

The Palestine Issue

Historical Background & Contemporary Developments



Prof. Dr. Mohsen. M. Saleh

Revised and Updated Version 2022



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

Chapter Five

The Palestine Issue 1987–2000

E-mail: info@alzaytouna.net

Website: www.alzaytouna.net

You can contact us and view the center's pages by clicking on the applications below:



The Palestine Issue 1987–2000

Introduction

During this period, the Palestinian people's capacity for making sacrifices and giving was heightened, but politically, the situation was disappointing. The "*Blessed Intifadah*" reflected the courage of an oppressed people, whose women and children faced the Israeli tanks with stones, and who aspired to freedom. However, there was despair caused by the Oslo Accords and the practices of the Palestinian Authority (PA) against its people and fighters. That period was thus characterized by the following:

- The *Intifadah* (1987–1993) and the emergence of the Islamic Jihadist movements.
- The Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israel in 1993, including the compromises it imposed on Palestinian rights.
- Weakness, fragmentation, and inter-Arab conflict following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the ensuing war, suffering, and aggression.
- The peace settlement agreement signed by Jordan and Israel.
- The collapse and fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, resulting in massive Jewish emigration to Israel, and US global hegemony.

First: The Intifadah

The *Intifadah* was ignited on 9/12/1987, following the intentional killing of four Palestinian workers on the previous day. The Islamic movement decided that night to take part in the *Intifadah* and direct it, and began to organize massive demonstrations after the dawn prayer on December 9 from the mosque of the Jabalia refugee camp. Hatim Abu Sisi was killed, and then Ra'ed Shehadeh in another demonstration next to al-Shifa Hospital. Then, many others were killed, and the demonstrations expanded to encompass the WB and the GS. The *Intifadah* was characterized by the following:

1. The inhabitants of the occupied “heartland” (WB and GS) took the initiative of resistance, after it had previously been in the hands of Palestinians living abroad.
2. The Islamic movement strongly and effectively took part in the *Intifadah* and emerged on the confrontation scene in an impressive manner.
3. The *Intifadah* included Palestinians from all sectors, political persuasions and ages.
4. The *Intifadah* was characterized by courage and sacrifice, and the broad participation of children, adolescents, and women, as well as noble behavior and the denunciation of treason and corruption.

The first stage of the *Intifadah* witnessed large-scale popular confrontations and turmoil, demonstrations, the boycott of the Israeli civil administration, and the cleansing of society from spies working for Israel, corruption, and drugs. Around four years later, the second stage witnessed the growth of armed operations against the Israelis, as well as the decline of large-scale popular actions.

The Fatah Movement and its allies in the PLO considered the Oslo Accords (September 1993) to be the end of the *Intifadah* and ceased their actions. As for the other sides, especially Hamas and the PIJ, they pursued their actions and even escalated their resistance operations. However, the PA’s formation in the WB and GS (May 1994) took away a lot of the *Intifadah*’s mass appeal and daily popular participation, and the uprising thus became confined to the members of movements and organizations.

According to PLO statistics, the *Intifadah*’s six years (December 1987–December 1993) resulted in the death of 1,540 Palestinians, the injury of 130 thousand others, and the arrest of 116 thousand persons for varying periods of time.¹



• Scenes of the 1987 *Intifadah*


Second: The Inception of the Hamas Movement

The birth of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas coincided with the beginning of the *Intifadah*. It issued its first communiqué on 14/12/1987, and was considered one of the most active group during the *Intifadah*. Hamas defined itself as a wing and extension of the MB Movement and stated in its charter that “The Movement’s programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its steps.” Its objective is the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an Islamic state on its land, and it calls for the comprehensive education of future generations in order to achieve its desired goals.²

Hamas was able to become widely popular, as its supporters represented (and still represent) between one third and half of the votes in student and professional syndicate elections, such as in An-Najah National University, Islamic University–Gaza, Hebron University, Birzeit University, and al-Quds University, and the orders and syndicates of engineers, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, and teachers, in addition to the chambers of commerce. Dr. Hisham Sharabi, who is renowned for his secular tendencies, said in an interview (published in *al-Hayat* newspaper, 5/3/1995) that Hamas is the new form of resistance, and that it has succeeded today in what the PLO and its factions have failed to do for more than 25 years, in coming up with new forms for organizing the Palestinian people and enabling them to conduct an effective military struggle away from any external aid.³

