

The Palestinian Strategic Report 2010/11



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Chapter Six

The Land and the Holy Sites

The Land and the Holy Sites

Introduction

The Israeli occupation continues to implement its settlement and Judaization plans, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Through these plans, it seeks to seal Jerusalem's identity and future before reaching the end of any peace settlement negotiations with the Palestinian side. During 2010, Israel continued to implement its agenda and refused to stop settlement activities, even when these acts led to a breakdown in the peace process.

This chapter attempts to present a view of the status of the land and holy sites under occupation, Jerusalem in particular. It also tries to shed light on settlement plans, expropriation of lands, house demolitions, the Separation Wall, exhaustion of water resources and other crucial matters. It brings into view the extent of the suffering endured by Palestinians under occupation and how far the Israeli side has gone in subduing them and denying them their rights, in addition to brushing aside all international conventions and resolutions. Simultaneously, it shows the extent of the Palestinians' perseverance and steadfastness in their land, in spite of the multiple difficulties and challenges that they face.

First: Islamic and Christian Holy Sites

During 2010, attacks on Islamic and Christian holy sites increased, their expected success based on gains realized during past systematic attacks; thus reaping the fruits of some strategies instituted during the previous five years. Regarding *al-Aqsa* Mosque, it has become clear that the Israeli government is endeavoring to realize a permanent division in the mosque, between Muslims and Jews; furthermore it became clear that the Israelis had made all the necessary preparations to achieve their goal; only waiting for a favorable political opportunity. As for excavations, they have increased in number and size, and in an unprecedented fashion. The interference of Israeli authorities in the mosque's administration has become a fait accompli in many areas. As for the area surrounding the mosque, the year 2010

witnessed the opening of the Hurva Synagogue, the biggest and most prominent landmark in the Old City to date. The mosques and cemeteries of the WB and the territories occupied in 1948 were subjected to a methodical campaign of arson and assault. Regarding Christian holy sites, the repercussions of the deals concluded by the deposed Patriarch Irineos I continue to be revealed. It seems that a long time may pass before we will be able to know all their details.

1. Al-Aqsa Mosque

a. Changes in the Political and Religious Stances Toward *al-Aqsa* Mosque

Continuous American pressures during 2010, in addition to the fact that the Israeli government realized that it had pushed the limits of the tension caused, prevented any escalation in the official political stances. 2009 had witnessed an incident in which the *al-Aqsa* Mosque was stormed, ordered by Public Security Minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch. 2010 witnessed conspicuous governmental silence, along with providing encouragement and cover for a number of storming incidents by MKs, among them, Moshe Feiglin, the head of Likud, who intruded on the mosque on 1/7/2010, and declared upon leaving that they cannot allow the status quo to continue in which Muslims are allowed to enter in their thousands, while religious Jews enter in small groups. He added that The Islamic Endowment Department that administers *al-Aqsa* Mosque does not own *al-Aqsa* Mosque, rather it is the property of the Israeli people.¹

Such statements and intrusion continued throughout the year. On a religious level, 2010 witnessed the largest storming of *al-Aqsa* since its occupation in 1967, when, on 10/5/2010, a group of 43 rabbis broke into the mosque, protected by Israeli police.² What was most striking in 2010 was the state of absolute indifference on the part of the Palestinian negotiator and Arab governments that gave Israel cover during the negotiations. They agreed to start indirect talks on 3/3/2010, at a time when confrontations were taking place at *al-Aqsa* Mosque, under an unprecedented siege of the mosque. This direction was consolidated on 8/3/2010, by a statement made by Nimr Hammad, an advisor to the Palestinian president, which coincided with the rising in Jerusalem against the opening of the Hurva Synagogue, in which he said that the PA will not allow a third *Intifadah*.³ Clamping down on demonstrations and protests in the entire WB during this period prompted Fatah member, Hatim 'Abd al-Qadir, advisor to the PA president on

Jerusalem affairs, to declare that Jerusalemites should appeal to Arabs for help and support, while at the same time the people in WB were in a state of suppression from the same PA.⁴

b. Excavations and Constructions Under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in Its Periphery

The number of excavations under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in its periphery rose from 25 by 21/8/2009 to 34 by 21/8/2010, i.e., an increase of 9, see the table below:

Table 1/6: Excavations Under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in Its Periphery, 21/8/2010⁵

Direction		Southern side	Western side	Northern side	Total
Type of excavations	Completed	4	9	-	13
	Active	11	8	2	21
Total		15	17	2	34

Excavations Under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in Its Periphery, 21/8/2010





Table 2/6: The Rise in the Number of Excavations Under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in Its Periphery, 21/8/2009–21/8/2010⁶

Direction of excavations	21/8/2009	21/8/2010
Southern side	11	15
Western side	13	17
Northern side	1	2
Total	25	34

The Rise in the Number of Excavations Under *al-Aqsa* Mosque and in Its Periphery, 21/8/2009–21/8/2010



Counting the number of excavations is no more than an indicator that sheds light on the size and extent of these excavations. Yet on the ground, these excavations have become more like a connected city with many entrances and exits; for the number of completed excavations that are open to visitors has reached 13; while a great many of active excavations are on their way to being open to the public. These excavations have caused a number of cave-ins and cracks inside the mosque

and in its periphery. They led, on 18/1/2010, to the collapse of a part of the Wadi Hilwah Street, south of *al-Aqsa*,⁷ and exposed, on 15/2/2010, cracks and corrosion in the walls and columns of the Marwani Prayer Hall.⁸ On 14/11/2010, a deep cave-in was discovered in the earthen region besides the *Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Mastabah*, southwest of the mosque. This cave-in indicates that the excavations have extended in the direction of The Cup ablution fountain (*al-Ka's*), facing al-Qibli Mosque gates.⁹

The year 2010 also witnessed the opening of the biggest Jewish landmark in the Old City, the Hurva Synagogue, in the presence of a number of senior rabbis and Israeli government ministers. One *Haaretz* journalist published a projection by a historical Jewish rabbi called Vilna Gaon; which states that the auspicious day of the third temple will coincide with the third completion of the Hurva Synagogue in Jerusalem's Jewish Quarter.¹⁰ This was considered an indication of an imminent attempt to demolish *al-Aqsa* Mosque on 16/3/2010. This led to confrontations in the city of Jerusalem and across the territories occupied in 1948, in which 150 people were injured.¹¹ Shortly after the inauguration of the Hurva Synagogue, some Jewish groups announced that they are working on building a taller synagogue, nearer to *al-Aqsa* Mosque, to be named the Tiferet Yisrael Synagogue which they expected to be opened in 2011.¹²

“Renovation of the Wailing Wall” Project


A media outlet reported that, in February 2007, one of the Jerusalem Municipality engineers, Yoram Zamosh, proposed an ambitious plan that aims at gathering and organizing efforts to renovate the Jewish Quarter and the area surrounding the mosque. This plan was called *Kedem Yerushalayim* (Jerusalem first). In spite of the fact that this plan was not officially approved by the occupation's municipality, it has become tantamount to a road map guiding Israeli institutions working in this domain.¹³ On 4/10/2010, it was announced that the Jerusalem Local Planning and Building Committee has approved a comprehensive plan to renovate the entire Western Wall Plaza. The new plan calls for a large underground plaza to replace the current main entrance, located at Dung Gate. A new visitor's center will replace the current police building, with areas for educational programming, additional bathrooms, an auditorium, lecture halls, and an exhibition space for archeological discoveries made in the area. Thus, it will be necessary to demolish part of the wall.

