



Academic Paper

# **“The Avichay Adraee Network, We Want to Live and the June 26 Movement”**



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
## Abstract

### “The Avichay Adraee Network, We Want to Live and the June 26 Movement”

This article traces the genealogy of what Palestinian activists and resistance actors have increasingly described as the “Avichay Adraee Network,” a transnational Arabic-language media ecosystem linking normalization initiatives, anti-Hamas activism, and collaborator formations in Gaza. Beginning with the 2019 “We Want to Live” protests and following the evolution of actors such as Moumen al-Natour, the study examines the emergence of interconnected institutions, including the Center for Peace Communications, the Arab Council for Regional Integration, and *Jusoor News*. It argues that these organizations cultivated a shared media and political infrastructure that, following the outbreak of Operation al-Aqsa Flood, expanded beyond advocacy into projects focused on alternative governance, “safe zones,” and the promotion of post-Hamas political arrangements. By situating the “June 26 Movement” within this broader trajectory, the article contends that the “Avichay Adraee Network” represents the culmination of a years-long effort to construct a soft-power apparatus capable of shaping political discourse, cultivating local intermediaries, and advancing new forms of political organization in Gaza.

#### Keywords:

|                |                            |                    |
|----------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| Avichay Adraee | “We Want to Live” Movement | “June 26 Movement” |
| Soft Power     | Alternative Governance     | Gaza Strip         |
|                | “safe zones”               |                    |




## “The Avichay Adraee Network, We Want to Live and the June 26 Movement”

Mujamma Haraket\*

### The Media Ecology’s Genealogy

The infrastructure of what many Palestinian activists and the Palestinian resistance platforms have referred to as the “Avichay Adraee Network” or the “Avichay cell”<sup>1</sup>—a soft power media nexus of Arabic-language platforms promoting socio-economic normalization between Middle Eastern countries and Israel—neither emerged organically nor originated in the period following Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Rather, this new media latticework, which critics have claimed functions as an excrescence of the Israeli Intelligence Corps’ unit 8200, has its genealogy to the “We Want to Live” protests of 14–18/3/2019 and the activists associated with their organization.<sup>2</sup>



To be clear, the protests that were eventually named the “We Want to Live” Movement were initiated by an organic but loosely arrayed coalition, as various Gazans of lower socio-economic status coalesced in Jabalia, Deir al-Balah, al-Bureij, and Rafah, responding to exacerbating poverty, salary cuts, economic collapse, and deteriorating living conditions in Gaza.<sup>3</sup> These protests, however, did not begin as anti-Hamas demonstrations. In fact, a number of activists from within the Hamas movement, including figures who had run on Hamas’ 2006 “Change and Reform” Palestinian Legislative Council platform, backed the protests, which explicitly took ire with the sanctions imposed by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud ‘Abbas.<sup>4</sup> Another motivating factor was the taxes that Hamas had imposed two weeks prior. Drawing from the “Great March of Return” and “Breaking the Siege” marches of the antecedent year, the early iterations of the movement donned the name of “The Movement of the Poor.” Espying the movement’s eventual co-optation, an Al Jazeera piece reflecting on the demonstrations highlighted that the organizers who participated in this movement “were not aware that the security services in Gaza and the ‘Hamas’ movement had, several months prior, obtained a leaked plan from the Palestinian Intelligence Service in Ramallah aimed at destabilizing ‘Hamas’ rule and ending the Great Return Marches.”<sup>5</sup> This may have, in fact, motivated Hamas’ harsh crackdown and arrests of participants,

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


as it published a statement apologizing for the harsh response but clarifying that, in so doing, it had “thwarted an organized plan of chaos in Gaza, which was sponsored by [Fatah’s Palestinian Authority] General Intelligence Service.”<sup>6</sup>

This was not an arbitrary justification: concurrent with the “We Want to Live” protests, figures in Fatah and the PA—including Osama al-Qawasmi, Adnan al-Damiri, Mohammad Shtayyeh, Azzam al-Ahmad, Yusuf al-Mahmud, Mahmud al-Habbash and Yusuf Ideis—articulated demands that went beyond the movement’s socioeconomic slogans, framing the protests instead as a revolt against Hamas rule and, in some accounts, as a campaign to “topple Hamas” and “get rid of” the Ezzedein al-Qassam Brigades.<sup>7</sup> Israeli media figures such as Ofer Gendelman, who then served as the Prime Minister’s Office spokesperson to Arab media—prefiguring Arab media division of the Avichay Adraee’s tenure—echoed these calls via Twitter. It was subsequently reported that three million dollars had been allocated by various foreign countries to use the movement to “topple al-Qassam and Hamas in Gaza.”<sup>8</sup> Soon, the chants and figureheads began to shift. The economic calls were displaced by ones calling for Hamas and al-Qassam to “go away,” deeming them “evil.”<sup>9</sup> As Hamas suspended its taxes, the protests dissipated on 21 March.

