

8

Am I Not a Human?

Edited by

Dr. Mohsen M. Saleh
Rana Sa'adah

Translated by

Baraah Darazi

The
Separation Wall
in the West Bank



By

Hasan Ibhais

Dr. Khaled 'Ayed



Am I not a Human?

(8)

Book series discussing
the sufferance of the
Palestinian people
under the Israeli
occupation

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The Separation Wall in the West Bank

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English Version

Translated by: Baraah Darazi

Proofread by: Tom Charles



**Al-Zaytouna Centre
For Studies & Consultations**



Prepared by: Hasan Ibhais & Dr. Khaled 'Ayed

Edited by: Dr. Mohsen Moh'd Saleh & Rana Sa'adah

Translated by: Baraah Darazi

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Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

P.O.Box: 14-5034, Beirut, Lebanon

Tel: + 961 1 803 644

Tel-fax: + 961 1 803 643

Email: info@alzaytouna.net

Website: www.alzaytouna.net

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Foreword

This book, the eighth in the *Am I not a Human?* series, attempts to cast light on the suffering of the Palestinian people emanating from Israel's construction of the Separation Wall in the West Bank (WB) outlining the economic, social, medical and educational impact on Palestinian life.

The book will outline the development of the idea of building a Separation Wall in the Israeli mindset prior to the start of construction in mid-2002. The book further provides a definition of the Wall, the motives behind its construction, its phases, route and structure. In addition, the book addresses the position of international law on the construction of the Separation Wall, including the authoritative advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2004. This opinion conceives the Wall as a violation of international charters and conventions and calls on the international community to shoulder its responsibility in holding Israel to abide by these agreements.

On another level, the book refutes the Israeli claims about the “security” motive behind the construction of the Wall showing that the route of the Wall is highly related to political calculations and settlement expansion in addition to the monopoly of agricultural lands and water resources. It also displays the effects of the Wall including direct damage as land confiscation and house demolition besides other damages caused by the restriction of movement and isolation on both sides of the Wall with all the following repercussions on the life of the Palestinian people.

The book adheres to the approach pursued generally in the series *Am I not a Human?*, describing the suffering of the Palestinians in a style that addresses hearts and minds through an academic and systematic style. Al-Zaytouna Centre would like to extend its deepest gratitude to Israa Institution in the UK, for its generous sponsorship of the publication of this book.





Introduction

It is a concrete, grey wall affecting human beings and the land they live on, standing as a barrier between the student and education, the patient and medication, the laborer and the source of his livelihood, severing ties of marriage and kinship, splitting neighborhoods and villages. It is a steel fence keeping the shepherd from his pasture, the farmer from his land and depriving the grapevines and trees of almond, figs and olives of the care they should receive from their owners. Both are deaf to the screams of the human whose life they destroy, both are insensitive to the pulse of the earth they shatter, and both are blind to the wilting trees deprived of their owners. Both are ignorant of international conventions and treaties being systematically violated.




Together, the wall and the fence constitute the Separation Wall, the Apartheid Wall, the Security Wall or the Wall of Annexation and Expansion...all different labels for the same thing.

What is the reality of this name? How and when did it originate? How and when did the idea become a plan of action? How far was the plan implemented? What are the consequences of the Wall on the daily life of the Palestinians and their political future? How do eye witnesses describe the Wall which perches on their hearts and lands?

This book seeks to answer these and other questions based on what has been written about the Wall in its seven years, including the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague about the legality of the Wall. It cites reports of the UN and human rights organizations about its impact on humanitarian and economic life in addition to providing testimonies and stories of people affected by the Wall throughout the WB.

The book dedicates a chapter for the Separation Wall in Jerusalem, or the so-called “Jerusalem Envelope,” displaying its impact on the demographic structure of the city and the city’s future identity, while shedding light on the intensified suffering of the Jerusalemites because of the Wall. The book also presents a snapshot of the weekly demonstration in Bil’in which has become a symbol of resistance against the Wall.



An aerial picture of a section of the Separation Wall in West Baqa in Tulkarem.

► Reuters News Agency,
17/2/2004.

Separation Wall!



Chapter 1: What is the Wall?

1. Beyond Apartheid

Constructing a wall which isolates the WB from Israel has long been discussed by the Israelis in a number of different contexts. A precedent had been established with the building of the fence surrounding the GS after the eruption of the first *Intifadah* in 1987, while Yitzhak Rabin won the Israeli elections in 1992 with the campaign slogan “We are here and they are there.”¹

In the wake of *al-Aqsa Intifadah* and the increased “self-immolation”² operations striking Israel, the core idea of the current wall crystallized when the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak approved in November 2000 the establishment of “a barrier to prevent the passage of motor vehicles” which was supposed to run from the northwest WB to the Latrun area in the south.³



When Ariel Sharon assumed the premiership and adopted the separation plan which his predecessor has started, he endeavored to translate this plan into realities on the ground. Among these realities was the construction of the Separation Wall in the WB approved by the Israeli cabinet in April 2002 and launched on 16/6/2002.

Regarding the motives which encouraged the adoption of this plan, Sharon Yerushalmi, an Israeli journalist, said that the idea of the wall appeared again after *al-Aqsa Intifadah*. It was in the context of building a barrier along the Green Line, or close to it behind the settlement blocs which Barak and Shlomo Ben-Ami were planning on annexing to Israel within the framework of a permanent agreement with the Palestinians. Yerushalmi said that the successive Israeli governments had tried previously to implement the disengagement plan, particularly in the wake of severe “terror” attacks. In this context, he referenced the Labor Party’s plan, presented in the elections of 1988, which suggested the establishment of a separation barrier on the front lines; however, the victory of the Likud Party in the elections prevented the progress of the plan. Yerushalmi also discussed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s request to the Minister of Internal Security Moshe Shahal to outline a plan of disengagement from the Palestinians in early 1995 after a commando operation in Beit Lid; however, the plan failed for economic reasons. In addition, Yerushalmi mentioned the initiative of the Minister of Internal Security in Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, Avigdor Kahalani, in 1996 to develop a plan which



primarily aimed at establishing fences and barriers along the Green Line to prevent the passage of cars, showing that the plan failed for political reasons, namely the eternal fear of the right wing that the barrier set undesirably narrow borders for the state.

It is noteworthy that Yerushalmi started his narrative of the separation by pointing to the supposed difficulty of getting six million Israelis and four million Arabs to live together, since friction between them, according to him, is destructive to the point of fostering “terrorism.” On the other hand, he pointed to the impossibility of establishing a firm separation between the two sides while there remained settlements in the WB and GS, and the impossibility of protecting these settlements. He explained that no army in the world can guarantee absolute protection over three thousand kilometers of streets that link the settlements and connect them to the inside of the country.⁴

Based on the aforementioned, the progress of the idea of constructing a separation wall shows that it partially depends on racial segregation between the Palestinian and Israeli communities. It is clear that the route of the Wall does not respect the limits of the Green Line but rather snakes deep into the WB to encircle major Israeli settlements, thus separating them from their Palestinian surrounding. Only 80 km, amounting to 10.4% of the total 770 km length of the Wall, will be established along the Green Line whereas the rest of the Wall will be established on the WB territory.⁵





It is important to note here that the stated goals and dimensions which Israel has considered for the construction of the Wall go far beyond the idea of racial segregation and can be summarized as follows:⁶

- a. **Security Dimension:** Israel sought to prevent the infiltration of Palestinian fighters from the WB into the 1948 occupied Palestinian territories and to stop the “self-immolation” operations.
- b. **Political Dimension:** Israel wanted to impose its vision of a final settlement on the Palestinians, to demarcate borders unilaterally, to annex lands and impose a fait accompli on the Palestinians in a way which renders the establishment of a viable Palestinian state impossible, while paving the way for Judaization policies, particularly in Jerusalem.
- c. **Economic Dimension:** This is represented in the confiscation of the Palestinians’ agricultural lands and water resources. Addition, Israel aimed to impede their ability to travel and work, increasing their hardship to encourage their migration and abandonment of their homeland.
- d. **Social Dimension:** The Separation Wall purposefully attempts to tear apart the fabric of Palestinian society as it isolates cities, villages and neighborhoods, thus preventing any social or family communication along with its impact on educational and health services for hundreds of thousands of affected people.



2. Phases of Construction and the Route of the Wall


The isolation plan approved by the Israeli occupation works towards snatching around 39% of the total WB area, amounting to 5,876 km² and it divides the WB into three major zones (see map 1):

- a. The Eastern security zone entirely controlled by the occupation authorities and known as the Eastern Separation Zone stretching over 200 km along the Jordan Rift Valley to cover 1,555 km²,⁷ amounting to around 26.5% of the WB.
- b. The Western Separation Zone which includes the region lying between the Separation Wall and the Green Line and its area according to the final modifications of the route is 733 km²,⁸ which is equivalent to 12.5% of the WB.
- c. The remaining area estimated at 3,588 km² constitutes around 61% of the WB and includes the major Palestinian cities. This is the area which Israel might leave for the Palestinians according to government plans.





Map 1: The Separation Wall and the Division of the WB



Source: Project of Monitoring the Israeli Colonization Activities (POICA), http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/segwall2010.jpg



The initial plan for the Separation Wall approved by the Israeli government divided the Wall into five phases. The first, phase A, extends from Salem village in northwest Jenin to Masha village in Salfit governorate near Elkana settlement in addition to two sections in the north and south regions of Jerusalem within the Wall surrounding the city and known as the Jerusalem Envelope. The first phase was finished in late July 2003 where the Separation Wall encroaches on 107 km² of the WB.

The second phase (B) extends from Salem village in northwest Jenin to Tell al-Himma in Tubas governorate on River Jordan, and from the west of Bardalah in Tubas heading south to the town of Tayaseer in the same governorate.

The third phase (C) mainly incorporates Jerusalem. Its first part includes three sections: the first running from Beit Sahour to al-Zaytoun crossroads, the second from Qalandia in north Jerusalem to Anatot settlement in the east of Hezma, while the third part is an inclusive wall surrounding the area of Bir Nabala on all sides.

The other two parts are situated to the west of Nablus diverging into many sections, the most important of which extends from Ariel to Kedumim settlement, thus including the region which is considered the major settlement bloc in the WB. There the settlements are considered the largest in terms of area and population.

The fourth phase (D) is situated in the south of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and west and south Hebron. The last phase extends from





Karmiel settlement stretching along the eastern slopes of the central mountain range from the south to the north where it crosses with phase B at the town of Tayaseer in Tubas province.⁹

However, it should be noted that the Wall has been rerouted since its construction began, where it was expected to annex 1,024 km² accounting for 18% of the WB.¹⁰ Yet after the modifications introduced, the Wall is expected to isolate 733 km², around 13% of the WB, whereas the total length of the Wall is 770 km according to the figures displayed by the Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem (ARIJ).¹¹ In February 2009, the Israeli Ministry of Defense spokesman Shlomo Dror announced the completion of approximately 500 km of the Wall adding that a year previously around 490 km of the Wall had been built. He noted that the budgetary problems, together with the decisions of the Israeli High Court to freeze the construction of around 100 km of the total length of the Wall, were the major reason delaying the completion of the Wall.¹²

The following table shows the progress of the route of the Separation Wall in the WB and the area seized for its construction (see table 1).¹³



Table 1: Progress of the Route of the Separation Wall in the WB 2002–2007

Date	Area Seized (km ²)	% of land Isolated in WB	Wall Length	On the Green Line (km)
June 2002 ¹⁴	1,024	17.4	734	–
June 2004	633	10.8	645	83
February 2005	565	9.6	683	138
April 2006	555	9.4	725	128
April 2007	733	12.5	770	80

It should be noted here that there are discrepancies in the figures dealing with the total length of the Wall, its completed part and the area it isolates. This is due to the ongoing modifications and adjustments to its route. Contrary to the figures mentioned above, the figures presented by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicate that the total length of the Wall is 709 km, of which 413 km have been completed (58.3%) in addition to 73 km under construction (10.2%). OCHA mentions that the Wall will isolate 9.5% of the WB, including East Jerusalem and No-Man’s Land.¹⁵