Hamas considers that, in light of the Zionist and Israeli rise, western support to Israel, Palestinian political weakness, and Arab and Islamic fragmentation, its actions do not aim for the direct and rapid liberation of Palestine, but it rather deals with it as a battle that spans across several generations. It thus strives to be active while maintaining the “fire of justice and struggle” over the long-term. Hamas was able to face many challenges by the virtue of its dynamism, leadership and discipline. Former Military Intelligence Chief General Uri Sagi (in an interview with *Yedioth Ahronoth* newspaper, on 5/4/1993) described Hamas as having advanced work methods and a high level of secrecy, enabling it to execute strong and prominent operations. Hamas has enjoyed vitality and endurance that enabled it to change many leaders in a short period of time. Indeed, every time its leaders were uncovered, killed, or imprisoned, there was always someone to replace them and pursue their work.

The Hamas military wing, *al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniyyun* (Palestinian Fighters), was led during the *Intifadah* by Sheikh Salah Shehadeh. It was



• Ilan Sa'adon and Avi Sasportas

able to kidnap and kill Israeli Sergeant Avi Sasportas on 3/2/1989 and soldier Ilan Sa'adon on 3/5/1989, but was soon thereafter dealt a blow in May 1989 during a fierce campaign launched by the Israeli forces. In May 1990 Hamas formed its current military wing, the Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades, which replaced *al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniyyun*.

On 13/12/1992, Hamas kidnapped Sergeant Nissim Toledano and demanded in exchange for his release the release of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin. When Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin refused to respond, the movement liquidated the soldier, thus leading Rabin to declare in the Knesset a full-fledged war against Hamas. Hence, 1,300 Hamas supporters were arrested, and the Israeli authorities conducted their greatest displacement and expulsion operation since the 1967 war, by expelling 415 persons, of which the majority (around 380 persons) were civilian Islamic leaders affiliated with Hamas.



• Deportees of Marj al-Zuhur

However, their rejection of expulsion by Israel and their steadfastness in Marj al-Zuhur, on the border with Lebanon, won them international media attention, broadened international interest in Hamas, and increased its popularity. This forced the Israeli authorities to approve the gradual return of the deported, which was completed one year after deportation.⁴



• 'Aziz al-Duweik and 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Rantissi in Marj al-Zuhur

According to a study prepared by Ghassan Duu'ar, in 1993 Hamas executed a total of 138 resistance operations, and according to Israeli reports 79 Israelis were killed and 220 injured.⁵

The PLO entered into a peace settlement with Israel and became autonomous in the residential areas of the WB and GS from 1994, thus rendering any resistance action virtually impossible. However, during 1994–1998, there was qualitative development in the resistance operations, especially those of self-immolation.*



• **Cave of the Patriarchs Massacre (executed by Baruch Kopel Goldstein – upper left)**

several resistance operations that killed 70 Israelis and injured 340), with several resistance operations during 25/2–3/3/1996, which according to Israeli sources killed 45 Israelis and injured 113. These operations shook Israel and led to the organization of an international conference with the participation of major countries for what they dubbed “fighting terrorism.”

The Israelis and the PA considered that their peaceful project had become jeopardized, or “in the eye of the storm” in the words of PA leader Sa’ib ‘Uraiqat. Israel and the PA, in direct cooperation with the US and with the use of a range of security techniques, launched a vehement campaign to uproot anything

For instance, Hamas retaliated against the 25/2/1994 Cave of the Patriarchs Massacre with five resistance operations that killed 39 Israelis and injured 158. There was also its retaliation against the 5/1/1996 killing of Yahya ‘Ayyash (who engineered



• **Engineer Yahya ‘Ayyash**

* Self-immolation: The overwhelming majority of Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims consider these operations to be “martyrdom operations” while most Israelis and western writers and media consider them “suicide operations.” We used the word “self-immolation” in this report to be as neutral as possible. However, such terms may need more discussions.