Originally framed around living conditions and economic grievances in Gaza, the “We Want to Live” Movement, which grew out of “The Movement of the Poor,” produced a cadre of activists who fomented anti-Hamas political initiatives.


Among the most prominent was the lawyer Moumen al-Natour, who transitioned over time from protest organizer into a key intermediary linking local collaborator cells with a growing media constellation of external organizations bolstered by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). During the years after 2019, individuals drawn from the “We Want to Live” milieu increasingly appeared within media and soft power networks cultivated by Joseph Braude’s “Center for Peace Communications,” an organization that, four years before 2023, had begun establishing contacts inside Gaza and identifying potential partners among critics of the resistance; it has, since then, served as the locus of a media ecosystem



**Moumen al-Natour**

championing anti-Hamas figures abroad and in Gaza, including those associated with the successor movement to the “We Want to Live” protests, the “26 June Movement,” and the collaborator militias operating east of the so-called “Yellow Line.”<sup>10</sup> This article, part of a multi-part investigative series, will seek to adumbrate this network and illuminate how, in the months and years following the outbreak of the 7 October 2023 “Operation al-Aqsa Flood” (viz., Operation al-Aqsa Flood), this nexus has consolidated into a formidable soft power apparatus.

Al-Natour, who cut his teeth as an anti-Hamas activist amongst the “We Want to Live” protesters, remerged in early December 2023 as the founder of the Palestinian “Youth for Development” (PYD), which publicly presented itself as a humanitarian organization providing relief to displaced families.<sup>11</sup> The group marketed its activities as involving



alternate education to the system in Hamas, noting that it would foreground teaching pupils to sustain amicable relations with the occupation. This verbiage would be repeated by the Abu Shabab collaborator militia (viz., the “Popular Forces”), which, following its public emergence in June 2024, similarly claimed that it was seeking coexistence with the occupation while, using social media platforms to market the development of new school systems in the group’s Rafah base, touting this as an attraction for would-be constituents wherein coexistence with Israel would be emphasized.<sup>12</sup> For instance, on 10 August 2024:

Abu Shabab issued a statement addressed to the Palestinians and the international community, in which he called for assistance and outlined a series of purported “achievements” in public services, including infrastructure projects, such as water and electricity systems, a communal kitchen, a school, a field hospital and a mosque, among others. The statement declared: “We have established a comprehensive system, achieved numerous successes in vital sectors, and formed security and police forces to maintain internal order and counter any external threats.”<sup>13</sup>

In March 2024, the Arab Council for Regional Integration was reconstituted as “*Jusoor News*,” which itself branched out into several phonetic offshoots, including “Juthoor” and “JSOR” News;<sup>14</sup> these outlets created an Arabic-language media ecosystem that became not only a hub for anti-Hamas activists but gave fraternal if not adulatory interviews to members of the collaborator militias ranging from Abu Shabab’s successor, Ghassan al-Dahini, to Shabab’s widow, Amna.<sup>15</sup> The Arab Council itself originated in 2019 as a London-based initiative closely associated with Joseph Braude, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and senior advisor to the al-Mesbar Center for Studies and Research in Dubai, and the aforementioned Center for Peace Communications.<sup>16</sup>



Braude, a Jewish American of Iraqi origin who has been described as “a Middle East expert who had assisted the FBI and CIA earlier in his career,” is today known for his activism on issues of regional dialogue and normalization between Middle Eastern countries and Israel.<sup>17</sup> He first gained notoriety after he traveled to Iraq after the 2003 U.S. invasion. Following a legal case concerning his smuggling “three ancient marble and alabaster seals when he returned from an Iraq visit in 2004,”<sup>18</sup> a case was filed against him in the United States concerning the unlawful transport of the antiquities, although he was later given a lenient sentence of six months house arrest. In the following years, through his Reclamation project with the Washington Institute for Near East and his various Center Communications efforts, Braude has worked to promote projects for regional rapprochement with Israel, a process that accelerated following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020; his modus operandi has been the use of Arab-language media indicatives to serve this purpose.<sup>19</sup> This soft power approach is the strategy outlined by Braude’s 2017 book, *Broadcasting Change: Arabic Media as a Catalyst for Liberalism*.<sup>20</sup>



Two years after formally outlining this media-based approach, the Center for Peace Communications was founded (in 2019). Its largest donors are explicitly Zionist ideologues. Indeed, amongst its top three contributors is The Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation (description: “Helping Israel Tell Its Story”; amount: \$275 thousand) and the Adelson Family Foundation (description: “General Charitable Purposes”; amount: \$150 thousand) (Fig. 1).<sup>21</sup>



Figure 1: The Center for Peace Communications top donors


| Who funds The Center for Peace Communications            |                       |                               |           |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| Grants from foundations and other nonprofits             |                       |                               |           |
| Grantmaker                                               | Grantmaker tax period | Description                   | Amount    |
| <a href="#">The Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation</a> | 2023-12               | Helping Israel Tell Its Story | \$275,000 |
| <a href="#">DAFgiving360</a>                             | 2024-06               | Religion Related              | \$255,000 |
| <a href="#">Adelson Family Foundation</a>                | 2023-12               | General Charitable Purposes   | \$150,000 |
| ...and <a href="#">15 more grants received</a>           |                       |                               |           |