On the other hand, a map published in English in July 2009 by the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) of the Negotiations Affairs Department in the PLO points that the total length of the Wall is 711 km of which 430 km have been completed (60.5%), in addition to 48 km under construction (6.7%). The figures provided by the NSU indicate that the Separation Wall isolates around 9% of the WB between the Wall and the Green Line, around 8% of the areas east of the Wall to be added to the settlements in that region and 28.5% which is the space lying within Eastern Separation Zone (see map 2).¹⁶

3. The Structure of the Wall and its Specifications

The Separation Wall is mostly composed of the following parts, starting from the Palestinian side: six coils of barbed wire, a deep ditch, a path enabling the Israeli army to patrol both sides of the structure, and a three-meter high intrusion-detection fence, in the center, with sensors to warn of any incursion. On both sides of the Israeli patrol road, there are two intrusion-tracking dirt roads, then another set of barbed wire followed by observation systems (see figure 1).¹⁷

The average width of the Separation Wall is around 60 meters. However, in some of its parts, the Wall consists of an eight-meter high concrete wall, mainly found in densely populated Palestinian areas.¹⁸



Map 2: The Separation Wall and the Division of the WB






Figure 1: A Section Showing the Structure of the Separation Wall



The Israelis had established 73 gates and checkpoints along the Wall in the period to July 2009 to allow the Palestinians' movement between the regions which have been isolated behind the Wall and the rest of the WB. Yet, these gates constitute:

some of the most restrictive checkpoints in the WB. Permit-holders must queue for their documents to be inspected and their persons and belongings searched...In addition...there are restrictions on the vehicles and on the vehicles and materials which are allowed into the closed area. Farmers also report that agricultural equipment, chemical fertilisers, construction materials, fodder, and essential parts for pumps can be denied, depending on the mood of the soldiers at the gate.¹⁹



Table 2: Gates in the Separation Wall by Type²⁰

Type	Description	No.
Closed Area Checkpoint	Primarily designed to allow residents of communities in the closed area access to the wider West Bank for essential services, schools and health centers, etc. They are generally open during the day but closed at night. These crossings can also be used by farmers with visitor permits to access land in the closed area, particularly during the annual olive harvest.	11
Daily Gates	Open daily, generally for one hour early in the morning, at noon and in the late afternoon to allow farmers holding valid visitor permits access to their land in the closed area. Only a minority of permit-holders, generally herders, are allowed to stay on their land overnight: all others must leave the closed area when the gate closes for the day.	11
Weekly/ Seasonal Gates	Open seasonally, generally during the olive harvest, to allow farmers access to olive groves in the closed area. Also open from one-to-three days weekly throughout the year.	10
Seasonal Gates	Open for a limited period during the annual olive harvest, October - December.	17
Prior Coordination Gates	Access is not dependent on permits but on ID cards and a list of names maintained at the gate. Gates are opened through prior coordination with the Israeli District Coordination Liaison (DCL) Office, primarily on a seasonal basis, with a few also opening several days weekly.	23
Other	The Bil'in gate is open 24 hours following an order by the Israeli High Court of Justice.	1
Total		73



Wall!



Chapter 2: The Legal Status of the Wall

1. Ruling of the ICJ

On 9/10/2003, the Arab Group in the United Nations submitted a draft resolution for consideration by the Security Council. The resolution states that the Security Council has decided that “the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed.” However, the US vetoed the resolution despite the ten votes to one in favor.²¹

After the failure of the Security Council to adopt the resolution, the issue was presented before the General Assembly (GA) which adopted a resolution on 21/10/2003 by a majority of 144 votes.²² It “demands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the [W]all” and requests



“the Secretary-General to report on compliance with this resolution.”²³ In 24/11/2003, the Secretary-General presented his first report in which he stated that Israel has not complied with the resolution and was still building the Wall where he attached to the report information about the Wall and its humanitarian and socio-economic impact.²⁴ Following this report, the GA requested that the ICJ urgently render an advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the construction of the Wall.²⁵

Worthy of mention here is that Israel refused to cooperate with the ICJ process, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction. Israel presented a document to the Court in which it justified its claim by stating that the issue discussed was political rather than legal and that it is a bilateral matter between Israel and the Palestinians. Nonetheless, the Court overwhelmingly annulled this claim and stressed the legality and legitimacy of the judgments issued in that respect. Moreover, the ICJ refuted Israel’s claims that the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to the Palestinian territories.

In addition to discussing its jurisdiction on giving an advisory opinion in the case of the Separation Wall, the ICJ further considered “certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudice the future frontier between Israel and Palestine; it considers that the construction of the wall and its associated régime ‘create a *fait accompli*’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, ... [the construction of the wall] would be tantamount to *de facto* annexation.’ ” It also found that the “construction [of the wall], along with measures taken previously, ... severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination.”



The Court also addressed the legality of the Wall in the light of international human rights law stressing that this law applies to the occupied Palestinian territories. It further showed that the Wall affects the various rights enumerated in the conventions and treaties signed by Israel. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 12 and 17, guarantee the liberty of movement and that no one “shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.” The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Articles 6, 7, 11, 12, 13 and 14, guarantees the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living as well as the right to health and education.²⁶

When examining the case, the Court relied on “the provisions of the Hague Regulation of 1907, which have become part of customary law, as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949.” Hence, the construction of the Separation Wall is a violation of these provisions. Article 23 of the Hague Convention states that it is forbidden to “destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.” On the other hand, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates that “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies,” while Article 147 of the same Convention states that the Occupying Power may not “destroy in occupied territory real or personal property except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.”²⁷





The ICJ issued its advisory opinion on 9/7/2004 where it considered that the “construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law.” It further stated that:

Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto.

Furthermore, the ICJ called on all UN member states:

not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.²⁸

The Court added that because the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has, inter alia, entailed the requisition and destruction of homes, businesses and agricultural holdings, that Israel is obliged to make:



reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned... Israel is accordingly under an obligation to return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized...The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the wall's construction.²⁹

On 20/7/2004, The GA approved the ruling of the ICJ, calling on Israel and “all United Nations Member States to comply with their obligations as contained in the finding by the ICJ.”³⁰

However, Israel continued building the Separation Wall while the Israeli Supreme Court issued an edict on 15/9/2005 rejecting the advisory opinion of the ICJ on the grounds that it did not take Israel's security needs into consideration. Thus, the Israeli Court considered the ICJ opinion non-binding for Israel. This was mentioned in a Court decision which allowed building the Separation Wall in the WB when there are security reasons which necessitate it. However, the Israeli Supreme Court left assessing the security needs to the Israeli army, the occupier of these lands and builder of the Wall.³¹

The security pretext is the primary excuse with which Israel relies in rejecting The Hague edict claiming that the Wall's construction does not involve any political objectives. Yet, this claim was refuted by the Israeli government's confession that it was seeking to achieve political goals from building the Wall in a petition filed by the Israeli Attorney General to the Supreme Court during examining a petition against building the Wall in East Jerusalem.³²





This confession occurred in another petition filed by the Israeli Attorney General to the same Court which was considering a petition submitted by residents of ‘Azzun village in east Qalqilya against building the Wall on their lands. In this document, Israel confessed that the route of the Wall was not only defined by mere security motivations.³³ In addition, the Israeli PM Ehud Olmert declared that anyone living outside the Wall was “outside the State of Israel,”³⁴ further confirming that the Wall is a political, demographic barrier rather than a security wall.

The Wall Before the Law

The fact that the Separation Wall cuts into the WB “was and remains the main cause of human rights violations of Palestinians living near the Barrier.”

- The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem) and Planners for Planning Rights (BIMKOM), Under the Guise of Security: Routing the Separation Barrier to Enable Israeli Settlement Expansion in the West Bank, September 2005, http://www.btselem.org/download/200509_guise_of_security_summary_eng.doc





2. Ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court

Despite the stance of the Israeli Supreme Court towards the Wall's construction, Palestinian citizens and human rights organizations opposing the Wall presented legal documents to the Court, and they succeeded in modifying the route of the Wall in many locations. However, the impact of these re-alignments is negligible compared to the projected Wall construction around the major settlement blocs: in particular the Kedumim and Ariel "Fingers," which will eviscerate the Qalqiliya and Salfit governorates; the encirclement of Ma'ale Adumim settlement, which will compound the separation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the WB; and construction around the Gush Etzion bloc, which will sever the Bethlehem urban area from its agricultural hinterland and stymie its potential for residential and urban development.³⁵

The major modifications approved by the Israeli Supreme Court were:

- **Jayyous-Falamya section:** After a legal battle between the Palestinian citizens and the relevant Israeli authorities for five years, the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice issued, in July 2007, a verdict to dismantle the original route of the Wall near Jayyous and Falamya which was 4.2 km in length. It confiscated 20,028 donums of Palestinian land to accommodate the expansion of Zufin settlement which Israel had already established on the territories of the two villages. The Court ordered the establishment of a new route closer to the Green Line at a length of 4.9 km and the restoration of 11,628 donums to the two villages, yet the decision kept 16,400 donums isolated (see map 3).³⁶





The isolated lands include the most productive areas for fruit and vegetable cultivation, four groundwater wells, the majority of the greenhouses and one Bedouin community.³⁷


- **Ma‘ale Adumim section:** In August 2008, the office of the Israeli Attorney General announced the modification of the route of the Wall east of Ma‘ale Adumim settlement which lies to the east of Jerusalem. This would lead to the restoration of four thousand donums of farming and grazing land which the original plan had placed on the Israeli side to meet the needs of 84 settler families in the new Kedar settlement, also to include an abandoned mosaic. The Israeli Supreme Court verdict was an answer to a lawsuit filed three years ago by the Palestinians of East Sawahreh village.³⁸

- **Bil‘in section:** On 4/9/2007, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the rerouting of 1.7 km of the Wall in Bil‘in village, located northwest of Ramallah, within a distance of 500 meters from the village’s built up area and closer to the Green Line. The court’s order came after a wave of petitions that were filed to the court by Palestinian residents suffering desperate living conditions caused by the existing Wall.³⁹

On 26/6/2011, Israeli forces started dismantling a section of the Wall. Residents of Bil‘in will regain 1,200 donums out of 2,300 seized, noting that the total area of Bil‘in is 4,000 donums.⁴⁰



Map 3: Modification of the Route of the Wall in Jayyous-Falameya Section



Source: POICA, http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/jayyus-8-09-08.jpg





Chapter 3: The Wall and the Settlements

1. Settlement Expansion

A report by Planners for Planning Rights (Bimkom) and The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), two Israeli human rights organizations, issued in September 2005 stressed that “contrary to the picture portrayed by the state, the settlement-expansion plans played a substantial role in the planning of the Barrier’s route,” adding that “one of the primary reasons for choosing the route of many sections of the Barrier was to place certain areas intended for settlement expansion on the ‘Israeli’ side of the Barrier.” The report also added, “In some of the cases, for all intents and purposes the expansion constituted the establishment of a new settlement.”



The report stated that “Study of a map of the route indicates that in most of the cases discussed in this report, the Barrier’s route was set hundreds, and even thousands, of meters from the houses at the edge of the settlement.” It noted, “The currently approved route of the Barrier leaves fifty-five settlements, twelve of them in East Jerusalem, separated from the rest of the West Bank and contiguous with the State of Israel.” The report further stressed that “Concern for the settlements’ expansion plans in planning the Barrier’s route has led to more extensive violations of the human rights of Palestinians living in nearby villages than would have occurred had protection of the existing settlement been the relevant consideration.”⁴¹

ARIJ states that the Separation Wall encloses 107 Israeli settlements out of 199, including those in East Jerusalem, accommodating 425 thousand (80.2%) of the Israeli settlers’ total population in the WB (530 thousand). In addition, there are 38 settlements with a combined population of 12,530 settlers are situated in the Eastern Separation Zone.⁴²

Among the examples of the cases where the route of the Wall is meant to enable settlement expansion is Zufin settlement, two kilometers northeast of Qalqilya, where Israel seeks to increase the number of settlers from one thousand to six thousand. The primary consideration in determining the route of the Wall around Zufin was to leave areas planned for the settlement’s expansion and for a nearby industrial zone on the “Israeli side” of the Wall. Leaving the area in which expansion is planned on the “Israeli side” of the Wall increases the number of Palestinians who are separated from 70% of their farmland, infringing their right to freedom of movement, their right to work and to earn a livelihood, as well as their right of property.