• **Muhyiddin al-Sharif, 'Imad and 'Adel 'Awadallah**

cells. Only very limited resistance operations were executed until 2000, and several symbols of resistant military action were taken out, such as Muhyiddin al-Sharif, 'Imad 'Awadallah, and 'Adel 'Awadallah.



• **Musa Abu Marzuq**

Despite Israeli-PA-international coordination to uproot this movement, its supporters still won student and syndicate elections, and Hamas still enjoyed strong popularity both domestically and abroad.⁶

As for the PIJ Movement, it conducted several self-immolation operations such as Netzarim in November 1994, Beit Lid in January 1995, and Tel Aviv in March 1996. They were exposed to as much pressure and pursuit as Hamas, and their leader Fathi al-Shaqaqi was killed by the Mossad on 26/10/1995. It is to be noted that PIJ obtains around 3–5% of the votes in student elections.

that is linked to Islamic resistance movements in Palestine. Hamas and the PIJ went through a tough period and were dealt severe blows. The PA was able to dismantle most of the resistance

Hamas also suffered from external pressure and hostility, such as the arrest of Musa Abu Marzuq in the US (July 1995–May 1997), the assassination attempt on Khalid Mish'al on 25/9/1997, the closing of the movement's offices in Jordan in August 1999, and the deportation of four of its leaders from Jordan (after their detention for more than two and a half months) to Qatar in November 1999.



• **Khalid Mish'al
assassination attempt**

Third: The PLO: From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Settlement

The PLO suffered from political weakness after the successive attempts to undermine it militarily, and was greatly marginalized in the October 1987 Arab summit in Amman. It considered the *Intifadah* a political boost, and tried to exploit it early on. The PLO formed the Unified National Command of the *Intifadah* one month after the *Intifadah* began, in which it actively took part alongside the Palestinian factions, especially Fatah. On 16/4/1988, Israel retaliated by assassinating Abu Jihad (the second-in-command in the PLO and Fatah) in Tunisia, as part of its fierce campaign to quash the *Intifadah*. When Jordan severed its administrative and legal links with the WB on 31/7/1988, the PLO reaffirmed its sole representation of the WB inhabitants and launched what it dubbed “the Palestinian peace attack.”

During the PLO’s 19th Palestinian National Council (12–15/11/1988), a Palestinian program was established based on the recognition of the UNGA Resolution 181 of 1947, which partitioned Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish. The



• 19th Palestinian National Council–Algiers 1988

PLO recognized for the first time UN Security Council Resolution 242 that was issued in November 1967, and called for a political settlement through an international conference. In order to help the Palestinians swallow all these bitter pills, the conference announced “the establishment of the State of Palestine.”⁷ This announcement was internationally acclaimed, and more than 100 countries recognized the state within a few months. Although the US and the western European countries did not recognize it, and it remained more of a hope than a reality, the announcement highlighted again the Palestine issue on the international arena and restored the PLO’s political presence, after it had accepted dwarfing its demands and reduced its attempts to struggle against occupation.

Changes took place both on the Arab and the international levels at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, which greatly weakened the Palestinian and Arab stance. Indeed, further weakness and disintegration took place in the Arab arena, particularly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2/8/1990. The invasion generated hostility among Arab countries, the depletion of Arab resources, the destruction of Iraqi military infrastructure, the displacement and emigration of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from Kuwait during and after the Iraqi invasion, and a withdrawal of support for the PLO. Generally speaking, the Iraqi invasion and Gulf War and its consequences had drastic effects on the Palestine issue.

Internationally, this period also witnessed the collapse and dismantlement of the Soviet Union and the socialist Eastern bloc. Their competition and



• Bill Clinton



• Robert Rubin



• William Cohen

hostility with the US and its allies changed to agreement, when they adopted Western capitalism and democracy and sought economic aid. This contributed to the



• Dan Glickman



• Alan Greenspan

destabilization of the international political balance, which was the basis of Palestinian and Arab maneuvering.