The Center for Peace Communications’ mission statement reads as follows:

The Center for Peace Communications strives to build public support for resolving identity-based conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa by reforming the region’s media, schools, and houses of worship. In cooperation with The Arab Council for Regional Integration, the organization aims to roll back anti-semitism and foster a culture supportive of relations with Israel through reform of Arab media, schools, and mosques as well as producing videos and other communication materials.<sup>22</sup>

This echoes the mission statement of its predecessor organization, The Arab Council for Regional Integration:

The Arab Council for Regional Integration strives to launch new initiatives by our members that will benefit their countries by breaking the barrier of boycotting within the region—in particular, the Arab boycott of Israelis,



which hindered partnership in technology, medicine, infrastructure, business, economy, and the expanse of human aspiration. The boycott also stymied hopes for peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples: Prevented from engaging either of the two peoples directly, Arabs were unable to cultivate ties that could have enabled us to foster conciliation and compromise on both sides. In sum, the boycott increased the suffering of our societies and weakened our capacities.<sup>23</sup>

The Center for Peace Communications has brought together journalists, politicians, religious figures, diplomats, and activists from across the Arab world to promote normalization with Israel and what it described as a “peace of the peoples” rather than merely a “peace of the elites.”<sup>24</sup> Relatedly, the inaugural 2019 London meeting of the Arab Council for Regional Integration, which took place on 19 and 20 November, brought together “30 public figures from 15 countries in the Arab world” who nominally gathered “to repudiate the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement (BDS) against Israel and to call for direct civil relations between the Jewish state and their respective societies.”<sup>25</sup> The participants included journalists, artists, politicians, diplomats, and Quranic scholars, around a platform opposing boycotts of Israel and promoting direct Arab-Israeli engagement. It was funded by anonymous “American donors” and organized by Mustafa el-Dessouki, “the Egyptian managing editor of the Saudi-owned journal *Majalla*,” who was paraphrased as ruling that “Arab media and political leaders” had historically encouraged “hostility toward Jews and Israel.”<sup>26</sup> Anticipating his participation in the Board of Peace, former British prime minister Tony Blair addressed the Arab Council’s conference via a video message, as did US ambassador Dennis Ross. Amongst the participants was “Anwar el-Sadat, the nephew of the late Egyptian president of the same name.”<sup>27</sup> Also present was former Kuwaiti Minister of Information, Sami Abdul-Latif al-Nisf, who apparently passionately railed against the “‘mistakes’ made in the Arab-Israel conflict, declaring also that ‘it is a mistake to insist on Israel’s being a racist apartheid state when it clearly is not.’”<sup>28</sup> Amongst the religious leaders was the Tunisian religious cleric based in Paris, Hassen Chalghoumi, and Lebanese imam Saleh Hamed.

The event was highly important as it initiated the dovetailing of the two organizations’ efforts. This was not the end of the collaborative efforts, which would reach a new zenith when the Arab Council for Regional Integration’s Facebook page underwent a name change to *Jusoor News* in the Spring of 2024. Specifically, as the *Palestinian Press Network* documented in a 16 March 2026 report, in March 2024, *Jusoor News* appeared after the social media pages belonging to the Arab Council for Regional Integration were renamed.<sup>29</sup> Researcher Daoud Attari has documented how the organization’s Facebook page underwent a name change.<sup>30</sup> Thus, *Jusoor* was born—or, more accurately, the Arab Council for Regional Integration was revived. The *Palestinian Press Network* pointed out that the *Jusoor News* platform, which it highlighted as “UAE-funded,” was focusing on producing unsubstantiated narratives claiming that the political bureau of Hamas was “divided” concerning how to respond to the Ramadan War, writing that:



The UAE-funded *Jusoor News* platform published a video inciting against Palestinian resistance factions and discussing alleged divisions within Hamas against the backdrop of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, continuing a media narrative that adopts unsubstantiated claims and aligns with Israeli propaganda. The report aired by the platform claimed that the war on Iran is “dividing Hamas,” alleging differences within the movement regarding its stance on the regional confrontation with Tehran.

As usual, the report did not provide any sources or documented evidence to support these allegations, contenting itself with presenting general analyses and political interpretations unsupported by on-the-ground data.

Since its inception, *Jusoor News*’ discourse has been fully aligned with the narratives promoted by the Israeli media, including content published by the Avichay [Adraee] Network’s mercenaries. This coverage relies on manufactured claims of division within resistance factions, in an attempt to influence Arab public opinion during a highly sensitive regional phase marked by widespread military escalation.<sup>31</sup>


The report then notes that:

Previously, circulating documents have provided evidence that the *Jusoor News* platform is linked to an organizational and funding structure tied to two organizations registered in the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively, which operate within the framework of initiatives related to the Arab-Israeli normalization process.