The same applies to Alfe Menashe settlement which is home to 5,700 settlers and where the route of the Wall reaches a distance of seven kilometers from the Green Line. The route in this area created three enclaves, separating the towns and villages from each other and from the rest of the WB. The harm is felt in every town and village and by every person, in almost every aspect of life, such as freedom of movement, employment and commerce, property rights, and family and social ties. The 1,100 Palestinians living in the five villages in the Alfe Menashe enclave suffer the most severe and extensive harm, where the Wall surrounds the enclave on all sides except the west, in the direction of Israel.

Palestinians living in the Alfe Menashe enclave need to obtain a permit from the Civil Administration if they wish to continue to live in their villages and to move to and from other areas in the WB. They are allowed to pass through a gate in the Wall, where the process lengthens travel time and makes it more difficult for them to obtain goods and services than in the past. There are no local medical services, except for an improvised clinic that was set up with funding from international organizations. The Wall has severely impaired family and social relations there. The ability of the residents in the enclave to earn a living has also suffered greatly, with dozens of donums of farm land on the other side of the Wall.⁴³

2. Confiscating Agricultural Lands and Water Resources

Besides the settlement expansion objective, the route of the Separation Wall also seizes agricultural lands and water resources in the WB.





A study of the lands isolated west of the Wall clearly shows that Israel has deliberately and tactically seized agricultural lands, forests and open areas with the least Palestinian communities. Israel wants the Palestinians to voluntarily leave their homes after tightening the noose on them through procedures at the gates. Thus, many of them end up moving to cities, leaving their agricultural lands open for the Israeli settlers. The following table shows the nature of the areas isolated west of the Separation Wall:⁴⁴

Table 3: The Land Use / Land Cover of the Western Separation Zone

Item	Area in Km ²	% of Isolated Area
Agricultural Areas	348	47.5
Palestinian Built-up Area	25	3.5
Israeli Controlled Areas (Settlements & Military Bases)	110	15
Forests	81	11
Open Spaces & Others	169	23
Total Area of Western Segregation Zone	733	100



Regarding confiscating water resources, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) mentioned that the Wall will destroy and isolate more than 90 wells in the WB as well as a large number of springs. After investigating the position of the Wall and the topography of the lands which the Wall is built on, it found that the isolated area behind the western Wall is located over the Northern and Western aquifers which have an annual discharge capacity of 507 million cubic meters (MCM), whereas the entire isolated eastern area is located over the eastern aquifers which have an annual discharge capacity of only 172 MCM. Water is extracted from these aquifers by pumping from artesian wells or from the natural discharge of springs. The number of artesian wells in these two areas is estimated to be 165 wells with an annual discharge capacity of 33 MCM, and the number of springs is estimated to be 53 springs with an annual discharge capacity of 22 MCM.

The water extracted from wells and springs in the isolated and confiscated area is used for human, agricultural, industrial and tourism activities. However, the localities inside this area do not benefit from this water, since it is transported and used in the areas and localities behind the Wall. That is to say, Israel is stealing a huge percentage of the Palestinians' natural resources.⁴⁵

It is also important to note that the Wall isolates up to 221 donums of inland water areas isolated in the Western Separation Zone and 685 donums in the Eastern Separation Zone, which constitutes 99% of the total inland water area of the WB.⁴⁶





Chapter 4: The Suffering of Palestinians Caused by the Wall

The Separation Wall in the WB causes harm to Palestinians, whether through house demolition and land confiscation or the isolation of their communities on either side of the Wall, impeding their freedom of movement and travel. They also suffer internal migration, separation of families and an absence of communication between them. It prevents farmers from reaching their lands, laborers their jobs, students and teachers their schools, patients and medical staff their hospitals and medical care centers, and the list goes on.



1. Figures and Statistics

a. Direct Damage

The Wall's direct damage is manifested in the demolition of houses and confiscation of land by Israel under the guise of "security." Confiscated lands have either been seized for the construction of the Wall or to secure a buffer zone or additional areas for settlement expansion.

Regarding house demolition, B'Tselem stated on 3/4/2008 that "[i]n the past three years, the Israeli authorities have demolished 166 structures that were near the route of the Barrier, according to the figures of the Civil Administration." It further added that "[b]ased on these figures, an additional 754 structures await demolition."⁴⁷

Regarding land confiscation, the PCBS' Survey on the Impact of the Annexation and Expansion Wall on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinian Localities where the Wall Passes Through, June 2008, showed that "49,291 donums of land has been confiscated since the building of the Expansion and Annexation Wall until the end of June 2008."⁴⁸

A previous PCBS survey published in August 2006, Impact of the Expansion and Annexation Wall on the Socioeconomic Conditions of Palestinian Households in the Localities in which the Wall Passes Through showed that 19.2% of Palestinian households had their lands totally confiscated, while 28.5% had their lands partially confiscated. The results also showed that 87.5% of the confiscated lands were agricultural.⁴⁹



b. Damage Resulting from Isolation on Both Sides of the Wall and Impediments on Freedom of Movement

Isolation on both sides of the Wall and obstructing freedom of movement are the major factors which affect daily the Palestinians there; this includes the economic, social, medical and educational aspects of their lives. A report issued by OCHA on the impact of the Wall on the humanitarian situation in the WB noted that approximately 35 thousand WB Palestinians will reside between the Wall and the Green Line once construction is complete, not to mention that approximately 225 thousand Palestinians who hold East Jerusalem ID cards reside between the Wall and the Green Line too. Approximately 125 thousand Palestinians will be surrounded by the Wall on three sides. Approximately 26 thousand Palestinians in eight communities in the al-Zawiya and Bir Nabala Enclaves will be surrounded on four sides by the Wall, with a tunnel or road connection to the rest of the WB.⁵⁰

The area between the Wall and the Green Line was declared closed by military order in October 2003. Those aged 16 and above require permanent resident permits from the Israeli authorities to continue to live in the closed area. In addition, all non-resident Palestinians above the age of 12 who need to enter the closed area must obtain visitor permits, including agricultural workers. In addition to security reasons, for which no further explanation is given, permit applicants are often rejected on the grounds of “no connection to the land” and “not having enough land.” It is worth noting that, historically, land





registration in the WB had been low, where only 33% of the WB overall and 31% of Area C is formally registered.⁵¹ This would lead to reducing the number of Palestinians who could cultivate their land.

The PCBS noted that up to the end of June 2008, there were 171 localities affected by the passage of the Separation Wall, where 157 are located outside the Wall and housing around 707 thousand Palestinians, and 14 localities behind the Wall housing around 5,400 Palestinians. The area of isolated lands, as per the survey, was estimated at around 274,607 donums out of the reach of their owners.⁵²

The results concerning the obstacles against movement and transportation for individuals living inside the Wall's route showed that 82.9% of Palestinian households reported that the time required for transportation and crossing checkpoints was a main obstacle preventing movement. The Wall also affected the ability of households to visit religious and holy places, at 95.2% for inside of the Wall, against 88.1% for outside the Wall.⁵³

The aforementioned damages have caused thousands of Palestinians to change their place of residence to avoid the Wall; the figures of the PCBS show that 3,880 households were displaced from the localities affected by the Separation Wall since the beginning of its construction until the end of June 2008. The total population of these displaced households was 27,841 persons.⁵⁴



The complexity and difficulty involved in obtaining a permit raises the suspicion that the policy is intended to create despair among the farmers, hoping that they will cease working their land west of the Wall.

The President of Israel's High Court of Justice, Aharon Barak, described the harm resulting from the separation of farmers from their land in the court decision issued in the case filed against the Wall in Beit Surik, as follows:

“This state of affairs injures the farmers severely, as access to their lands (early in the morning, in the afternoon, and in the evening), will be subject to restrictions inherent to a permit system. Such a system will result in long lines for the passage of the farmers themselves; it will make the passage of vehicles (which themselves require permits and inspection) difficult, and will distance the farmer from his lands (since only two gates are planned for the entire length of this segment of the route). As a result, the life of the farmer will change unrecognizably. The route of the separation fence severely violates their right to property and their freedom of movement. Their livelihood is severely impaired. The difficult circumstances from they have suffered (due, among other things, to the high unemployment in that area) will be exacerbated.”

- B'Tselem, Under the Guise of Security; and B'Tselem, Not All it Seems - Preventing Palestinians Access to Their Lands West of the Separation Barrier in the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya Area, June 2004, http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/200406_qalqiliya_tulkarm_barrier





In the economic domain, the Wall has prevented communication between residents of the regions isolated behind it and the major cities nearby. Until August 2006, the unemployment rate reached 32%.⁵⁵

The Wall has also obstructed the movement of customers and goods. The PCBS survey shows that, to June 2008, the total number of closed economic establishments in the localities affected by Wall was 3,551.⁵⁶

In the agricultural sector, the Wall hampers the marketing of agricultural produce from the villages in the cities, undermining the livelihood of farmers and leading to price rises in the city.⁵⁷

A report issued by the World Bank noted that around 170 thousand donums of fertile agricultural lands, constituting 10.2% of the total area cultivated in the WB, have been affected by the Wall. Their average economic value reached \$38 million (The symbol \$ used throughout this book is the US\$), equal to roughly 8% of Palestinian agriculture product. The report warned that around 274,700 donums of agricultural lands accounting for around 20% of total Palestinian agricultural production is threatened because of the Eastern Separation Zone along the Jordan Valley. This zone also contains more than 80% of the Palestinian rangeland areas where herders currently graze their sheep and goats. Of the 1.5 million donums of existing rangelands, only 225 thousand donums remain as open rangeland for grazing.⁵⁸



A report issued by OCHA stated that the agricultural sector accounts for between 11–20% of the Palestinian economy, employing approximately 15% of the formal, and up to 39% of the informal, workforce. Yet, OCHA mentioned that, in 2007, it conducted a survey in the northern WB in cooperation with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). In the survey, village representatives reported that fewer than 20% of those who used to work land in the closed area before completion of the Wall, whether in a full or occasional capacity, were being granted permits at the time of the survey. Refusing to grant permits was on the grounds of “security reasons,” “no connection to the land” and “not having enough land.”⁵⁹

Life in the enclaves also entails grave damage to the fabric of life in the social and family spheres. In many cases, the Wall separates first degree relatives. Visits by relatives living outside the enclave to family members inside the enclaves involve a long series of bureaucratic procedures and security checks. Residents of the internal enclaves who wish to visit their relatives on the other side of the Separation Wall must travel long distances, and often pass through checkpoints and undergo protracted security checks.⁶⁰

Furthermore, the situation is also affecting traditional wedding patterns. Women traditionally move to their husband’s locality upon marriage, but parents are reluctant to approve a union that will lead to their daughter’s isolation and the need for permits to visit family and in-laws in the closed area. Several proposed marriages have been





cancelled as people are reluctant to allow their daughters to move to the closed areas. Families are also reluctant to let female members endure searches and delays at the checkpoints. Women's mobility, social participation and educational opportunities have declined as a result.⁶¹

Figures by the PCBS show that 30.5% of Palestinian households or one of their individuals in the localities affected by the Wall have been separated from relatives. In addition, 87% of households living inside of the Wall had their ability to visit family and relatives been affected by the Wall, against 53.1% of the households living outside of it.⁶²

On the medical level, statistics reveal that 65% of the Palestinian households living inside the Wall indicated that separation from health services (hospitals and medical centers) in the main cities formed an obstacle for them to get the required health services, while this percentage was 39.4% outside the Wall. Also the inability of medical staff to reach the localities formed obstacle for 63.3% of the households located inside the Wall and 36.3% of the households located outside of it.⁶³

Worthy of mention here is that the health damage caused by the Wall includes a psychological component. In Qalqilya, for example, “a study by the Palestinian Counseling Center of Wall-related psychosocial symptoms revealed a high prevalence of depressive factors, such as sleeping and eating disorders among adults and children.”⁶⁴



