem. This perspective necessitates effecting a substantial transformation of the demographic structure within Palestine to secure the "Jewish state," a concern that now lies at the heart of contemporary Zionist strategic thought. The current objective is thus to engineer a decisive demographic shift within Palestinian territory to secure the "Jewish state," thereby reshaping population geography to serve political ends. The Palestinian population in historic Palestine exceeds the Jewish population by

approximately 100 thousand, while Palestinian population growth rates are higher than those of Jews. These dynamics help explain the shift in Israeli strategic planning from an exclusive focus on controlling physical territory toward demographic engineering as a means of dominating population geography, while simultaneously pursuing a strategy to attract Jewish populations from around the world, thereby reinforcing a demographic imbalance in favor of Jews in Palestine.[18]

3. Ensuring a secure immediate neighborhood: Israel has sought to achieve this through the establishment of geographic buffers that serve distinct political purposes. These include controlling the Jordan River to impede any military action from the east, designating southern Lebanon as a buffer zone or "No Man's Land," and imposing legal restrictions on Egyptian movement in Sinai, as stipulated by the peace treaty with Israel. There also appears to be a gradual inclination to extend the buffer zone along the Syrian border, reflecting the strategic vision of Israel's current Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa'ar.[19] The revival of the "Greater Israel" concept epitomizes this enduring Israeli ambition to secure its interests through territorial expansion, alongside the other previously noted factors.[20]

4. Ensuring Israel's strategic role in shaping the Middle East's geopolitical and geo-economic structures and its strategic standing in the region: Achieving this objective requires Israel's sustained intervention in Arab affairs to steer their development along a compliant trajectory that poses no future threat. Historical experience with foreign invasions demonstrates that Arabs expelled invaders only when they possessed sufficient power, as seen in liberation from Roman, Persian, Crusader, French, British, Spanish, Italian, and other forms of domination. Similarly, the failures of settler colonialism in the Maghreb and elsewhere underscore the challenges of external control.[21] Accordingly, Israel is likely to persist in intervening in Arab affairs, molding them into a compliant framework to avert any repetition of the historical encounters Arabs had with foreign aggressors.

5. Shaping the region's value system to secure the stability of the four objectives: This entails influencing educational curricula, arts, and literature, particularly emphasizing reconciliatory themes in religious texts,[22] while promoting Gnostic, Sufi, and ritualistic tendencies. It also involves fostering subcultural alignments, often referred to as the "periphery alliance,"[23] and diverting regional attention toward conflicts with powers other than Israel, such as Iran, Türkiye and Ethiopia. Furthermore, it includes strategies to ignite unrest in African Sahel countries to distract the Maghreb states, and to exacerbate divisions among minorities, such as Tuaregs, Kharijites, and Amazigh, from western Sudan to the Atlantic coast. This demonstrates that Israel perceives the Arab geography as a single unit in principle, yet regards its security as contingent on fragmenting this geography by all available means. All these measures serve to construct a Middle East under Israel's leadership, enhancing its regional centrality and, consequently, its international standing.[24]

Fourth: Greater Israel: Between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics

The Israeli strategic vision is divided between two competing approaches. The first conceives of "Greater Israel" through territorial expansion, aimed at increasing the state's strategic depth and establishing buffer zones between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This perspective prioritizes security above all else and frames expansion as a continuation of Israel's religious and historical legacy. A view endorsed by Likud and religious Jewish parties, with Netanyahu describing it as a "historic and spiritual mission."[25] The second vision approaches Greater Israel from a geoeconomic perspective, emphasizing the expansion of economic and technological ties between Israel and its Arab neighbors to transform the conflict from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum framework. This strategy, championed by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres of the Labor Party, seeks to replace political-security geopolitics with economic-technological geopolitics in which Israel maintains the decisive advantage.[26]

Available evidence suggests a convergence of the two approaches. The security-geopolitical perspective is being recalibrated to contain, rather than reignite, conflict, for instance through the establishment of buffer zones. At the same time, geo-economic geopolitics is being strengthened to support the security option through softer, indirect instruments.[27]

Fifth: International Presence in Arab Geography

Any examination of the Arab world reveals a pervasive foreign military presence across most states, alongside strategic economic projects that traverse the region. This military footprint takes multiple forms, including bases, logistical facilities, intelligence cooperation, military missions and arms sales, frequently accompanied by foreign trainers.[28] These dynamics are reinforced by major economic initiatives, most prominently China's BRI, which strategically links Asia and Europe through Arab geography, and the IMEC, for which the Arab region serves as the main transit route. Such developments generate the possibility of Sino-Indian competition in the Arab world, which could later take on a militarized dimension reminiscent of European rivalries in the early twentieth century. In this context, Israel's recognition of the so-called Somaliland, the establishment of Chinese military bases in Djibouti, and the exacerbation of internal conflicts in Yemen and Sudan suggest deliberate attempts to strategically shift the locus of conflict from its original center, Palestine, to new geographic arenas.