The first organization is called the Arab Council for Regional Integration; it was founded in London in 2019 before reportedly being shut down on paper. The second entity is the Center for Peace Communications, an organization registered in the United States described as the entity currently funding *Jusoor News*’ activities and overseeing its media programs.

An Arabic-language article by *Shehab News* titled “An investigation reveals evidence and documents: From Washington to Tel Aviv. How is the “*Jusoor News*” platform run with a Mossad mindset?” highlighted that the *Jusoor* platform was an extension of antecedent normalization efforts that can be traced back to 2019, when the initiative began as the “Arab Council for Regional Integration,” though the name was quickly changed to “Arab Council for Regional Cooperation,” “following a wave of scathing criticism,” adding that the *Jusoor* appellative shift was but a “third attempt to recycle the project, this time in the midst of the war on Gaza.”<sup>32</sup>

The article adds that the *Jusoor* platform employs a special coordinator for Gaza affairs named Amin Abed, a Fatah activist who resides in the UAE “and has been publicly accused of collaboration and coordination” with the occupation.<sup>33</sup> This name is highly significant as Amin Abed would later take up the mantle as one of the leading figures for the “June 26 Movement,” which attempted to organize a bloody revolt against the resistance in Gaza from abroad.<sup>34</sup> As part of the *Jusoor* team, Abed’s efforts extended



to selecting the Palestinians who appear in its media reports, according to predefined criteria. These individuals were provided with scripts and pre-prepared questions; the *Shehab* article added that “the interviews are then recorded for \$300 per appearance, making it more of a process of buying voices than a journalistic practice.”<sup>35</sup>

### ***Jusoor* Rebranded**

By the time *Jusoor News* emerged under its new branding, two individuals had become particularly significant within this milieu: Ahed al-Hindi and Hadeel Oueis. Oueis serves as editor-in-chief of *Jusoor News*, while Talal al-Hariri is listed as serving on the Executive Committee of the Arab Council for Regional Integration.<sup>36</sup> Both are Syrian expatriates who eventually settled in the United States after separate periods of imprisonment under the Assad government.<sup>37</sup> Although their activities frequently intersected, their professional trajectories reveal different areas of emphasis. Al-Hindi’s work gravitated toward organizing activists, cultivating networks, and building institutional connections, whereas Oueis increasingly occupied the communications and media side of the enterprise.

The Center for Peace Communications identifies al-Hindi as both a member of the Arab Council’s Executive Committee and a “social entrepreneur.”<sup>38</sup> The organization’s website further states that he oversees outreach efforts directed toward Arab reformists and peace activists operating in territories controlled by armed groups. Another media element of the organization is the *Peaced Off* podcast, hosted by Orly Ravid and Abe Gurko, and often featuring Braude and al-Hindi as guests.<sup>39</sup> The podcast functions as a platform through which various figures within this media ecosystem discuss post-Hamas governance, normalization, the creation of “safe zones,” and the cultivation of anti-Hamas networks inside Gaza.<sup>40</sup> Speaking on the *Peaced Off* podcast, al-Hindi remarked that he remained in constant contact with Gazans, explaining that communication from the Strip flowed regularly to the Center for Peace Communications through its network of interlocutors.<sup>41</sup> Before joining these efforts, he worked with the pro-Israel media-monitoring organization CAMERA, where he helped launch and develop its Arabic-language media initiatives.<sup>42</sup> Earlier still, during the opening stages of the Syrian uprising, al-Hindi appeared in international media as a representative of CyberDissidents.org, a U.S.-based activist network.<sup>43</sup> At the time, he argued that digital platforms were enabling dissidents to construct virtual forms of organization that would have been difficult or impossible to sustain through face-to-face meetings.

Oueis became most publicly associated with *Jusoor News* through her position as editor-in-chief, though the Center for Peace Communications simultaneously describes her as responsible for the Center’s Arabic-language communications. Her professional affiliations have been especially visible within pro-Israel and Zionist advocacy circles, particularly those connected to evangelical Christian networks. In 2022 she joined the Philos Project as a Senior Research Fellow. The organization presents itself as equipping Christians to support Israel and the Jewish people while promoting what it describes as Western values grounded in Hebraic traditions. Alongside this role, Oueis has written frequently for Joel C. Rosenberg’s *All Israel News* and *All Arab News*. Since 2019 she



has also served as Arabic Outreach Manager for JIMENA (Jews Indigenous to the Middle East and North Africa), a position she continues to hold.