The study also showed that the Wall as a stimulant causes emotional, behavioral and psychological responses (tension, fast heartbeat and moving away from the gate), in addition to increased aggression among children and other negative psychological effects.⁶⁵

On the educational level, a report issued by the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education in 2006 showed that the number of schools affected by the Wall in the governorates of the WB has amounted to 124, while the number of affected students had reached around 14 thousand.⁶⁶

The report highlighted the negative impact of the Wall on the educational process mainly because of its irregularity; either because students and teachers are not allowed to reach schools on most days or are detained for several hours. This might affect the level of academic achievement of the students caused by the delay in finishing the curricula. It might also affect curricular and extracurricular activities due to the focus on finishing the regular school curricula.⁶⁷

The PCBS noted, in August 2006, that 4% of Palestinian individuals in the localities affected by the Wall left their education due to the security situation and the Separation Wall. In addition, 85.3% of Palestinian households in the localities affected by the Wall that have some members attending higher education used detour roads in order to reach their universities and colleges as a method of adaptation to the difficulties they face, and 65.3% of the





households were forced to be absent from university and college due to the closure.⁶⁸

2. Examples and Testimonies

Damage resulting from the Wall's construction and the isolation of communities on both sides of the Wall impacts all sides of daily life. The following is a summary of the most prominent forms of suffering:

- a. Demolition of houses and Palestinian population displacement.
- b. Land confiscation.
- c. Closure of economic facilities.
- d. The uprooting of trees.
- e. Isolation of the localities west of the Wall from the rest of the WB.
- f. Isolation of the population in closed or semi-closed enclaves (Seam Zone).
- g. Separation of farmers from their land.
- h. Displacement of families.
- i. Separation of families.
- j. Impediment or prevention of communication between relatives.
- k. Impediment or prevention of workers reaching their work places.
- l. Impediment or prevention of students and teachers reaching their schools or universities.
- m. Impediment or prevention of patients and medical staff reaching



hospitals and medical centers in addition to impeding the access of medical staff to isolated regions to rescue patients in emergency situations.

- **From Jenin**

The Wall isolates a number of villages in Jenin from a large area of agricultural lands and rangelands. In ‘Anin, for example, the Wall isolates eight thousand olive and other trees from the village and in Ya‘bad 10 thousand olive trees are isolated. Israel does not allow farmers to take tractors into the enclave thus forcing them to use taxis to transport the olives out, which in turn affects productivity. In the villages of Umm Dar, al-Khuljan and Khirbet Suruj livestock levels decreased from 6,000 to 1,500 since the construction of the Wall started and up to 2007, as herders could not access traditional grazing lands isolated behind the Wall, while the cattle from Israel graze in the isolated lands of al-Mutilla and al-Mughayyir, thus causing major harm to the trees there.⁶⁹

Ahmad Mwaffaq Qabaha, from Tura al-Gharbiya village, is disabled. He has motor problems affecting half of his body and severe learning difficulties. He relies on his parents for most of his personal needs.

In May 2004 at around midnight, Ahmad and his family were woken by a heavy banging at the door and loud voices shouting, “Open the door, it’s soldiers.” Ahmad’s father, Muwaffaq Qabaha went to the door. There were five soldiers raiding the house and





around 15 taking up position outside. The officer claimed he had a military order to arrest one of his sons, and asked Mwaffaq to bring them out.

Mwaffaq brought his two sons, Mu‘taz and Qais, assuming that there was no possibility that the order might want his eldest, disabled son. The officer examined their birth certificates—they do not have identification cards—and looked again at his military order: it was clear that they wanted Ahmad.

Muwaffaq started to explain the situation to the officer but to no avail. The soldiers harshly beat Ahmad and cursed him, and then they arrested him on suspicion of throwing stones at the Separation Wall.

The soldiers insisted on arresting the child despite his father’s attempts to convince them of reconsidering their decision in the light of his son’s severe motor and mental impairment. They dragged him to the military patrol barefooted and wearing his pajamas while kicking him with their boots and the butts of their guns. Then they transferred him to Salem detention center where he was held for 26 days during which he was twice brought before a court of law. According to the father, the trial was “a real farce” where the judge was questioning a child who did not understand his charges while the court room was filled with laughter.



After his second court appearance, the judge agreed to release Ahmad with a two thousand shekels fine, and with the threat of imprisonment if he repeated these actions again within a year.⁷⁰

- **From Tulkarm**

The economy of Tulkarm depended to a great extent on Israel due to its proximity to the Green Line. Israelis used to shop in Tulkarm, while many of its residents used to work in Israel; however, the Wall brought all that to an end and put Tulkarm on the brink of a major economic decline.

In addition, the Israeli occupation has demolished around 60 buildings and 200 shops in the Tulkarm Governorate in recent years. It also confiscated around 27 thousand donums of its land, making it difficult for farmers to reach their land, thus increasing the general economic devastation caused by the Wall.⁷¹

In Qaffin, for example, the Wall isolated around 12 thousand olive trees, and in the village of Far'un hundreds of donums of citrus and guava died due to the farmers' lack of access. Only 149 out of the 3,100 residents of Far'un have permits. In al-Jaroushia village, the Wall caused the death of 70% of almond trees which used to produce 10 tons annually due to lack of regular care. In Zeita, in February 2009, floods damaged around 11 donums of greenhouses and 15 donums of rainfed crops due to blockage of drainage culverts under the Wall. In Khirbet Jubara, which is isolated between the Wall and the Green line, the poultry flock dropped from 120 thousands to





20 thousands due to access problems. In the isolated areas where the village lies, four separate fires were reported in 2008, yet Israel prevented the access of the fire brigade and 500 donums of olive trees were burnt.⁷²

In Khirbet Jubara, villagers find themselves completely surrounded by an electric fence, with one gate controlled by Israeli soldiers that is opened just three times a day, for a maximum of 15 or 20 minutes each time, and which only allows entrance to local residents in a further effort to isolate the village from the surrounding areas.

In the absence of any medical care in the village, residents are entirely dependent on the mobile clinic of the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS). However, the Israeli soldiers in charge of the gate frequently refuse to let the mobile clinic pass because its team members are not registered as residents of the village.

Dr. Imad Barakah from PMRS declares that due to the limited times of opening the gate patients are forced “to manage their sickness within the little time they have in the morning from 7:40 to 8:00, in the afternoon from 14:00 to 14:15, or in the evening from 18:45 to 19:00.” Dr. Barakeh adds that “the Israeli authorities are attempting not only to isolate Jubara, but to erase its very existence.” It should be noted here that since the construction of the Wall, the Israeli army has prevented anyone from registering as a resident of the village including all babies born there since 2003.⁷³



• From Qalqilya and Salfit

Qalqilya and Salfit are considered to be the governorates most affected by the Separation Wall after the Jerusalem governorate, where the Wall dramatically snakes around the land of both governorates to encompass a large number of settlements and include them to Israel thus forming two “fingers” known as Kedumim and Ariel fingers. In these two regions around 27 asphalted roads and 148 agricultural roads are severed by the Wall, restricting the possibility of access to lands, water resources and markets. In addition, it isolates both governorates from their most productive lands thus affecting the agricultural economy there. In Jayyous, productivity declined from approximately nine thousand tons of fruits and vegetables in 2002 to four thousand tons in 2008.⁷⁴

In Qalqilya, the Wall surrounds the city on three sides and isolates seven communities between the Wall and the Green Line, and it also isolates 20 of its wells. In Salfit, the Israeli authorities have confiscated around 12% of lands for the establishment of settlements and industrial zones. An additional 10% has been declared a firing zone, used for military training. As a consequence, close to 100 km², almost half of Salfit’s land area, will be effectively cut off on the “Israeli side” of the Wall. The geographical contiguity of Salfit will be shattered into three disconnected pockets, affecting all of the governorate’s Palestinian population centers. The Wall surrounds nine localities in the north of Salfit governorate on three sides, squeezed between the two “fingers.” It further surrounds al-Zawiya





enclave, which includes the villages of al-Zawiya, Deir Ballout and Rafat, on four sides with a tunnel connection to the rest of the WB. Thus, the residents of most villages in Salfit will have to take a long bypass road to reach the regions in the south of the Ariel finger and the capital of Salfit governorate.⁷⁵

When Israel started the construction of the Separation Wall, which annexed donums of Jayyous lands, Safiyyah became afraid because she knew what will happen in the coming days. She said that that in the morning of 20/9/2003, her grandson Samer in Grade five rushed into the house yelling granny granny, urging her to hurry to their orchards. At that time, she knew that the Israeli bulldozers have started to uproot the olive trees and orchards, while grinding the planted vegetables with their heavy chains. Her dreams were shattered. She wondered, What should she do? To whom should she turn to other than almighty God? Then she asked herself if crying would return what the Israeli arrogance has stolen? and immediately answered that probably not.



- Hanady Dweikat, Separation Wall and Stories from the Lives of the Palestinians, site of Aljazeera.net, 3/10/2004, <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/D54E36A4-BF1B-42D7-B34B-A4C74F9C40BC.htm>



Barring Life: Letter from Jayyous

Jayyous, with the richest aquifer in Palestine, and the agricultural capability to produce all the fruits and vegetables known to the region, was once considered the breadbasket of the WB. Now, all six water wells in Jayyous and 75% of Jayyous land are trapped behind Israel's "security" fence, the construction of which resulted in the uprooting of four thousand olive and almond trees belonging to Jayyous farmers.

Since the completion of the Wall (which is approximately 16 km from the Green Line) the number of greenhouses in Jayyous has fallen from 136 to 72. There are families in Jayyous, I learn—those very families whose land could feed a country—who now skip meals for weeks at a time so that they can pay their children's school fees.

Jayyous, a part of Qalqilya Governorate, is a town of 3,200 people—550 families, 350 of whom depend entirely on agriculture, and 200 of whom depend partially on agriculture. In 2005, according to the records of the Israeli army obtained by the Jayyous Land Defense Committee, 69 Jayyous farmers have never been issued permits to access their land, and 20 farmers have been unable to renew their permits, though anecdotal evidence indicates that these numbers are not comprehensive. Those farmers who have been issued permits to access their land may do so by way of one of two gates in Jayyous, three times a day for one hour at each time.

Sharif 'Umar is a farmer there. He is a big man, and, at 62, his face is dark and lined and his hands hard from years of working in the sun, but his obvious physical power is belied by a gentle smile and goofy, booming laugh. As we walked through the groves of lemon, mango, avocado and olive trees that belong to his family, he called me "yabba," or "daughter," and told me about his town.

It was nearly 6 pm—the time that the gate into Jayyous closes for the night—so Sharif and I got onto his tractor to leave. When we reached the gate I was told that I cannot enter the town.

This gate is only open for farmers, the soldiers said, and I wondered how much longer it will be open for anyone at all. I asked them why I can't go in and one told me, this is not a country. This is a military zone. They told me that I need to go to the Qalqilya gate, about 4 km away, and as I left to walk west I glanced back and saw Sharif's arm raised in a gesture of strength rendered powerless—a gesture that has become, in just a few short weeks, familiar to me.

► Margaree Little, *Barring Life: Letter from Jayyous*, West Bank, 2005,
http://www.thewe.cc/contents/more/archive2005/july/jayyous_west_bank.htm



A demonstration of the impact of the Wall on the Palestinians is the case of Mo'in 'Ata who, like all other Palestinians affected by the Wall, needs different permits from the Israeli authorities to be able to continue his daily life.

Mo'in, who lives in Qalqilya selling trees and flowers for a living, shows three copies of permits: the first to enter Israel, the second to cross the Wall and the third to move between the cities of the WB and without these permits he says that he cannot work and survive.

On the other hand, Rasim al-Jayyousi, who lives in Ramallah and sells computers for a living, was prohibited by the Israeli soldiers positioned at one of the three gates from reaching the orchards of his family in Jayyous village near Qalqilya. They said that the permit he had did not bear the number of the gate which he was allowed to cross.

Rasim's brother, Helmi, lives in Jayyous and has an Israeli army permit which is effective for two years. It specifies the access gate for those whose lands are on the west side of the Wall. The permit also defines specific hours for entry starting from the morning until the evening; after which no Palestinian is allowed to enter the region, which has practically become a part of Israel.⁷⁶

Among the testimonies about the impact of the Wall on residents of Qalqilya is the testimony of Yaseen Marab'ah, who is the father of 10 children, He lives in Ras al-Tira village, southeast Qalqilya and 700 meters away from the Alfe Menashe settlement. Yaseen said that



before the Wall was built, “residents of our village received most of the services they needed in the village of Habla, which is three kilometers away... Now, since the barrier was built, you need to drive through the gate.” He added:

Two years ago, my brother’s daughter, Nabal Taufik, who is nine years-old, got sick and had an extremely high temperature. My brother wanted to take her to Habla but the soldiers wouldn’t let him through the barrier claiming that they didn’t have the key to the gate. In the end, the doctor came to the other side of the gate and checked her through the fence. The doctor stood on the eastern side of the gate and stuck the stethoscope through the gaps in the fence. He tried to give her a shot but was not able to [do so], so he gave her pills instead.

Yaseen also describes how the Wall prevents them from maintaining relationships with friends and family that live on the other side, he said:

There are many women whose parents live on the eastern side of the fence. My brother, Zaharan Yunes, got married four years ago to [Lubna] Jaber, age 24. Since the barrier was built, her parents have not been able to visit her. Over and over again they submit a request for a permit and are denied. This restriction includes all of her family members. There are many similar cases.

Yaseen draws attention to another fact:

There are families that own land and houses in the village but have possessions in other areas as well. In mid-2003 a population census was carried out, without anyone being told in advance.





Some of the residents who have possessions outside of the village were not present that day. Therefore, they were not listed as residents and have not been given permits to enter the village and return to their home and land.⁷⁷

Another testimony is that of Mu'tasim 'Omar, who lives in the town of 'Azzun 'Atmeh which is surrounded by the Wall. He said that he had an accident when he was with his cousin 'Adil Rashid 'Abdullah 'Omar and their friend Qusai 'Ali. On 17/2/2007, they were riding a tractor which flipped and injured 'Adil while Mu'tasim and Qusai were not hurt. Qusai managed to get a vehicle to raise the tractor and pull 'Adil from beneath, and then they took him in a car to the hospital.

They headed to the only gate of 'Azzun 'Atmeh and got there at around 10:20 pm; the gate closes daily from 10 pm until 6 am. There, they stepped out of the car and called the soldiers in the control tower. Mu'tasim told them in Hebrew that they had an injured person and he must be immediately taken to the hospital. So did Qusai who was more fluent in Hebrew. One of the soldiers looked from a small window in the tower asking them to leave and turn away from the gate. But they insisted on staying and asked the soldiers over and over again to come down and open the gate, noting that he tried to move the legs of the injured person lying in the backseat of the car to assure the soldiers that there is a state of emergency. After 65 minutes, three soldiers came down and checked 'Adil's serious condition. One of the soldiers inquired some details about the accident and then the gate was opened after a delay of an hour and 10 minutes.



Afterwards, they hurried to *al-Aqsa* Hospital in the city of Qalqilya. On the way, Mu‘tasim checked ‘Adil and he was still breathing. The journey took 20 minutes, but ‘Adil didn’t survive. After examination, the medical staff said that he had fractures and internal bleeding in his chest.⁷⁸

• From Ramallah

The Wall extends in Ramallah to include the settlements of Beit Arye, Ofarim, Mod’in Illit and Mevo Horon in addition to most lands of Latrun valley, which was declared as a demilitarized zone between Jordan and Israel in 1949. In addition to separating the governorate from thousands of donums of agricultural lands, the Wall separates Ramallah from Jerusalem. A succession of “Fabric of Life” roads, tunnels and underpasses connect enclaved communities in the northern Jerusalem governorate to each other and to Ramallah. Once suburbs of Jerusalem, their “centre of life” has been rerouted to Ramallah.⁷⁹

Fakhri ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Qudaih is a farmer from Shuqba village in Ramallah. Like every farmer, following years of tradition in this region, Fakhri depends on two seasons of production. Planting and harvesting during the winter and summer ensures enough produce and income to live. In winter, Fakhri depends largely on figs, and in the summer olives. The Separation Wall has devastated this cycle and jeopardized Fakhri’s, as well as his community’s, very existence on their own land.





12 year-old Hammam Isma'il sits down leaning against a massive tree that died after it was uprooted by an Israeli bulldozer to prepare the land for the footprint of the Separation Wall. The young boy wonders about his and his family's future. He shares these burning questions with some 250 students in his school. The village is being isolated from neighboring villages by the Wall.

Hammam says, "Our daily suffering is great but it becomes worse every winter. We are forced to walk on foot for half an hour to reach school. The new road opened by the village council is sandy but at least allows us to reach our goal: Education."

Students from a nearby village called al-Tira attend the same school. The Israelis have forbidden al-Tira students from crossing the settler by-pass road. If any of them try, he or she will be arrested. Therefore, the students use a drainage hole below the Wall to reach school. This hole was built to prevent rain water from flooding the area and, in winter, crossing under the Wall becomes a real life threatening operation.

'Issa 'Ali 'Issa, the administrative manager of the school, said, "First, the Wall was built around our school then the Occupation Forces imposed restrictive rules upon the students. The students are no longer allowed to come to school or go back home, so they are forced to move in big groups with a teacher accompanying them."

The situation escalates when the Israeli Forces learn that a group of students went home from school without the company of teachers. "At that point, the military comes and starts interrogating the teachers and threatening the administration," he explains.

- Struggling for Education: The Grueling Path to School of the Students in Beit Ur, site of Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 9/12/2006, <http://www.stophthewall.org/struggling-education-brthe-gruelling-path-school-students-beit-ur>



Fakhri said, “They started the Wall last year, just one month before the olive collecting season. It was October of 2003. They uprooted the olive trees and destroyed and isolated our lands totaling 1,000 dunums.”

Fakhri owns 50 donums of the land isolated behind the Wall. He explained, “most of those 50 dunums are mine. Some lands are for my uncle’s sons but I was supervising them.” He added that the Israelis “started by uprooting 120 of my olive trees. This piece of land was the most fertilized of all, now they destroyed it.”

This land was used for planting figs and almonds besides the olive trees. Yearly income from figs alone equaled \$4,500. The monthly income of around \$375 was considered high in a country in which the brutal conditions of military occupation make any form of livelihood challenging. However, since the construction of the Wall began, Israeli authorities have refused to issue a permit for Fakhri to reach his lands. He said, “I tried more than once but every time they said we are not allowed to get the permit or even to reach the land.”

This isolated land wasn’t the only loss for the Qudaih family. They also lost land to the Jewish-only bypass road that connects settlement blocs with each other. Fakhri notes:

We don’t have any settlements on our lands but they built these bypass roads on our lands to serve the settlements blocs to the north and south of the West Bank. You also need to count





the land close to both sides of these bypasses. These land were forbidden for us to use for planting, building or any other kind of investment. We consider them lost too.⁸⁰

Out of Mood

‘Abdul Rahman (5 years) is from the village of Mas-ha near Salfit. He was standing near one of the Wall gates waiting for the school bus to take him as usual to Al-Hayat Kindergarten. Suddenly, a soldier came and slapped him in the face then grabbed his clothes and lifted him off the ground with his legs dangling while he screaming “Mama, Mama.”

This was the last time ‘Abdul Rahman leaves his home alone. After that, he insisted on always being accompanied by his father or one of his brothers.

His mother explained that ‘Abdul Rahman stood at the gate. Unluckily for him, the soldier was out of mood that morning, and as we live under the mercy of the soldiers’ moods he beat him. Since then ‘Abdul Rahman refuses to go to the kindergarten or go out alone. He also cries permanently and has daily nightmares in addition to bedwetting after that incident.

► Hanady Dweikat, Separation Wall and Stories from the Lives of the Palestinians.



• From Bethlehem

Of the 660 km² area of Bethlehem governorate, only 13% is available for the Palestinians as a result of the Wall's construction and the ongoing expansion of the settlements in addition to designating large areas of land as military areas/firing zones and nature reserves. Moreover, Palestinians also lack access to the 32 km of the Dead Sea coastline which forms the most easterly part of the Bethlehem governorate. The area isolated by the Wall to the west comprises approximately 64 km², including some of the most fertile land in the governorate. Nine Palestinian communities with approximately 21 thousand residents will also be affected, constituting the largest enclave in terms of population. The Wall blocks access to Road 60, the main route south to Hebron. It isolates al-Khader village, which is known for the variety and quantity of its grapes, from 75% of its agricultural lands in addition to isolating Beit Jala from 3,200 donums of agricultural lands, mostly olive groves. The Wall intrudes two kilometers into Bethlehem city, encircling Rachel's Tomb and severing the historic artery to Jerusalem. Most shops in the area have closed or relocated. In Beit Fajjar, 72 factory owners fear that if the Wall is constructed and Road 60 cut off, the local community will collapse.⁸¹

Al-Walaja village, which is four km from Bethlehem, is another example of the localities where houses were destroyed and lands confiscated.





Shereen al-A'raj, member of the village council says: "The demolishing of houses is a weekly event here in Al Walajah. People have nowhere else to go and so there are at least three families living in every house, sometimes even more. Some families have even been forced to live in caves." She adds that "It's like a life sentence in prison for everyone here, even for those who are yet to be born."

Al-Walaja lost most of its lands which were confiscated for construction of the Wall and the three surrounding settlements (Gilo, Har Gilo and Giv'at Yael); thus, its area was reduced to 2.2 km² of land, half the area remaining after the Israeli occupation in 1948 and 12.5% only of its original area of 18 km².

Palestinians waiting at a gate on the Separation Wall in Bethlehem to pass to Jerusalem for Ramadan's second Friday prayer in *al-Aqsa* mosque.

► Agence France-Presse (AFP), 14/10/2005.





In addition, when this section of the Wall is completed, the villagers will be separated from more than 90% of their agricultural land. They will be completely surrounded by the wall, and forced to use a terminal to get into, and out of, their own village.⁸²

A case study by ARIJ shows that Israel manipulates the villagers and pressures them through the tight construction restrictions and the Separation Wall to push them to leave voluntarily.

The study presents the case of one of the villagers, Munthir Hamad, whose house was demolished twice under the pretext of “security needs.” The first occasion, on 31/1/2006, the Israeli Army demolished the house under the pretext of security purposes to build the Separation Wall. Munthir says that he paid around 50 thousand shekels (around \$12 thousandⁱ) to reconstruct his house. However, after the reconstruction of the house, Hamad received a notice, warning him that he built his house without permit, and therefore his house was under demolition order, and in December 2006, the Israeli bulldozers demolished Munthir’s house once again. Consequently, Munthir was left bankrupt and homeless along with his five family members.⁸³

In the city of Bethlehem itself, one statement was exceptionally revealing in describing the suffering of its residents because of the Wall, when Claire Anastas said that her family had to obtain a permit in order to hang laundry on their own roof.

ⁱ According to the exchange rate from shekel to dollar in 2006 (4.46 shekels for one dollar), <http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdatamth/average/average06e.htm>





When wondering about the reason, the answer comes through this scene: the Separation Wall coils into a semi-circle around a secluded three-floor building, where Claire lives with her family. The roof of the family's home is slightly higher than the peak of the Wall. Because of this, Israeli soldiers decided to transform the roof into a military outpost for several months.

Fourteen members of her family live in the building, including Claire's husband and four children, her mother, and her brother's family. "No one else lives in the building anymore except us," Claire said. "There used to be others, but they left because of the problems."

The Anastas family once ran three successful souvenir shops, located on the first floor of the apartment building. "This was one of the main streets in Bethlehem before the Wall," Claire said, motioning in the direction of the road. "It was one of the busiest streets for business." However, the Wall blocked the road forcing them to close their shops, for no one comes down a street that runs into a solid wall.

One winter, the ice melted and rushed down the slight incline on which the house sits. Previously, the water would continue down the hill, but the Wall now blocks its way. Only one drain was installed and it became blocked, causing the water to flood the artificial bowl created by the Wall. The flood crept up and damaged the Anastas' shops, costing them a lot of money in repairs. They have received no compensation for their losses due to the Wall.⁸⁴



Complete Isolation

After completion of the Wall around the village of Nu‘man, north east of Bethlehem and to the south east of Jerusalem, the Israeli authorities adopted a tactic to force the villagers out: complete isolation of the village. The only way out or in is through a gate manned round the clock by military patrols.

No-one living outside the gate is allowed in, even if he or she is a first-degree relative. Access is refused to anyone with Jerusalem identity papers and even human rights groups are refused access.

Jamal Der‘awi, one of the villagers, says “for the last two months garbage trucks have been forbidden to enter.” The population has resorted to burning the garbage as they did thirty or forty years ago. He added, “In many cases, the villagers have resorted to smuggling barrels of fuel: sometimes they are successful, sometimes not. But we keep trying.”

Even the vet is not allowed to enter the village: instead, the 200 cattle have to go to Beit Sahour for vaccination. A malfunctioning refrigerator has to be carried to Beit Sahour for repair, because the technician is not allowed in.

Wheat sacks must be emptied into transparent plastic bags. If someone is carries a kilo of tomatoes or bananas, he can be accused of “smuggling food products into Israel.”

Ambulances are not allowed to enter. When a fire broke out in the village woodland, neither the WB nor the Israeli fire engines were allowed to enter. While the area is considered Israeli, no municipal services whatsoever are available. Jamal comments that “our village is simply a detention center.”

- ▶ Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, and Ma‘an Development Center, “Palestinian Towns and Villages: Between Isolation and Expulsion,” 2007, pp. 29–31, <http://www.ma-an-ctr.org/pdfs/onenew.pdf> and <http://www.stopthewall.org/palestinian-towns-and-villages-between-isolation-and-expulsion;>



• From Hebron

The route of the Wall in Hebron isolates around 50 Palestinian communities, where a large number of herders have lost access to their traditional grazing grounds, including four thousand donums near Eshkolot settlement. In Beit Yatir, in the southernmost part of Hebron, an extended family of 50 people lives between the Wall and the Green Line. The area was declared closed in January 2009, and Palestinians need permanent resident permits to live in their homes, but 35 of them were denied such permits. The region lacks shops, schools and medical services, forcing the residents to go to Imneizil village, the nearest service center. Such a journey is impossible without crossing the Beit Yatir terminal which is run by a private Israeli company that checks children on their way to school and back.⁸⁵

On 29/10/2007, the Israeli army forced more than 200 Palestinian to leave their homes in Khirbet Qassa, which is located near the town of Idhna, west of Hebron. The small village was established in the 1950s and most of its residents are refugees from the village of Beit Jibrin.

The villagers lived in tents and caves and gained a livelihood from raising sheep and goats. Since construction began on the Separation Wall, isolating the village from the rest of the WB, the army has harassed the residents and denied them access to the grazing fields and other facilities that lie beyond the Wall. After a while, the army warned the residents that it intended to demolish their homes on the grounds that they were built without a permit.



Four days prior to the destruction date, the army left demolition orders under stones at the entrances to homes in the village. On the set date, soldiers in jeeps and bulldozers began to demolish the tents and caves without giving the residents leave to remove their possessions. Much of the residents' property was crushed and buried among the ruins.

Later, the Israeli army loaded the water containers and feeding troughs onto a truck and deposited them beyond the Wall, forcing the residents to leave the place by noon the next day. Most residents remained homeless and had to rent temporary housing in the town of Idhna.⁸⁶

'Abdul Halim Nattah, who used to live in Khirbet Qassa, said, "I estimate our losses at one million shekels. We can be compensated for that, but not for the memories of fifty years of life. We didn't do anything wrong, we didn't do anything. We lived on Palestinian land in occupied territory." While Tamir Nattah said, "My family doesn't have any land or houses outside the village, so we are suffering greatly... the emotional pain and the feeling of instability cannot be measured. We don't know what the future will bring."⁸⁷





Chapter 5: The Separation Wall in Jerusalem (Jerusalem Envelope)

The Wall around Jerusalem, designated by the Israeli authorities as the Jerusalem Envelope, is a manifestation of Israel's most important goals. These are Judaizing the city, confiscating its lands, surrounding it with settlements and walls to separate it from its Arab and Islamic environment, in addition to pressuring the indigenous Jerusalemites into leaving the city.

The National Bureau for the Defense of Land and Resistance to Settlements noted that the construction of the Wall in Jerusalem would incur dangerous consequences. The clear aim of the construction within the borders of what is known as Greater Jerusalem is to reduce



its Palestinian population from 35%, as is the case in the Extended Jerusalem, to 22%. This reveals the Judaization project in the holy city in addition to the dangerous political, economic and social repercussions on the Palestinians.⁸⁸



A Palestinian girl holding the picture of her friend 'Abir 'Arameen who died of an injury during a demonstration against the Wall in 'Anata.

► Reuters, 21/1/2007.

On 19/3/2008, *Maariv* newspaper revealed that the Israeli Attorney General approved for the border guards shooting live ammunition on the Palestinians protesting against the Separation Wall surrounding East Jerusalem known as “Jerusalem Envelope”.

According to these directions, the Israeli forces are allowed to shoot live ammunition towards the Palestinians demonstrating against the Wall in compliance with the directions followed in the WB, yet they are not allowed to shoot live ammunition on protestors while there are Israeli and international peace activists among them.

- Site of The Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (Madar), 20/3/2008, <http://www.madarcenter.org/mash-had-details.php?id=3855&catid=20>
For more information on the continuous use of lethal weapons by the Israeli army see *Haaretz* newspaper, 19/9/2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/idf-still-using-banned-weapon-against-civilian-protestors-1.314521>; and see also site of Mondoweiss, 14/1/2011, <http://mondoweiss.net/2011/01/another-made-in-usa-%E2%80%9Cless-lethal%E2%80%9D-weapon-kills-in-palestine.html>



This chapter presents the impact of the Separation Wall on Jerusalem and Jerusalemites.

1. Isolating Jerusalem from the Rest of the WB

The route of the Wall in Jerusalem is 168 km long, and it separates the city from the rest of the WB. Further, its route winds around the Israeli settlements that surround Jerusalem ensuring that the majority lie on the western side of the Wall,⁸⁹ while isolating Arab villages and neighborhoods in Jerusalem Governorate from the city itself; such as al-‘Eizariyah, Abu Dis, al-Sawahirah al-Sharqiyyah and Sheikh Sa‘ad in the east, and the villages of Beit Surik, Beddo, Qattana, Al-Qubeibah, Beit Ijza, Beit Ikxa, Beit Duqqu, Beit ‘Anan and al-Tira in the northwest, and al-Ram, Dahiyat al-Barid, ‘Anata and Hazma in the north.

To the north of the city over 15,200 Palestinian residents of four villages in the Bir Nabala enclave are surrounded by the Wall on three sides, with an Israeli security road on the fourth, closed to Bir Nabala residents. As a result, these residents are in a totally enclosed enclave isolated from Jerusalem. The only way in and out is by means of an underpass to Ramallah, which passes under a motorway restricted for Israeli vehicles only.⁹⁰

On the other hand, the Wall links Jerusalem to the Israeli settlements in and around the city thus forming one bloc such as Gush Etzion bloc in the southwest, Ma‘ale Adumim bloc in the east, Givon bloc in the northwest in addition to the settlement of Pisgat Ze‘ev, Neve Yaakov and Atarot in the north (see map 4).





On 16/2/2009, the Israeli authorities completed isolating Jerusalem from the north by closing Dahiyat al-Barid gate in the Separation Wall. This gate was the only remaining outlet for the residents of Dahiyat al-Barid and al-Ram from and to Jerusalem, thus forcing them to use the Qalandia crossing. Hence, all the gates around Jerusalem are closed and the Israeli forces control the passage through gates.

Sarhan al-Salaymeh, the head of al-Ram Local Council, believes that, from a demographic perspective, this measure aims at the residents from Jerusalem. He said that around 60 thousand Jerusalemites living in Dahiyat al-Barid and al-Ram are under the threat of having their blue Jerusalem ID cards revoked. This measure would force them to evacuate the Jerusalem Envelope.

► Site of Al Quds City, 17/2/2009, <http://www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=news&id=1676>



The route runs deep into the WB to encircle the large settlements of Giv‘at Zeev and Makale Adummim, which are outside the municipal boundary and home to 39 thousand inhabitants. By contrast, densely populated Palestinian areas, Shu‘fat Camp, Kafr ‘Aqab, and Samiramis with a total population of over 30 thousand, which are currently inside the municipal boundary, are separated from Jerusalem by the Barrier.⁹¹

In total, the area isolated behind the Wall after its completion will amount to 151,974 donums, which makes up 43% of Jerusalem governorate’s area. Around 230 thousand Palestinians will be isolated by the Wall in Jerusalem, 56.5% of Palestinian Jerusalemites.⁹²


Table 4: Wall Construction Progress in Jerusalem ⁹³

	Length (Km)	% of Barrier’s Length
Completed Construction	78.5	47
Under Construction	30.6	18.3
Construction Not Yet Begun	58.2	34.7
Total	167.3	100





Map 4: The Separation Wall and the Israeli Settlements around Jerusalem, December 2009





Besides the geographic separation, the Separation Wall in Jerusalem solidifies the various Israeli mechanisms that have been put in place to restrict Palestinian movement between the WB and Jerusalem, namely identity cards, permits and checkpoints. The Palestinian's ability to move in and out of Jerusalem depends on the type of ID card he holds. In this context, West Bankers who have Palestinian ID require a permit to enter Jerusalem, and this permit is obtained when a person passes an Israeli security checking procedure. The permit usually designates the length of stay, the duration of the permit and in many cases specifies the checkpoint the person can cross; it can be cancelled at any time without any notice.⁹⁴

2. The Suffering of Jerusalemites due to the Wall

a. Displacement of the Population

The construction of the Wall in Jerusalem has overburdened the Jerusalemites with Israeli procedures. They are forced to change their place of residence for different reasons, notably in an attempt to preserve Jerusalemite identity. The Israeli law authorizes the Ministry of Interior to revoke the permit of a resident who left the country for a period of seven years or more, or who acquired citizenship or permanent license in another country, and thus had supposedly severed ties with Israel. The ministry regularly revokes residency permits without prior notice and without holding a hearing to allow residents to voice their arguments. In this manner, residents discover after the fact that they may no longer return to their homeland.⁹⁵ In addition, the “center of life” policy of





the Interior Ministry, imposed on the Palestinians with Jerusalem ID to prove continuous residency in Jerusalem by submitting documents to demonstrate that they actually resided in the city for the previous seven years. The requirements to prove the “center of life” are so detailed that even persons who hadn’t left the city have difficulties meeting them. The requirements related to this are characterized by ambiguity and vagueness.⁹⁶

This Israeli policy led to the revocation of 1,363 Jerusalem ID cards in 2006, and 4,577 in 2008, which is the highest ID revocation rate since the complete takeover of Jerusalem in 1967. The number of Palestinians whose residency was revoked, during the 1967–2008 period, is 12,207.⁹⁷

However, the Jerusalemites’ attachment to their city has led them to move their residence from outside to inside the municipality borders, where the number of those who moved up to the end of 2007 reached around 40 thousand Palestinians.⁹⁸ Israeli policies make the circumstances difficult for the Jerusalemite returnees, for they will face over-crowdedness in residential communities and classrooms, a high cost of living with high taxes, and other serious financial burdens on family members in addition to the difficult social and economic concessions caused by their transition.

Between 15/5–10/6/2006, a household survey on the impact of the Wall on the forced displacement in Jerusalem was conducted by the PCBS in collaboration with BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights. It showed that 32.9% of Palestinian



Jerusalemites have changed their last place of residence. The percentage of persons who changed their place of residence for the first time after the beginning of constructing the Wall in 2002 amounted to 53.9% of the total. The study also revealed that 63.8% of individuals aged 16 years and over think of changing their place of residence due to the Wall and its associated regime. The results show that 86.7% of them require suitable services in order to stay in the current place of residence, particularly suitable jobs and social security.⁹⁹

Salma's family is an example of this case. In the 1980s, the 10-member Jerusalemite family had decided to buy land in al-'Eizariyah to build a house large enough for everyone. At the same time, they maintained the house in Jerusalem, paid their property tax, and held on to their residency status.

However, the difficulties which the Wall has caused changed this situation and forced the family to go back to Jerusalem. The journey to work, which used to cost Salma 2.5 shekels (about half a dollar) and took 15 minutes, now costs 50 shekels (more than \$10)ⁱⁱ after the construction of the Wall, and it takes more than one hour by taxi through the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim. At times, she braved the wall and climbed through rooftops to get across. She was stopped several times. "Once the Israeli soldiers caught me and shoved me to the ground," Salma remembers. "I hurt my back and had to take several days off work. Luckily, they didn't arrest me."

ⁱⁱ According to the exchange rate from shekel to dollar in 2005 (4.49 shekels for one dollar), <http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mth/average/averg05e.htm>





The problem of this family did not end with returning to Jerusalem where the Jerusalem municipality started court proceedings against them to take away their Jerusalem IDs, under the pretext that the family no longer maintains Jerusalem as its “center-of-life,” due to their temporary stay in the WB. If this was proved and Salma’s family loses Jerusalem residency, they will be classed as WB residents. According to the 1950 Israeli Absentee Property law, their Jerusalem house, in the family for generations, could become the property of the Israeli government.¹⁰⁰

Bedouins affected by the Wall of Ma‘ale Adumim are yet another example of the common impact of the Wall and the settlements on the life of the Palestinians. In 1999, al-Jahalin tribe were evacuated from their shanties, tents and caves located near the Ma‘ale Adumim settlement to the east of Jerusalem in order to expand the greater settlement in the WB towards Jerusalem. Al-Jahalin indeed moved from the locations where they used to live for decades to a new location situated between the settlement from one side and the Palestinian towns of al-‘Eizariyah and Abu Dis on the other side, on lands considered by Israel as “State Land,” while the residents of Abu Dis consider them as their property which the Israeli authorities have confiscated.

However, the “model village” of al-Jahalin tribe lies outside the planned route of the Wall and it will be annexed to Abu Dis. Mohammad Khalil, one of the leaders of the tribe says: “First we were all forced to abandon our previous way of life and to live within a half-kilometer-square piece of land,” adding “now they want to build a wall that will cut us off both from the desert and from workplaces in



Ma‘ale Adumim and to attach us to Abu Dis, with which we have no regular contact and which we don’t go into.”

In the summer of 2004, the Israeli authorities started sending evacuation and demolition orders to the tribe. According to a report published by Haaretz, at least 66 such orders were issued to the Salamat and Hamadin tribes living in Area C.

Muhammad Hamadin, 34 and a father of six, has a house which is composed of many huts and lies midway between Ma‘ale Adumim and the of the Jahalin village. Muhammad jokingly says that his *diwan*, the room in Arab homes that serves as the parlor, rates a five-star on the Bedouin scale: carpets that are carefully arranged and well brushed, a stand for the television and the stereo. He adds: “I don’t want houses or money,” in reference to his people in al-Jahalin.

Wouldn’t it be a pity to demolish a home like this? At first they came and started taking pictures of the huts and everything. Now they’ve issued 12 orders for all the huts. Later they started putting up random checkpoints on the access road. All at once we’ve gotten nervous. Where will we go? The flocks go east into the desert, and when the wall is built they won’t have anywhere to go and neither will we. We were here before the people of Kedar and even before the people of Ma‘ale Adumim. So move them to somewhere else.

Abu Yusuf Saraya, the *mukhtar* (mayor) of Wadi al-Hindi located in the desert some hundred meters away from Kedar, underwent demolitions and demolition attempts in 1997. Despite it all, he managed to build an elementary school and to keep his extended family together.





He said, “We didn’t ask for the residents of Kedar or Ma‘ale Adumim to leave, so why are we being asked to go?” and then added, “If we are forced westward, no one will let us in. And to the east there’s a firing zone that no one can enter.”¹⁰¹

b. Economy

The Separation Wall has prevented Palestinian WB traders and consumers from reaching East Jerusalem, which was the commercial hub of the WB. It further prevented the traders and consumers of Jerusalem suburbs from reaching the city markets. Checkpoints and the Wall now channel the movement of people away from these local businesses. Jerusalem businesses have traditionally relied on people traveling into the city for Friday prayers, but the number of Palestinians obtaining the necessary permits has significantly decreased. The deterioration in commercial traffic has impacted the economy in Jerusalem; a report issued by OCHA noted that the Separation Wall has partially contributed to the increase in unemployment rate in the city which reached 19.3% in the third quarter of 2006 compared to 8.3% in Israel.¹⁰²

Al-Ram is one example of the economic deterioration created by the Wall. This city was a booming commercial center because of its location between Jerusalem and Ramallah. After the construction of the Wall in the middle of the main street which links the two cities, commercial centers in al-Ram were isolated from customers and buyers. Of the 1,650 registered commercial establishments in al-Ram in 2006, 730 were closed and the rental of a 90–120 m² apartment dropped



from 1,500 shekels (around \$336) to 700 shekels (around \$157), while the price of such an apartment now ranges between 120 thousand shekels (around \$27,900) and 150 thousand shekels (around \$33,600) down from 250 thousand shekels (around \$56 thousand).ⁱⁱⁱ In addition, many international and civil society organizations left al-Ram after the completion of the Wall there.¹⁰³

Zahra Khalidi is one of al-Ram residents who were affected by the Wall's construction. She moved to the city in 1999 and paid \$60 thousand for an apartment with a view over Jerusalem's municipality. Yet with the crawling of the Wall into the street where she lives, the value of the apartment dropped to \$35 thousand. Fearing that she would be expelled from her city, Zahra was forced to move again into Jerusalem and rent a small apartment in the Old City as she could not afford to buy a house.

The flow of thousands of Palestinians again into Jerusalem made taxes and prices higher, while rents have soared, thus exacerbating the housing shortage. Zahra, who has been unemployed for the past seven months, struggled in order to meet her financial obligations.¹⁰⁴

Another example is the village of Beit Surik, northwest Jerusalem. It originally had an area of 13 thousand donums, but like other Palestinian villages it lost four thousand donums in 1948 and more territories were confiscated to establish the settlements of Mevaseret Tsiyon

ⁱⁱⁱ Israeli Shekel to US Dollar Exchange Rate 2006 (4.46 shekels=US \$1), <http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/deptdata/mth/average/averg06e.htm>





and Har Adar after 1967. Since then, the Israeli government seized additional lands in the village to expand the settlements and establish an Israeli sewage system on 750 donums.

Upon the completion of the Wall, another 5,500 donums will be confiscated and the area of Beit Surik will diminish to include the built-up region only, which is 1,300 donums, without any open or ploughed land.

One of the villagers commented on the loss of village land, stating that the Wall is a slow way to force them to leave. As land diminishes, people are wondering where their children would live, how they would feed their families if the Israeli authorities stole all these lands and where would they bury the dead.¹⁰⁵

c. Society

The Wall separates the Jerusalemite families and disperses them, in addition to hindering communication among them and even marriage between those living on both sides, thus forming a barrier which destroys their social life.

The survey conducted by the PCBS and BADIL notes that 21.4% of Palestinian households reported to have at least one member was separated from relatives while 18% of families were separated from the father compared to 12.7% from the mother. The survey also shows that the percentage of households that faced obstacles to marrying a partner living on the other side of the Wall amounted to 69.4%, noting that the Wall has affected the ability of 84.6% of



households to visit their relatives and 56.3% to practice cultural, social activities and entertainment.¹⁰⁶

d. Medical Care

The construction of the Wall in Jerusalem has separated the residents of its villages and suburbs from the main hospitals they depend on for specialized medical care. There are six specialist hospitals all of which are located inside the city, namely: Augusta Victoria Hospital (AVH), al-Makassed, St John of Jerusalem Eye Hospital, St. Joseph, the Palestine Red Crescent Society Hospital and The Jerusalem Princess Basma Centre for Disabled Children.

The Wall prevents Palestinian patients in the WB and GS from reaching the hospitals of East Jerusalem which they used to visit for treatment due to the advanced level of medical care provided there. For example, AVH is the only center in the WB and GS that offers radiation therapy for cancer patients and pediatric dialysis. Such hospitals used to receive an average of three thousand patients referred by the MOH from all Palestinian territories.

With the Wall's construction, patients and medical staff in the WB and isolated areas in Jerusalem are finding these hospitals increasingly difficult to access due to a fraught and time-consuming process to obtain permits and pass checkpoints. Many patients are turning to smaller and less equipped hospitals in other parts of the WB and GS, due to delays and the frequent refusal of permits for a spouse, parent or other escort.





This led to a decrease in the number of patients in East Jerusalem hospitals and the caseload at Augusta Victoria has fallen by more than 30% for its general medical services. In the period 2002–2005 the number of emergency room patients in al-Makassed Hospital dropped by 50%, illustrating the difficulties faced by patients. UNRWA noted a significant decline in the number of patients registered for clinical care in the three major hospitals which receive refugees covered by UNRWA; thus, while the number of patients received by al-Makassed, AVH and St John of Jerusalem Eye Hospital in 2003 amounted to 11 thousand, this number dropped to about four thousand patients by mid-2006.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, impeding the movement of medical staff led to a decline in the number of WB employees in Jerusalem hospitals from around 70% in 2007 (1,168 out of 1,670) to 62.5% in 2009 (915 out of 1,470). The chronic lateness and absence of WB staff makes managing consultations and operations, which is already a delicate task for any hospital, additionally difficult.¹⁰⁸

A household survey was conducted by the PCBS in cooperation with BADIL on the impact of the Wall on forced displacement in Jerusalem. It showed that 34.5% of Palestinian households in the Jerusalem governorate were hindered from receiving medical services (5.8% inside of the Wall and 88.3% outside the Wall). In addition, the inability of the medical staff to reach health centers is an obstacle for 31.3% of the households (4.4% inside of the Wall and 81.8% outside the Wall).¹⁰⁹



e. Education

The PCBS-BADIL survey showed that 72.1% of the households with students in higher education endured forced absence from university because their area was closed several times; 80% of these households were forced to find alternative roads to reach their universities or colleges and to accommodate the difficulties imposed by the Wall. 69.4% of the households with students enrolled in primary or secondary education had to be absent from school, while 75.2% of these households were forced to find alternative roads to reach their schools.¹¹⁰

Available data on how the Wall impedes the access of students and teachers to their schools shows that out of 33 thousand students and two thousand teachers in East Jerusalem schools, as many as six thousand students and more than 650 teachers face difficulties reaching their schools. For such residents as those of al-‘Eizariyah, Abu Dis, Bir Nabala and Kafr ‘Aqab, the once-short journey from home to classroom takes up to two hours each way. This is due to circuitous routes, military checkpoints and crossings along the Separation Wall. Consequently, student numbers in many schools have dropped and schools struggle to find qualified local staff.

Schools that are less affected by the Wall suffer overcrowded classrooms as increased numbers of students have moved to these schools. These students wanted to avoid the daily difficulties of crossing the Wall and the problems their parents face in maintaining contact.¹¹¹





For example, children in the town of Beit Hanina have been denied enrollment in the schools of Jerusalem since the Wall isolated their houses from their schools. Thus depriving them the chance of an education which must be made “compulsory and available free to all” by the governing state as stipulated in Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

‘Anata Secondary School for Boys suffers from the Wall that crosses the school, separating its two playgrounds, leaving a narrow space which is too small to accommodate its 800 students. Yusuf ‘Alyan, the school principal, stated that the Wall has isolated around three donums of the school yards, including the playgrounds.

The students’ testimonies reflect the impact of the Wall impacts on their lives at school in particular. Hisham Mahmud, aged 15, angrily says that they feel that they are in a small prison and that wherever they go they cannot laugh or talk.

Sulaiman Muhammad Kirshan, also 15, says that the students do not have enough space to stand or play, and that they feel stressed and afraid of the soldiers that watch them daily at the school gate ready to attack them at any time. Yassir Salamah, 11, said that school is no longer how it used to be, that they used to stay after school to play football and volleyball, but now to avoid the soldiers they go directly to their homes.¹¹²



The students of 'Anata Secondary School were shocked when they returned from their weekly vacation on the morning of Saturday 1/10/2005 to see an eight meter high concrete grey wall. The Israelis built it in the middle of their school as a part of the Separation Wall in the WB.





Moreover, the Wall has affected higher education and the University of Jerusalem, with its three branches in Abu Dis, the Old City and Beit Hanina, is a striking example. The number of students in Beit Hanina campus has dropped by 70% because of difficulties of access, thus all students on this campus now hold Jerusalem ID cards. Consequently, the University transferred most classes to Abu Dis campus, where almost half of the students (3,941 out of 8,921) travel from Jerusalem every day to attend specialized classes. In addition, since the construction of the Wall, the journey to the University has become more time consuming because students have to take more than one taxi or bus to reach the campus. The military checkpoints at the entrance of Abu Dis delay students and lecturers, sometimes causing students to miss their examinations. In 2005, for example, between 350 and 400 students were delayed for their annual examinations.

In addition, around one third of the land owned by the University in Abu Dis is located either under or lies on the western side of the Separation Wall and is no longer accessible.¹¹³



A picture of an Israeli army jeep passing by the Separation Wall in Abu Dis.

➤ AFP, 1/12/2005





Chapter 6: Facing the Wall... Bil'in Case

The village of Bil'in, northwest Ramallah City, is home to about 1,800 people (in 2004) and has an area of around 4,000 donums. Mod'in Illit settlement eats in to more than 800 donums of its land. In 2005, a revised Wall plan showed that it would isolate around 2,000 additional donums which amount to half the lands of the village.¹¹⁴

'Abdullah Abu Rahmah, the coordinator of Bil'in Popular Committee Against the Wall, tells how the village's weekly demonstration against the Wall started. He said that Bil'in village is like the other border villages where the Separation Wall has been constructed and that building the Wall in Bil'in started on 20/2/2005. Since that time, the residents of Bil'in conducted meetings and formed a popular committee which represents all the national movements



and institutions in the village. He added that since the first bulldozer started Israel's works of destruction in Bil'in, the residents protested on daily basis, marching towards the bulldozers trying to throw stones at the soldiers and the bulldozers to stop them from proceeding with their work. The villagers decided that demonstrations should proceed until the Wall is dismantled, demolished and the Israeli settlements removed.¹¹⁵

During that period, protests in the village continued on daily basis and every Friday became a date for the weekly Bil'in demonstrations against the Wall. Palestinian citizens, national figures and Israeli and international supporters participated in these demonstrations.

Abu Rahmah said that they will never give up. He added that despite the fact that the weak usually cannot contend with the strong, Bil'in's case is different. The Israelis took their land and they will not remain silent. He explained that this was the place where they ate thyme and olive oil, where they played as kids, where their fathers and grandfathers were buried, where they will be buried and this is the place where the collapse of the Wall will start.

Abu Rahmah lives in a two-storey house of which he presented one flat to international supporters. He said that these supporters should get special treatment since they come to support Bil'in. The villagers are adamant about the participation of international supporters in every popular demonstration, for the Israeli soldiers do not shoot live ammunition on the protestors when these foreigners are there.¹¹⁶



1. Innovative Ideas to Resist the Wall

Bil'in's revolution has been characterized by innovative ideas. Abu Rahmah explained that they work as a team and everyone in Bil'in has his specialty. There are media representatives; others have their field work while some work as guards. They try to come up with new ideas in order to draw international attention. For example, once they tied their bodies to the olive trees so that when bulldozers try to uproot them they would be uprooted too. Another time, they tied ropes around their necks and tied them around the trees, so when the Israelis raze the trees they would raze the villagers too, killing them. Abu Rahmah added that they also organized dozens of candle protests, held musical concerts next to the Wall, placed an outdoor big screen to watch the World Cup games and once organized a wedding ceremony there.¹¹⁷

The residents of Bil'in resisted the construction of the Wall by building two rooms on their land located west of the Separation Wall. The first was built in December 2005 while the second was built three months later. These rooms were built to embarrass the Israeli authorities which refuse to halt construction in the Matityahu East neighborhood in the settlement Mod'in Illit, despite the injunction issued by the Israeli Supreme Court banning any further building there without permits.¹¹⁸

Abu Rahmah said that after the villagers proved before the Israeli courts that this settlement was not legitimate, they built a room there.





Graffiti is one of the ways that Palestinians and international activists resist the Separation Wall.





When the Israeli soldiers wanted to destroy it, claiming its illegality, the villagers handed the documents proving the illegality of the settlement. Consequently, they could not uphold the law to demolish the room. It remained there and the people of Bil'in constantly guard it. Abu Rahmah added that one of the most striking things they did was when his family and another stormed into a house in the settlement, putting some of their belongings and even their kids' toys there. They raised the Palestinian flag, telling the Israelis that the settlers also came in an illegal way and that when these settlers get out the two families will go out. Then came the Israeli army, forcing them out of the house. After that the villagers presented the necessary documents for some of the houses in the settlement to be demolished. Consequently, the people of Bil'in regained part of their land and even the soil that was shoveled before the construction.¹¹⁹

2. Testing Weapons in Bil'in

Different kinds of weapons are used by the Israeli forces failed to suppress the weekly demonstrations in Bil'in. This is despite the many testimonies of converting the village into a place for testing “non-lethal” weapons.

In 2005, the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported that unknown weapons are being used to disperse protesters in Bil'in. The newspaper added that the village “is said to be a site where new methods of crowd control are tested,” and that in addition to the Israel army which is primarily “responsible for dispersing the demonstrations, Border Police and Prisons Service personnel are also on the scene.”





One of the weapons used was “a small bean bag that can be shot from a hunting rifle or from a rifle used to fire 37-milimeter shells or tear gas canisters.” The newspaper described that it has “a fatal impact if it hits a sensitive area of the body like the head or neck.” Two months earlier, an investigative report by the same newspaper revealed “two new types of ammunition used for the first time at Bil’in: a pepper ball that splits into several smaller projectiles on contact and causes burning and dizziness, and blue sponges.”¹²⁰



Israeli bulldozers uprooted their olive trees, so the villagers rose to defend them. It is an olive revolution, where the blessed tree stands as a unique symbol for a unique resistance.

- Special Mission: Bil’in Wall, site of Al Arabiya News Channel, 19/10/2006, <http://www.alarabiya.net/programs/2006/10/22/28459.html>



Other reports talked about a wide array of weapons used in dispersing the demonstration including: A weapon codenamed Tze'aka (Scream), it is “a minute long blast of sound emanating from a white Israeli military vehicle.” As for its effects, they will appear within seconds, where “protestors begin falling to their knees, nauseous and unable to retain their balance.” Another weapon is “a small transparent red plastic ball, the size of a marble, containing a creamy white powder.” When this bullet hits the skin and explodes, “it gives an extreme burning sensation penetrating into open wounds and causing blistering.” As for the creamy white powder, it has a pungent odor, which is “irritating, causing coughing, sneezing, burning eyes and skin, nausea and vomiting.” In addition, there is the skunk bomb which is “a foul-smelling liquid that is sprayed on the rioters.” An Israeli army officer explained that its “smell is so strong that people flee immediately.”¹²¹

Yet, with every new repressive method, the protestors study possible ways for retaliation. They used metal armor on the chest to protect themselves against rubber bullets, and tried big mirrors to reflect sunlight on the soldiers' eyes to confuse them and prevent them from pointing their weapons towards the demonstrators, in addition they wore old clothes or covered their bodies with plastic bags to avoid the foul water.¹²²





The Bil'in Popular Committee Against the Wall considered the bankruptcy of the Israeli construction company, Heftsiba, which builds residential blocs in the settlements, including the settlement established in Bil'in, another victory for the Committee. This happened after it handed with Peace Now movement a series of four petitions involving the illegality of Matityahu East neighborhood, which is being built on the land of Bil'in.

An interim injunction handed down by the High Court of Justice on 12/1/2006 stipulated that all construction in Matityahu East—a neighborhood in the Modi'in Illit settlement—is to stop until the legal questions surrounding the zoning plan and building permits are resolved. It added that “all actions involving moving into the apartments in the area will cease immediately and, at this time, no deeds of ownership will be transferred to purchasers and their entry and use of the property is hereby forbidden.”

In midst 2007, the Jerusalem Magistrates Court granted temporary bankruptcy status to the financially troubled Heftsiba construction firm, and ordered its management to draft a recovery plan. Heftsiba had accumulated debts of about \$370 million, \$189 million of which are bank loans.

- Peace Now Blamed for Heftsiba Fall, *The Jerusalem Post* newspaper, 5/8/2007, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=70985>; Court Grants Heftsiba Bankruptcy, *Yedioth Ahronoth* newspaper, 6/8/2007, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3434141,00.html>

3. Diverting the Route of the Wall

The most notable achievement of the Bil'in case is represented in the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court concerning the route the Wall. On 4/9/2007, the court ordered the Israeli state to “redraw, partially dismantle and rebuild the route of a 1.7 kilometer section of the West Bank separation fence, which was built on land belonging to Bil'in.” The unanimous decision wanted the change so the new route “causes



less harm to the village’s residents.” The court “ordered the government to come up with a new route in a reasonable period of time.”¹²³

However, the second amended route of the Separation Wall proposed by the Israeli State on the lands of Bil’in was also considered illegal by the Israeli Supreme Court. It “concluded that the proposed route violates the Court ruling from September 2007, and ordered the State to pay the residents of Bil’in’s legal expenses.” If the decision is implemented, the inhabitants of Bil’in should regain around half of their land isolated to the west of the Wall.¹²⁴

It should be noted that although the settlement is established on the territories of the WB in violation of international law, the Court approved the annexation of the lands where the settlements were established under the pretext of “security considerations.” Thus, the “justice” which the Court is supposed to present to the Palestinians is insufficient, as it returns to them half of their lands only while allowing the occupation to keep the other half.





Conclusion

It was clear during the course of this book that the Separation Wall is not a mere wall or fence and its aim is not restricted to separation or security. It is rather an integrated system of walls, fences, trenches, barriers, military patrol roads and electronic alarm equipment. This system occupies a “strip” of the WB territories and penetrates them for around 20 km, aiming at making them part of Israel. It snakes through these lands, isolating many villages and towns from the source of their livelihoods, farmers from their agricultural lands and students from their schools.

Even worse, this system of annexation and isolation surrounds many villages and cities, cutting across the WB and transforming it



into groups of enclaves. It further bites into many areas of the WB, rendering the thought about the establishment of a Palestinian state, even on a tiny part of Mandate Palestine, an illusion. Israel's unilateral step of disengagement from the GS leads to the same conclusion in the sense that it consolidates the construction of the Wall and enhances the settlement blocs in the WB.

Israel proceeds with building the Wall despite the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Hague condemning the Wall, which was approved by the UN, and despite the dozens of international decisions on the illegality of the Jewish settlements in the WB including Jerusalem. This would not have been possible for Israel without its alliance with the US and the weakness and collusion of Arab states.



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The
Separation Wall
in the West Bank

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This Book

The Separation Wall in the West Bank introduces to the readers the Separation Wall that the Israeli government is building in the West Bank. It clarifies the declared and undeclared objectives of the Wall, and its role in entrenching settlement activities, annexing the land, and confiscating water resources. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) conceives the Wall as a violation of international charters and conventions.

Chapters of this book describe the sufferings inflicted by the Separation Wall on the Palestinians in the West Bank, especially the areas near Jerusalem or "Jerusalem Envelope." The book also focuses on Bil'in village's actions to resist the Wall, deeming it as a model for the Palestinian popular resistance.

This book is the eighth in the Am I Not a Human? series, in which al-Zaytouna endeavors to present to its readers the full and complete picture of the suffering of Palestinians under the Israeli occupation. It tries its best to address hearts and minds with the most accurate, and documented information.



Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations

مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات

P.O.Box: 14-5034 Beirut - Lebanon

Tel: +961 1 803 644 | Tel-fax: +961 1 803 643

info@alzaytouna.net | www.alzaytouna.net



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Am I Not a Human ?