Sixth: Regional Competition for the Central State

With the marked decline of Egypt's regional influence, as noted earlier, and the absence of a central Arab state pursuing a coherent geostrategic agenda, non-Arab regional powers are increasingly contending for dominance in the region:

1. Israel: While Israel benefits from certain shifts in power, it remains acutely aware of several vulnerabilities:[29]

- a. It is experiencing its highest level of political instability since its establishment.
- b. Concerns persist over a potential reassessment of its status in US strategic calculations, reminiscent of Washington's recognition of the One-China principle regarding Taiwan and its UN expulsion. President Trump's positions toward Europe and Canada further amplify these Israeli concerns, reflecting the pragmatic orientation of American policy.
- c. The rise of religious currents, alongside the global spread of secularization, introduces further potential for instability that could affect Israel.
- d. Demographic pressures, particularly the proportion of Arabs within the 1948 territories and the implications of full annexation of the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS), remain a concern.
- e. Israel's international standing has visibly declined in the wake of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, affecting its perception in global public opinion.
- f. Emerging developments, such as the US transfer of Israel from the area of responsibility of the US European Command (EUCOM) to that of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), may gradually enhance military coordination with Arab states. This shift represents an evolution that carries both strategic opportunities and associated risks.

2. Iran: Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has experienced 11 waves of social and political unrest, resulting in an average stability score of approximately –1.69 between 1996 and 2023.[30] This instability has been exacerbated by the weakening of the Axis of Resistance, the impact of economic sanctions, and separatist tendencies among certain Iranian minorities.

3. Türkiye: Türkiye faces relative instability, with an instability index of –1.01, ranking 165th globally.[31] Beyond its somewhat mitigated tensions with the Kurds, it contends with a volatile neighborhood, including disputes with Greece, conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the Azeri-Armenian conflict, and concerns over potential religious divisions amid fluctuating support for the ruling conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP).

4. The African Sahel States: The so-called Alliance of Sahel States comprises countries geographically adjacent to the Maghreb, primarily Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso. This group is among the most politically unstable in the world, all ranking in the high-negative category in terms of instability, with their positions among 193 UN

member states as follows:[32] Mali 192, Burkina Faso 182, Niger 176 and Chad 175. Such instability has significant implications for the Maghreb states, in addition to Israel's efforts to establish strategic footholds in the region. Furthermore, relations between the Maghreb and the Sahel states are prone to tension, driven by migration flows, arms trafficking, the expansion of armed groups, and foreign interventions, particularly by major powers. Moreover, Israeli activity in these countries further complicates the situation and reinforces Israel's security perspective, which is grounded in the principle of geostrategic transformation, aimed at redirecting Middle Eastern conflicts away from Israel.[33] Nevertheless, Operation al-Aqsa Flood has had some effect on Israel's relations with these African states.[34]

Seventh: Defining the Mega-Trend

The transformations outlined above suggest that shifts in political geography and geopolitics have laid the groundwork for the overarching mega-trend shaping the geostrategic perspective of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which can be summarized as follows:

1. Growing Recognition of Israel's Legitimacy: Recognition of Israel's legitimacy has increased markedly, rising from zero Arab states to ten, either de facto, de jure, or through acceptance of the Arab Initiative and UN Resolution 242 as interpreted by Israel (i.e., "occupied territories" rather than "the occupied territories"). Among Muslim countries, 32 of 57 (56%) recognize Israel. Overall, 165 countries, or roughly 85% of the international community, recognize Israel, alongside nine states that have frozen or withdrawn recognition following Operation al-Aqsa Flood. By comparison, 157 countries, approximately 81% of UN member states, recognize Palestine.[35]
2. Despite the severe human and material losses in the GS and WB following Operation al-Aqsa Flood, trade between Israel and Arab states rose from $3.6 billion to $4 billion by August 2024. The UAE has emerged as the primary driver of this growth, accounting for 70% of total Arab-Israeli trade.[36]
3. The expansion of Israeli intelligence penetration across the Arab world, encompassing the entire region and leveraging both human and technological assets.[37]
4. The growing official Arab hostility toward major religious movements across the Arab world.[38]

Conclusion

The future geostrategic significance of the Middle East will be defined by several major mega-trends arising from ongoing transformations in political geography and geopolitics:

1. The strategic value of the Arab region is expected to gradually decline from the US perspective, while continuing to rise in the view of China and India, and remaining relatively stable in significance for Russia and Europe. Israel is likely to adjust to these shifts incrementally.
2. The implementation of a two-state solution could potentially spark internal unrest in Israel, thereby reinforcing tendencies toward Israeli expansion at the expense of Arab geography, either through direct control of selected areas or by converting them into buffer zones that serve as barriers or the Separation Wall between Israel and the Arab world.
3. The Arab world's improvement in international standing is likely to remain weak and may even decline in the near term (1–3 years).
4. We anticipate the persistence of international competition over the Arab region, particularly Arab Asia, whether among Asian powers, between Asian and Western powers, or between certain Asian powers and Israel.
5. Israel's international standing has been significantly undermined by Operation al-Aqsa Flood, making short- and medium-term restoration highly challenging.
6. In the short- and medium-term, the Arab geostrategic focus on maintaining normalization agreements is likely to remain predominant, alongside an increasing emphasis on monitoring and restraining religious movements.
7. Zionist planning regarding population displacement from the WB and GS, and potentially the Galilee, is expected to remain active, with strategies ranging from coercive to gradual forms of relocation.

Endnotes

[1] An expert in futures studies, a former professor in the Department of Political Science at Yarmouk University in Jordan and a holder of Ph.D. in Political Science from Cairo University. He is also a former member of the Board of Trustees of Al-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Irbid National University, the National Center for Human Rights, the Board of Grievances and the Supreme Council of Media. He has authored 37 books, most of which are focused on future studies in both theoretical and practical terms, and published 120 research papers in peer-reviewed academic journals.

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