Thus, the US prevailed as the sole major power in the world, especially after the Gulf War in 1991. What made matters worse to Palestinians was the increase of the Jewish Zionist influence in the US administration. For instance, President Bill Clinton's Administration appointed several officials in crucial positions; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, the Chairman of the US Federal Reserve (Central Bank) Alan Greenspan.

The US sought to impose its hegemony, and vision of a new world order, including pushing to close the Palestinian file in order to serve Israel, its strategic ally. While the Palestinians paid a hefty price for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist states, these countries restored their diplomatic ties with Israel, and opened up the doors of Jewish immigration to Palestine, especially from the Soviet Union. Indeed, on 7/5/2000 Israel celebrated the arrival of the millionth immigrant from the Soviet Union since September



• Jewish immigrants

1989, welcomed by the prime minister himself.⁸ This wave of immigrants included around 92 thousand scientists,⁹ among whom were several thousand specialized in the nuclear industry, not to mention the advanced military competences, which increased the danger of Israel and its nuclear project in the region.



• Haidar 'Abdul Shafi

It is amid such advantageous circumstances for the US and Israel that the US succeeded in dragging the Arab states to the Arab-Israeli Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991, which was followed by direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Around two years of negotiations between the two did not break Israeli intransigence. The announcement of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government

Arrangements (Oslo Accords) between both sides came as a surprise, as it was disclosed that secret negotiations had been taking place between the two sides since 20/1/1993, unbeknown to the official negotiating Palestinian delegation (headed by Haidar 'Abdul Shafi) and most of the PLO officials.

The Accords were initially signed in Oslo, Norway, on 19/8/1993, before being signed officially on 13/9/1993 in Washington. It was sponsored by US President Bill Clinton, and took place in the presence of Yasir 'Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Accords were signed by Mahmud 'Abbas for the Palestinian




• Signing Oslo Accords 1993

side and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for the Israeli side, in addition to the US and Russian foreign ministers acting as witnesses.

The multi-phased Oslo Accords,¹⁰ which constituted the basis for the PA, stipulated self-governance in the GS and Jericho first, then in broader Palestinian areas (especially inhabited ones) in later stages. It stated that authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Negotiations were supposed to take place on sensitive issues and the final status two years after self-governance. However, the Israelis kept stalling and delaying, while granting the powers to the Palestinians encountered many complications that usually revolved around demanding the PA to succeed in the Israeli “test” of striking a blow to Hamas and the resistance movements, and to offer even more concessions.

• **Palestinian Autonomous Areas – Jericho 1994**




Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), *Haaretz*, 9/5/1994.

Many detailed agreements then followed, such as the Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area on 4/5/1994, the Oslo II Accords (Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) also known as Taba Agreement on 28/9/1995, the Wye River Plantation Memorandum on 23/10/1998, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on 4/9/1999. The self-governance regions were divided into A and B. Until 2000, the PA only controlled 18% of the WB under Article A pertaining to its security and administrative control, and around 22% of the WB under Article B pertaining to its administrative control, while the security control was administered jointly with the Israelis.

The Palestinian people were divided in their stance towards Oslo Accords and the peace process. Fatah Movement was the backbone of the support to the agreement, aided by some small Palestinian factions like the Palestinian Democratic Union (Fida). They saw in this agreement the best practical way to regain WB and GS

and to establish the Palestinian independent state. On the other side, there was a very strong opposition to the peace agreement among Islamic, Leftist and national factions. Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, DFLP, beside six other factions formed the



• **Palestinian Autonomous Areas – GS 1994**

“Alliance of the Ten Factions” which rejected Oslo Accords. Furthermore, several Fatah leading members opposed Oslo Accords, including Faruq al-Qaddumi, Khalid al-Hasan, Muhammad Jihad, Muhammad Ghunaim, etc.