The area for excavations proposed by the plan were almost seven thousand square meters in width. The plan proposed the construction of eight different Jewish buildings in the periphery of the Western Wall Plaza. These buildings have a total area of approximately 7,500 square meters. The plan includes expanding the Jewish center known as *Beit Moreshet HaKotel* currently located on the side facing the Western Wall. The plan proposes the expansion of the present center so that its area would increase to 2,384 square meters above ground and 1,320 square meters below ground. The plan also proposed the merger of the Umayyad corridors in the plaza with its proposed entrance, so that these corridors would be on the same level as the Western Wall Square.¹⁴

It must be noted that a group of archaeologists had previously petitioned Jerusalem's District Planning Council and said that the new building of *Beit Moreshet HaKotel* would damage an ancient Roman road, flanked by rare and elaborate columns, that runs beneath the planned construction. In response to the petition, Shmuel Rabinovitch, the Western Wall's rabbi, said the new building would be essential in providing services to the increasing number of visitors to the site, thus rejecting the petition.¹⁵

The renovation of the Western Wall area took another major step forward on 21/11/2010, when the Israeli government approved a budget of \$23 million for its completion, over a period of five years, starting on the date of its approval.¹⁶ It is worth mentioning that the project's objectives include expanding tourism to that sight; a decade ago, the number of visitors was two million; in 2009, the number grew to eight million. It is expected to have in the future room enough for about 15 million visitors per annum.¹⁷

Western Wall Plan as Approved



A Drawing of the Proposed Lower and Upper Levels of the Western Wall Plaza, According to the Jerusalem's Municipality's New Plan



c. Jewish Presence Inside *al-Aqsa* Mosque and Interference in Its Administration

During the period 22/8/2009–21/8/2010, *al-Aqsa* Mosque witnessed 6 incidents of storming by officials, 34 by Jewish extremists under Israeli police protection, and 15 by Israeli security forces. This brought the total to 55 such incidents by 21/8/2010, compared to 43 during the period 22/8/2008–21/8/2009.¹⁸

It has become clear that the intensive storming incidents called for by extremist Jews at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 were aimed at consecrating the site of the “Temple Mount” as a center of Jewish religious life. For they let no religious holiday or a day of remembrance pass without calling on people to storm the mosque; starting with *Yom Kippur* Holiday (Day of Atonement) on 28/9/2009, *Sukkot* (Feast of Booths) on 3/10/2009, the anniversary of Moshe Ben Maimon’s ascent to the “Temple Mount” on 25/10/2009, Purim Holiday on 28/2/2010, and the anniversary of the destruction of the temple (*Tisha B’Av*) on 20/7/2010.

All of these incidents were conducted under the watch of the Israeli police. This fact confirmed that, by 2010, their main task had reached completion, namely

its transformation from being responsible for preventing the Jews from entering the mosque, according to the orders given before 2000, to securing the Jews' entrance into the mosque, individually and in groups. To this end, they formed a special force known as "The Temple Mount Force," now in possession of a comprehensive database of the mosque through break-ins that involved repeated photography and surveillance since 2005. Now it has a system of cameras and heat sensors that monitor carefully the mosque and its periphery.¹⁹ This force has conducted a series of experimental and live maneuvers,²⁰ which intensified during 2009 and 2010. Most significant among these is that observed by the al-Aqsa Foundation for Endowment and Heritage on 21/7/2010, when its cameras photographed this force conducting a maneuver quelling a demonstration in the mosque, using a miniature maquette of the mosque in a wooded area in the forests of Ben Shemen, northern Israel.²¹

A Picture of Training Exercises Conducted by Israeli Forces on a Small Maquette of *al-Aqsa* Mosque



Moreover, Jerusalem's municipality, in cooperation with extremist Jewish organizations, tried to consecrate the walls and outer gates of *al-Aqsa* as spaces for celebrations. Indeed these spaces witnessed loud protests as well as sound and light shows seven times between November 2009 and October 2010.²²

2. Jerusalem's Islamic Holy Sites

In addition to its attacks on *al-Aqsa* Mosque, the Israelis concentrated their attacks on Islamic holy sites on two elements:

- a. The Mamilla Cemetery: razing and construction operations continued there for the benefit of establishing the Center for Human Dignity–Museum of Tolerance Jerusalem (MOTJ), which is being built by the Israeli authorities on parts of the cemetery. In June 2010, Israeli authorities began accelerating plans to build a courthouse complex on the Mamilla Cemetery.²³ On 10/8/2010, bulldozers unearthed 200 graves in preparation for constructing this complex. A spokesman for the Israeli police mentioned that the destruction will later affect 150 graves.²⁴
- b. Expanding the scope of excavations: generally, the excavations have concentrated on the area surrounding *al-Aqsa* Mosque, specifically its southern and western sides. What was new during 2010 was that the expansion of these excavations westwards along two tracks was revealed: the first track reaches the farthest point west in the Old City under the Jaffa Gate. It is believed that part of it passes under the Church of the Holy Sepulcher or under its periphery.²⁵ As for the second track, an elevator was proposed by the Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter, to connect the Jewish Quarter to the Western Wall Plaza. The elevator would connect to a new tunnel under the Aish HaTorah building and was financed by the American Jewish millionaire Baruch Klein.²⁶

3. Jerusalem's Christian Holy Sites

By the end of 2010, information was published revealing the extent of the threat that the Christian presence in Jerusalem is facing. The Christian holy sites in Jerusalem were subjected to numerous attacks during 2010, including:

- a. Setting the Jerusalem Alliance Church in West Jerusalem on fire: on Friday 29/10/2010, theology students in this church, located in the Street of Prophets in Jerusalem were awakened by a fire that was set to their church by Jewish extremists.²⁷ This type of attacks has been carried out against several churches in West Jerusalem. These attacks express the rejection by Jewish extremists of the presence of these churches in Jerusalem.

- b. The repercussions of the deals made by the deposed Patriarch Irineos I continue: after making public the Jaffa Gate deal, on 18/3/2005, the grave circumstances accompanying this deal were then revealed. It came to light that this patriarch had granted the church's financial manager at the time, Nicholas Papadimas, power of attorney for all the church's properties. After the deal was revealed, Papadimas absconded. No party was able to keep count of the deals and contracts that were concluded during the period of his authorization over several years. One of these deals was that of al-Talbieh, known in the media as the "Mar Elias Monastery Deal," according to which the deposed patriarch granted, on 14/12/2007, the right to develop 71 donums in the al-Talbieh area, on the road connecting Jerusalem with Bethlehem, parallel to the Green Line, to the Israeli settlement company B.A.R.A. On 9/8/2009, Palestinian sources revealed that the new Patriarch Theophilos III had signed a new contract for the development of the same land to the benefit of the Talpiot Hahadasha co. owned by the leftist Israeli Shraga Biran. The patriarch and his legal counsel insisted that this was the only solution available to them to regain the land. Although he introduced a new Israeli company, the terms of its contract are better for the church. This will cause a dispute between the two companies, from which the church will benefit.²⁸ However, the outcome in both cases is that an Israeli company won a contract to develop the area. So this deal remains highly controversial.²⁹ There is a real dread that the coming years will reveal more deals signed during the reign of Patriarch Irineos I and Papadimas, and that this dossier will remain open for many years to come.
- c. The ratio of Christian residents of Jerusalem continued its drop from 20% of the city's population in 1948 to 2.9% in 1988; while in 2009, it became only 1.9%, as their total fell to 14,500. This trend is expected to continue or even worsen, as the median age of Christian Arab residents is 34.6 years, compared to 25.1 years for Jews and 19.4 years for Muslims;³⁰ a rate not seen in Jerusalem for centuries. It portends the extinction of Christianity in the city.

4. Islamic and Christian Holy Sites in the Rest of Historic Palestine

a. The Territories Occupied in 1948

The attacks recorded in 2010 varied between transgressions against endowment properties and the selling of them at auction to arson against mosques and offensive graffiti on their walls (see table 3/6). In addition the Israelis incorporated an unknown number of mosques and religious shrines in the list of Jewish heritage sites announced on 21/2/2010, which includes 150 Palestinian sites, not all of them revealed.

Table 3/6: Most Notable Attacks on the Holy Sites in the 1948 Occupied Territories 2010

Location	Nature of attack	Date
Acre	Sale of endowment properties (250 properties and sites in various areas) ³¹	16/2/2010
Sarafand Mosque	Storming and offensive graffiti on its walls ³²	22/5/2010
Abtan Mosque near Haifa	Storming and offensive graffiti on its walls ³³	9/6/2010
Kfar Saba	Vandalizing a prayer room and erasing Qur'anic verses ³⁴	22/6/2010
Jaffa	Burning the western gate of Hasan Beik Mosque ³⁵	20/7/2010
Negev	Demolishing a mosque in the town of Rahat ³⁶	7/11/2010

b. The WB

Anyone who looks closely at Israeli aggression against Palestinian Islamic holy sites cannot miss the presence of a systematic campaign of attack and arson against mosques throughout historic Palestine. Furthermore, it is clear that the groups that carry out these attacks are linked, leaving the same signature in every mosque that they attack. For example, they sign the burned-out mosques with the phrase “burning done [followed by a serial number].” The last mosque carrying such a signature in 2010 was al-Anbiya’ Mosque (The Prophets Mosque) in the town of Beit Fajjar, south of Bethlehem, on which it was written “burning done 18” (see table 4/6).