As evidenced by the aforementioned conference, the Arab Council for Regional Integration's motivation was to rear a generation of Arab masses who warmly embraced normalization with Israel. According to the Council's own materials and contemporary reporting, its activities have thereafter focused on reshaping Arab public opinion through interventions in media, education, and religious institutions, themes that would later remain central to Center for Peace Communications' operations in Gaza.<sup>44</sup> Although direct evidence of Emirati sponsorship remains limited, the network repeatedly highlighted the UAE as a model for societal transformation, maintained close ideological proximity to the Abraham Accords project, discussed Emirati institutions such as the UAE-based Hedayah Center as exemplars, and was later linked by multiple commentators and investigations to media campaigns promoting UAE regional initiatives.<sup>45</sup> Through the efforts of figures such as Ahed al-Hindi and Hadeel Oueis, *Jusoor* connected activists in Gaza to journalists, researchers, policymakers, and international audiences, including *Fox News* and *The Free Press*.

In an illuminating example that demonstrates the closely woven nature of this network, Tanya Lukyanova, video journalist of *The Free Press*, published a flattering exclusive interview with Abu Shabab, the Tarabin clan member with a criminal history from drug smuggling and ties to the Islamic State (Sinai), who, at the time, was the leader of the Israeli-backed "Popular Forces" militia.<sup>46</sup> The video report, titled "We Spoke to the Israeli-Backed Militia Leader Fighting Hamas in Gaza," begins with a message by Joseph Braude, who remarks that: "[...] discussions both within the Israeli establishment and among anti-Hamas Gazan politicians about the idea of creating enclaves within Gaza patrolled locally by Gazans and protected externally by IDF troops where Gazan civilians can pilot post-Hamas or anti-Hamas self-rule."<sup>47</sup>



**Yasser Abu Shabab**

Al-Natour himself would later articulate a similar vision in June 2025. Speaking on *the Peaced Off* podcast in July, he observed that: "Recently, news emerged that the eastern part of Rafah is controlled by a man named Yasser Abu Shabab, who is managing a small safe zone area. There is no disagreement over the idea of establishing a safe zone."<sup>48</sup>

Notably, when he made these remarks, al-Natour was speaking from the Abu Shabab militia's Rafah camp, as he had relocated there at al-Hindi's invitation. This public media reappearance, in the aftermath of the first Trump ceasefire's collapse, was during a period marked by widely publicized protests that al-Natour had been involved with and operations that attracted the resistance's Arrow Units' attention. Two months before his relocation, in March 2025, al-Natour had published a *Washington Post* opinion piece reflecting on the wave of protests against Hamas that had erupted earlier that month.<sup>49</sup> Dispensing with ambiguity, he framed his movement's objective as political change in Gaza, writing that the demand advanced by the protesters was straightforward, the "message" of my



“movement is clear: The people of Gaza want to live, so Hamas must go, the hostages taken from Israel must be released.”<sup>50</sup> It is no coincidence that in these remarks, we find the “[we] want to live” verbiage repeated, nearly verbatim. In the article, al-Natour also stressed the importance of external backing for this effort, arguing that initiatives such as the Center for Peace Communications and the Atlantic Council’s Realign for Palestine project provided forms of support that he believed should be expanded. He wrote that “[w]e need more groups such as the Center for Peace Communications and the Atlantic Council’s Realign for Palestine project.”<sup>51</sup>

A wave of anti-Hamas demonstrations erupted between 25 and 27 March 2025, attracting extensive publicity through the Center for Peace Communications network before being relayed to international media outlets. At least eight separate protests reportedly occurred during the first day alone. The Center for Peace Communications was drawing attention to the unrest almost immediately, posting about it on the evening of 25 March.<sup>52</sup> By the following day, however, the organization had already begun situating the events within a broader political narrative, posting on its X account videos of the protests with the title “Who are the Gazans now braving torture and execution to protest Hamas?”<sup>53</sup>

Responding to the question of who exactly was risking arrest, torture, or worse by taking to the streets against Hamas, the Center for Peace Communications directed readers to what it characterized as a six-year campaign of Gazan opposition to the movement. As supporting evidence, it circulated a *Jusoor News* article on the “We Want to Live” movement, describing the report as its own work and presenting the protests as the latest manifestation of a longer struggle. However, the *Jusoor* piece itself had appeared only a week earlier.<sup>54</sup> Al-Natour promoted it on social media shortly after publication, calling it a fair account of the movement and expressing confidence that the “We Want to Live” campaign would ultimately prevail.<sup>55</sup>

The anti-Hamas protests were, however, unsuccessful and rather meager; the media coverage, however, attempted to portray them as far more significant, demonstrating the significance of Braude’s media ecosystem. “When the danger intensified,” al-Natour recounted on his Instagram, “I contacted my colleague at the Peace Communications Center, Ahed al-Hindi, who immediately cut short his vacation, and the center’s director, Mr. Joseph Braude. They worked on arrangements for my protection and contacted parties to ensure my safety.”<sup>56</sup> Al-Hindi, in a Facebook post, explained how from that time on the two were in “daily contact,” as al-Natour “moved from one apartment to another until he reached Rafah.”<sup>57</sup> By June 2026, al-Natour had relocated from the Rafah camp to Spain and then Italy, continuing his anti-Hamas incitement from abroad.<sup>58</sup>

Although at first gloss one might conclude that the protests’ ineffectiveness betrays the insignificance of this network, the result of these efforts was that, by the summer of 2025, there had emerged an integrated structure in which the CPC provided organization and international access, *Jusoor* supplied media amplification—subsequently taken up by mainstream media—and veterans of the “We Want to Live” Movement furnished a pool of activists capable of advancing an alternative political agenda inside Gaza. Furthermore, already by the summer of 2025, these efforts had moved beyond advocacy and entered the realm of governance proposals. In an October 2025 *Wall Street Journal* article



putatively authored by al-Natour, the significance of “Clause 17” of President Trump’s “20-point peace plan” is one of the focal points; the article emphasizes the clause’s ability to operationalize the safe-zone framework before the conflict’s conclusion rather than postponing implementation until a hypothetical postwar phase.<sup>59</sup> As the article puts it, “[e]ven if Hamas refuses to sign the deal, the U.S., together with regional partners, will establish an independent civilian administration to manage the large areas of Gaza that have already been cleared of Hamas fighters.”<sup>60</sup> This readily sought to operationalize and further the model of the Rafah “Popular Forces” militia site. Al-Natour’s July 2025 *Peaced Off* appearance further substantiates this ecosystem’s role in popularizing the “safe zone” pitch—one that would be echoed in al-Natour’s July 2025 *Jewish Chronicle* op-ed, where he (supposedly) wrote “The only way to truly defeat Hamas is to build a civil alternative – a government for and by the people of Gaza, firmly opposed to Hamas’s rule.”


Consequently, al-Natour and other activists associated with the “We Want to Live” current promoted the creation of Hamas-free “safe zones” administered by local civilian actors. In conversations with Western lawmakers and policy circles, they presented these enclaves as prototypes for a future post-Hamas order. Al-Natour argued that his network already possessed the human infrastructure required to run such areas, including teachers, engineers, medical personnel, aid workers, and community organizers. Increasingly, the activists were no longer portraying themselves merely as opponents of Hamas. They were positioning themselves as a prospective governing class. In this vision, humanitarian administration, education, aid distribution, and local security would gradually be transferred to a new leadership stratum cultivated outside Hamas’s institutional orbit.

### “We Want to Live”

The final stage of this trajectory unfolded during the summer of 2026, when the activist milieu associated with the “We Want to Live” current became increasingly intertwined with the emerging collaborator formations operating under Israeli protection and, therein, began publicly making claims to violently confront the aegis under the banner of the “June 26 Movement.” The “June 26 Movement” has a simple call to action: for citizens of Gaza to use violence against the resistance on the eponymous date.



It has been spearheaded by a coterie of figures, including Fatah spokesman in Europe Jamal Nazzal, Palestinian Authority embassy in Spain employee Louay Abu Shab, Fatah activist Amin Abed, and social media commentators based abroad such as Amjad Abu Koush, Ramzi Harzallah, Ali Shreim, and Mustafa Asfour (all based in Belgium, with the exception of Shreim, reportedly currently in Ramallah, and Abed, based in UAE).




These social media figures' calls for violence against the resistance have been widely circulated by the *Jusoor News* circuit.<sup>61</sup> *Jusoor* began making its audience aware of this "Movement" by circulating similar calls from other figures, including a video of Louay Abu Shab supporting the "voice of the revolution" in Gaza and another *Jusoor* Facebook video presenting Louay Khaled as explaining why Gazans were calling for a "revolution against Hamas."<sup>62</sup> At the time of this article's writing, 26 June had not yet transpired, but already many local Gazan citizens have expressed their dissent and frustration with these calls.<sup>63</sup>

Despite the "June 26 Movement's" self-professed claims to being a neoteric manifestation born from wartime conditions, it is in fact part and parcel of a political genealogy and concomitant media ecosystem whose roots can be traced to anti-Hamas networks that emerged from the "We Want to Live" protests of 2019.<sup>64</sup> Not only are many of the central themes—including opposition to Hamas's rule, calling for an alternative political order, appealing to international actors to intervene, and claiming to speak on behalf of a silent constituency within Gaza seeking a different future—deeply familiar, but the networks that propagated them can be traced to the infrastructure and media ecology inaugurated in 2019. That is, its genealogy can be traced to the "We Want to Live" protests, the activist networks cultivated by the Center for Peace Communications, the media infrastructure of *Jusoor News*, the wartime safe-zone initiatives promoted by al-Natour and his associates, and the collaborator formations that later emerged under Israeli patronage.

### The June 26 Day Arrives

The digital campaign in the weeks and days leading up to 26 June saw an upsurge of activity within the ecosystem adumbrated above. Calls for the "June 26 Movement" demonstrations began on June 8 with posts by a figure named "Abdul Hamid Abdul Ati," before being amplified by a network of news platforms and newly created social media accounts.<sup>65</sup> The call reached its apex on 13 June, when a cluster of central accounts circulated calls for demonstrations while echoing the Israeli army's claim that Hamas uses Gaza's population as "human shields." The campaign was further boosted by numerous fake accounts that operated in concert across multiple social media platforms. The investigation's most consequential finding, however, was the coordinated participation of accounts linked to every major armed militia collaborating with Israel in Gaza. One of the earliest accounts to promote the #June26Revolution hashtag was "People's Army – Northern Forces," whose transparency data indicated that it operated from Israel.<sup>66</sup> The account subsequently changed its name to "Kasser al-Mansi," suggesting its affiliation with the latter Israel-collaborating militia. A similar pattern emerged with the account "Asmar al-Mansi," believed to belong to Ashraf al-Mansi's son. It promoted the #June26Revolution campaign by reposting material from an



**Abdul Hamid Abdul Ati**




account titled “The Free People’s Revolution,” which had been created on June 10, 2026, exclusively to publicize the June 26 demonstrations. Together, the “Kasser al-Mansi” and “Asmar al-Mansi” accounts headed a network of accounts belonging to members of militias collaborating with Israel in Gaza that participated in the coordinated digital campaign. The network extended further. An account named “Abu al-Zain” published a post promoting the June 26 demonstrations and tagged seventeen accounts that the investigation identified as belonging to members of militias collaborating with Israel in Gaza. Among them was “Gosay Adel,” who is affiliated with those militias and appeared in a video alongside Shawqi Abu Nasira, who had previously announced his cooperation with the Israeli army. Another tagged account, “Joker al-Dawla,” was found to belong to the Hossam al-Astal group, another armed militia that collaborates with the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip.

The link between the “We Want to Live” Movement and the “June 26 Movement” became even more explicit after a fine-grained postmortem investigation undertaken by the *Misbar* fact-checking website.<sup>67</sup> *Misbar* found that one of the Facebook pages using the name “June 26 Revolution” had been created on June 11 under the original name “266/ Movement” and followed only seven accounts, including another page titled “June 26 Revolution,” Jusoor News, and the Facebook page for “We Want to Live.” Further suggestive evidence emerged from the page’s activity. On 24 June, the account posted a photograph showing machinery operating in the central area east of Jahr al-Deek, behind the “Yellow Line.” This indicates that the image was likely taken from territory in which militias collaborating with Israel were deployed, operating behind and adjacent to the “Yellow Line.” That inference was further reinforced by the account’s network of friends, which included individuals affiliated with Shawqi Abu Nasira’s militia.

That this self-professed movement amounts to an artificially constructed political ecosystem rather than a legitimate grassroots effort became abundantly evident in the days leading up to the titular 26 June 2026 date.<sup>68</sup> On 25 June, Avi Dichter, a former Shin Bet director, former Israeli Minister of Public Security, Likud member, and current Minister of Agriculture and Food Security in Netanyahu’s government, released an Arabic-language video urging Gazans to take part in the planned uprising against Hamas. In the video, Dichter claimed that “[i]t has been almost three years since the Battle of al-Aqsa,” before underscoring that, despite the woeful conditions on the ground, “no one has come to your aid, neither the Arab states nor the politicians who spoke on your behalf,” adding that Gaza had been abandoned by “the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah, [...] the residents of the West Bank” and “the Iranians.”<sup>69</sup> In the video, Dichter told Gazans that they were in “the worst situation ever,” asked how much longer “this gang of thugs from Hamas” would control them, and urged them to “wake up” and take responsibility for their lives and their children’s future.<sup>70</sup> The message ends with Dichter exhorting Gazans to rise up against Hamas.<sup>71</sup> Ghassan al-Dahini, using the self-styled “Popular Forces” Facebook page, echoed similar claims, endorsing the “June 26 Movement.”<sup>72</sup>

Seemingly, the proposed action was to include a military incendiary element. In the hours leading up to 26 June, a security source speaking to the resistance-affiliated Telegram



platform al-Hares reported that a group of agents collaborating with the occupation who were operating inside various displacement camps had been apprehended with weapons and explosive devices.<sup>73</sup> According to the same statement, the agents' initial confessions indicated that the occupation and its proxy gangs intended to carry out a "sabotage plan in more than one area during the coming hours."<sup>74</sup> The statement further said that resistance security was pursuing occupation agents whom the proxy gangs had deployed among displaced persons' tents in multiple areas to carry out acts of sabotage, and called on residents to report suspicious movements or armed individuals immediately.<sup>75</sup>