Generally speaking, the main comments and observations on the Oslo Accords can be summarized as follows:


1. As seen by many Muslims, the Palestine issue is the issue of all Muslims and not just the Palestinians. Indeed, it is a cross-generational battle, and no generation is entitled to yield or make concessions that would degrade the following generations. Many Muslim scholars agreed that this peace settlement is not valid and called for *jihad* to liberate the holy land.
2. The PLO leadership signed this agreement and other agreements followed alone, without consulting the Palestinian people, many of whom objected to these settlements.
3. The PLO command recognized “the right of Israel to exist” and the legitimacy of its occupation of 77% of Palestine in 1948, over which no negotiations will ever take place.
4. The most crucial issues were not tackled and were postponed to the final negotiations stage. Because the PLO committed to never resort to force, the issue became linked to the “generosity” of the Israelis, who held all the cards, and these issues are:
 - a. The future of Jerusalem.
 - b. The future of Palestinian refugees.
 - c. The future of Israeli settlements in the WB and the GS.
 - d. The surface area of the promised Palestinian state, and its sovereignty on its land.
5. The PA’s responsibility did not include external security and borders, and no one may enter the PA territory without an Israeli permit. The PA may not form an army, and weapons may only enter upon Israel’s permission.
6. Israel has the power of veto over any legislation issued by the PA, during the transitory phase.
7. The agreements do not include any indication to the right of Palestinians to self-determination, or to the establishment of their independent state, nor is there any indication that the WB and the GS are occupied territories, thus reinforcing the impression that they are disputed lands.

• Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum 1999)

The West Bank

After the First Israeli Redeployment

According to the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum – September 1999



Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP)



8. While the PLO (the PA) pledged both not to use armed struggle against Israel and to resolve its problems through peaceful means, it was also forced—in light of its peaceful commitments—to quash any armed resistance against Israel, and fight the Palestinians who resorted to it. It practically found itself something of a tool for the protection of “Israeli security” in its regions and launched wide and fierce campaigns of arrest as proof of its “good intentions” and in order to maintain peace with Israel.

In a nutshell, the situation was as described by the renowned Palestinian writer Edward Said, who said that ‘Arafat involved his people in an inescapable trap;¹¹ while Palestinian thinker Hisham Sharabi said that the Palestinian command was left unaware of how decisions are made and how fates are decided.¹²

Fourth: The PA

The Palestinian police first entered the GS on 18/5/1994, and the self-governance members took their oath before Yasir ‘Arafat in Jericho on 5/7/1994. Many fears related to the peace settlement and potential performance of the PA materialized. Since the self-governance agreements were temporary and since the transfer of the land to the authority took place at an extremely slow pace, and also since achieving any progress had become linked to Israel’s approval, the PA found itself “at the mercy” of the other side and was forced to bow to its pressure in order to obtain any rights, no matter how minor. The Israelis sought to stall and delay in order to achieve new concessions, and linked any progress in the peace settlement with the PA’s quashing of the armed opposition. Israel succeeded in portraying Hamas, the PIJ, and the Palestinian opposition as an obstacle that the PA must quash, until it achieves what it considers to be Palestinian nationalist objectives.

Indeed, the Israeli stalling continued for years after the Oslo Accords, and the crucial issues, due to be settled in 1998 under the Accords, remained unresolved. The effective PA centers of control became in the inhabited regions, in which the Israelis had long wanted to delegate all the “dirty work” such as security tracking, taxes, municipal work to Palestinians, so that their colonization could seem legitimate.

The security aspect of the PA was heightened, with around 40 thousand members of the Palestinian police, constituting the highest police offer to

population ratio in the world. The PA formed eight different security forces, dealt mercilessly with Palestinian opposition and coordinated directly and openly with the Israeli and US security forces. The budgets for security and ‘Arafat’s office increased until they reached around 70% of the total PA budget in 2000.¹³

The emphasis on security for Israel was at the expense of the economy, educational institutions, political freedoms, and social institutions. In April 2000, prominent Palestinian figures and human rights organizations described the Oslo Accords as an economic and political catastrophe for Palestinians, and called on ‘Arafat to resign in a document published in Washington. This document stated that Palestinian income had decreased by 30% and that the unemployment rate had tripled in the WB and the GS since 1993.¹⁴