Table 4/6: Most Notable Attacks on the Holy Sites in the WB 2010

Location	Nature of attack	Date
Nablus	Attack on the seventy Sheikhs and Mufadel shrines in 'Awarta, writing offensive graffiti on their walls, and throwing liquor bottles inside. A similar attack on the town's cemetery ³⁷	20/1/2010
Nablus	Notification to stop the construction of the mosque of Salman the Persian in Burin village ³⁸	27/1/2010
Palestine in general	Announcing the Jewish heritage sites list (which includes 150 sites; among them, the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, the mountains of Ebal and Gerizim in Nablus, the Twins Cave west of Jerusalem, the town of Silwan in Jerusalem, and others) ³⁹	21/2/2010
Nablus	Attack on Bilal Bin Rabah Mosque (Rachel's Tomb) in the town of Huwwara. Writing offensive phrases and drawing Israeli six-pointed stars on the mosque's walls ⁴⁰	16/4/2010
South of Nablus	Arson attack on the main mosque in the village of Lubban al-Sharqiya ⁴¹	4/5/2010
Hebron	Building a road that connects the Kiryat Arba' settlement directly with the Ibrahimi Mosque ⁴²	25/5/2010
Nablus	300 settlers protected by 30 army vehicles break into Joseph's Tomb ⁴³	14/6/2010
Nablus	500 settlers break into Joseph's Tomb ⁴⁴	5/8/2010
Salfit	Notification of demolishing a mosque in Qarawat Bani Hassan ⁴⁵	5/8/2010
Nablus, Ramallah	The military governor orders the demolition of two mosques in Burin and al-Jalazun, claiming that they lack permits ⁴⁶	23/8/2010
Bethlehem	Arson against al-Anbiya' Mosque in the town of Beit Fajjar, throwing copies of the Holy Qur'an on the floor, and writing offensive graffiti on its walls ⁴⁷	4/10/2010
Tubas	Demolishing a mosque in Khirbet Yarza ⁴⁸	25/11/2010
Hebron	Leveling a cemetery designated for the burial of newborn babies, at the entrance of the town of Beit Ummar ⁴⁹	22/12/2010
Hebron	Repeatedly forbidding the <i>Athan</i> (Muslim call to prayer) at the Ibrahimi Mosque ⁵⁰	Intermittent periods throughout the year

c. The GS

Attacks against the GS holy sites during 2010 can be summed up by the following two items:

1. Continuing to forbid the restoration of demolished mosques; as during the aggression against the GS, the Israeli forces destroyed totally 45 mosques. Concerned parties were not able to rebuild them due to the continuous siege of GS. They also partially damaged 107 other mosques; some of which were restored during the period 2009–2010.
2. Leveling a mosque in the border area of al-Duhniyah, east of Rafah, on 4/5/2010.⁵¹

Second: The Population Under Occupation

The Jerusalemites' success in altering the demographic equation in their favor, in spite of the fact that they are the party under occupation that suffers from restrictions in all areas of their lives, was a source of worry for the Israeli decision-maker. Indeed in 2000, he appeared alarmed when numbers indicated a steady rise in the Palestinian population, in spite of all the control mechanisms devised by Israeli planners. At the end of 2000, they charged Hebrew University distinguished demographer Sergio Della Pergola with preparing a study that would predict the ratios of Jerusalem's inhabitants in 2020. From this study, he came to the conclusion that, by that date, Arabs would constitute 40.2% of the population of the city, with its two parts. This would pose a threat to the city's Judaization programs and Jewish character. Hence, it should be stressed that a reading of the battle for existence in Jerusalem must depart from a study of the demographic balance; keeping in mind that the most remarkable point of strength that preserved what remained of Jerusalem's Arab Islamic identity is the Jerusalemites' ability to persist and continue, and even grow.⁵²

1. The Demographic Battle’s Reality⁵³


Published data indicates that the demographic make up of Jerusalem was as follows:

Table 5/6: Number of Jerusalem’s Residents 2008–2009⁵⁴

Group	Year	Population	% Annual growth	% of the total population
Palestinians	2008	268,600	3.1	35.2
	2009	275,900	2.7	35.7
Jews and others*	2008	495,000	1.6	64.8
	2009	497,000	0.4	64.3

*There are about 12,300, i.e., about 1.6% of Jerusalemites, registered in 2009 under “others.” Statistically, they are usually added to the Jews. These are mostly immigrants from Eastern Europe and Russia who are not recognized as Jews, non-Arab Christians, or those who refuse to register themselves as Jews.

Number of Jerusalem’s Residents at the End of 2009



After careful reading of Israeli statistics, we have come to the following conclusions:

- a. There is a decline in the Palestinian population’s growth in Jerusalem. After this growth had reached 3.7% annually in 2004, it dropped to 2.7% in 2009.⁵⁵ Israel bears much of the responsibility for that.
- b. Israel had partial success in raising the annual rate of increase of Jewish residents from 1% in 2004 to 1.6% in 2008,⁵⁶ in order for it to correspond to that of the general Jewish population in the state of Israel for the first time since 1992.

It seems that the special policies adopted by the government and Jerusalem's municipality toward Jewish residents made it the city that witnessed the highest rate of Jewish population growth among the main urban centers in the state; e.g., Tel Aviv (0.5%), and Haifa (-0.3%).⁵⁷ However, this ratio dropped once again in 2009 to 0.4%.

- c. Israel succeeded in lowering negative net internal migration to 4,900 Jewish residents in 2008, after it had reached 6,400 in 2007 and the lowest figure since 1995.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, this type of migration rose again to 8,200 persons in 2009, indicating that the success in 2008 was partial and temporary.⁵⁹
- d. The annual increase in the Jewish population in the settlements of East Jerusalem varied greatly. Most settlements continued to fail to attract more settlers. This increase varies between -0.6% in Gilo, -0.4% in East Talpiot, 0.6% in Pisgat Ze'ev, and 0.8% in Neve Yakov. However, the biggest breakthrough and the almost unique success case occurred in Har Homa (Jabal Abu Ghneim), which witnessed an increase in population at the high rate of 27.4% in 2008.⁶⁰
- e. According to the numbers released by The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), Palestinian residents continued to be the majority in East Jerusalem. Of a total population of 456,300 persons in 2008, there were 195,500 (43%) Jews and 260,800 (57%) Palestinians.⁶¹
- f. There has been a decline in the number of Christians in Jerusalem, as previously mentioned.⁶²
- g. With the decline in the number of Jews coming to the state of Israel in general, the number of Jewish immigrants coming to Jerusalem from abroad has plateaued at 2,500 between 2002 and 2007, and did not exceed 2,100 immigrants in 2008.⁶³ Most of the Jewish immigrants arriving in Jerusalem immigrate for religious reasons. 51% of them arrive from the US and France; countries whose Jewish citizens seldom immigrate to Israel.⁶⁴
- h. The proportion defining themselves as Ultra Orthodox Jews, i.e., Haredim, (29%) is the highest of all the large cities in Israel, and is almost four times the proportion of Haredim in Israel as a whole (8%). This indicates a rise in religious migration to Jerusalem by Haredim, a rate that is likely to continue to increase. The proportion of Jerusalem's residents that were Haredim was 26% between 2003–2005, and rose to 29% during the years 2006–2008.⁶⁵
- i. The proportion of Haredim in Jerusalem's population is expected to rise as the average fertility rate of Haredi women is 7.7 children, compared to 4.1 for the


city’s Arab women.⁶⁶ In addition, the ratio of children less than 14 years old among the Haridim is 43%, compared to 25% for the rest of Jews, and 41% for Jerusalemite Palestinians.⁶⁷

- j. As a consequence of the increase in the proportion of religious Jews, internal migration has become largely confined to Jerusalem and the WB settlements. 31% of the Jews who had left the city in 2008 took up residence in the WB settlements; while those who came from the settlements to reside in Jerusalem constituted 24% of the Jews who moved into the city in 2008.⁶⁸
- k. In Jerusalem’s Old City, the number of residents evolved in the manner shown in the following table:

Table 6/6: Number of the Old City’s Residents 2005–2008⁶⁹

Group	2005	2006	2007	2008
Palestinians	32,635	33,181	33,109	32,834
Jews and others	3,942	3,894	3,856	3,847
Total	36,577	37,075	36,965	36,681

Number of the Old City’s Residents 2005–2008



The Jewish population in the Old City has been in decline since 2003. The Palestinian population increased until 2006. It started to decrease in 2007 for the first time since 1970s; and it continued to decrease in 2008. It looks as if Israeli policies have succeeded in expelling Palestinians from the Old City; a direction that is being reinforced year upon year.

