Abstracts of Working Papers: The European Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Issue Conference
|
Title
|
Author
|
|
Dr. Alain Gresh
|
|
| European Israeli Economic Relations and its Effect on European Foreign Policy | Dr. Hussein Abou el-Namel |
| Mr. Denis Sieffert | |
| Dr. Muhammad Abu Kazleh | |
| Mr. John McHugo | |
| Dr. Amine Hotaite | |
| Dr. Daud Abdullah | |
| Prof. Dr. Nasr Abdel Karim | |
| Ms. Aisling Byrne | |
| Mr. Osama Hamdan | |
| Dr. Are John Knudsen and Frode Løvlie | |
| Prof. Dr. Nezam Barakat | |
| Prof. Dr. Abd Elfatah al-Rashdan | |
| Dr. Nahla Chahal | |
| Mr. Houssam Shaker | |
| Prof. Dr. Tariq Ramadan |
The Backgrounds of the European Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Issue
Dr. Alain Gresh
The European foreign policy as such began in the 1970’s. We can divide it in three phases concerning Palestine and Middle East:
- From 1970 to the Oslo agreement, Europe changed its view of the Palestinian problem, from a refugee problem to a national problem. It played an important role to advance the ideas of negotiations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and of Palestinian rights in self-determination. It was, in some way, at the vanguard of western positions;
- The Oslo agreements : during the 1990’s, the European union was more and more involved in financing the Palestinian Authority but lost any political role to the United States;
- The 2000’s, with a rapprochement between Europe and Israel. Even if the official position of Europe didn’t change – two states, Palestine and Israel living side by side – Europe developed very strong ties (political, economical and even military) with Israel, despite the policy of Israel on the ground (colonization, check-points, arrests, etc.), and refused any serious pressure on Israel.
What are the reasons and the factors of this change in the European Policy? Will it evolve in the near future?
Back to top
European Israeli Economic Relations and its Effect on European Foreign Policy
Hussein Abou el-Namel
The European Israeli Economic Relations could be briefly summarized by the phrase: "concurrence of opportunity and response." The European opportunities have always met the Israeli demands, and on the other side, the Israeli response has taken full advantage of the available opportunities –if not even more. Thus the relations subject of study in this paper are not developing or usual in being conditional to purely economic considerations, but rather historic and strategic relations that have been in development by various political, cultural, ideological and security factors.
It is not a case of economy dictating the Politics but an opposite case, where it is clear that economic relations are merely a parallel manifestation of the political relations between Israel and the European States; whereas the latter try to make it appear as if these relations, both political and economic, are disturbing and are a result of American pressure.
This paper reads through the European Israeli relations from the perspective of examining the 'political' in light of the 'economic', and compares the European contribution to the Israelis relative to that given to the Palestinians, and vice versa. The above is argued based on the indication of relations, and not on the traditional basis of external trade, i.e. marketing dimension, but rather from the productive dimension, i.e. providing an environment that produces 200 billion dollars and an external trade amounting to 130 billion dollars annually, and a balance of imports and exports.
Add to the above that besides the important aspect of trade and economics, invaluable is the European support of Israel in science and technology; consequently in increasing the productivity to rival leading international standards, because of intense use of science. In the latter, the European role has been crucial in the level of assistance provided at this level, estimated incrementally between 1949 and 2009 by about 600 billion dollars, representing the Israeli profit share from the 232 thousand patents on which the Israeli technology has been based and developing.
It is from the above –and other similar- statistics that the evaluation of the European role gets additional importance. The resulting economy with a productive infrastructure amounting currently to 200 billion dollars and an external trade of 130 billions, most of which are high-tech, is but a reflection of the qualitative nature of the productive infrastructure established.
Israel has found in the European market an opportunity to take up 45.5% and 35.7% of its imports and exports respectively. The majority of these products are indeed with the European Union (34.5% and 29% from imports and exports respectively). Europe, for example, is also a transit for Israel's passing of its products to "rival" regional states that officially ban Israeli products. Examining the rates of individual products reveals yet more observations. For example if we examine percentages of industrial exports excluding diamonds, the percentage of Israeli exports amounts to 32% which is even higher than the Israeli exports of these products to the United States (28%).
Finally the paper argues that the European-Israeli economic relations, which have been based on a political background, have developed after sixty years to become major economic interests for both sides, and serving both sides' interest. This given is available to further strengthen the political relations between the two, and not the opposite. Europe has provided the Israelis with such a productive capacity, while on the other hand it only provides the Palestinians with some of their consumer needs and under very strict political conditions; not to mention the vast difference between the two!
Back to top
France and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Mr. Denis Sieffert
France has been concerned with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more than any other European country for many reasons, including: social, demographic and historical reasons. Demographically, France incorporates the largest Jewish community in Europe, in addition to an estimated 2.9 million Muslims whose majority is of North African roots. Historically, the issue dates back to the colonization era when France was highly involved in the Middle East. It has inherited Lebanon and Syria following the dismantle of the Ottoman Caliphate and according to Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, although France was highly desiring Palestine.
The French policy was neither pro-Zionist before the Second World War (WWII), nor did it support the establishment of a Jewish national homeland on the lands of Palestine. Then, France was only focusing on its interests in North Africa, being afraid of a strong Moroccan reaction especially in light of the threat of a revolution in North Africa. In addition, France considered that Zionism would be a card in the hands of the British Empire.
After WWII, the French policy towards the Middle East has changed, because of the ethnic cleansing and its consequences, where the French had a feeling of guilt towards the Jews. And with the Algerian war of independence, France's relation with the Arab world turned into a hostile attitude; France considered that its relations with the Arab world are to a loss, and started thus to support the Jewish settlement movement and the Israeli policies.
We must not forget here that the roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict date back to France, when the Austrian reporter Theodor Herzl was covering the Dreyfus affair as the Paris correspondent for Neue Freie Presse. There, he heard the chants of mass rallies in Paris "Death to the Jews!", which hurt him a lot and impelled him to think and look forward to the concept of a Jewish state.
Until 1962, France (the fourth republic) had been supporting the Israeli state, but then, De Gaulle lent the French hand to the Arabs again and stalled the close relations with Israel. This act however was symbolic, as for example the French-Israeli economic relations were not affected.
The year 1967 witnessed a sharp change in the diplomatic relations between France and Israel, after De Gaulle charged the Israelis with the responsibility of the 1967 June war. That same year witnessed also the appearance of Palestinian figures in France, where earlier Palestinians were not present at all. France was the first Western country to meet officially with Yasir ‘Arafat despite the kidnapping of Israeli athletes who were participating in Munich Olympics in 1972, and the assassination of the first Palestinian representative in France, Mahmoud Hamshari.
As for today, the French society has been more aware of the Palestinian issue and rights, and many French are moving towards taking a supportive position towards these rights. Nonetheless, the French diplomacy isn’t aligned with this direction, but rather in the opposite direction, especially with the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy whose policy seems to resemble that of President Bush Jr., and who supports Israel, unconditionally.
Back to top
The German Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Issue
Dr. Muhammad Abu Kazleh
This paper aims at analyzing and understanding the German Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict from two overlapping perspectives: Pragmatic and Value-based. For that purpose, this paper focuses the main determinants and major driving forces in making and practicing this policy. It attempts at answering the following questions: What are the national German interests in the Arab region? And how do these interests contribute in the making process of the German foreign policy, specifically towards the Palestinian issue and more generally towards the Arab-Israeli conflict? What are the frames within which this policy is made? What is the effect of the special relationship with Israel in that? And is there really a new German policy in the region, and if yes, what is the nature of this policy and its main reflections?
This paper builds on the hypothesis that the German special relationship with Israel has been the major driving force in making and practicing the German policy towards the Palestinian issue. The historical responsibility brought about by the Nazist past or the "Holocaust" represents in this case what we can refer to as an "ethical standard" on the basis of which the German foreign policy towards the Palestinian issue and the whole Arab region was established. Yet more, this factor has been the "benchmark" in guiding this policy.
Thus the analysis of the Pragmatic and Ethical/Value-based dimensions, along with their significant intersection, indicates the existence of a problematic dilemma in the German foreign policy making; Germany needs to balance its increasing interests with Arab sides on one hand, and its special relationship with Israel on the other. At the same time, Germany is seeking to expand its role and influence within the efforts of the conflict settlement, in a way that reflects its being the leading European power, and the major contributor in the aid granted to the various regional sides involved in the conflict.
To date, it does not seem that Germany has been able of achieving the above role; and it couldn't as long as the German foreign policy is chained with its historical past. Germany needs to adopt a more open policy, especially towards the influential parties of the conflict, namely the resistance. Until then, the German role in the region and the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to be -similar to that of the European Union: marginal.
Back to top
The British Foreign Policy towards the Palestinian Issue with special Reference to Resolution 242
Mr. John McHugo
Resolution 242 is frequently cited as the basis for a peace settlement between Israel and Palestine but it is also given as an example of the dubious practice of "constructive ambiguity" which allows different interpretations to suit different parties. However, John McHugo and other scholars have now shown that Israel's official interpretation is unsustainable, with the consequence that the Resolution can no longer be seen as ambiguous.
What are the consequences of this, and what view of 242 is taken by British policy makers today?
Although the Balfour Declaration was indeed an example of constructive ambiguity, the same cannot now be said about Resolution 242 when Lord Caradon crafted it half a century later in 1967.
Despite Suez and the Iraq War, Britain's self-image is as a state which is deeply committed to upholding international law. Although Britain is reluctant to put pressure on Israel to compel its compliance with international law, and has also been reluctant to see international law clarified to uphold Palestinian rights, Britain has had no choice but to take positions on the Palestine issue which it can justify in terms of international law. It is increasingly doing this with regard to Resolution 242.
Back to top
Euro-Israeli Military and Security Relations and Agreements and Their Impact on the European Foreign Policy
Dr. Amine Hotaite
After being the embracing land of the Jewish Zionist dream of establishing a national Jewish homeland in Palestine through Balfour Declaration, European countries or at least some continue in supporting and backing Israel today. Within this context, the military relations between Israel and European countries have been a primary resource for Israel in preparing its army.
The essence of the Israeli-European relation is centered around its relation with France, not to deny that Israel had established military relations with more than one country, and had thus attainments in more than one realm, namely armament, training, and exchange of experiences, in addition to the scientific and technical exchange in the various diverse military domains.
European countries have adopted the Israeli Occupation since its establishment, supported it with arms and arranged for military cooperation with it; all because they saw in it a bridge for their interests in the East.
On the other hand, Israel has planned to establish relations and sign agreements with the European Union as a unity, to benefit from the common security and defense section within the union's system, and consequently have these agreements and relations apply on its relation with all the European Countries and not one at a time.
Recent statistics indicate that some European countries indeed are another spring for Israel's armament following the US, and these countries are: France, Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium, Poland, Romania, and others. As for training, and following the decline of Israeli-Turkish relations, Israel has sought European help for training fields and areas, where earlier Turkey has been its primary resource in this field.
It is obvious that there is a certain relation between the bilateral arms trade of two countries and their foreign policy. Thus, arms trade reflects some shared backgrounds and goals including strategic goals; the tuning of the regional power balance, economic implications and goals, military purposes, and political implications. The final goal is political, since the military aid is always disguised with an implicit condition based on coordination in foreign policy, reaching the extent of possession or control or confiscation of the national sovereign decision. Concerning how did the European military relations with Israel affect the European Union's foreign policy, the paper argues that Europe is concerned with Israel because of underlying European interests that can be achieved via this relation. The major lines that are currently pressuring the European-Israeli relations are three: an independent European policy, a regional policy in coordination with the United States, and the increasing European public dismay at Israeli violations and practices that consequently pressures the political decision-making process.
Back to top
The Impact of the Israel Lobby on European Foreign Policy in Palestine
Dr. Daud Abdullah
Pro-Israeli lobbying activities in Europe preceded the creation of Israel itself. The Jewish and Israeli lobbies have exerted considerable and consistent influence over European policies and strategies over the course of the entire post World War I period and arguably over the entire course of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century. Without the unlimited support of western governments, particularly that of the US and Britain, the enterprise to colonise Palestine could never have succeeded.
Across Europe the lobbying efforts to influence policy were pursued through finance and investment interests, as well as through the major political parties focusing on the entire political spectrum ranging from the extreme left to the right-wing. At all times, attempts are made to link Israel to the grand strategies of European countries to the extent of harnessing them for Israel's grand strategic purposes.
After successfully swaying policy-making in Washington in a pro-Israel direction since the second half of the 20th century, Israel’s American lobby has recently turned its attention to Europe.
There are already signs of considerable progress. Several organizations are now spearheading the charge in Brussels and other European capitals. The latest of these initiatives, "Friends of Israel", was launched by the former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar on 31st May 2010.
A salient feature of the operations of the Lobby is to convince the Europeans that certain criticisms of Israel can be regarded as a form of anti-Semitism. It was clear that pro-Israel groups exploit the history of Jewish suffering in Europe to dissuade modern-day politicians from taking robust action against Israeli oppression in Palestine.
The current impact of the Israeli lobby on European foreign policy reflects the symbiotic nature of a relationship born out of political expediency and strategic interests. Not only did the Jewish and Zionist lobbyists exploit the European imperial rivalries, they have also linked support for the creation of Israel to the aspirations and interests of the Europeans during the period 1914-2010.
If the influence of the Israeli lobby is manifested in the policies of the individual European countries, it is even more apparent in the collective policies of the EU. Despite its manifestly poor human rights record the EU in June 2008 undertook to upgrade its with relations Israel; a move which demonstrated markedly how pervasive the influence of the Lobby had become within the EU.
Another striking example of the influence of the Lobby on EU policy was demonstrated in November 2009 when the Union released a draft policy document authored by the Swedish government, which held the presidency at the time, proposing recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. After strong protest by Israel and its front organizations, the EU foreign ministers, one week later issued a statement deleting the earlier reference stating explicitly that East Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian state and instead called for Jerusalem to serve as the capital of both Israel and a future Palestinian state as part of a negotiated peace.
The extent to which EU officials have succumbed to the Lobby was, perhaps, best underscored by Javier Solana, shortly before he stepped down as the EU’s foreign policy chief at a conference convened by Israel’s President Shimon Peres under the title: Facing Tomorrow (Jerusalem, 20-22 October 2009). He said, “There is no country outside the European continent that has this type of relationship that Israel has with the European Union.” He added, “Israel, allow me to say, is a member of the European Union without being a member of the institutions. It’s a member of all the [EU’s] programmes, it participates in all the programmes.” Such groveling attitudes by senior European officials were always translated into policy; making it possible for Israel to become the main external participant in the EU’s “framework programme” for scientific research and for Israeli arms companies to become eligible for the Union’s funding.
While economic and strategic considerations have underpinned EU policies in Palestine it is strikingly clear that ideological factors do also play a major role. Since September 2009, the European Parliament's official delegation to the Knesset has been headed by the Dutch politician Bastiaan Belder who belongs to the Political Reformed Party (known by its Dutch acronym SGP). The party views the foundation of the State of Israel as the fulfilment of a Biblical prophecy.
On the whole, the policies adopted by the EU are in many respects a microcosm of the national policies towards Palestine. Not only have European countries provided political and diplomatic support but they have also intervened militarily at critical junctures in the history at the behest of the Zionists. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it was the French who laid the foundations of Israel’s nuclear programme. If nothing else, it can be safely said that the Lobby has realized Theodor Herzl’s dream in Palestine when he said, “We should there form a portion of a rampart of Europe against Asia...”.
Back to top
The Euro-Palestinian Relations: The European Economic Role
Prof. Dr. Nasr Abdel Karim
The international community has provided a great deal of aid to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the signing of Oslo Accord in 1993, both to help them bear the burden of the prolonged Israeli occupation and to build their own resources to foster sustainable development.
Besides many countries of the world have rushed to initiate and sign Free Trade and Cooperation Agreements with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in an attempt to promote exports of products and services of private businesses. European countries individually and collectively have been a leading economic partner with Palestinians through all interim period.
However, because of the continued Israeli destructive and aggressive measures against Palestinians and their vital resources, neither the billions of dollars in aid nor the trade agreements have resulted in sustainable development or even self-development.
This study provides a comprehensive profile and analysis of the Palestinian-European economic relations in the past fifteen years from the two dimensions: Aid and Trade. It concludes with recommendations on how these relations could be better employed in the strategic interest of Palestinians.
The key findings of the study are summarised as follows:
• International aid disbursements to Palestinians totalled close to US$15000 million over the 1994-2009 period, averaging US$250 per capita on an annual basis. Aid flows increased from an average of US$500 million per year in the period 1994-2000 to an impressive US$1 billion annually since the outbreak of the Second Intifada till 2006, but increased again to more than US$1500 million per annum in the 2007-2009 period. This recent increase came in Support of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008-2010 (PRDP) and in consistence with the Economic Peace Initiative of Netanyahu and Blair.
• The EU countries contributed more than 40% of total aid flows and the United States provided 15%. The share of Arab countries increased from 8% during 1994-2000 to 30% between 2001 and 2009. Other major donors included Norway and Japan as well as international and multilateral organisations.
In the period of 1994-1999: 137 million Euros annually with a focus on infrastructure and capacity building.
In the period of 2000-2005: 250 million Euros annually with a focus on economic recovery, budget support and humanitarian relief.
In the period of 2006-2009: a significant increase in volume (340 m€ in 2006, 550 m€ in 2007, 540 m€ in 2008 and 440 m€ in 2009 ), with a focus on budget support and humanitarian aid, but with some increase in the development assistance.
• The analysis of the sectoral distribution of aid shows that 60% targeted social services and institutional capacity-building of the Palestinian National Authority, 22% was spent on the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and only 9% was directed to the productive and private sectors. The most remarkable change in the direction of foreign aid was the shift in priorities after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, channelling a substantial amount of funding towards emergency aid, job creation and budget support at the expense of long-term development activities.
• Most of the international aid (85%) was given as grants, while the remaining 15% was provided in the form of loans. Moreover, 82% of the assistance was channelled through Palestinian public institutions, 8% through NGOs and 10% through the UNRWA.
• All recent financial EC’s aid is channeled through the PEGASE mechanism. This mechanism builds on Temporary International mechanism (TIM) Experience.
• As to Trade arrangements, the PNA and the EU first established contractual relations in 1997 when the EC and the PLO on behalf of the PA signed the Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation (IAA). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership inaugurated at the 1995 Barcelona conference established a policy with ambitious and long-term objectives. On this basis, the EU-PA Action Plan was adopted in May 2005, for a period of three to five years. The overall security and political context stalled progress in the implementation of the Action Plan during 2006 and the first half of 2007. This changed after the EU resumed normal relations with the Palestinian Authority in June 2007 and re-established political dialogue.
The study concluded that the effectiveness and impact of EU Aid and Trade Facilitation did not fully meet Palestinian aspirations and expectations. Although international aid resulted in some achievements, especially in developing infrastructure, in building capacity of the PNA institutions, and providing basic social services, it failed to empower Palestinian society to attain independence and self-determination and to lay the foundations for sustainable human development. International aid was not able to develop the Palestinian economy, to generate sustainable employment opportunities or to reduce the economy’s vulnerability to and dependence on external factors. The assistance failed to compensate for the losses and damages inflicted on Palestinian society and individuals by Israeli adverse policies and practices. Indeed, international aid may unintentionally have relieved Israeli authorities of their economic and service-related obligations as an occupying power, since it enabled the PNA institutions and NGOs to continue providing basic services to Palestinian citizens. Further, no one may expect that the Palestinian economy can grow and develop without sufficient natural resources, of which land and water represent two key components. The EU, as a community of strong nations including two permanent members of the UN Security Council and as the first trading partner with Israel has, aside from its historical responsibility, a moral responsibility for the resolution of the conflict in the Middle East. So, the EU should play more political role in the ongoing peace process, and stop being a financier of that process only.
Back to top
European-Palestinian Relations: A Critical Analysis of Europe’s role in Reform of the Palestinian Security Services
Ms. Aisling Byrne
This paper will analyse the security-led state-building process being implemented in the West Bank and Europe’s role in this process. While state-building is described as the route to a Palestinian state, what we see is the deconstruction of a state under the guise of counter-terrorism -- fragmented and outsourced. This process is being led by the US, the EU and their Palestinian protégés -- and the ‘peace process’ has and continues to be a clever, yet misleading, cover for their “profoundly political” project. Campaigns ostensibly to re-establish public order have provided the cover to clamp down on political opposition, predominantly Hamas, with the normal components of a state-building project – democratic accountability, parliamentary oversight, popular legitimacy, institutional development, political reconciliation – not only absent, but many intentionally destroyed in one way or another. The paper will argue that the concept of state-building, far from leading to Palestinian state-hood, instead aims to develop a form of normalised occupation and to politically cleanse the West Bank of any opposition in order to stop this solution being challenged. The very foundation of this project seeks to divide the Palestinian people, thereby putting beyond anyone or any group’s reach the ability to find a political solution. The very Palestinian polity which could give legitimacy or acceptance to a political solution is being destroyed – effectively putting a peaceful settlement to the conflict further away.
Back to top
The European Attitudes towards the Palestinian Resistance Movements: The Case of Hamas
Mr. Osama Hamdan
The European Union and most of its countries traditionally consider the Palestinian resistance movements as terrorists, while they acknowledge Israel’s right to defend its security and citizens.
As for the relation between Europe and Hamas, it has evolved through many stages. The first stage was the acquaintance stage in which the Europeans were getting closer to the movement and communicating with it, without any particular stance concerning this relation. In the second stage, the Europeans were hesitant, particularly after the movement was enlisted on the American terrorist list. For Europe, on one hand, wanted to maintain its support for the peace settlement efforts, and on the other, it didn’t want to disregard the US position. Then, after al-Aqsa Intifadah, there was the stage of partial openness, where Europe condemned the Israeli violence after the outbreak of the second Intifadah while maintaining its condemnation to the operations of the Palestinian resistance. In addition, the EU announced in 2001 that both Hamas and the Jihad are terrorist movements and called for the Palestinian Authority to dismantle both movements and arrest their members.
And during that stage European countries made several contacts, mainly the contacts done by the European Commission through Solana's representative of security affairs in the Palestinian territories. The most important thing accomplished by these contacts, was the declaration of the resistance factions of a unilateral truce in May 2003.
Despite the fact that Hamas was enlisted on the European terrorist list, several countries kept their contacts with Hamas. However, after Hamas participation in the municipal elections held in 2005, a confusion appeared in the attitude of the EU in two dimensions: either refusing to contact or communicate with Hamas, or considering it a de facto that must be dealt with.
During the stage that followed the legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2006, the European Union has adopted the Quartet's conditions, In parallel to this, European countries have sought to get Hamas to agree on these conditions to be a political partner, otherwise Hamas should face political and economic blockade. Thus, the economic sanctions stayed imposed on the Palestinian Authority (PA) until the declaration of the Emergency Government in June 2007 by Salam Fayyad. The European Union welcomed this government and declared an end to economic sanctions on the PA. In spite of that, some European countries and members of the EU have developed their contacts and relations with Hamas.
As for lifting the Gaza blockade European stances have varied; Where the European Union has insisted on ending the siege for humanitarian purposes, while the Vice President of the European Parliament said that there must be an intervention to open all of Gaza's borders immediately. Moreover, some countries insisted on applying the Agreement on Movement and Access signed in 2005, while others are still opposed to opening the crossings, even if there is a European participation.
During the recent Israeli aggression on Gaza Strip, the European stances varied between equalizing between the executioner and the victim, and between accusing the resistance and judging it with unfair judgments. Thus, the French presidency of the European Union demanded to halt rocket fire on Israel and Israel’s bombardment of Gaza immediately, while condemning the unequal use of force.While the Czech presidency which came after France for the presidency of the European Union, blamed Hamas for the military escalation, and considered the Israeli actions defensive more than being offensive. After the end of the aggression, the European Union and its countries linked any aid granted to the harmed people and for the reconstruction to the Government of Ramallah.
Back to top
The European Foreign Policy on the Palestinian Issue: The Case of Norway, “Post-Oslo”
Dr. Are John Knudsen and Frode Løvlie
This paper discusses Norwegian foreign policy towards Palestine from the “back-channel talks” leading up to the 1993 Oslo Accords until the present. Disproportionate to its size, Norway has at times played a significant role on the international scene, in particular by facilitating the back-channel talks leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. This disproportionality between size and ambition has been symptomatic for Norway’s post Cold War foreign policy doctrine – a value based doctrine which posits that small states can, and should, play an important role in promoting human rights worldwide. This “potent small state” paradigm was introduced already in the mid 1980s, but it gained prominence and became a de facto part of the Norwegian foreign policy doctrine -- the idealist “policy of involvement” – from the end of the Cold War.
For a small country such as Norway, consistency in foreign policy is essential The failure of the Oslo Accords was a serious blow to Norwegian foreign policy, yet the “policy of involvement” continued to guide Norwegian foreign policy under shifting governments throughout the 1990s and well into the 2000s. Rather than re evaluating the doctrine – and despite failures to mediate and negotiate a lasting peace in a range of conflicts – Norway kept with its “policy of involvement”. Too much financial and political capital had been spent and had been promised, in effect tying Norway’s international image and role with its mediating efforts and as a major donor to Palestine and other countries.
There is at present a “centrist turn” in Norwegian foreign policy and a downplaying of the “policy of involvement” as part and parcel of Norway’s foreign policy. The relative importance assigned to humanitarian aid, peace and reconciliation work has been considerably reduced, as Norwegian foreign policy now is more expressively focused on national security and economic interests. There is also the realisation that a small, but rich state like Norway can not make peace, only bankroll the expenses of key actors and parties. Thus, Norway is still a major donor to Palestine but not a major political player.
Norway and Norwegian diplomats want to play a role, but there is no longer a clear role for a small, unaligned state. Norway had not found a new foreign policy paradigm to replace the aging “small state” one and instead sought to harmonise two very different foreign policy modes – the idealist and the realist – under the label “policy of involvement”.
Back to top
The Israeli Attitude towards the European Role to Settle the Palestinian Issue
Prof. Dr. Nezam Barakat
This study aims to watch and analyze the Israeli position toward the European collective role in settling the Palestinian cause. The study begins with analysis of factors affecting the Israeli position and constitute inputs to this position, such as the historical and geographical environment, the psychological, cultural, social and economic environment, and finally the international and global environment.
It is noted by observers that the European position regarding the settlement of the Palestinian issue is constantly striving to protect the interests of European countries and to ensure political stability in the region.
In general, there are points of convergence between positions of Israel and Europe, such as:
1- The peace process will link the region's economy with the capitalist and Jewish economy.
2-The settlement of the issue will help to stabilize the region and provide Israel a chance to be the core state in the Middle East from one side, and will ensure western interests from the other.
The differences between the two sides:
1- Europe calls for giving a greater role for the United Nations and international legitimacy, while Israel refuses to do so.
2-Israel refuses to give Europe an independent role from United States.
3- Israel demands that the role of Europe does not exceed the economic support
4- Israel has reservations on the European demands for activating international humanitarian law and to condemn Israeli violations of human rights.
Finally, future outlook indicates that the European role in settling the Palestinian issue is retreating, and the American and Israeli pressure will prevent Europe from submitting initiatives for a settlement.
Back to top
The Palestinian and Arab Stances on the European Role in the Settlement of the Palestinian Issue
Prof. Dr. Abd Elfatah al-Rashdan
The European attitude and what Europe might play towards a settlement to the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli conflict enjoys a big interest in the Arabian and Palestinian spheres. The Arabian countries seek to find an active influential European role in the Middle Eastern region. Thus, this study aims at discussing and showing the nature of the Arab Palestinian attitude from the European perspectives and its role in settling the Palestinian issue. These study discovered that there is no united and clear Arabian or Palestinian attitude towards the European role in settling the Palestinian issue the study came up to that the Arabian weakness and the Palestinian divisions reflects in a negative way on the European attitudes towards this issue.
The study concludes that its not possible to release the Arab countries and the Palestinians from their responsibilities towards taking advantage of the European interest in the Arabian region and employ them in a positive way to put pressure on Europe to take bigger responsibility and to have a more effective role in participating in settling the Palestinian issue.
Back to top
The Current Bases for Europe’s Solidarity with Palestine
Dr. Nahla Chahal
The European movement of solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people has finally adopted the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Against Israel (BDS) appeal of the Palestinian civil society launched in 2004.
It took time to do so, because of many considerations related to the European context, but the aggression against the Gaza strip in 2008-2009 flattened these reserves, and drove the European movement to be aware of the need to get a real efficiency.
It is a turn. The European solidarity is now, with BDS, aiming to act in Europe, and not only as a support of the Palestinian struggle when needed (aka: to protest in case of aggressions, or to be backing in the diplomatic debates etc). Adopting BDS means that the European movement won’t be an «external» body with a very limited role concerning the Palestinian struggle anymore, but that it has appropriated itself this issue and made it rooted in Europe (this phenomena is however an international one).
People, on an individual level, as well as institutions, have to take position in their own countries now. The question of Israel’s exceptionality, and its impunity are becoming an issue of conscience, of ethics, rising the question of the kind of world we, all of us, want to live in.
In this view, the Palestinian issue is the concrete example of the difference between a world guided by the law of the jungle, and a world of shared human rules.
Israeli officials say that the BDS movement aims to delegitimize Israel. By saying this, they, in fact, want to play on people’s fear of the ready-to-use accusation of anti-Semitism.
The end of the exceptionality of Israel, which is at stake in this struggle, would open the horizon to a new stage. Indeed, without this exceptionality, Israel would not be able to carry its colonization, and the building of an apartheid system.
For the European movement, the end of colonialism and of segregation doesn’t concern the Palestinians exclusively, but is a general human matter, concerning anyone anywhere directly. That’s why, putting BDS as the core issue now is a strategic choice. The European movement is strongly going in this direction.
Dr. Nahla Chahal
The European movement of solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinian people has finally adopted the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Against Israel (BDS) appeal of the Palestinian civil society launched in 2004.
It took time to do so, because of many considerations related to the European context, but the aggression against the Gaza strip in 2008-2009 flattened these reserves, and drove the European movement to be aware of the need to get a real efficiency.
It is a turn. The European solidarity is now, with BDS, aiming to act in Europe, and not only as a support of the Palestinian struggle when needed (aka: to protest in case of aggressions, or to be backing in the diplomatic debates etc). Adopting BDS means that the European movement won’t be an «external» body with a very limited role concerning the Palestinian struggle anymore, but that it has appropriated itself this issue and made it rooted in Europe (this phenomena is however an international one).
People, on an individual level, as well as institutions, have to take position in their own countries now. The question of Israel’s exceptionality, and its impunity are becoming an issue of conscience, of ethics, rising the question of the kind of world we, all of us, want to live in.
In this view, the Palestinian issue is the concrete example of the difference between a world guided by the law of the jungle, and a world of shared human rules.
Israeli officials say that the BDS movement aims to delegitimize Israel. By saying this, they, in fact, want to play on people’s fear of the ready-to-use accusation of anti-Semitism.
The end of the exceptionality of Israel, which is at stake in this struggle, would open the horizon to a new stage. Indeed, without this exceptionality, Israel would not be able to carry its colonization, and the building of an apartheid system.
For the European movement, the end of colonialism and of segregation doesn’t concern the Palestinians exclusively, but is a general human matter, concerning anyone anywhere directly. That’s why, putting BDS as the core issue now is a strategic choice. The European movement is strongly going in this direction.
Back to top
The Media and Foreign Policy in the European Interaction with the Palestinian Issue: Roles - Phenomena - Attitudes
Houssam Shaker
This paper discuses the nature of the European interaction with the Palestinian issue, on the media and political level. It looks at the roles, phenomena, and attitudes notable on these levels.
First the paper recalls that the European role had been central in the creation of the Palestinian issue and its developments. Next, the paper attempts at figuring out the current European policies towards the Palestinian issue through some of its features, along with a critical discussion.
As for how the European media deals with the Palestinian issue, the paper considers the current situation of European media and its standards and traditions. It examines its experiences and attitudes with regards to its interaction with the Palestinian issue and the related dimensions.
The paper sheds light on primary criteria that characterize the European media's interaction with the Palestinian issue. It also observes some attitudes and phenomena in this interaction, concluding that they both associate with related political positions and contexts.
Taking into consideration the interactive and highly complicated and interrelated relation between media and political levels, the paper argues that it is difficult to isolate or separate the roles of media and politics as influence tools in the case of the European dealing with the Palestinian issue.
Then the paper moves on to exemplify through observation some phenomena and attitudes in the interaction of European media and foreign policy with the Palestinian issue, and how convergent are the two levels. This argument is supported with the fact that it is actually very hard to find a starting point in answering the question of “what affects what?” i.e., on the media and political level. Yet more complicated is the issue of how do the political and media contents related to the Palestinian issue get affected by certain psychological and social factors in the related European context, or by the more general cultural backgrounds and historical experiences within the same context.
The paper notes for example the phenomenon of soft-toned or indirect criticism that characterizes the European political stances in general towards the vast Israeli violations and extremist policies and violent practices. Similarly, this has been the phenomenon in the European media dealings as well. Also among other phenomena considered by the paper: the tendency to "blame the victim," the centrality of the idea of "peace," and the Israeli stance's sticking to the argument of "historical commitment towards the Jews".
The paper alarms that knowing the public attitudes, convictions and ideas through the media could lead us to inaccurate conclusions and assessments, that could even be misleading.
Finally, the paper suggests "anticipated roles" for the European media regarding its interaction with the Palestinian issue, based on the mediatory role of media.
Back to top
The Role of the Arab and Muslim Communities, in Europe, in Affecting the European Foreign Policies Regarding the Palestinian Issue
Prof. Dr. Tariq Ramadan
It is quite important to get a sense of the importance of the Muslim presence in Europe today. We are no longer talking about immigrants but about European citizens. As such they should be involved in all the debates and discussions dealing with domestic and foreign policies. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is of an utmost importance domestically and internationally. The Muslim/Arab European citizens should be much more involved in the policies and decision processes within Europe. It means, in practice, to work at three different levels: First, within the civil societies by informing their fellow citizens and institutions about the reality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Second, they should try to get a voice in the media to spread both another rationale and a new rhetoric to the conflict. Third they should be more involved in the political arenas to push for an alternative positioning of the European countries. We have witnessed over the last decades important change in the European popular “sensitivities” towards the conflict partially due to the presence of these new European citizens. It remains that much more still needs to be done to improve the seemingly scattered European policy.
Back to top
>> Back to the Conference's Main Page
Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations, Beirut, 3/11/2010
|
Font size:
Share on:
|
Email to a friend
Print version
Plain text