The PA suffered from rapidly spreading administrative corruption and nepotism. One of the major Fatah leaders, Muhammad Jihad, did not hesitate to say that ‘Arafat had surrounded himself with a cabal of thieves and racketeers.¹⁵ Another figure said that revelry was taking place on a daily basis in the streets and there was much talk about depravity, bribes, and nepotism.¹⁶ In May 1997 a report was published by the Legislative Oversight Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) affiliated with the PA. It stated that financial corruption in the PA’s bodies and theft had reached \$326 million, ** an enormous proportion of the PA’s budget; around \$1 billion and 500 million. Thus, the PLC passed a no-confidence motion against ‘Arafat’s government (56 votes to one). In November 1999, twenty prominent Palestinian thinkers and figures under PA rule signed a document, “The Twenty,” which accused the PA of corruption, nepotism, paralysis, restricting freedom, etc. Then, Hisham Sharabi described the PA’s formation as non-representative of the Palestinian people that it is unable to change the condition of the Palestinians, and it is one of the reasons why the tragic situation has gotten worse.¹⁷

As for the opposition, it suffered from the PA’s security restrictions and the constant campaigns to uproot it. The PA launched 12 arrest campaigns during its first year. In GS, with area of 363 km², it established 24 arrest and detention centers. In one month for instance (19/4–9/5/1995), the PA raided 57 mosques 138 times, in the context of its oppression of the Islamist movement.¹⁸ Security

** The symbol \$ used throughout this book is the US dollar.

campaigns took place after each resistance operation, the harshest taking place in March 1996 following the self-immolation operations executed by Hamas in retaliation for the assassination of Yahya ‘Ayyash. The dialogue attempts between the PA and Hamas failed, and the PA arrested and tortured more than once its interlocutors, such as Hassan Yusuf, Jamal Salim, and others. The Israeli-Palestinian-American security coordination succeeded in thwarting several resistance operations and arresting several freedom fighters. In January 1997, human rights organizations announced that there were at least 1,600 Palestinian detainees in the PA prisons, 700 of them without any charge or trial.¹⁹

Fifth: Israel

Throughout its 52 years of existence (1948–2000), Israel was able to bring in around two million and 900 thousand Jewish immigrants. The number of Jews in occupied Palestine thus increased from 650 thousand in 1948 to four million and 947 thousand by the end of 2000, i.e., around 38% of the Jews in the world.²⁰ Israel was able to overcome its international isolation. Indeed, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes, Russia and Eastern European countries rushed to open their embassies and strengthen their political and economic relations with Israel. In light of Arab and Islamic weakness following the Kuwait invasion and the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the signing of the Oslo Accords, Jordan signed a peace agreement with Israel, and was followed by several Arab states that opened and exchanged commercial representation, offices and interests (including Qatar, Oman, Tunisia). More than 50 other states in the world entered into diplomatic and economic relations with Israel.

With the regression of the Arab liberation project, and the PA in GS and WB taking on the task of repressing armed resistance against Israel, the latter enjoyed relative stability that enabled it to enjoy economic growth. Indeed, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from \$15 billion and 300 million in 1983 to \$105 billion and 400 million in 2000, a seven-fold increase (689%). It was no longer at the mercy of US aid and external donations that represented 25% of its GDP in 1983. This dwindled to 3%, even though the amount of aid remained the same (around \$4 billion annually). The average annual per capita income in Israel increased to \$18,300 in 2000, one of the highest in the world.