It is worth pointing out here that Israel's efficiency in marketing Jerusalem as an international tourist destination has improved. The number of nights spent by foreign tourists in Jerusalem's hotels in 2000 was 2,923,200 nights, dropping to 600,000 nights during the Palestinian *Intifadah* of 2002. It has recovered and increased to reach 2,895,900 nights in 2007 and 3,527,000 nights in 2008.⁷⁰

2. Attempts to Expel the Palestinians

The policy of expelling Palestinian residents runs along two tracks; the first is harassing them and surrounding them with harsh living conditions, in order to push them toward "voluntary" migration; while the second is stripping them of their right to reside in the city, using various pretexts.

- a. Harassing the Jerusalemites: Jerusalem's development and infrastructure policies were designed to exclude the Arabs from the largest possible number of projects and services; and to collect from them the highest possible rate of taxation. The policy resulted in a huge discrepancy in poverty rates between Palestinian and Jewish residents of the city. 23% of Jewish families lived in poverty,⁷¹ while the poverty rate of Palestinians jumped to 60% of families. In addition, 74% of non-Jewish children in Jerusalem belong to families living under the poverty line.⁷² Unemployment reached 8% of the Jewish workforce and 13% among Palestinian residents.⁷³

Placing restrictions on housing remains one of the means of putting pressure on Jerusalemites. Statistics show that the number of residential apartments in all of Jerusalem in 2008 was 191 thousands. Of these, 79% are located in Jewish neighborhoods, in spite of the fact that Jews make up 64.8% of the city's inhabitants; while 21% of them are in Palestinian neighborhoods, in spite of the fact that the Palestinians constitute 35.2% of the city's population.⁷⁴ This reflects the number of rooms designated for each individual. In the Jewish population, there is one person per room; while in the Palestinian population, there are 1.9 persons per room.⁷⁵ The average housing density in Jewish neighborhoods was 24 square meters per person, dropping to 12 square meters per person in Palestinian neighborhoods.⁷⁶

During 2010, 39 residences in Jerusalem were demolished, resulting in the displacement of 280 people. 90 agricultural and commercial structures in Jerusalem were destroyed;⁷⁷ while the number of building permits approved by Jerusalem's municipality during 2009 did not exceed 18.⁷⁸

Table 7/6: Demolished Houses in Jerusalem 2010⁷⁹

Location	Area (m ²)	Residences	Rooms	Family members	Children (under 18)
Al-Tur	176	4	9	26	14
Silwan	400	5	13	38	24
Jaba'	210	3	10	25	12
Old City	100	3	4	28	16
Al-'Isawiyyah	720	6	27	43	22
Beit Hanina	70	1	3	6	2
Jabal al-Mukabber	338	4	13	34	13
Sur Baher	680	9	23	51	33
Sheikh Jarrah	80	1	3	9	6
Al-Thawri	96	1	3	6	2
Kafr 'Aqab	120	1	3	7	5
Al Nu'man	170	1	6	7	4
Total	3,160	39	117	280	153

Note: These data were collected from 1/1/2010 to 31/12/2010.

b. Revocation of the right to reside in Jerusalem: The figure above regarding Jerusalemites' numbers represents those who carry Blue ID Cards, which allow them to reside within Jerusalem's municipal limits and pass through the crossings built in the Separation Wall that surrounds the city. These figures are from the Israeli Ministry of Interior. However, all the sources, including Israeli sources, that publish these figures, agree that not all of the Blue ID residents reside within the Separation Wall's limits. Rather, a large number of Jerusalemites who carry the Blue ID cards reside in neighborhoods that in the past were physically connected to the city and are now isolated from it by the Wall, such as al-'Eizariya, Abu Dis, 'Anata and al-Ram. Sources differ on the numbers of such Jerusalemites. The Jerusalem Center for Social & Economic Rights (JCSER) estimates their numbers at 125 thousands,⁸⁰ while other Palestinian sources estimate it at 100 thousands.⁸¹ As for Israeli sources, they failed to publish any clear estimates of the figures.

Removal of such a large number of Jerusalemites from the city's total population was one of the main objectives behind the Separation Wall's construction. Today, with 95% of the Wall's construction completed, Israel has

set about revoking the ID cards of those residents who have become isolated outside the Wall, on the pretext that they live in “a foreign country.”⁸² These measures began to be applied gradually in some of Jerusalem’s neighborhoods, among them, al-Ram (estimated population 58 thousands),⁸³ and al-‘Eizariya (estimated population 17,600).⁸⁴ This explains the big jump in the number of those stripped of their residency rights, between 2007 when they numbered 229 persons and 2008 when their numbers reached 4,672 persons.⁸⁵

3. Attempt to Promote Jerusalem as a Jewish Residential Center

The Israeli authorities continued to work hard to try to persuade large numbers of Jewish citizens to move to Jerusalem. This requires overcoming a number of obstacles that had made Jerusalem less attractive to Jewish residents in previous years. One important obstacle is the fact that Jerusalem is isolated from the state’s Jewish center, and the eastern settlements in Jerusalem are far from the Jewish trade center in the west of the city. The municipality proposed the light rail system project, which connects various eastern settlements to Jerusalem’s west as its primary weapon in overcoming this obstacle. 2010 witnessed intensive work on the infrastructure of Jerusalem Light Rail (JLR) in Beit Hanina, Shu‘fat, Wadi al-Joz and Mamilla.⁸⁶ Work progressed to the point of conducting test runs of the train on some of the completed portions of its track.⁸⁷

Another obstacle was the high price of housing, a deterrent to those who would otherwise be in favor of increasing the Jewish population of the city. On 13/6/2010, Mayor of Jerusalem Nir Barakat unveiled a plan to facilitate the purchase of affordable houses by young families, offering a discount of 20% on the market value.⁸⁸

Third: The Settlement and Judaization Process in Jerusalem

The Israeli authorities employ two parallel policies to consolidate their control of Jerusalem’s lands. On the one hand, they work at emptying Palestinian neighborhoods, focusing on those that embrace the Old City, in order to control geographically and demographically the city center. In parallel, they work on expanding settlement blocs in order to bring about a geographic connection between them and to change the status quo in the

eastern part of the city. The aim is to change Jerusalem from a Palestinian city, in which settlement outposts are scattered, to a city of connected settlement blocs with scattered Palestinian neighborhoods between them. To bolster this trend, on 23/10/2010, the Ministerial Committee on Legislative Affairs has approved a bill, defining Jerusalem as a “national priority area.” This paved the way for an increase in official support and care for the city, and an implementation of the settlement expansions.⁸⁹

1. Taking over Palestinian Neighborhoods

a. Sheikh Jarrah Neighborhood

During 2010 and in the beginning of 2011, Israel worked at sealing the fate of the Sheikh Jarrah Neighborhood. On 17/2/2010, they confiscated land belonging to Kamal ‘Ubeidat as part of a long-standing plan to increase parking for the nearby Shimon HaTzadik Tomb.⁹⁰ The land is adjacent to the housing and where Um Kamal al-Kurd erected her protest tent when she was expelled from her house in October 2008. The Israeli Supreme Court decreed on 26/9/2010 that the lands of Sheikh Jarrah housing belong to the settlement company Nahalat Shimon International, paving the way for the expulsion of the neighborhood’s residents from what remains of the properties, such as the families of al-Kurd, al-Ghawi and Hanun.⁹¹ In addition, The Jerusalem municipal committee for commemorating “terror victims” has authorized the construction of a new headquarters for Zaka, a voluntary rescue organization, in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The planned headquarters will include facilities for storing thousands of bodies and a museum for “commemorating terror victims.”⁹² It also decided in April 2010 to change the name of this neighborhood to the Shimon Hatzadik Neighborhood.⁹³ On 7/4/2010, settler groups pushed to evict two more Palestinian families from the same neighborhood, as a part of a wider program to demolish Palestinian homes in the area to make way for 200 housing units designated solely for Jews.⁹⁴ Israeli authorities plan to build 250 settlement units at Karm al-Mufti and 90 at the Shepherd Hotel.⁹⁵ Soon after, on 9/1/2011, they demolished the Shepherd Hotel⁹⁶ in order to build settlement units. The completion of these steps will mean that Israel has succeeded in completely Judaizing the Sheikh Jarrah Neighborhood and linking the Jewish areas west of Jerusalem with the Hebrew University and the French Hill settlement to the east.

A Picture of the Demolition of the Shepherd Hotel in Jerusalem



b. Al-Bustan Neighborhood

In al-Bustan Neighborhood, where the number of properties threatened with demolition totaled 88 and where 1,500 Palestinians reside, Israel employed a different strategy, one of “taming” this neighborhood’s residents, through a series of break-ins and arrests that affected every house in the neighborhood.⁹⁷

Some reports have stated that Israeli forces arrested 750 Jerusalemites during 2010, accusing them of throwing stones. Most of these were from Silwan and al-‘Isawiyyah neighborhoods and most of them were minors.⁹⁸ They placed some of the neighborhood children under house arrest in houses other than those of their parents. Jerusalem’s mayor realized that the gradual demolition of these properties would be a slow and ultimately unsuccessful process and so he tried more than once to push for implementing a mass demolition of all the threatened properties; to that end, he divided the roles between himself and settlement societies. Thus, after the Israeli Supreme Court issued an order to demolish the settlement outpost erected in the neighborhood, known as “Beit Yonatan” because it was built without a permit; Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barakat declared on 2/3/2010 that if he was asked to execute this order, he would demolish the whole neighborhood, including 88 Palestinian homes. The mayor attempted

to trade settlement building for Palestinian homes in the neighborhood. This compelled the prime minister to interfere and ask for postponement of the demolition operation.⁹⁹ The neighborhood's inhabitants presented an expensive, self-funded organizational plan to the municipality on 1/5/2010 in an attempt to stop the demolition of their homes.¹⁰⁰ However, the mayor responded by proposing on 18/6/2010¹⁰¹ to the Local Planning and Construction Committee in the municipality a settlement to the effect that the Palestinians themselves should demolish 22 of these properties and in exchange the remaining properties would be legally recognized. According to this settlement, the municipality does not owe any compensation to the owners of the 22 properties; rather it asks them to share the remaining 66 properties with their neighbors.¹⁰² On 21/6/2010, the committee approved this proposal.¹⁰³

c. Other Neighborhoods

In Jerusalem, there are many areas threatened with evacuation or mass demolition, such as al-'Abbasiyah Neighborhood, adjacent to al-Bustan Neighborhood in Silwan. On 24/2/2010, the Israeli police handed out demolition orders for 11 properties in the al-'Abbasiyah and Wadi Hilwah areas.¹⁰⁴ On 16/6/2010 they demolished three animal sheds and a nursery in the same neighborhood under the pretext that they lack building permits.¹⁰⁵ During January 2010, other neighborhoods were added to those threatened, when the Israeli forces handed evacuation notices to the residents of 26 properties in al-'Isawiyyah.¹⁰⁶ During the same month they issued a ruling that turned 660 donums of al-'Isawiyyah lands into a national park.¹⁰⁷

These demolition notices extended to the area surrounding the city from the north, where once again, on 10/2/2010, the Israeli authorities renewed evacuation orders to the owners of five shops directly facing the Damascus Gate,¹⁰⁸ after they had previously handed them demolition notices on 22/7/2009. On 9/2/2010, a new neighborhood joined the threatened, when Israeli courts issued 42 eviction and demolition orders against two buildings in the Beit Hanina area, on the pretext that they had been built without construction permits.¹⁰⁹

2. Settlement Expansion in Jerusalem

On 25/11/2009, PM Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel would impose a 10-month freeze on the construction in WB settlements, but there would be no freeze implemented in predominantly Arab East Jerusalem.¹¹⁰ During this freeze period, the Israeli government and municipality accelerated settlement building measures in the city. Through these measures, it can be presumed that the Israeli government was trying to compensate for the nominal freeze on settlements in the WB. Israel timed the announcement of some of its biggest expansions to coincide with visits by American officials in order to emphasize that Jerusalem is not a subject for negotiations. On 9/3/2010 the Israeli Ministry of the Interior approved the building of 1,600 new homes in the settlement of Ramat Shlomo in the north of East Jerusalem, timing the announcement to coincide with the arrival of the American Vice President, Joe Biden.¹¹¹ This embarrassed the Israeli government and made it announce a postponement of implementing this decision. However, the Interior Ministry's Jerusalem District Planning and Construction Committee did not have to wait long and on 15/6/2010, it ratified the expansion.¹¹² During the "freeze" period, the number of constructed residential units in Jerusalem, and those that were under construction, reached 700; contracts for 392 units were prepared for implementation; and plans to build 3,010 residential units in the city were approved.¹¹³ On 12/9/2010, the Peace Now Movement announced that there are approximately "37,684 housing units in plans that were approved in the past but were never built. Most of those units require further approval of the government for the allocation and marketing of the lands."¹¹⁴ Among these, 12,050 units are in Jerusalem.¹¹⁵

The most notable settlement developments during 2010 can be divided in to two types: the first is the announcement of new settlements in Jerusalem; and the second is the announcement of great expansions in existing settlements; in addition to limited "routine" expansions to various settlements in the city.

One of the most significant new settlements is Ma'ale David. In January 2010, the Construction and Planning Committee began reviewing the blueprint of this settlement which was to be built on an 11 donums of land, 300 meters from the Ma'aleh Hazeitim settlement.¹¹⁶ On 9/5/2010, it was announced that renovation work has begun for the construction of the first 14 housing units, to rise to include 104 units.¹¹⁷ This settlement is established in the area connecting the Mount of

Olives to Ras al-‘Amoud. It is located above the main police headquarters, built during Jordanian rule and vacated by the Israeli police in September 2008 after the construction of its headquarters in area E1 had been completed. In November 2010, 66 Jewish families moved to reside in Ma‘aleh Hazeitim, which is located on a land purchased by the American Jewish millionaire Irving Moskowitz.¹¹⁸ This settlement is expected to house 110 families.¹¹⁹

Plans for the Givat Hamatos settlement were further discussed in 2010. It is to be built on the land of the town of Beit Safafa, south of the city. The number of residential units planned to be built in this settlement is 3,699, in addition to 1,100 hotel rooms.¹²⁰

There are also plans to establish a third settlement called Givat Yael on an area of more than 2,500 donums of the lands of Walaja village southwest of Jerusalem. This settlement will consolidate the southern settlement belt in the city, which is currently made up of the existing Har Homa and Gilo settlements. By adding the settlement of Givat Hamatos, planned to be established on the lands of Beit Safafa, the southern line of Jewish population density which is connected directly to the west of Jerusalem would be complete.¹²¹

As for the second track, the biggest expansions were concentrated on specific points; most prominent among them was the Ramat Shlomo settlement to the north. Its expansion will yield 1,600 residential units, extending in the direction of West Jerusalem; in the hope of attracting more Jews to live in this settlement.¹²² Another expansion was approved, linking the two settlements Pisgat Ze‘ev and Neve Yaakov, with 198 housing units to be constructed in the former and 377 in the latter.¹²³ Southern settlements had their share of expansion as, on 29/11/2010, a request to change the designation of a plot allocated for a hotel in favor of 130 housing units near Gilo Settlement was approved.¹²⁴ In addition there were plans, most of them submitted by the Israel Lands Authority, to expand Gilo by another three thousand housing units.¹²⁵ It was decided also to add 1,025 housing units to the Har Homa settlement, the fastest growing residential complex in the east of Jerusalem; 983 of them will be in Har Homa C and 42 in Har Homa B.¹²⁶ The following is a table of settlement developments, the execution of which were announced from 27/10/2010.

Table 8/6: Expansions Planned for After the End of the “Settlement Freeze” Period¹²⁷

Location	Settlement	No. of units	Current status	Remarks
Shu‘fat	Shu‘fat Hill “Ramat Shlomo”	1,600	Approved	
Beit Hanina, al-Ram, Hizma, Shu‘fat	Mir Forest-Neve Yaakov	377	Approved	The area of the Mir Forest is to be used to celebrate the memory of the victims of the Holocaust. The plan raised strong objections for fear of harming the Jerusalem Wildflower Sanctuary there and consequently the number of units was reduced to 400. Construction is already underway.
Shu‘fat	Kantri Ramout	700	Approved	Efforts to speed up the marketing of the residence are underway.
Bethlehem, Sur Baher, Beit Sahour, Beit Safafa	Jabal Abu Ghneim Har Homa	1,025	In process	Over the last few years, construction there has been continuous. 42 units will be built in Har Homa B, and 983 in Har Homa C.
Beit Safafa	Givat Hamatos	3,699	In process	The project continued for many years without being certified by the relevant Israeli authorities due to the presence of Palestinian landowners in the area.
Jabal al-Mukabber	The Governor’s Palace Armon HaNatziv	450	Under construction	Leveling the plot of land adjacent to Eliyahu Street. The move represents an attempt to rejuvenate the Armon HaNatziv neighborhood, which is moving progressively beyond the preliminary stages of construction.
Jabal al-Mukabber	Ramat Rachel	850	In process of being authorized	Unorganized land designated for agricultural use. The land was converted for the use of expanding the Talpiot residential neighborhood.
Beit Safafa, Bethlehem, al-Walaja	Gilo	3,000	In process of zoning	A Master plan is in place. No objections were made.
Total of settlement units		11,701		

Fourth: The Struggle over Jerusalem's Cultural Identity

1. Judaizing Names and Landmarks

During 2009, Israel launched a campaign to change the names of landmarks, neighborhoods, and streets in Jerusalem. 2010 witnessed a continuation of this campaign, focusing on the areas of Jaffa Gate,¹²⁸ Wadi Hilwah in the south of the Old City, and Wadi al-Joz to its north.¹²⁹ The Jerusalem Municipality told store owners in East Jerusalem neighborhoods “to change the language of their store signs into Hebrew, and informed the owners that, unless they do so, their stores will not be licensed and they will have to be shut down.”¹³⁰

2. The Jewish Heritage List

On 21/2/2010, the occupation government announced a Jewish heritage list that included 150 religious and heritage sites; among them mosques and Islamic sites, such as the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem, the Old City's walls, the town of Silwan, Jerusalem's hills, the mountains of Ebal and Gerizim in Nablus, Marj Ibn 'Amer (Meadow of Amr's Son) in northern Palestine, and the Twins Cave west of Jerusalem.¹³¹ Not all the landmarks in the list were revealed; but it is clear that this list was an attempt to present the religious and historical landmarks in Palestine in a new light through a fabricated Jewish narrative.

3. The Project to Renovate the Walls and Gates of Jerusalem's Old City

Early in 2010, the Israeli authorities closed Damascus Gate north of the Old City, as part of a plan to renovate the Old City's gates and walls, according to which Jerusalem's municipality is allowed to alter the architectural style of the walls and gates, introduce sculptures and stones that carry menorahs and the six-pointed star of David and other forms in an attempt to impose an artificial Jewish identity to the walls. Some sources declared that the Israelis intended to lengthen the period of renovation of the Damascus Gate and to join to it the New Gate; a step towards the turning of the Jaffa Gate, which directly overlooks Jerusalem's west, into the Old City's main gate. This is confirmed by the restoration and renovation work underway on the squares that one sees upon entering the Old City sees from the Jaffa Gate.¹³²

Fifth: Israeli Settlement Expansion

In spite of the fact that Israeli governments recognize that establishing and expanding settlements is in clear and flagrant violation of international law and of the agreements that they had signed with their Palestinian counterparts, supporting and encouraging the settlement agenda in the occupied WB territories continued.

Statistics indicate that the number of settlers in WB has multiplied more than 40 times between 1972 and 2010. Those settlers live in 144 settlements; of them, 26 are in the Jerusalem Governorate alone. Data shows that most settlers are concentrated in the Jerusalem Governorate, where there are as many as 262,493 of them. Among them, 196,178 settlers live in that part of the Jerusalem governorate (J1), that Israel had forcibly annexed shortly after its occupation of the WB in 1967. In the Ramallah and al-Bireh governorates there are approximately 96,400 settlers; in Bethlehem Governorate, 56,200; and in the Salfit Governorate 33,200 settlers.¹³³

The announcement on 25/11/2009 that settlement construction in the WB was to be frozen for 10 months stirred indignation among Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Palestinians expressed their rejection of this decision issued by the Israeli government because it did not include the 18 Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem or the settlement plans that were approved before the announcement of the settlement construction freeze.¹³⁴ The heads of the regional councils of WB settlements as well as many official parties in the Israeli government have criticized their government's decision to freeze settlement construction in the WB and threatened to fight the government's decision and invite settlement tenders and settlement plans to continue construction. Based on the Israeli decision to freeze this construction that excluded Jerusalem, the Jerusalem municipality continued to deposit settlement plans successively, as a tactical step that would ensure a continuation of settlement construction in Jerusalem.

The American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomed Netanyahu's decision to freeze settlement activity. She said that this announcement "helps move forward toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."¹³⁵ Thus, she contradicted her administration's view of complete cessation of settlement building in the WB, including Jerusalem and "natural growth." However, Israel shrugged off every US proposal, and deposited new settlement plans with the Interior Ministry's Jerusalem

District Planning and Construction Committee. These plans include the building of 942 new settlement units in Gilo Settlement, which were approved on 5/4/2011. The plans also included building 1,600 new residential units in the Ramat Shlomo Settlement, announced during the visit of American Vice President Joe Biden, and then ratified by the committee on 15/6/2010.¹³⁶

Israel remained obstinate after Obama and Netanyahu met in July 2010; the latter refusing to give any statement related to extending the period of the settlement freeze. Netanyahu wanted to avoid the fall of his government as a result of incurring the wrath of the settlers who had announced, prior to his meeting with Obama, that they were ready to build 2,700 residential units without approval from any party.¹³⁷

On 12/9/2010, the Israeli Peace Now Movement published a report that stated that there are approximately “37,684 housing units in plans that were approved in the past but were never built. Most of those units require further approval of the government for the allocation and marketing of the lands.”¹³⁸ Thus, these plans would continue as soon as the period of settlement construction freeze in the WB Israeli settlements ends on 27/9/2010.

An analysis of the Israeli Peace Now Movement report conducted by The Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem (ARIJ) showed that the settlements designated for expansion immediately after the end of the freeze period and those to be expanded in the near future are mostly concentrated in 52 settlements in the western isolation area between the Green Line (Armistice Line) and the Separation Wall. They include 28,319 settlement units, representing a ratio of 75.2%.¹³⁹

On 30/8/2010, Israeli army radio indicated that thousands of residential units in Israeli settlements obtained the necessary licenses to start building them as of 27/9/2010 in 57 Israeli settlements in the WB. The official extension of the settlement freeze was the sole means of stopping these construction projects.¹⁴⁰ The Israeli response to the post-freeze period has taken different forms, as the spiritual leader of the right-wing Shas Movement, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, showered the Palestinians with a barrage of curses, wishing that they “perish from this world,” and describing them as the “evil, bitter enemies of Israel.”¹⁴¹

Netanyahu stressed that Israel, in any peace settlement with the Palestinians, would retain the Ariel Settlement, saying “Anyone who understands the geography of the Land of Israel knows how important Ariel is.”¹⁴²


An analysis of high precision aerial photos (0.5x0.5 meters) conducted by ARIJ, revealed that, during 2010, settlement construction was substantial; as Israel built 1,819 buildings/apartments in 133 settlements all over the WB, including Jerusalem; in addition to 1,433 mobile homes (caravans).

Table 9/6: Number of Buildings Added to Israeli Settlements in WB During 2010¹⁴³


Governorate	No. of Buildings	% of total
Bethlehem	214	11.8
Hebron	138	7.6
Jenin	35	1.9
Jericho	15	0.8
Jerusalem	420	23.1
Nablus	160	8.8
Qalqilya	219	12
Ramallah	324	17.8
Salfit	268	14.7
Tubas	11	0.6
Tulkarem	15	0.8
Total	1,819	100

Source: Geographic Information System (GIS) Unit in ARIJ, 2011.

Number of Buildings Added to Israeli Settlements in WB During 2010



Map 2/6: The Settlements That Underwent Expansion During 2010 in WB



Note: Translated into English by al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations.




When the following picture taken in 2009 is compared with the next picture taken in 2010, the comparison reveals the changes in construction in parts of the Modi'in Illit Settlement made during 2010.

Modi'in Illit 2009



Modi'in Illit 2010




It is worth mentioning here that, in the above settlements, 1,819 buildings translates into 7,276 residential units, plus an additional construction area estimated at more than 902 thousand square meters. It is noticed that most of the construction is concentrated in the Jerusalem Governorate, a ratio of 24%, then 18% in the Ramallah Governorate.

During 2010, settlement construction was concentrated in the settlements located west of the Separation Wall (the area between the Wall and the Green Line). This is in keeping with the final Israeli plan of declaring the Wall the eastern borders of the Israeli state. Construction operations in the settlements situated east of the Wall are considered limited to an area of 203.81 donums, or 26.7% of the total construction done during 2010; construction and development operations in the settlements west of the Wall constitute an area of 698.56 donums, or 73.3% of total construction (see table 10/6).¹⁴⁴

Table 10/6: Expansion in the Israeli Settlements Located East and West of the Separation Wall 2010

Location	No. of caravans	%	No. of buildings	%
East of the Wall	537	37.5	485	26.7
West of the Wall	896	62.5	1,334	73.3
Total	1,433	100	1,819	100

Expansion in the Israeli Settlements Located East and West of the Separation Wall 2010



There is a major disparity between the sources of information regarding the statistics on settlement units that were built or began to be built in 2010. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) indicates that more than 6,764 residential units were built in 2010 in the Israeli settlements on the WB, compared with 1,703 in 2009 and 2,107 in 2008; while the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) says that only 1,492 residential units were built in 2010, compared with 2,071 in 2009. CBS claimed that there were only 541 housing units that started to be built in 2010. This contradicts what the Peace Now movement has said; that since the resumption of settlement construction on 26/9/2010 up until mid-November 2010, the settlers laid foundations for 1,126 homes.¹⁴⁵ The above raises a question mark over whether Israeli officials are purposely hiding facts and providing low figures, in order to avoid being subjected to more Palestinian and international objection and pressure.

On 29/12/2010, the Israeli Knesset approved the government's 2011–2012 budget, which allocated more than 2 billion shekels (\$535.76 million), to settlements, their services and security. The 2011 budget approved the marketing of 200 housing units in the Ma'ale Adumim Settlement and 500 others in the Har Homa Settlement. In addition, it allocated 89 million shekels (\$23.84 million) to the development of Ma'ale Adumim in 2011 and 2012. It also allocated 238 million shekels (\$63.75 million) for the development of Har Homa in the same two years. Sums of more than 405 million shekels (\$108.49 million) were allocated for the development of the infrastructure of WB settlements, such as roads. An allocation of 786 million shekels (\$210.55 million) went to boost settlement security; while more than 22 million shekels (\$5.89 million) went to compensate exporters operating from Israeli settlements "for the loss of sales to the European Union, which no longer recognizes settlement produce as Israeli produce under the terms of its free trade agreement."¹⁴⁶

Many Israeli leaders continued to encourage settlement expansion by residing in the WB settlements; which boosted a trend already set in motion with the rise in the political influence of settlers and their settlement councils. The following table lists the names of a group of Israeli Knesset members who reside in WB Israeli settlements:¹⁴⁷

Table 11/6: Group of Knesset Members and the Names of the Settlements in Which They Reside

	Knesset member	Party	Settlement
	Yuval Steinitz	Likud	Mevasseret Tzion
	Nachman Shai	Kadima	Mevasseret Tzion
	Otniel Schneller	Kadima	Maaleh Michmas
	David Rotem	Yisrael Beitenu	Efrat
	Uri Orbach	Habayit Hayehudi-The New National Religious Party (NRP) (Jewish Home)	Modi'in
	Alex Miller	Yisrael Beitenu	Ariel
	Avigdor Lieberman	Yisrael Beitenu	Nokdim
	Yariv Levin	Likud	Modi'in
	Yaakov Katz	National Union (HaIhud HaLeumi)	Beit El
	Arie Elad	HaIhud HaLeumi	Kfar Adumim
	Yuli Edelstein	Likud	Alon Shvut
	Michael Ben-Ari	HaIhud HaLeumi	Karnei Shomron
	Uri Ariel	HaIhud HaLeumi	Kfar Adumim
	Rachel Adatto	Kadima	Mevasseret Tzion
	Zeev Elkin	Likud	Alon Shvut*
	Benjamin Netanyahu	Likud	Mamilla, Jerusalem

* On the official website of the Knesset it is mentioned that Zeev Elkin lives in Jerusalem.

In response to Israeli intransigence and refusal to halt settlement construction, the Palestinians have launched a far-reaching and popular boycott of Israeli settlement products, which was endorsed and observed by all public and governmental institutions. This campaign has added to pressure placed on international companies operating in Israeli settlements, forcing some of them to halt production there and move their factories elsewhere; while some other factories were completely shut down due to a drop in revenue as a result of the boycott.

The impact of this popular action became evident when the Yesha Council described this popular campaign as a “hostile act” and “economic terrorism.” The Council called on the Israeli government to immediately announce that it would not participate in the proximity talks with someone—PM Fayyad—who “conducts economic terrorism against Israel as a strategic policy.” It said, “Israel must use the money of the PA it holds in order to compensate the owners of the boycotted industries,” and called for the closure of “Israeli ports to Palestinian exports until the boycott is lifted.”¹⁴⁸

During the Arab League summit in Sirte, Libya, in October 2010, Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas declared that the fact that Israel continues with its obstinacy and refusal to stop settlement activities will force him to resign his post as president of the PA. He also said that the Palestinians have other options, all peaceful, for declaring a Palestinian state. Among them are asking the US to recognize the state’s borders as inclusive of all the territories occupied in 1967, and having the UN supervise this state until Israel withdraws completely from it.

Some prominent Europeans expressed sympathy with the cause of the Palestinians on the issue of settlements, when 26 ex-EU leaders addressed a letter to EU Foreign Affairs Chief, Catherine Ashton, urging the EU to impose sanctions on Israel for continuing to build settlements in the WB.¹⁴⁹

Sixth: Palestinian House Demolitions

Israel’s systematic policy of demolishing Palestinian homes is considered to be in grave violation of the Palestinian right to have a home, and a form of illegal collective punishment, as cited in Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. During 2010, the Israeli army and Jerusalem municipality demolished 194 Palestinian houses, 44 in the Jerusalem Governorate, and most for lack of

permits. This took place specifically in Beit Hanina, al-Tur, al-Za'im, Silwan, Jabal al-Mukabber, Beit Safafa, Sur Baher, al-'Isawiyyah, Sheikh Jarrah, the Old City, and al-Thawri.

WB governorates such as Qalqilya, Tulkarem, Nablus, and Hebron also suffered this Israeli attack against Palestinian construction, again under the pretext of lack of permits; as these houses are located in area C, over which Israel has total civil and security authority. Furthermore, during 2010, Israeli occupation forces sent notices to the owners of 1,393 Palestinian homes (119 of them in Jerusalem) telling them to stop construction and/or evacuate and demolish their home.

Seventh: Confiscation and Destruction of Palestinian Agricultural Lands

During 2010, Israel confiscated and destroyed 13,149 donums of Palestinian lands in the WB, primarily for the purpose of building the Separation Wall. Israel claims that confiscations are executed for military reasons, summed up in the military orders regarding building bypass roads and military towers, expanding military bases and Israeli settlements, among other objectives. A study done by ARIJ showed that most of the confiscated land was agricultural, the sole source of income for many Palestinian families who had lost their jobs inside Israel. The biggest share of these confiscated lands were in the Hebron and Ramallah governorates, where work on building the Separation Wall is underway, with the aim of fulfilling the Israeli vision of isolating the Jerusalem Governorate from the rest of the WB governorates.

Eighth: Uprooting Palestinian Trees

The Israeli army systematically targets trees and since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967, 2.5 million trees have been uprooted, 10,364 in 2010.

Attacks on olive trees, through their destruction or burning, have become a widespread phenomenon, in particular in the villages surrounding the city of Nablus. These attacks are carried out by settlers, particularly at the start of the annual olive-picking season, in an attempt to scare away Palestinian farmers and

keep them from reaching their agricultural lands. These attacks have become a source of concern to Palestinians worried about suffering economic loss, the olive season being a good source of income for many Palestinian families in all parts of the WB.

Table 12/6: Israeli Violations in the WB, Including Jerusalem, During 2010, and on a Monthly Basis¹⁵⁰

Type of violation	Confiscated lands		Uprooted trees		Demolished homes		Homes threatened with demolition	
	WB	Jerusalem	WB	Jerusalem	WB	Jerusalem	WB	Jerusalem
January	305	660	2,340	0	15	8	26	8
February	1,742	0	1,205	0	10	1	31	31
March	257	0	607	0	0	0	27	8
April	2	0	935	0	6	0	9	4
May	30	0	1,265	150	2	0	86	5
June	40	0	340	0	1	4	74	11
July	64	0	25	60	48	7	24	0
August	0	0	220	0	34	2	851	31
September	611	0	130	50	0	0	42	1
October	7,155	50	1,612	0	5	0	30	15
November	350	3	825	60	15	11	42	5
December	1,880	0	410	130	14	11	32	0
Total	12,436	713	9,914	450	150	44	1,274	119
Grand total	13,149		10,364		194		1,393	

Ninth: The Separation Wall

Geographically, the Separation Wall did not witness any noticeable change during 2010. However, the Israeli army has extended the validity of previous military orders to seize certain Palestinian lands in order to build parts of the Wall on them. In the past, the army had issued orders to that effect, but building on them did not take place. Work on building the Wall resumed in various locations in the WB, among them Beit Jala, Bil'in, Jerusalem, and south of Hebron.

The Israeli army has finished building 473 km (61%) of the Wall. Work is underway on another 54 km (7%). There remains 247 km (32%) in the planning stage.¹⁵¹ Most of the remainder is located in the periphery of the Jerusalem Governorate, where Israel is trying to redefine the city's borders through the Separation Wall within the plan that it calls "Greater Jerusalem," which will impose three great settlement blocs, Givat Ze'ev, to the north of Jerusalem; Ma'ale Adumim, to its east; and Gush Etzion, to its southwest.

According to the PCBS, the isolated and confiscated area between the Wall and the Green Line amounted to almost 733 km², according to 2010 estimates, that is 13% of the WB area. Of these, 348 km² are agricultural lands, 110 km² are Israeli settlements and military bases, and 250 km² are forest and open space areas, in addition to 25 km², which are Palestinian residential areas.¹⁵²

Tenth: The Water Situation

Israeli restrictions on Palestinian use of water resources remained in effect throughout 2010. Obstacles remain that are blocking efforts to improve the status of water distribution networks infrastructure; specifically in the Area C over which Israel has total civil and security authority, and which constitutes 60% of the WB. Moreover, and in spite of the fact that the Palestinian communities present in Area C are classified by Israel as first rate development areas, Israeli Civil Administration control over these areas had the greatest impact on executing private development projects in the water sector in those areas, exclusively for the benefit of Israeli settlements. Whereas the Water and Sanitation Hygiene Monitoring Program (WaSH MP) in the occupied Palestinian territories pointed out the urgent need for implementing 15 projects in order to fulfill the pressing water needs of about 52 thousand Palestinians in 17 Area C communities.¹⁵³

Severe water shortages in a number of Palestinian communities in Area C in the south of the WB, has caused deficiency in the supply of water for drinking and sanitation purposes for more than 15 thousand Palestinians. These were classified as being in dire need, where the water available per person per day was less than 30 liters. This situation prompted the UN Human Rights Committee, in its session convened between 12–30/7/2010, to address the subject of denial of access to water. It was "concerned at water shortages disproportionately affecting the Palestinian

population of the West Bank.” The Committee said that Israel “should ensure that all residents of the West Bank have equal access to water, in accordance with the World Health Organization quality and quantity standards.”¹⁵⁴

It should be noted that different indicators were used to describe the water situation in the most affected WB and GS communities. Domestic water consumption and water prices were essential indicators in defining the status of water in WB; while quality of water and the reach of water networks to various communities were the indicators that defined the status of water in GS.

Deficiency in water quantities forces the Palestinians to buy water from Mekorot, Israel National Water Company. And in reference to the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) which stated that the average Palestinian person’s consumption of water in the WB was 73 liters, the deficiency in water supply is 34.6 million cubic meters (MCM). The available supply in the area is 88.6 MCM, while the quantity needed is 123.2 MCM.¹⁵⁵

According to WaSH MP statistics, there are 313 thousand people living in 113 communities in the WB, most of them in the Hebron, Jenin and Nablus governorates, who are not connected to the water system. The unconnected households pay between 15 and 20% of their income for water, as the price of a cubic meter of water reached \$14.2.¹⁵⁶

Further, WaSH MP indicated that, in the WB, there are 441 Palestinian communities unable to obtain more than 60 liters of water per person per day.¹⁵⁷ This figure represents 60% of what the WHO recommends, which is 100 liters per person per day.¹⁵⁸

According to statistics issued by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA-oPT), 194 Palestinian communities in Area C in the WB do not receive adequate supplies of water. These statistics state that:

- In the north of the WB: 86% of 64 communities present in Area C are in urgent need of water supplies. In addition, the residents of 22 other communities pay more than \$5.6 for every cubic meter of water.
- In the central WB: 90% of the communities in Area C are not connected to the water system. In addition, 30% of residents there pay more than \$5.6 for every cubic meter of water.

- In the south of the WB: there are 30 thousand Palestinians unconnected to the water system; the scarcity of water has kept residents from improving many facets of their lives, and they are compelled to spend 25–30% of their monthly income on water.

Conclusion

If the “Jewishness of the state” is the concept that today dominates Israeli political thought, the battle to settle Jerusalem’s identity is the foremost manifestation of this concept. There is a challenge to the Israeli plan for Jerusalem; as 35% of its population remains Palestinian. The city’s horizon clearly reflects its Arab identity, with its Islamic and Christian holy sites, in spite of the fact that 44 years have passed since its occupation became complete. *Al-Aqsa* Mosque, the imposing Islamic landmark, continues to dominate the city’s sky line, and is even used in the posters put out by the Israeli tourist board. This challenge is a stark example of what Israel faces today, as it finds its Jewish identity threatened, and its citizens face becoming a minority in historic Palestine. It has failed to create for itself a dominant culture to replace the indigenous culture of this land’s people. Israel was not able to abrogate the historic Arab names of places and landmarks, in spite of its systematic and persistent efforts. It was not able to find for itself an architectural style, which it could claim to be its and its people’s own, to the exclusion of all others.

Israel benefited from the weakness of the Palestinians, as well as the Arab and Islamic governments, to expand its settlement programs and further Judaize Jerusalem. It rejected the idea of freezing settlement activities as a condition for continuing the peace talks. It continued its operations of demolishing houses, revoking Jerusalemites’ IDs, and taking control of the Palestinian water resources. The Separation wall has become a main tool in confiscating the lands of Palestinians; ruining their economy, destroying their social fabric and hindering their freedom to move and work. Under its extremist right-wing government, it does not seem that Israel will suspend its programs as long as Palestinian and Arab weakness, incapacity and schism remain. However, the promising signs of change in the Arab world may, in the medium and long term, force the Israelis to reassess their calculations.

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To follow the annual development of these measures, see the series of reports “‘Ayn ‘ala al-Aqsa (Eye on Al-Aqsa)” published by Al Quds International Institution, which has been covering events since the beginning of 2005.

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This Report

The Palestinian Strategic Report 2010/11 is the sixth in a series of annual resourceful scientific studies. The Report discusses the developments of the Palestinian issue of this period, in an objective and comprehensive manner. The meticulous analytical reading of events tries also to foresee the future. This Report has become a basic reference in Palestinian studies, it is a must read for all those concerned.

An outstanding team of 14 academics and experts contributed to this Report. It is divided into eight chapters, that cover the internal Palestinian situation, the Israeli scene and the Israeli-Palestinian relations, the Arab, Muslim and international stances toward the Palestinian issue. This Report focuses also on the issue of Jerusalem and the holy sites; whereas, the demographic and economic indicators are studied and analyzed in two separate chapters.

As a serious addition to Palestinian studies, those interested in this field, including specialists, experts, libraries of universities and research centers, should have their copies of this Report.

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