The "June 26 Movement" ultimately failed in its bid to foment an anti-resistance insurrection. On the preceding day, its Facebook page circulated a list of planned gathering points across northern, central, and southern Gaza.<sup>76</sup> However, photographic evidence of these suggested gathering spots was circulated by Gazans on the proposed date; they evinced that the sites were sparsely populated if not altogether empty. The more substantial event on that date was the funeral of Isma'il Haniyyah's nephew, Walid Haniyyah (Abu Khaled), who had been a deputy commander in the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades' elite (*Nukhba*) force and had been assassinated on Thursday, 25 June 2026, in an Israeli airstrike in the al-Nasr neighborhood of Gaza City.<sup>77</sup> Rather than mobilizing Gazans against Hamas, large masses instead affirmed Palestinian sovereignty, marching in support of the resistance. Civilians young and old waved green flags identified with Hamas, with the crowd cheering "Those who ask, 'Who are we?' We are the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades."<sup>78</sup> Meanwhile, Israeli drones buzzed overhead throughout Gaza, using loudspeakers to incite people to join the incendiary protest.<sup>79</sup>

Despite the failure of the mobilization effort, violence and loss of life nevertheless ensued, as the collaborator gangs operating east of the "Yellow Line," working under Israeli air cover, mobilized under the auspices of the "June 26 Movement" and attempted to cross the line. The collaborators were met with a swift response by the resistance. During the morning of 26 June, the resistance's "Radaa" (Deterrence) Forces published the following message: "The 'Radaa' force is currently confronting groups of proxy gangs that have crossed the 'Yellow Line' in areas in the north and south of the Gaza Strip."<sup>80</sup> In the subsequent days, it was revealed that the resistance's ambush had been successful, thwarting the attempted onslaught.<sup>81</sup>

Under the cover afforded by what was presented as a legitimate "protest movement," Israeli drones bombed al-Maghazi Camp, killing three young police officers: Mansour Ziad Shehtout "Abu Ziad," aged 38; Mohammed Khaled Nofal, aged 34; and Mahdi Jabr, aged 37.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, the organizer of the protest precipitated an advance by collaborator gangs west of the "Yellow Line." That the police were the subject of the Israeli attack further bespeaks the coordinated nature of the "June 26 Movement," as, in fact, in the weeks prior, organizers of the movement had published a list of the names of various police force members.<sup>83</sup>

In light of the failure, the movement organizers resorted to infighting, with some claiming that funds had been squandered by certain figures who pursued luxuriant lifestyles in Europe.<sup>84</sup> Meanwhile, *Jusoor News* circulated photographs it claimed were



of Hamas “Sahm” (Arrow) forces tasked with intimidating prospective protesters on the morning of 26 June.<sup>85</sup> However, it was later revealed that these photographs were old images from the Syrian Civil War.<sup>86</sup>

## Conclusion

The recent emergence of the “June 26 Movement” should not be understood as a discrete or spontaneous political development. Rather, it represents the latest phase—or, arguably, the reification—of efforts punctuating a longer process that linked the 2019 “We Want to Live” protests, the activist networks surrounding Moumen al-Natour, the media infrastructure of *Jusoor News*, and, most importantly, the organizational efforts of the Center for Peace Communications. What the Palestinian resistance deems the “Avichay Adraee Network” thus does not consist of a coterie of figures but a of broad ecosystem connecting activists, media platforms, policymakers, and armed formations operating under Israeli patronage. The network’s significance is not only in its media output but its ability to disseminate what are, within Gaza, minor voices, endowing them with the appearance of political significance.

Simultaneously, the *Jusoor* ecosystem has not circumscribed its favorable coverage just to the Abu Shabab militia. It has also praised other militia figures, whitewashing their aid looting, smuggling, trafficking, and abuse activity. To give but one example, while Husam al-Astal, a former PA Preventative Security Officer and the current leader of the so-called “Strike Force Against Terror,” has, in addition to his mercenary-like activities against the resistance, recently been implicated in sexual assaults by Gazan activists, *Jusoor* has labeled him a “humanitarian” figure.<sup>87</sup>

Whether these efforts ultimately succeed remains dubitable; hitherto, they have been unsuccessful. However, sustained analysis demonstrates that the primary goal is not to topple the Hamas government or squelch the resistance, but rather to popularize the narrative—thereby widening the media apparatuses that legitimize it. By signaling that the Gazan masses are opposed to the resistance, this network is able to attempt to excuse Arabic and Middle Eastern nation-state actors’ pursuit of socio-economic normalization with Israel—an endeavor that might otherwise be regarded as morally unacceptable by their populations.



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It should be noted that while both *The Washington Post* and *The Jewish Chronicle* have published English-language articles they attribute to al-Natour, he has repeatedly given interviews in Arabic through a translator, demonstrating that he cannot speak English. Fox quotes him “through a translator,” and the Boston Globe says he “spoke to the editorial board in Arabic through a translator via WhatsApp.” See Michael Tobin, “Gazans speak out against Hamas for the first time in 18 years,” site of Fox News, 11/4/2026, <https://www.foxnews.com/world/gaza-residents-speak-out-against-hamas-first-time-18-years> (Retrieved online 15/06/2026); “Everyone closed the door on us,” *The Boston Globe* newspaper, 21/8/2025, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/08/21/opinion/gaza-injured-kids-hospitals-trump-loomer> (Retrieved online 15/06/2026)




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