Endnotes

- ¹ *Sawt al-Sha'b* newspaper, Amman, 8/12/1993.
- ² The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18/8/1988, the Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp
- ³ *Al-Hayat* newspaper, London, 5/3/1995.
- ⁴ See the issues of *Filastin al-Muslimah*, London, which covered the deportees and their news in detail throughout 1993.
- ⁵ See Ghassan Duu'ar, *Maw'id ma' al-Shabak: Dirasah fi al-Nashat al-'Askari li Harakat Hamas wa Kata'ib 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Khilal 'Am 1993* (A Meeting with the Shabak: A Study of the Military Activity of Hamas and Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades During 1993) (London: Filastin al-Muslimah, 1995).
- ⁶ On Hamas, see Mohsen Moh'd Saleh, *al-Tariq ila al-Quds*, pp.183–205; and Khaled Hroub, *Hamas: Political Thought and Practice* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000).
- ⁷ Palestinian National Council Declaration of Independence, 14/11/1988, site of Arab Thought Forum (*al-Multaqa*), <http://www.multaqa.org/pdfs/PNC%20INDEPENDANCE%20DECLARATION.pdf>
- ⁸ *Al-Khaleej* newspaper, Sharjah, 8/5/2000.
- ⁹ *Al-Khaleej*, 25/1/2000, and according to the same source, there are ten thousand nuclear scientists in Israel.
- ¹⁰ On Oslo Accords and what followed, see 'Imad Yusuf et al., *al-In'ikayat al-Siyasiyyah li Ittifaq al-Hukm al-Dhati al-Filastini* (The Political Repercussions of the Palestinian Self-Governance Accord) (Amman: MESC, 1995); Munir Shafiq, *Oslo "1" wa "2": al-Masar wa al-Ma'al* (Oslo "1" and "2": Its Path and Its Outcome) (London: Filastin al-Muslimah, 1997); and Mohsen Moh'd Saleh, *al-Tariq ila al-Quds*, pp. 174–182.
- ¹¹ *Al-Hayat*, 12/8/1995.
- ¹² *Al-Hayat*, 5/3/1995.
- ¹³ According to news on 1/3/2000, see site of The Palestinian Information Center (PIC), 2/3/2000, <https://www.palinfo.com>
- ¹⁴ *Al-Khaleej*, 16/4/2000.
- ¹⁵ *Al-Seyassah* newspaper, Kuwait, 27/4/1995.
- ¹⁶ *Asharq Alawsat* newspaper, London, 22/3/1995.
- ¹⁷ Hisham Sharabi's declaration in *al-Hayat*, 5/3/1995.
- ¹⁸ Dawud Sulayman, *al-Sultah al-Wataniyyah al-Filastiniyyah fi 'Am 1994–1995* (The Palestinian National Authority in 1994–1995) (Amman: MESC, 1995), p. 135.
- ¹⁹ Palestine Facts 1997, site of Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), https://passia.org/palestine_facts/chronology/1997.htm
- ²⁰ On the immigration of Jews and their numbers, see Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010*, no. 61, table 4.2, http://www1.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st04_02.pdf; and 'Umran Abu Subayh, *al-Hijrah al-Yahudiyyah Haqa'iq wa Arqam: 1882–1990* (Jewish Immigration, Facts and Figures: 1882–1990) (Amman: Dar al-Jalil li al-Nashir, 1991).

This Book

This book seeks to present a comprehensive overview of the Palestine issue, its historical background, as well as its modern and contemporary developments.

The book, in a documented, methodical, and concise style, and in plain language, delves into the history of Palestine from its early history throughout the Islamic era, and the background of the emergence of the Zionist movement, as well as the British occupation of Palestine and the founding of Israel. The book analyzes the various phases of the Palestine issue and its developments, shedding light on the struggle of the Palestinian people, their uprisings and revolutions, and the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its factions, as well as the role of the Palestinian Islamic movements.

The book places particular emphasis on the first two decades of the twenty-first century, so that the reader would be able to obtain a clear picture about many of the issues related to the contemporary aspects of the Palestinian question.

The revised and updated edition of the book covers the period up to the year 2021, and contains a large collection of pictures and maps to illustrate its points.

The book is an important source for readers seeking to acquaint themselves with the Palestine issue, and to become informed of the pertinent facts in a balanced manner. It can also serve as an introduction to further studies of the Palestine issue.

The Palestine Issue

Historical Background & Contemporary Developments



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations
مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات

P.O. Box: 14-5034 Beirut - Lebanon
Tel: +961 1 803 644 | Tel-Fax: +961 1 803 643
info@alzaytouna.net | www.alzaytouna.net



ISBN 978-614-494-020-4



9 786144 940204



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations